The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy

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Becoming Heidegger

On the Trail of his Early Occasional Writings, 1910–1927

edited by

THEODORE KISIEL and
THOMAS SHEEHAN

2nd, revised and expanded edition

NOESIS PRESS, LTD.
SEATTLE
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Frequently Cited Works by Martin Heidegger


GA  Gesamtausgabe [Collected Edition]. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1975–. This abbreviation is followed by the volume number and the page numbers being cited, as in ‘GA 9, 176–81’.


BT  Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1927; 7th ed., 1953; 17th ed., 1993. Pagination of the 7th to the 17th edition will be used in citing this 1927 classic. The two extant English translations under the title of Being and Time—first published respectively in 1962 (Macquarrie and Robinson) and 1997 (Joan Stambaugh)—both give the pagination of Niemeyer’s German edition in the margins.

Frequently Cited Works by Others


**German University Semesters**

- **KNS** (Kriegsnotsemester) (war emergency semester), the “interim semester” from February to mid-April 1919, when Heidegger at war’s end became Husserl’s assistant and taught his breakthrough course on phenomenological philosophy.
- **SS** (Summer semester), which in Heidegger’s time took place typically from May through July.
- **WS** (Winter semester), which typically ran from November through February, with a month off at the Christmas season.
Preface to the Second Edition

The goal of this second edition is the same as that of the first: to provide a relatively complete collection of Heidegger’s occasional writings in English translation and paraphrase from the young Heidegger’s formative years to his breakthrough to his lifelong topic in the lecture course of Kriegsnotesemester (KNS) 1919 to the end of 1927, after the first major explication of that topic in his magnum opus, Being and Time, was published and subjected to its first public reception. All the works that precede KNS 1919, before Heidegger became Heidegger, give us a different Heidegger than the one we have come to know through his later works: the young seminarian writing apologetic essays in defense of the Catholic faith, the newly graduated university instructor dedicated to a “life’s work” in medieval philosophy that would be “equiprimordially” systematic and historical. The one thread that endures out of these earliest works is that of phenomenology, first as a phenomenological logic in 1912 and then as a phenomenology of religious consciousness/life in 1917, which culminates in KNS 1919 with a definition of phenomenological philosophy as the pre-theoretical proto-science of originary experience. Other elements of Heidegger’s distinctive thought soon emerge in his lecture courses and his more extracurricular occasional writings: the formal indication of Existenz as the sense of being of the “I am,” of the self that I myself am in my unique existential situation; the hermeneutics of factic life (double genitive); the hermeneutic situation out of which each generation of philosophers comes to terms with its time; the temporal ontology of Dasein prefigured in statements of self-identification like “I myself am my time” and “We ourselves are history!” At this point, we can break off this progression of Heidegger’s central insights and leave him to continue following his one guiding star, namely, the intimately interrogative Dasein-Sein relationship, in a lifetime of fundamental questioning.

This collection of vitae, reviews, journal articles, talks in a variety of concrete contexts and occasions, philosophically revealing letters, etc. thus constitute the occasional writings composed at various stages in the course of the life of a German academic. Some of the occasions (here usually sketched out in biographical detail) are quite mundane and routine, like the earliest reviews, and some more pressing, like the text written for academic promotion. As Heidegger polished his
rhetorical style and found his unique philosophical voice, he at once developed a
stronger sense of the favorable occasion, the opportune moment, and even the
urgent sense of an existential situation in which to frame his presentations. One
would expect nothing less from a philosopher who dedicated his life to a focus on
Da-Sein, being-here-and-now in its own temporally particular situation and his-
torical context. Not to say that there were not some miscues. But then there is the
Nietzschean meditation on the comprehensive situational meaning of the Great
War in the 1915 article in a local newspaper. This sort of meditation-on-the-
meaning (*Besinnung*) of world-historical events and trends would continue for
the rest of his life, where the old Heidegger, for example, kept up with the latest
developments of technology in the “atomic-cybernetic-space age,” on the basis of
which he cultivated a prescient sense of the essence of modern technology as “syn-
thetic com-posit(ion)ing” (*Ge-Stell*). Such an etymological translation (as opposed
to “enframing”) immediately captures today’s technical realities of artifactual sys-
tems that network the entire globe into global positioning systems, air traffic con-
trol grids, world weather mapping, the CNN network, and the internetted World
Wide Web, all of which are programmed by the composited wholes of the posits
and non-posits of digital logic that was first devised by Leibniz.

The entire collection is situated deliberately at the interface of philosophy
and biography, thought and life, in Heidegger’s terms, the existential-ontological
and the existentiell-ontic. This is very much in keeping with Heidegger’s own
sense of philosophizing, which begins in the primal act of each existing individual
owning up radically to the finite existential and temporal situation in which they
find themselves, and making it their very own. This act of existential self-approp-
riation, in accepting all that is irrevocably and inescapably given in the facticity
of the “I am,” would include certain unalterable characters of a person’s situation
that cannot be denied without “denying who I am,” which may well be “bio-
graphical” in nature. Heidegger illustrates this in his letter to Karl Löwith in Au-
gust 1921 in which he declares that inescapably given in his concrete facticity is
the fact that “I am a Christian theo-logian.” Behind this admission of self-identi-
ity lies an ontic background experience that finds itself deeply embedded in a fac-
ticity of Christian religiosity that came from a (here left unspoken and clearly
ontic) boyhood spent in the still medieval rhythms of Messkirch as the son of the
church sexton, and a former Catholic seminarian who had broken with the reli-
gion of his youth to become a non-denominational “free Christian” and was now
on the verge of proclaiming the atheism of philosophy in close conjunction with
the rigorous fideism of Protestant theology. Thus, Heidegger explains to his two
prize students, Löwith and Oskar Becker, neither one of which, in view of their
own respective facticities (concrete backgrounds), could be expected to accept his
Christian side, where he is in fact coming from (*Herkunft*) and how he is trans-
lating “the inner obligations of my facticity” into necessary tasks and projects, like
the two courses in the phenomenology of religion that he had just completed. When each of them has come to terms with their respective facticities (concrete existential and biographical backgrounds), then they all are in a position, despite their differing philosophical approaches, to come together “in the one way in which humans can be genuinely together: in *Existenz,*” in a philosophical community of individualistic existentialists.

All translations and paraphrases have been thoroughly vetted especially for this second edition.

Theodore Kisiel
Introduction to the First Edition

We see which way the stream of time doth run,
And are enforced from our most quiet there
By the rough torrent of occasion –
– Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part II, Act IV, Scene 1

When Martin Heidegger “reluctantly” (FS, xi) published a collection of his Early Writings (Frühe Schriften, 1972) four years before his death in 1976, he included only the two book-length doctoral dissertations supplemented by the “test lecture” presented at the dissertation defense in July 1915 before the Freiburg Philosophical Faculty which, upon fulfillment of these final requirements, immediately granted him the license to teach at the university level. The posthumous German edition of the Early Writings in 1978 was further supplemented mostly by some short book reviews and a literature overview, so that “the volume now includes, in their entirety, all of the early published writings of Martin Heidegger between 1912 and 1916” (GA 1, 438). This “definitive” supplementation of Heidegger’s earliest philosophical writings itself however soon proved to be short-lived. In his biography of Heidegger in 1988, Hugo Ott first announced the archival discovery of eight hitherto unknown earlier essays, mostly book reviews and literature overviews, from the years 1910–1913, not to speak of an early poem, that the youthful theology student Heidegger had published in the newly founded German Catholic journal aimed against “modernism,” The Academician.1 These newly dis-


Ott in this same chapter of his biography (65–66/63) reports another hitherto unknown review published by Heidegger in 1911 in the Academic Boniface-Correspondence, and in the next chapter publishes the poem that appeared in The Academician under the pseudonym “gg,” “Auf stillen Pfaden” (On Still Paths) (71/68), along with another hitherto unpublished poem from the same period, “Julinacht” (July Night) (72/69). All three have been reprinted in GA 16, 15–17.

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covered essays were quickly translated into English, as were some of the more significant supplements to the first volumes of the *Early Writings*. One goal of the present collection is accordingly to bring together the most philosophically significant of these already translated texts, hitherto scattered in various English-language journals, into a single volume. These extant English translations will in turn be supplemented by translations and paraphrases of hitherto untranslated texts by the early Heidegger that have only recently surfaced in the archives or have otherwise come to light.

The need to supplement the published texts of the early Heidegger does not stop with his student writings. After his graduation to university teaching, Heidegger published nothing whatsoever until his magnum opus, *Being and Time*, first appeared in 1927. This outstanding publication gap has for decades kept the complex academic path toward this major event of twentieth-century philosophy shrouded in obscurity. Only the editorial project launched in 1975 to edit and publish the Marburg lecture courses, belatedly supplemented a decade later by the earlier Freiburg courses, where the partial course manuscripts themselves often have to be editorially supplemented by student transcripts, has begun to lift the veil for interpreters interested in the genesis and development of this great work. But Heidegger himself early on had occasion to observe to his closest students that his course work alone is an insufficient basis for understanding his more original development. Often more revealing were his talks and texts composed for more extracurricular occasions, which his resourceful students usually managed to transcribe in one form or another, and pass on by the clandestine routes of the student “grapevine.” It is thus the case that many of Heidegger’s more incidental works have first surfaced in scattered archives other than the main Heidegger Archive housed in the Deutsches Literaturarchiv at Marbach, and accordingly have first appeared in dispersed venues outside the central pale of Heidegger’s Collected Edition. Such archival discoveries of the past decade or so, gathered together in this volume in English translation or paraphrase, include the discovery in the archive of Josef König in Göttingen of the complete typescript of Heidegger’s *Introduction to a projected treatise on Aristotle as conflicted proto-phenomenologist*, written in October 1922; student protocols of Heidegger’s contributions to Rudolf Bultmann’s seminar on Paul’s Ethics in WS 1923–1924 found in the Marburg University Archives; an auditor’s transcript of Heidegger’s 1924 talk on Aristotle and truth given in the presence of Max Scheler at Cologne, uncovered by Thomas Sheehan in the private archive of an early student, Franz Josef Brecht; the Kassel Lectures of 1925 transcribed solely by Heidegger’s student, Walter Bröcker, later typed by another student, Herbert Marcuse, and thus found in the latter’s archive in Frankfurt; the impromptu talk on truth on Pentecost Monday 1926 recently uncovered in the Helene Weiss Archive at Stanford. A newspaper article from 1915, newly uncovered by Alfred Denker in the archives at Heidegger’s birthplace
of Messkirch, which attempts to deepen the philosophical tone of a three-day religious meditation (Besinnung) on the war, provides a rare early glimpse into the young Heidegger’s reception of Nietzsche as well as into his phenomenological way of meditating on situational meaning that would persist to the end of his life. These and other occasional (jeweilige) works by Heidegger, brought together in English rendition for the very first time in this volume, are further supplemented by the less public occasions of several philosophically significant letters that have been found in Heidegger’s personal correspondence, especially from the decade of publication blackout preceding Being and Time. The relationship between Husserl and Heidegger, so crucial to the history of the “phenomenological movement” of this past century, as reflected in their private correspondence typically transgresses the distinction between the philosophical and the personal, thought and life. As a way of precisely documenting, for the very first time, both the philosophical and interpersonal vicissitudes of this fateful relationship of twentieth-century philosophy, the relevant correspondence of the two has been gathered together in translation for this collection in a major appendix to this volume. The vicissitudes of this philosophical and personal friendship gone awry, brought out through their correspondence to and about each other, in particular illustrates the occasionality (Jeweiligkeit) of this collection of writings, and the need to bring them together and view them in their comprehensive temporal and historical context.

In first presenting his Early Writings in 1972, the old Heidegger felt compelled to supplement them with an autobiographical sketch seeking to convey a sense of the fin-de-siècle “intellectual world that tacitly defined my early essays” during the student years. We have followed suit and done the same for this collection of early occasional works, by way of vitae and self-depictions written on various occasions en route to Being and Time, and beyond; in short, Heidegger on Heidegger “in his own words,” depicting his philosophical situation and the works-in-progress then projected in his current or past “intellectual world” as he saw it “at that time” (jeweils) or recalled it at various stages of his development. One needs only to compare these vitae with the two extant vitae from the later Nazi period (in GA 16, 247, 350) to sense the ominous contrast of the changed circumstances of that particular “intellectual world” in the different biographical parameters that they emphasize and invoke (family lineage, military service). This is perhaps one of the clearest examples in which the sense of situational occasionality (Jeweiligkeit) so central to the experience of “Da-sein,” which this collection of occasional works systematically seek to underscore, promotes a fuller and more complete understanding of the particular text under study. Other clear examples of occasionality

2. FS, ix. A translation of this “autobiographical sketch” is included as a “retrospective vita” in chapter 1 of the present volume, serving to introduce the occasional writings collected in Part I, “Student Years.”
highlighted in this volume include the “Ruhr-Rede” (chapter 17) first drafted in the Weimar Republic’s annum terribilis of 1923, which began with the French occupation of the Ruhr, and the talk on truth on Pentecost Monday 1926, oriented as it is toward the “Spirit of Truth” (chapter 19). The note of Jeweiligkeit so central to “Da-Sein,” being-here-and-now in this particular situation and historical context, throughout Heidegger’s long career of thought is in this volume thus hermeneutically applied to the event of Heidegger “himself” and his “own” occasional writings, as well as their translation.

The proliferation of vitae, correspondence, book reviews, literature surveys, journal articles, newspaper articles, poems published (often pseudonymously) and unpublished, seminar protocols, jeweilige speeches addressed to one or another occasion: These are the varied genres and vehicles which Heidegger from the start took as opportunities to express and apply his burgeoning philosophical insights to one or another occasion of thought, mostly academic but sometimes extracurricular, like his meditation on the war for a hometown audience, and personal, like his poems and the letters that communicate his most current philosophical, religious, and even political convictions. The broad range of vehicles that Heidegger as seminarian, university student, instructor, young intellectual, and thoughtful local boy gratefully acknowledging his provincial roots, his “German facticity,” comes to utilize to “publish” his ideas, both in passing speeches and in somewhat more fixed and permanent scripts, establish a pattern of prolific communication which will persist for the rest of his career, as the most up-to-date comprehensive bibliographies of Heidegger’s entire path of thinking demonstrate. These bibliographical supplementations have long supplanted the deficient earliest bibliographies of Heidegger, like the one appended to the very first encyclopedia article on “Heidegger, Martin” (1928; translated in chapter 22), which names only the Scotus dissertation (1916) and “Being and Time, First Half,” the fragment of the magnum opus published in 1927.

3. Heidegger’s very first “publication,” or first recorded public presentation, was just such a “passing speech” reported in paraphrase in the local newspaper, the Heuberger Volksblatt, September 9, 1909. As “president” of the local Abraham of Saint Claire Club, the 19-year-old seminarian said a few “poetic” words in honor of the hometown hero Abraham and followed up with a report on the controversy between two Catholic journals, where the ultraconservative Giral receives Heidegger’s endorsement over the modernist Hochland.

Soon thereafter, the seminarian Heidegger would publish his very first authored article in the Heuberger Volksblatt 11, no. 133, November 5, 1909, on the occasion of All Souls Day (November 2), entitled “Allerseelenstimmmungen” (All Souls’ Moods). I wish to thank Alfred Denker for calling my attention to this fledgling text, the young Heidegger’s initiation into the print medium.

The present collection of Heidegger’s earliest occasional writings, in English translation and paraphrase, from 1910 to the end of 1927 seeks to supply the most important philosophical documents that fill out the working context in which these major works were written and expose the background of multifarious occasions against which they appear. It aims especially to document, in his own words, the young Heidegger’s shifting philosophical perspectives from his university student years (1909–1915) through the early Freiburg period of first university teaching (1915–1923) to most of the Marburg period of professorial teaching (1923–1928). Especially noteworthy are the recently uncovered documents from 1919 to the first Marburg years that record Heidegger’s initial breakthroughs to his life-long topic. These documents trace his tortuous struggles to find the appropriate language to properly identify this purportedly ineffable topic and the ways and means to effectively communicate it, and thus to “say the unsayable.” It is in this period that the young Heidegger laboriously finds his unique philosophical voice and shapes his inimitable style, thus for the first time truly “becoming Heidegger,” with all the public fame and infamy that have come to be associated with that name and the massive opus to which it is attached.

This triple-phased collocation of development is prefaced, as a first orientation to this early twentieth-century intellectual context and continuing guide for the reader of this collection, by several introductory chronological overviews centered around Heidegger’s academic career from 1909 to 1930: 1) a preliminary background chronology of the young and early Heidegger’s personal and academic life; 2) a complete chronological listing of Heidegger’s university courses and seminars that Heidegger took as a student and taught as an instructor and professor; 3) a complete chronological listing of the extant occasional writings that Heidegger “published” (i.e., presented “publicly” in one forum or another) during this same period, from which the following selective collection is drawn. The appendices in the later part of this volume further supplement this regular rhythm of the academic schedule, punctuated on occasion by extracurricular events—or “by the rough torrent of occasion”—with various statements about Heidegger by his contemporaries and peers, providing translations of the extant academic evaluations of Heidegger by his teachers and his peers at crucial junctures of his career from 1913 to 1928; the correspondence of Husserl and Heidegger from 1914 to 1934; and the “on-the-spot” (jeweilige) evaluation of both Husserl and Heidegger in student parody by Heidegger’s very first habilitation student, Karl Löw. 

The chapter introductions to the individual occasional writings usually specify the details of the occasion and context in which each of them came into being, as well as their particular significance within Heidegger’s overall development. The following more general introduction seeks to bring out the unity and threads of continuity that interlink the chapter selections, along with the signs of discontinuity that announce one or another new direction in Heidegger’s meandering path of thought.
§ 1. Student Years

The curricula vitae 1913 and 1915 as well as the more retrospective “vita” of 1957 (chapter 1) serve to introduce this entire period of early development by Heidegger’s own highlighting of three converging lines of philosophical influence fusing in his work at the time: Aristotelian Scholasticism, Husserlian phenomenology, and neo-Kantian logic of philosophy and the sciences (Rickert, Lask) as it applies to the history of philosophical problems (Windelband). The young Heidegger’s 1915 narrative of his intellectual development concludes with the commitment to a “life’s work” in medieval philosophy that would be “equiprimordially” systematic and historical. More specifically, the young Heidegger projects a research program that would aim to systematize medieval logic and psychology in the light of phenomenology as well as to determine the historical place of the individual medieval thinkers within this systematic whole.

The more literary cast of the student years projected in retrospect by the 1957 “vita” is evident to some degree only in the religiously oriented occasional pieces selected from this period. Heidegger began his public writing career with a few newspaper articles and a series of review articles for the anti-modernist Catholic journal, The Academician. The two articles selected here (chapter 2) show the seminarian Heidegger exercising the art of apologetics in favor of the answers to life’s questions provided by the Catholic worldview in opposition to the modernist cult of personality and aesthetic individualism, while at the same time seeking to “extract the wheat from the chaff” of modern worldviews that would promote and allow for the necessary personal development respective of unique individuals who wish to make these authoritative truths their own, in their own way, according to the dictates of their conscience. Even after the independently minded Heidegger begins to express reservations about the anti-modernist oath mandated for all Catholic academics, he could still promote the Catholic worldview as a meaningful vantage for comprehending and coping with the catastrophic situation of a Germany at war (chapter 5). But the most remarkable feature of this article on the “war-triduum,” with its early reference to Nietzsche, is its early formulation of the phenomenological “method” of meditation (Besinnung) understood as a non-objectifying interrogation and “fathoming of sense” of a comprehensive situation, thus already in the hermeneutical and ontological terms that would repeatedly recur in more and more refined form through Heidegger’s entire career of thought.

The occasional works of a more strictly philosophical nature during the student years cluster around the logical and ontological themes of the two dissertations, and mark the shift from a religious anti-modernism to an overt enthusiasm for the modernist “logic of philosophy,” transcendental and phenomenological, which is gradually being shaped into a more hermeneutical sense of philosophical concept formation. Heidegger’s first two properly philosophical articles both appeared in Catholic journals in 1912. “The Problem of Reality in Modern Philoso-
phy” (chapter 3), expresses the gratitude of Aristotelian-scholastic realism to the pioneering work in cognitive psychology, in part experimental, by Oswald Külpe, whose “critical realism” seeks to separate, from the immanent additions contributed by the cognitive subject, the transcendent moments of “realization” of contents “that force themselves upon us” willy nilly and compel us to affirm their real existence independent of the experiencing subject. Being is thus not merely equivalent to perceived being in the phenomenological context of the intentionality of consciousness. The natural scientist’s spontaneous realism in positing and defining trans-subjective objects, in “realizing” them in their lawful relations articulated in scientific terms, is thus justified within the framework of a transcendental philosophy of intentionality. This form of realism will persist in Heidegger into Being and Time, and beyond, and analogous formulae of “finding oneself put upon and disposed by the world” will be invoked to express the situated finitude of Dasein as well as of its be-ing. The historical-philosophical “Problem of Reality” in what was once thought to be Heidegger’s “Opus One” is thus the first version of the classical “question of being” upon which the young Heidegger felt compelled to focus his attention in great scientific as well as the then current philosophical detail.

Crucial to Külpe’s critical realism is the clear and sharp distinction between acts of consciousness and their contents made by Husserl (and Brentano) in the context of intentionality as a safeguard against the confusions of psychologism. The campaign to exorcise all vestiges of empirically oriented psychologism out of logic is the running theme of Heidegger’s literature survey of “Recent Research in Logic” (chapter 4), which documents the struggles of modern logic at the turn of the century to establish its identity (“What is logic?”) and claim its unique domain. This logical domain is for Heidegger, following Husserl, the domain of sense, perduring meaning, and for the neo-Kantians, following Lotze’s impersonal “It ‘is’ not, rather It holds, validates [gilt],” the domain of validity (Geltung). Thus, Emil Lask’s logic of philosophy, whose domain encompasses the highest categories formed from the matter of thought, whose ambition is to embrace “the totality of the thinkable in its two hemispheres of the entitative and the valid,” provides for Heidegger the very first categorical system sharply focused on something like the “ontological difference” between beings and their meaning, which system he will apply with astonishing insight to the various transcendental categories of being of medieval philosophy in the Scotus dissertation on “categories and meaning.”

Noteworthy also in this 1912 survey of current logical research is Heidegger’s proclivity toward the grammatical fringe phenomena of judgment: the existential judgment, the negative judgment, the question, the exclamatory impersonal sentence, all of which are destined to play central roles in the later Heidegger’s own “grammaontology.” Already in 1915, the young Heidegger had occasion to present a detailed seminar report on one of these puzzling grammatical phenomena, that of the question, which “can be resolved neither purely logically nor purely psycho-
logically” (so in 1912), but rather (by implication) phenomenologically. Presented in Heinrich Rickert’s seminar, the protocol entitled “Question and Judgment” (chapter 6) serves to exhaust the resources of the philosophical logic of both Rickert and Lask and clears the way for Heidegger’s more phenomeno-logical treatment of “the question of be-ing” in its “formal structure” in Being and Time (§ 2).

Heidegger’s test lecture, “The Concept of Time in the Science of History” (chapter 7), constitutes an early, and rare, venture on his part into the philosophy of the sciences, understood by him as a “logical” deliberation on the sense (i.e., a Besinnung)—analyzed into its material what, formal how, and teleological what-for—of their ground concepts or basic categories, which accordingly drives the initially epistemological analysis of a science toward exposure of its correlative ontological implications. The contrast between the concepts of time in physical science as opposed to historical science thus exposes a homogeneous time whose uniformity of continuity is amenable to quantitative determination. Juxtaposed to quantifiable homogeneous time is a qualitatively heterogeneous time amenable to the distribution of unique events and occasions in accord with their historical and “cultural” significance, which inevitably draws attention to those epochal Events that define an entire “time” (age, era, period). It is this latter time of the “historical in its individuality” that the young Heidegger wishes to make central to his own ontologic of philosophical concept formation, as he observes in the task-setting conclusion to his habilitation (chapter 8): “history and its teleological interpretation along the lines of a philosophy of culture must become a meaning-determining element [i.e., a form-differentiating matter, a reality principle] for the category problem.” Heidegger will therefore have more than one occasion, on his way toward Being and Time with its temporal ontology of occasional expressions structured according to a special constellation of “existential” categories, to cite the test lecture as a proto-development of the distinction between the originative time of the unique self and the derivative time of science and the clock. Heidegger’s marginal notes to the test lecture also expose it as a significant step toward his development of the strategy of “formal indication” as a way of accessing and expressing the occasionality of unique historical existence.

The conclusion that supplements the habilitation, with its focus on another classical philosophical problem, “The Problem of Categories” (chapter 8), summarizes much of the work of the student years while amending it with a series of additional tasks projected for the immediate future. The most prescient and perduring are the ontologically oriented tasks for, as the later Heidegger reminds us, the “problem of the categories” is the question of be-ing in logical disguise. The vocabulary of the conclusion is still an epistemological mélange of Scholasticism, neo-Kantianism, and phenomenology, but the occasional terms of “life philosophy,” like vitally immediate life, the world of life experience, the fullness of history and the historical spirit, the living spirit as a pretheoretical and translogical
dimension of sense, the attainment of which would result in a “breakthrough to true actuality and actual truth”: all of these testify to the “metaphysical drive” that is struggling to come through what is admittedly still debilitated by the cognitively intentional structures of a subject standing over against a world of objects. The freshly graduated Heidegger still has a way to traverse before he will achieve his unique breakthrough to true actuality and actual truth.

One of the “vitalistic” tasks proposed in the conclusion would become a pressing priority in the war years, namely, the revitalization of medieval Scholasticism by a restoration of its roots in the full “form of life” of medieval man, whose fundamental intentionality is the relationship of the soul to God, with special attention to be given to the roots of Scholasticism in medieval mysticism. The task had already been set in more hermeneutic terms in the 1915 introduction to the habilitation. In the context of seeking to establish that scholastic psychology already operates with a non-psychologistic sense of intentionality, Heidegger proposes the task of a “phenomenological elaboration of the mystical, moral-theological, and ascetic literature of medieval scholasticism” as a way of entering into its non-psychologistic “vital life” (FS, 147/GA 1, 205). But by 1917, Schleiermacher and other Lutheran spirits are added to the list for religious revival by way of the phenomenological approach, such that the Catholic Middle Ages must now share the spotlight with the spirit of the early Christian communities that evangelical Protestantism takes as its first models. The extended note “On Schleiermacher’s Second Speech, ‘On the Essence of Religion’” (chapter 9), thus constitutes one example of the project of a “Phenomenology of Religious Life” that marks the transition to a new phase of Heidegger’s philosophical development in the postwar years of the early Freiburg period.

§ 2. Early Freiburg Period, 1919–1923

Heidegger returns from military service near the front and back to teaching, now as Husserl’s assistant, his course of the war-emergency semester in early 1919 (KNS 1919). In this inaugural course he quietly announces a new topic for a radical phenomenology fused with a philosophy of life, which he at first calls the historical I (after Dilthey), the situational I (after Jaspers), and soon after, “factic life,” whose fully concrete and radical facticity can only be articulated by a phenomenological hermeneutics. The laborious articulation of this new topic and the equally novel phenomenological method that is designed to gain access to it is by and large carried out in his lecture courses and seminars at the time. But this early period of “publication silence” that would ultimately come to fruition in the ontology of Dasein of Being and Time provides the occasions for two long essays (chapters 13 and 14), left unpublished in their time and notorious for their difficult language and expression in a “lackluster and refractory” style. The in-depth documentation of Heidegger’s breakthrough to his lifelong topic in these two essays is accordingly
supplemented by some prefatory documentation in which Heidegger has occasion to explain his change in orientation and transformation of his “philosophical person” to colleagues and students in less tortuous and somewhat more accessible language (chapters 10–12).

§ 2.1 The Philosophical Person

The personalized vita prepared for Georg Misch in 1922 (chapter 12) details “directions of my current research and teaching” that stand in marked contrast to the “life’s work” in medieval logic and psychology to which the younger Heidegger dedicated himself in the “Curriculum Vitae” of 1915, indicating a sharp departure from the scholastic and neo-Kantian concerns of the student years. Since 1919, the one topic of philosophy for Heidegger had become “factic life” in its manifold phenomenal manifestations, and its philosophical exploration involves a fusion of phenomenology with the life philosophies of the day, especially the hermeneutical version being cultivated by Dilthey and his school. For the self-illuminating comportment of factic life has interpretive exposition (Auslegung) and not intuition as its basic mode of knowing, philosophy is accordingly its explicit phenomenological interpretation (Interpretation), and the logic of philosophical concept formation is hermeneutical. The history of logic understood philosophically as research into the ground categories now reaches back to Aristotle as well as forward to Dilthey’s categories of life taken in its historical particularity. The sense of being of factic life is accordingly historical and worldly in its finite contexts. A fundamental overview of this burgeoning phenomenological ontology of factic historical life is thus incorporated in both of the unpublished manuscripts of this period (chapters 13 and 14), which can be regarded as private communications by Heidegger attempting to orient older peers like Misch and Natorp to the original directions that his unpublished work was then taking.

The 1922 Vita outlines the development of not only Heidegger’s philosophical directions but also of his concomitant religious convictions from his student years. Heidegger’s letter to Engelbert Krebs in early 1919 (chapter 10) communicates a crucial life decision in which the two developments are inextricably interlinked. Heidegger justifies his personal conversion to a “free Christianity” on purely philosophical grounds, as a direct consequence of thinking these grounds through to the end. His arrival at a Christianity “in a new sense” is reached by way of a metaphysics “in a new sense,” an “epistemology” extending to historical knowledge (i.e., a hermeneutics!), and especially his intensive reading since at least 1916 of a plethora of religious works, both classical and modern as well as Catholic and Protestant, along phenomenological lines, which gave him insight into the entire spectrum of Christian life-worlds from primitive Christianity through the medieval to the modern German evangelical household and the modern German Catholic coping with the sense and essence of “modernism.” The philosophical approach to Christianity
is also on display in the 1921 letter to Karl Löwith in which Heidegger reveals his philosophical identity (chapter 11) in “personal” and yet more than ontic statements like “I am a Christian theo-logian,” as one who strives to get to the bottom (logos) of Christian theo-logy, clearly the move of a philosopher of origins, albeit “in a new sense.” For the same letter maintains that “I am not a philosopher” in any traditional sense. The facticity of the “I am” seethes with the uniquely historical life that is Heidegger’s own, and it is out of this unique historical situation of what is “most my own” and toward it that Heidegger would philosophize and meditate on its sense. Such a philosophy makes no claim to scientific objectivity. But as a philosophy that takes its starting point from the facticity of the “I am,” it does stake claim to its own peculiar “objectivity of what matters” (Sachlichkeit and not Objektivität) and is based on a call to each individual to come to radical terms with the respective existential situation in which they happen to find themselves, in order to be able to truly and properly say “I am!?” Thus what truly matters in such a context, as Heidegger puts it to the proto-existentialist Löwith, is “that we understand each other well enough so that each of us is radically devoted to the last to what and how each understands the unum necessarium (“one thing necessary”—namely, our own respective facticity). We may be far apart in “system,” “doctrine,” and “position”—but we are together in the one way in which humans are able to be genuinely together: in Existenz: ergo a philosophical community of individualistic existentialists.

§ 2.2 The Unpublished Essays

In genre far more than an extended book review, “Critical Comments on Karl Jaspers’s Psychology of Worldviews” (chapter 13) deconstructively sifts out certain insights from Jaspers’s book that Heidegger will find conceptually fruitful for his own work, like “limit situation” and “existence.” But Jaspers himself does not develop and pursue the positive and radical direction indicated by the phenomenon of Existenz, life’s movement toward limits and ultimate situations. Jaspers thus squanders the promise of his discovery by lapsing into traditional methods of pure observation and aesthetic objectification in his treatment of the whole of psychic life. Heidegger accordingly presents a sketchy survey of more appropriate methods in the process of applying them to his critique of Jaspers. He begins with the methods of phenomenological critique and historical destruction and how these bear on the “formal indication” of existence as the sense-of-being of the factic experience of the “I am” (the life of the self as a whole). It gradually becomes clear that Heidegger’s main goal in the essay itself, in his running critique of Jaspers’ less than adequate preconception and his own concern for more appropriate methods (“ways” to the matter itself of life), is the conflation of three radical trends in the contemporary philosophy of his day: the trend toward Existenz found in Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Jaspers, phenomenology’s radicalizing tendency toward factic life experience, and the trend in Lebensphilosophie, notably Dilthey’s, toward human
life interpreting itself in unique historical context. Thus, the repeated traditional claim that the “individual is ineffable” is found to be but a consequence of the external “aesthetic” observation of the finished whole of individuality. But the historically situated individual can draw the resources for its hermeneutical articulation directly from the particular “lived” context being transmitted to it, to which phenomenology adds the formal prestruction of a triple-sensed intentionality which is capable of articulating a self in becoming, catching it in the very act of actualizing and temporalizing itself. Heidegger thus projects the possibility of relating a history in its very actualization, without the objectifications that would “still the stream” and breach the continuity of the history that we ourselves are. This early rehearsal of the terms for the matter and method of the return to the immediate factic life of the historically existing self in its full temporality even hints at its being called, in the experience of being fully present to itself while experiencing its world, the experience of “being there,” da sein.

The overt aim of the second, posthumously published, essay stemming from 1922 is to provide an “indication of the hermeneutical situation” in which Heidegger finds himself with his philosophical peers in 1922 that would serve to ground, guide, and justify a planned treatise entitled “Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle” (chapter 14). This introduction to a book on Aristotle in fact becomes a hermeneutics of any research situation in philosophy and a call to each time and generation of philosophers first to come to terms with, to make as transparent as possible, its own inherited and historically situated presuppositional context. For it is on the basis of this pre-given context that each time in fact interprets and interrogates its “living present” as well as its inherited past of philosophy’s history, to the point of deciding what aspects of that past to revive in view of its relevance and continuing questionability for the living present. Heidegger highlights the radical tendency of his time toward factic life in its full temporality and historicality, that is, its full questionability, that governs his own hermeneutical situation (see chapter 13). He accordingly selects the Greek-Christian interpretation of (human) life as the historical thread to be traced back to its original sources in the Greek experience that has become paradigmatic for Western philosophy. While Aristotle himself is ultimately governed by the Parmenidean experience of being as permanent presence, certain texts of this philosopher obsessed by the problem of motion betray a sense of the radical facticity and contingency of the temporal human situation, of “that which can also be otherwise.” These are the Aristotelian texts that are selected for special exegesis in the planned treatise of “Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle.” In the overview of this treatise that follows his introduction to the current hermeneutical situation of interpretation, Heidegger concentrates especially on the Aristotelian account of the five ways in which the human soul arrives at the truth, such that truth is first understood as a temporal process of unconcealing. This brief summary of Nico
machiavellian Ethics VI is Heidegger’s first concentrated account “on the essence of truth,” which will quickly be “repeated” in the ensuing years, on the occasion of two talks (chapters 17 and 19), before it enters into the very fabric of his magnum opus, Being and Time, and its special focus on the being “that can also be otherwise.”

§ 3. The Marburg Period, 1923–1928

Heidegger’s appointment to an associate professorship at Marburg, largely on the strength of the unpublished manuscript introducing his Aristotle interpretations (chapter 14), immediately leads to a close working relationship with the resident theologian, Rudolf Bultmann, and quickly bears fruit in his two-part lecture concluding Bultmann’s seminar on “Paul’s Ethics” in WS 1923–1924 entitled “The Problem of Sin in Luther” (chapter 15). The “Aristotle Introduction” had suggested that the young Luther’s theology is particularly attuned to the factic situation of human life, as opposed to Scholastic theology, and Heidegger’s seminar lecture now provides the depth and detail of Luther’s sense of the radical facticity of sin in the very structure of the human being. (Significantly, Heidegger’s first name for the intrinsic tendency to fall or lapse in the human situation in WS 1921–1922 was ruinance, after ruina, the Latin Bible’s term for the Fall.) Sin and faith are brought together as the two opposing e-motive tendencies of being turned away from or turned toward God. Following Luther, Heidegger regards both as affective habits, where affects are understood ontologically (and not psychologically) as ways of being-in-the-world, as the how of being placed before and so disposed (Wie des Gestellseins) toward things, the world, and God. Heidegger is accordingly applying the burgeoning categories of his own phenomenological ontology of situated Dasein to the clarification of theological problems. His philosophical conclusion is therefore not at all surprising: “Faith can be understood only when sin is understood, and sin is understood only by way of a correct understanding of the be-ing of man itself.”

This burgeoning ontology of Dasein receives its first full, albeit sketchy, public rehearsal in Heidegger’s talk before the Marburg Theological Faculty in July 1924 entitled “The Concept of Time” (chapter 16). Central to the characterization of Da-sein, its most fundamental character in which all others converge, is its je-weiligkeit, such that Da-sein, which is always an “I am,” is in each instantiation its very own “while,” that is, each is its own time. This equation between unique Dasein and its time will play itself out in the course of the lecture in the examination of a series of rhetorical one-liners—I am my future, past, present—clearly patterned after Dilthey-Yorck’s hortatory assertion, “We ourselves are history.” Thus, the basic question of the lecture transforms from “What is time?” to “Who is time?” and the interrogative litany that concludes the lecture, “Are we ourselves time? Am I time? Am I my time?” gives these ontological questions a hortatory edge—to what extent have I/we become my/our time?—and recalls the call to
each generation of philosophers first to come to terms with their own hermeneutical situation as the inescapable route to retrieving past philosophy (chapter 14). That this temporally outstrips the classical exhortation of “Becoming what you [already] are” in a predetermined manner is indicated by the emphasis being placed on becoming futural by way of forerunning one’s own certain but indeterminate “being gone.” It is only by way of this forerunning, which “is nothing other than the proper and singular future of our own particular Da-sein,” that we each instantiate our particular and unique “while” charged with its unprecedented proper possibility. Heidegger concludes by indicating the different sort of individuation involved in historical versus natural time, between the individuation of the proper and unique lifetime and the individuation of common time, which is maintained in the time of the everydayness of the Everyone. It is the classical problem of the difference between the distributive universal of the “each,” ever subject to varying interpretation (je nach dem) according to the individuating context, and the leveling generic universal of the common “all,” which (as Aristotle already noted) be-ing never is.

The talk on truth entitled “Being-There and Being-True According to Aristotle” (chapter 17), scheduled for delivery in six cities in the Rhine-Ruhr region in December 1924 and notably in Cologne in the presence of Max Scheler, bears the subtitle, “Interpretations of Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI,” which suggests that it may have been intended as an opening chapter of the treatise of Aristotle interpretations planned in 1922, and still a viable project for Heidegger in 1924. But the question it raises, the locus of truth, and the movement of the lecture to relocate this locus from the judgment’s correspondence to Dasein’s uncovering to being’s unconcealing, have long been familiar to Heideggerians in the form of the later pivotal lecture first delivered in 1930, “On the Essence of Truth,” of which the earlier “Ruhr-talk” is clearly a first cousin. One striking difference of this earlier talk is its interim relocation of the discussion of truth from judgment to the rhetoric of everyday speech (Rede). On the basis of the duplicitous nature of this speech as at once concealing and unconcealing, Heidegger develops his very first listing of the three modes of the concealment of being. Unconcealment thus becomes a struggle for the appropriate words of a native language as well as the struggle against the concealing speech of sophistry, the chatter and idle talk that pretends to be disclosive and knowing. For the prevalent opinions about beings and matters contained in the “wisdom” of our native language, which constitute the proper arena of rhetoric, themselves contain a partial view and measure of insight into their very being. Such insight must be brought out into the open by way of the comprehensive “dianoetics” especially of pure understanding (σοφία) and circumspective practical insight (φρόνησις), which must accordingly bring the essentially preverbal noetic dimension to which they have access into words. The third mode of un-concealing concealment, the disclosive entry into domains of being of which we have hither-
to been ignorant, is illustrated by Heidegger’s concluding call to the “immense task of creating an ontology of Dasein in contrast to the ontology of the world and the eternal cycles of the heavens” that the Greeks have transmitted to us. But in order to “press forward to a radical ontology of history and the human world,” Heidegger firsts insists on going back to the language of philosophy that we have inherited from the Greeks. He seeks to translate especially what the Greeks had to say about “that which also can be otherwise” as a propaedeutic for the linguistic articulation of the *terra incognita* of a temporal ontology of Dasein in his own native language, understood as the “native ground” (*Bodenständigkeit*) of “truth.”

The title “Being-There and Being-True According to Aristotle” suggests that this is Heidegger’s first attempt, following Aristotle’s statements to the effect that “the soul itself is true” and thus “in a way all things,” to make Dasein the locus of truth by equating Dasein with being-true, or uncovering, the favored term for Dasein’s truth in 1924. But one must wait until *Being and Time* before Heidegger clearly proclaims that “Dasein *is its disclosedness*” (*BT*, 133). In a period in which it is repeatedly asserted that “We ourselves are history” and that “Dasein *is its time*” in each of its instantiations, this new identification clearly raises the question of the connection between time and truth, or “openness,” the later Heidegger’s favored “translation” of Dasein, which Aristotle would have called the “passive/receptive/potential intellect.” A closer look at *Being and Time* reveals that Heidegger in fact equates the “clearing of be-ing” with the unity of temporality (*BT*, 133, 170, 350–51). The temporality (= clearing) of be-ing thus provides the standards for the practical “art” of making (paradigm of Division One) and the protopractical “prudence” of human action (paradigm of Division Two) and so serves as their νοὴς-surrogate in this temporialized framework of the “five ways in which the human soul *is* true.” The most unique feature of this lecture of 1924 is however its location of truth in the speech (*Rede*) in which we already find ourselves situated, in the λόγος which according to Aristotle defines us as human beings and which, in Heidegger’s reading, possesses us as much as we possess it. The speech situation that Dasein is, in the terms of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, is structured by the three modes of persuasion, the three “trusts’ that inspire confidence in the “truth” of the speech: right mood, right understanding, right speech. These become, in Heidegger’s ontological transposition of them into *Being and Time*, the three equiprimordial modes of “being-in” and “being-there” disclosive of the human situation: disposedness, understanding, discursivity. “Dasein *is its disclosedness*” (*BT*, 133) in being properly disposed to its comprehensive situation and projected understandingly (“resolutely open”) in it by an overt articulation of its latent discursivity.5

5. For more on the parallels in this “Ruhr-talk” that find their way into the very structure of *Being and Time*, as well as an in-depth account of the political occasionality of the talk, see Theodore Kisiel, “Situating Rhetorical Politics in Heidegger’s Protopractical On-
At a time when Heidegger had just written his “review” of the recently published correspondence between Wilhelm Dilthey and Graf Yorck von Wartenburg (BT, 397–404) and so was privy to the sudden spate of Dilthey publications at the time, he gives a series of semi-popular lectures for the lay public of Kassel entitled “Wilhelm Dilthey’s Research and the Current Struggle for a Historical World-view” (chapter 18). The lectures constitute a kind of laudatio and expression of his own debt of gratitude to both Dilthey and Yorck, whose basic maxim, “We ourselves are history,” had been recurring in his occasional writings since 1920. In a patient pedagogical manner, Heidegger follows Dilthey’s variegated directions—intellectual historian and biographer, philosopher of the human sciences, philosophical anthropologist, hermeneutical philosopher—in order to determine Dilthey’s most central and innermost tendency. He finds it in his Lebensphilosophie, in its sense of factic life as through and through historical. Dilthey’s most proper question is the question of the sense of historical being. What does it mean to be historical? What actuality is historical in the proper sense? Dilthey already saw that the proper historical reality is the hermeneutical whole of life which is the “human condition,” Da-sein, which is time and history. But Dilthey did not have the philosophical resources to ask the ontological question of the sense of being itself that is implied in such questions. Phenomenology must therefore “repeat” Dilthey’s question of history in order to explicate the being-of the historical and, in a reversal of its initially anti-historical tendency, to make historicity itself its very matter. This leads to the development of the concept of Dasein as a whole, which proves to be time itself, the time of my/your/our temporally particular historical situation in its full uniqueness. If history is the happening that we ourselves are, it is no momentary happening that merely happens to us. It also happens with us and through us, since we are fully there in self-comprehension only in getting ahead of ourselves in a properly historical movement which does not leave the past behind, but in fact uncovers it as our unique past related to our unique future that is living out the past as well as out of it, its heritage. This is best seen in the historical being-with-one-another that Dilthey defines as a generation, a phenomenon essential to human historicity. For the generation precedes as well as lies ahead of the individual, and defines its Dasein as both an individual and communal task. Historically, each of us is not only our selves but also our generation, out of which and toward which we each live, only to be overtaken by a new generation. The goal of historical research oriented to the temporally unique situation of historical Dasein, of its generation, is to cultivate a uniquely original disclosure of the past, to discover in it the proper roots of our existence and to bring them into the present as a vitalizing...
force, thus making the past free and productive for the future. Heidegger’s example for such research is the history of philosophy, as we have already seen more than once (chapters 14 and 17).

Delivered while he was busy drafting the pivotal § 44 of *Being and Time*, “Dasein, Disclosedness, and Truth,” Heidegger’s impromptu talk to a university student group, “On the Essence of Truth,” on Pentecost Monday 1926 (chapter 19) can also be fruitfully compared to the “truth” talk of 1924 (chapter 17). While raising the traditional question of the locus of truth with the intent to take judgment back to its native ground in Dasein, his metaphors vary slightly but significantly in the interim, shifting from truth’s rootedness in its native soil (of a native language! *Bodenständigkeit*) to its domestic domicile where truth is “at home” (*von Haus aus beheimatet*) in the familiarity of the world. But the thematic focus on the essence of truth leads to a focus on truth as a relation, such that the judicative relation of agreement with objects by way of a subject’s (re)cognition is referred back to the original nexus of relations that comes from Dasein’s being-in-the-world in a discovering and disclosive way. The judgment’s being-true is accordingly grounded in Dasein’s being “in the truth” in and through its disclosure of the world’s complex of relations. Being-disclosive is the basic way of Dasein’s be-ing, its original ontological relationship of understanding, its way of relating to the world and at once to itself in its primary comportments. These include not only seeing, hearing, and saying in their broadest sense, but also its originary acting in its unique situation, which involves resolute openness to its tacit demands. This disclosive openness toward its unique situation is in fact its originary action, which constitutes the most proper be-ing of Dasein, the way in which Dasein is especially in the truth. Only because Dasein is uniquely in the truth and in the already uncovered world can it, in its tendency to lose itself and forget itself in favor of the world, also be in untruth, which is taken to be co-original with the factically situated truth of unique Dasein. The notorious statement, “There is truth, it gives truth, only as long as Dasein is” clearly refers to a finite temporal truth in keeping with the facticity of Dasein, and therefore to the co-originality of untruth and error.

The actual appearance of *Being and Time* in late April 1927 coincided with the drafting, by Heidegger’s very first habilitation student, Karl Löwith, of a dissertation that incorporates the very first “critical review” of the book by someone who was intimately familiar with its genesis. The letter exchange between the two on *Being and Time* and the dissertation in August 1927 (chapter 20) thus produces a remarkable survey by Heidegger himself of his own ideational itinerary. De facto, the journey begins with his habilitation on Duns Scotus, the medieval logical magister of individualized “thisness” and the “form” of individuality, and ends in *via* with the ontology of temporally individualized existence in *Being and Time*. The interim is spanned by the radical effort “to go all out after the factic” (e.g., after historically actualizing life, after the unique self “existing” its limit situ-
ations, after factic life experience along phenomenological lines) in order to make facticity itself into the focal problem of a hermeneutical ontology. Heidegger in 1927 thus maintains that “formal indications, critique of the customary doctrine of the a priori, formalization and the like, all of this is still there [in Being and Time] for me even though I do not talk about them now.” Löwith for his part favors investigating the ontic thrust of what Heidegger proudly proclaims to be an ineluctably ontically founded “fundamental ontology,” which Heidegger himself will soon concede to be a necessary task in the face of Scheler’s critique of Being and Time. Appendix III to this volume continues the development of Löwith’s case for an ontic “philosophy of life” by way of translated excerpts from an unpublished “autobiographical” manuscript with its parody of Husserl and Heidegger.

At Husserl’s invitation, Heidegger spends almost a fortnight with the Husserls in Freiburg in early October 1927 serving as a “ghost writer” in the second of four drafts of Husserl’s article on “Phenomenology” for the Encyclopaedia Britannica (chapter 21). Heidegger’s rewriting of the first part on pure (phenomenological) psychology and its object, the “purely psychical,” reflects his long experience with the Husserlian terminology in his seminars and courses on Husserl’s texts, but also betrays his penchant for the fundamentally ontological direction of phenomenology and the history of this ontology, which then infiltrates Husserl’s own account of transcendental phenomenology in the second part of the draft. Their differences over the precise locus of transcendental constitution—transcendental subjectivity versus factic Dasein—only clearly emerge in Heidegger’s “postmortem” of this ultimately stillborn draft, in the form of marginal comments to Husserl’s second part along with two appendices attached to a cover letter mailed to Husserl on October 22 (all translated in chapter 21). This running argument between the two directions of phenomenology—in 1919 it was the rift between the absolute ego and the historical I—thus comes to a full-fledged confrontational climax between its two chief proponents after the appearance of Being and Time, and couched in its terminology. Heidegger now insists that transcendental constitution takes place in a being, the concrete whole of human Dasein, which differs from all intraworldly beings in its being-in-the-world, ex-sistence, transcendence, a mode of being which already in the factic self includes the spontaneous possibility of transcendental constitution of the world and “everything positive” posited in it. What then is the mode of being of Da-sein, the entity that already is the understanding-of-being, if it is nothing positive, posited, substantive and present at hand? This is the basic problem of phenomenology, its question of be-ing, which for Heidegger as well as for Husserl converges with the question of time and of truth.

The question of phenomenology’s “transcendental” ontology had by and large governed Heidegger’s occasional writings since his student years and would come to one final “confrontational climax” on the occasion of the festschrift cele-
boration of Husserl’s seventieth birthday on April 8, 1929 (appendix II). Between the two confrontations, Husserl could write, despite his growing realization of an unbridgeable gulf between himself and his most promising student, a laudation of Heidegger (as the successor to his professorial chair) in which he once more identifies Heidegger’s most unique contribution to the phenomenological movement, namely, the deep grounding of its “systematic” research in “historical” investigations that extend back to ancient philosophy (appendix I; see also appendix II, January 1928). Indeed, the second draft of Husserl’s “Phenomenology” article begins by tracing the roots of transcendental phenomenology (that is, philosophy) back to Parmenides’ statement of “intentionality,” “Thinking and being are the same,” whereas Husserl’s history later in the draft only goes back to Descartes. Thus, Heidegger’s laudation of Husserl on the occasion of his seventieth birthday (appendix II) concludes with a Greek citation from Plato’s letters on “getting back to what matters,” phenomenology’s maxim, and lauds Husserl’s phenomenology not as a movement nor as a method, but for its breakthrough into a “new dimension of philosophizing” and so its opening of a “whole new space of philosophical questioning . . . with a new regard for the concealed powers of the great tradition of Western philosophy.” What then is this new way of philosophizing in its new regard for the old, which is accordingly “equiprimordially” systematic and historical? Drawing on various formulae reiterated in his courses at the time, Heidegger observes that philosophy is not a doctrine nor some already achieved result of the human spirit, but rather the ever ongoing historical “happening of Dasein itself, in freedom [that lets be], from out of its own ground.” The course of WS 1928–1929 concludes by defining transcendental philosophy as a matter of “letting transcendence happen from out of and in its [historical] ground” (GA 27, 395). Heidegger would therefore supplement Husserl’s deeply classical as well as modern sense of philosophizing with a more thoroughgoing historicality whose radicality would become clearly manifest first in the late 1930s.

Our collection concludes with a lexicon article on “Heidegger, Martin” (chapter 22) attributed to Rudolf Bultmann but in fact written by Heidegger himself at Bultmann’s request. The source and expression of the request itself tends to slant Heidegger’s list of motives and influences stemming from his background and education, such that Rickert and Lask stand out for their inclusion and Jaspers for his exclusion. But in the course of reviewing his past, Heidegger slyly announces two newly found projects that will occupy him into the mid-1930s, both connected with the ongoing project of Being and Time in its unpublished second half:

1. Deconstruction of the texts of Kant and German idealism by setting their sense of the “subject” in the context of factic Dasein, such that “the true motives of German idealism come into their own.”

2. Through the example of the task of ontologically founding the ontic science of theology, Heidegger tacitly introduces the larger project of developing a
metontology, a metaphysical ontic of the primal phenomenon of human existence in all of its ontic aspects, ethical, political, practical, technical, artistic. The project remains viable into the Nazi 1930s, moreover in close conjunction with the deconstruction of German idealism.

We thus take leave of Heidegger in late 1927 still very much on his way, underway toward new, unanticipated, and more fateful “world-historical” occasions for his thought.

This concludes our traversal of the earliest stretches of Heidegger’s Denkweg by way of the juxtaposition of a series of extracurricular philosophical occasions that are nevertheless sufficiently connected to reflect a sense of the drama of ideational development of that way of thought against the background of the way of life of a German academic in the early twentieth century. Sufficient detailed documentation has been presented to prompt the reader to ponder the question of the relation between thought and life, philosophy and biography, the existential and the existentiell. Heidegger was proud of the fact that he was the first to explicitly see that every ontology has its ontic founding (chapter 20). What then is the ontic foundation of Heidegger’s ontology? What is the philosophically essential element in Heidegger’s biographical admission, “Ich bin christlicher Theologe” (chapter 11)? At what level does biography interject an element essential to a philosophy, which can no longer be dismissed as merely accidental? In the language of the occasionality of Da-sein, which is in each instantiation mine (yours, ours), where and how, and by what process or event does the unique become a universal, and the common proper?

The problem recurs in Heidegger’s insistence on the co-originality of the systematic and the historical in philosophy, where the historical here is the history that we ourselves uniquely are. For all his voracious reading of the history of philosophy and related fields, Heidegger’s own reading was nevertheless selective, conditioned by his background and upbringing, by his particular “motivations and tendencies,” “thrownness and projection,” not to mention his “fallenness.” In turning Heidegger’s own terms back onto himself, we only wish to heighten the sensibility for the source and ends, the scope and the limits, of that unique vocabulary which Heidegger conjured, flaunting the role imputed to him of “magician of the Black Forest,” while being at once dismissive of the “heideggerianisms” invoked in his name.

In part toward this end, an annotated glossary of German terms has been appended to this collection, which summarizes many of the threads of conceptual development as well as their genesis, like that of Befindlichkeit translating the Greek word for disposition or disposedness, dia-thesis, and generated from a Lutheran word for affective habit, Gestellsein, the hoc of being-pos(ition)ed or -disposed before God and toward the world. The discovery and in-depth study of such correlations of genesis and development are made possible only by bringing together
the most complete and multifaceted collection of “early occasional writings” in the English-speaking world and making it accessible to the beginning student in Heidegger through appropriate introductory materials, while at the same time setting the highest standards of scholarship for the more advanced student.

Needless to say, a detailed index, anathema to the literary executors of the Heidegger Gesamtausgabe, has been provided for the reader seriously interested in tracing these multiple connective threads of development by way of a backward “anal” reading of this volume, or to make more playful connections forward and backward among the various occasional pieces in this collection that may prompt hitherto undiscussed interconnections either of the holistic kind or of the disseminative variety, either mildly supplemental or radically displacing, whichever one may choose to ply.

Theodore Kisiel
Chronological Overview

The following three chronologies are provided as introductory frames of reference to aid the informed reader in situating each of the chapters of occasional writings within a somewhat larger personal and academic context of Heidegger’s development. Our first chronology is a “table” of critical personal, familial, and academic events that serves as an introductory comprehensive overview for the following two more detailed chronologies: a listing of courses and seminars constituting Heidegger’s university education and teaching career up to 1930; and a bibliography of Heidegger’s prolific occasional works from 1909 to 1930. If we superimpose the first chronology onto the second chronology, for example, it becomes evident that the ailing Heidegger in all probability did not attend any of the courses of SS 1911 that are recorded in his “official transcript” at the University of Freiburg, since he was convalescing at his family home in Messkirch at the time. This initial background chronology also outlines the academic and personal contexts of the young Heidegger’s development in sufficient detail to serve to correct some of the erroneous or misleading dates and data presented in the “Zeittafel” (2000) appended to GA 16, 825–26, the most extensive collection of Heidegger’s myriad occasional writings to appear to date, thereby serving to supplement it for the purposes of this collection.

A. Martin Heidegger, 1889–1930

September 26, 1889 First-born of sexton/cooper Friedrich and Johanna Kempf Heidegger, in the town of Messkirch, province of Baden

1895–1903 Attends the public elementary schools in Messkirch, supplemented by tutorials in Latin by the parish priest

1903–1906 Boards at the minor seminary (Konradihaus) while attending the public Heinrich Suso Gymnasium in Constance in preparation for the diocesan priesthood

1906–1909 Boards at the minor seminary while attending the public Berthold Gymnasium in Freiburg
July 13, 1909  
Awarded the highest possible overall grade in his high school baccalaureate examination (Abitur)

September 30 – October 13, 1909  
Trial period at the Jesuit novitiate of Tisis in Feldkirch (Austria) is terminated because of health problems

November 5, 1909  
Publishes his very first article in the hometown newspaper, the Heuberger Volksblatt, thereby launching an extensive and prolific publishing career early on that is often hidden by the commonplace obscurity of the occasion

WS 1909–1910 to SS 1911  
Seminary student of theology and philosophy at the University of Freiburg

February 16, 1911  
Seminary doctor sends the exhausted Heidegger home for rest and convalescence from a heart-and-nerve disorder. During this convalescence extending through the summer of 1911, Heidegger makes plans to leave the major seminary and to redirect his university studies.

WS 1911–1912 to SS 1913  
Supplementing his concentration on philosophy, Heidegger studies the natural sciences, mathematics, and the humanities at the University of Freiburg.

July 26, 1913  
Awarded a doctorate of philosophy summa cum laude with a dissertation under Arthur Schneider’s direction

October 10–15, 1914; August 18, 1915 to November 16, 1918  
Military service: discharged from active duty in the army on two occasions because of heart trouble; November 1915 placed on reserve and assigned to censorship duties at the Freiburg post office; January to August 1918 military training for the infantry (Heuberg) and meteorological service (Berlin-Charlottenburg); late August to mid-November 1918 assigned to active duty at a weather station near the front at Verdun.

July 27, 1915  
Achieves habilitation and the license to teach with a dissertation under Heinrich Rickert’s direction

WS 1915–1916  
Begins his teaching career as an instructor at the University of Freiburg with a historical course on the “Basic Trends of Ancient and Scholastic Philosophy”

March 21, 1917  
Marries Elfride Petri in a Catholic ceremony at the Freiburg University Chapel; a week later married in a Protestant ceremony in the presence of the Petri family in Mannheim

January 9, 1919  
Informs Father Engelbert Krebs of his personal change of confession to a “free Christianity”

January 21, 1919  
A son, Jörg, is born
February 7, 1919  Opening day of teaching, as Edmund Husserl's assistant, his groundbreaking course in the extraordinary war-emergency semester (Kriegsnote 1919; until mid-April).

August 20, 1920  A son, Hermann, is born

October 1923  Begins tenure as associate professor of philosophy “with the rights and privileges of a full professor” at the University of Marburg.

Mid-April 1927  First copies of his opus magnum, Sein und Zeit, appear in print. Heidegger's fame begins to escalate exponentially.

October 1927  Promotion to professor of philosophy at Marburg, assuming the chair formerly held by Paul Natorp and Hermann Cohen

October 1928  Assumes the chair vacated by Husserl at Freiburg

May 10, 1930  Refuses the offer of the Ernst Troeltsch chair at Berlin, the same chair that was offered to Husserl in 1923.

B. Heidegger’s University Education and Teaching, 1909–1930

Composed and edited by Theodore Kisiel. Revised and updated version of “Heidegger’s Lehrveranstaltungen, 1915–1930 (German–English),” first published as appendix B to Kisiel, Genesis, 461–76, heavily annotated on 551–62. Especially for this collection, it has been supplemented by the Lehrplan (curriculum) that Heidegger as Lehrling (student) followed at the University of Freiburg from 1909 through 1915, as reported by Bernhard Casper, “Martin Heidegger und die Theologische Fakultät Freiburg 1901–1923,” Freiburger Diözesan-Archiv 100 (1980), 534–41. This official “course of instruction” drawn from the matriculation records at the University of Freiburg has been translated and supplemented by a running account and some useful annotations that are herein adapted, by Sheehan, “Heidegger’s Lehrjahre,” 90–107. Titles of courses and seminars probably audited by Heidegger as well as other data, such as the biographies of some of his teachers, have been drawn from course catalogs and other records in the archives of the Freiburger Universitätbibliothek.1

1. Sheehan, in “Heidegger’s Lehrjahre,” 90–107, in translating the student Heidegger’s curriculum of instruction, also annotates it with brief biographies of many of Heidegger’s teachers, which we present here in distilled and supplemented form in the order in which the names first appear:

Rev. Julius Mayer (1857–1926), Catholic theologian, author (in German) of History of the Benedictine Abbey at St. Peter in the Schwarzwald (1893), Christian Asceticism (1894), Albon Stolz’s Sermons: Edited from his Literary Estate for his Hundredth Birthday (1908), all published by Herder in Freiburg.

Rev. Gottfried Hoberg (1857–1924), Old Testament exegete who taught at Freiburg
The listing below of Heidegger’s teaching career follows the format first established in William J. Richardson, S.J., *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963), in the “Verzeichnis der Vorlesungen und Übungen von Martin Heidegger” [Catalogue of Martin Heidegger’s Lecture Courses and Seminars], 663–71, which was annotated and approved by Heidegger himself and later used as the sole basis for Division Two (the lecture courses) of the Heidegger *Gesamtausgabe* (1975–) until some of its factual errors, especially in Heidegger’s early years of teaching, became manifest. Our corrected list, supplemented by Heidegger’s extracurricular lectures on and off campus, stops with 1930, Richardson’s list continues from 1930 to Heidegger’s retirement in WS 1957–1958 (667–71); except for the time around the rectorate 1933–1934, this continuation is by and large factually accurate.

From 1890 to 1919, advisor to the Pontifical Biblical Commission on the Pentateuch, his specialty. His books (in German by Herder) include *Genesis Explained in its Literal Sense* (1899), *Moses and the Pentateuch* (1905), *Exegetical Handbook to the Pentateuch, with Hebrew and Latin text* (1908 ff).


Rev. Georg Pfeilschifter (1870–1936), 1903–1917 professor of church history at Freiburg, thereafter at Munich where he founded the *Deutsche Akademie* (1925).


Rev. Emil Göller (1874–1933), church historian, 1909 associate professor at Freiburg, 1917–1933 professor of church history and canon law, publications on the history and finances of the Roman Curia. In the eulogy of one rector-designate for a former rector in May 1933, Heidegger extols Prelate Göller as an “ever enthusiastic teacher and tireless researcher” who was “always ready to help students through his work with granting agencies and scholarship committees” (*GA* 16, 90).
Georg von Below (1858–1927), 1905–1924 professor of medieval history at Freiburg, specializing in the economy and state constitutions. Since 1917 co-editor, with H. Stuart Chamberlain, of *Deutschlands Erneuerung: Monatschrift für das deutsche Volk* [Germany’s Renewal: Magazine for the German People], outlet for the “Fatherland Party” with its expansionist campaign for a Greater Germany in central Europe.

Rev. Joseph Sauer (1872–1949), archeologist and historian of ecclesiastical art, student of church historian Franz Xavier Fras at Freiburg, 1902 habilitation under Pfeilschifter and instructor in church history, 1905 associate professor teaching the history of mysticism and scholasticism, of Christian art and literature, and of theological science in the middle ages. Editor of *Literarische Rundschau für das katholische Deutschland* at a time when the young Heidegger published his literature survey on logic (1912) and some book reviews in it. Heidegger would give Sauer a dedicated copy of his Scotus book in 1916.

Heinrich Finke (1855–1938), from 1899 holder of the Catholic chair for history at Freiburg, as power broker in the Philosophical Faculty promoted Dr. Heidegger for the confessional chair in Christian philosophy vacated by Schneider in 1913 by influencing him to choose a historical topic for his habilitation, but then abandoned Heidegger in the final vote of 1916. In 1924 he became president of the Görres-Gesellschaft. Finke remained a power to be reckoned with in Freiburg, and Heidegger would send him a dedicated copy of *Sein und Zeit* in 1927.

Lothar Heffter, Heidegger’s teacher of mathematics for three semesters who would take Heidegger beyond exercises into a deep philosophical interest in mathematical theory; he therefore became a co-examiner in “cand. Math.” Heidegger’s final doctoral examination in 1913.


Heinrich Rickert (1863–1936), with Wilhelm Windelband founder of the Southwest German School of neo-Kantianism, 1894–1916 professor of philosophy at Freiburg, where he directed Heidegger’s habilitation.

Richard Reitzenstein (1861–1931), professor of classical philology at Freiburg from 1911 to 1914, is best known for his book on the history of religions, *Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen* (1910), to which the young Heidegger will occasionally refer in his own research in this field.

Eduard Schwartz (1858–1940), professor of classical philology at Freiburg from 1909 to 1913, where his courses and seminars ranged from Hesiod and Homer to Tacitus and Cicero. In addition to his single venture into the Greek New Testament—the Gospel of John in WS 1912–1913—Heidegger may also have sampled Schwartz’s course of SS 1912 on Sophocles’ *Oedipus Rex*.

Wilhelm Vöge (1868–1952) was professor of art history at Freiburg from 1909 to 1916, when a serious nervous illness forced him into early retirement. Heidegger appears to have audited more than one course by Vöge: in later years, about the time of Vöge’s death, he recalled to his students (e.g., Hartmut Buchner) the powerful effect that Vöge’s slow, deliberate, and clear style of lecturing had upon him, which he himself would adopt in his own teaching. See chapter 1 for a more complete biography of Vöge.
Heidegger’s Student Courses and Teaching Activities, 1909–1930

University of Freiburg

Curriculum of Courses as a Student of Catholic Theology

WS 1909–1910
J. Mayer 1 Encyclopedia of Theological Sciences, 2hr. 2
G. Hoberg 1 Introduction to the Sacred Scriptures of the Old Testament, 4hr.
S. Weber 1 Explication of Paul’s Letter to the Romans, 4hr.
G. Pfeilschifter 1 General History of the Church, Part I, with particular regard to the post-Nicene period, 4hr.
H. Straubinger 1 Theory of Religion, 3hr.
J. Uebinger 1 Logic, 4hr.

SS 1910
Hoberg Messianic Prophecies, 3hr.
Hoberg Hermeneutics with a History of Exegesis, 2hr.
Weber Introduction to the Sacred Writings of the New Testament, 4hr.
Pfeilschifter General History of the Church, Part II, with particular regard to the 16th century, 6hr.
Straubinger Theory of Revelation and the Church, 3hr.
Uebinger Metaphysics, 4hr.

WS 1910–1911
C. Braig 1 Introduction to Catholic Dogmatics: The Doctrine of God, 4hr.
Weber Explication of the Holy Gospel according to John, 4hr.
Mayer General Moral Theology, Parts I–III, 3hr.
Mayer The Doctrine of Property, 1hr.
E. Göller 1 Catholic Canon Law, Part I: Introduction, Sources, and Constitution, 4hr.
Pfeilschifter General History of the Church, Part III: The Age of the Enlightenment, 1hr.

2. We are following the abbreviations of Casper’s list, who follows the Freiburg university catalogs, throughout this chronology:
   2st. = zweistündig = 2hr. = two-hour course
   WS = Winter Semester
   SS = Summer Semester

In addition to this listing of courses in which he was officially enrolled, Heidegger at times alludes to a “greater number of lecture courses in philosophy” that he felt free to audit from
Heideggers Lehrveranstaltungen, 1909–1930

Albert-Ludwigs-Universität zu Freiburg

Lehrplan seiner Vorlesungen als Student der katholischen Theologie

WS 1909–1910

J. Mayer  Enzyklopädie der theologischen Wissenschaften, 2st.²
G. Hoberg  Einleitung in die heiligen Schriften des Alten Testaments, 4st.
S. Weber  Erklärung des Briefes Pauli an die Römer, 4st.
G. Pfeilschifter  Allgemeine Kirchengeschichte, I. Teil, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der nachnicänischen Zeit, 4st.
H. Straubinger  Theorie der Religion, 3st.
J. Uebinger  Logik, 4st.

SS 1910

Hoberg  Messianische Weissagungen, 3st.
Hoberg  Hermeneutik mit Geschichte der Exegese, 2st.
Weber  Einleitung in die hl. Schriften des NT, 4st.
Pfeilschifter  Allgemeine Kirchengeschichte, II. Teil, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des XVI. Jahrhunderts, 6st.
Straubinger  Theorie der Offenbarung und der Kirche, 3st.
Uebinger  Metaphysik, 4st.

WS 1910–1911

C. Braig  Einleitung in die katholische Dogmatik: Gotteslehre, 4st.
Weber  Erklärung des heiligen Evangeliums nach Johannes, 4st.
Mayer  Allgemeine Moraltheologie, I.–III. Teil, 3st.
Mayer  Die Lehre vom Eigentum, 1st.
E. Göller  Katholisches Kirchenrecht, I. Teil: Einleitung, Quellen und Verfassung, 4st.
Pfeilschifter  Allgemeine Kirchengeschichte, III. Teil, das Zeitalter der Aufklärung, 1st.

1911 on. In a letter to Misch in 1922 (chapter 12), he specifically mentions attending the courses of two classical philologists then at Freiburg, Richard Reitzenstein on the Hellenic mystery religions and Eduard Schwartz on the Gospel of John. The exact title of these two courses audited in 1912–1913, drawn from the Freiburg university catalogues, are placed in square brackets above. All of the courses and seminars listed after Heidegger received his doctorate in SS 1913 are audited courses, that is, Heidegger did not officially enroll in them.
G. von Below
History of the German Constitution from the 16th Century to the Present, 4hr.
J. Sauer
History of Medieval Mysticism, 2hr.

SS 1911
Braig
Theological Cosmology: Creation, Preservation, and Governance of the World, 4hr.
Mayer
Special Moral Theology, Parts I and II, 4hr.
Sauer
The Christian Art of the 19th Century and the Present, 1hr.
H. Finke
The Age of the Renaissance (History of the Late Middle Ages), 4hr.

Curriculum of Courses as a Student of Philosophy, Mathematics and the Natural Sciences

WS 1911–1912
L. Heffter
Analytic Geometry of Space, 1hr.
Exercises in Analytic Geometry, 1hr.
Alfred Loewy
Differential Calculus, 1hr.
Exercises in Differential Calculus, 1hr.
Wilhelm Himstedt
Experimental Physics, 2hr.
Ludwig Gatterman
Experimental Inorganic Chemistry, 5hr.
A. Schneider
Logic and Epistemology, 4hr.
Schneider
Seminar: Spinoza’s Ethics

SS 1912
Heffter
Algebraic Analysis, 3hr.
Exercises in Analysis, 1hr.
Loewy
Integral Calculus, 4hr.
Exercises in Integral Calculus, 1hr.
Himstedt
Experimental Physics, 5hr.
H. Rickert
Introduction to Epistemology and Metaphysics, 2hr.
Rickert
Seminar: Epistemological Exercises in the Doctrine of Judgment
[R. Reitzenstein
Religious Life at the End of Antiquity, 1hr.]

WS 1912–1913
Heffter
Advanced Algebra, 4hr.
Loewy
Theory of Differential Equations, 4hr.
Schneider
General History of Philosophy, 4hr.
G. von Below  Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte vom 16. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart, 4st.
J. Sauer  Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Mystik, 2st.

SS 1911
Braig  Theologische Kosmologie: Erschaffung, Erhaltung, Regierung der Welt, 4st.
Mayer  Spezielle Moraltheologie, I. und II. Teil, 4st.
H. Finke  Das Zeitalter der Renaissance (Geschichte des späteren Mittelalters), 4st.

Lehrplan seiner Vorlesungen als Student der Philosophie, Mathematik und Naturwissenschaften

WS 1911–1912
Lothar Heffter  Analytische Geometrie des Raumes, 1st.
              Übungen zur analytischen Geometrie, 1st.
Alfred Loewy  Differentialrechnung, 4st.
              Übungen zur Differentialrechnung, 1st.
Wilhelm Himstedt  Experimentalphysik, 2st.
Ludwig Gatterman  Anorganische Experimentalchemie, 5st.
A. Schneider  Logik und Erkenntnistheorie, 4st.
A. Schneider  Seminar: Spinoza, Ethik

SS 1912
Heffter  Algebraische Analysis, 3st.
         Übungen zur Analysis, 1st.
Loewy  Integralrechnung, 4st.
        Übungen zur Integralrechnung, 1st.
Himstedt  Experimentalphysik, 5st.
H. Rickert  Einführung in die Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik, 2st.
Rickert  Seminar: Erkenntnistheoretische Übungen zur Urteilslehre
[R. Reitzenstein  Religiöses Leben im ausgehenden Altertum, 1st.]

WS 1912–1913
Heffter  Höhere Algebra, 4st.
Loewy  Theorie der Differentialgleichungen, 4st.
Schneider  Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie, 4st.
Schneider  Seminar in Problems of Knowledge
Rickert  Seminar on the Theory of the Subject
[E. Schwartz]  On the Fourth Gospel and the Question of John, 1 hr.

SS 1913
Finke  The Age of the Renaissance (History of the Late Middle Ages), 4 hr.
Rickert  Logic (Foundation of Theoretical Philosophy), 4 hr.
Rickert  Seminar on Metaphysics in Conjunction with the Writings of H. Bergson

July 1913
Schneider  Dissertation: The Doctrine of Judgment in [Psychologism: A Critical and Positive Contribution to Logic (GA 1)]
(Director)

July 26, 1913
Final doctoral exam—tested by
Schneider  in Philosophy (major)
Heffter  in Mathematics (minor)
Finke  in Medieval History (minor)

July 26, 1913
Graduation  Philosophical Faculty awards Heidegger the Doctorate in Philosophy summa cum laude.

August 20  Application
September 29  Granted
Schaezler grant  On the expectation that the applicant “would remain true to the spirit of Thomistic philosophy”
1913–1914

3. Schneider’s evaluation of the doctoral dissertation, dated July 10, 1913, and Rickert’s evaluation of the habilitation work, dated 19 July 1915, are to be found in English translation in appendix I of this volume.

4. For a detailed account of the procedures and organization of this final examination, the last formal requirement leading to the doctorate, see Sheehan, “Heidegger’s Lehrjahre,” 105–7. It is significant that Heidegger signs his letters as “Candidatus mathematicus” at this time, when one of his projected topics for habilitation was still “The Logical Essence of the Concept of Number.” Having finished a more historical habilitation in July 1915 with his work on Duns Scotus, Heidegger still proposes “The Concept of Number” as a third choice of a topic for the trial lecture.

5. This grant from a Catholic foundation, upon the recommendation of Schneider who was thereby grooming Heidegger to become his successor in the Catholic chair for
Schneider | Übungen über Erkenntnisprobleme
Rickert | Seminar: Übungen zur Subjektslehre
[E. Schwartz | Über das 4. Evangelium und die johanneische Frage, 1st.]

SS 1913

Finke | Das Zeitalter der Renaissance (Geschichte des späteren Mittelalters), 4st.
Rickert | Logik (Grundlage der theoretischen Philosophie), 4st.
Rickert | Seminar: Übungen über Metaphysik im Anschluss an die Schriften von H. Bergson

Juli 1913

Schneider | Dissertation: Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus. Ein kritisch-positiver Beitrag zur Logik [GA 1]

26. Juli 1913

Rigorosum – geprüft durch
Schneider | im Hauptfach Philosophie
Heffter | im Nebenfach Mathematik
Finke | im Nebenfach Mittlerergeschichte

26. Juli 1913

Promovierung | Philosophische Fakultät promoviert Heidegger zum Doktorat in Philosophie mit dem Prädikat summa cum laude.

20. August beantragt
29. September bewilligt

Schaezlersches Auf der Erwartung, dass der Antragsteller “dem Geist der thomistischen Philosophie getreu bleiben wird”
Stipendium | 1913–1914

philosophy at Freiburg, was renewed for two additional years and thus was crucial in sustaining the impoverished Heidegger throughout the habilitation period. It was also extraordinary, since the Schaezler grant was normally reserved for theologians and priests. In his initial application, Heidegger promises “to dedicate himself to the study of Christian philosophy and to pursue an academic career.” In the 1914 application, Heidegger notes that the renewal will “enable the last step in the course of the service of research and teaching Christian Scholastic philosophy and the Catholic worldview.” In the re-application of 1915, he notes that “his scientific lifework is oriented toward making the wealth of ideas inherited from Scholasticism applicable to the intellectual struggle of the future over the Christian and Catholic ideal of life.” To this end he is seeking financial support not only for the publication of his habilitation work but also “a nearly finished investigation on the logic and psychology of high Scholasticism.” For a fuller account of the provincial politics sur-
1913–1915
Finke, Rickert  Heidegger’s participation in their advanced seminars on historical and logical method in preparation for his habilitation work. 6

WS 1913–1914
Finke  The Causes of the Reformation, 4hr.
Finke  History of the Medieval Worldview and its Spiritual Culture, 4hr. Advanced Seminar in Conjunction with the Lecture Courses
Rickert  German Philosophy from Kant to Nietzsche (Historical Introduction to the Problems of the Present), 4hr.
Rickert  Seminar in the Philosophy of History (Methodology of the Cultural Sciences)

SS 1914
Finke  Introduction to the Study of History, 4hr.
Finke  History of the German Church Constitution, 2hr. Advanced Seminar in Conjunction with the Lecture Courses
Rickert  Seminar in Epistemology
Wm. Vöge  The Gothic: Its Connection with the Roman Schools, its Essence, and its Development in France, 4hr.

WS 1914–1915
Finke  Political History of the Middle Ages in Overview, 4hr.
Finke  Record of the Sources, with Particular Regard to Germany from the 6th Century to the Thirty-years War, 3hr.
Finke  Advanced Seminar in Conjunction with the Lecture Courses
Rickert  Seminar on Philosophical Systematics in Conjunction with Hegel

SS 1915
Rickert  Seminar (Lotze’s Logic)

6. On the documentation placing Heidegger in these seminars, see Sheehan, “Heidegger’s Lehrjahre,” 111–13. The extant letters to Rickert in 1913–1915, in which Heidegger discusses the various reports he is to present in Rickert’s seminars on the “logic of history,” serve the same end. These include a possible talk on Augustine, which was withdrawn because it did not fit into the seminar context, and a submitted outline entitled rounding this period of grant-getting and the potential duplicity of such statements of intention, see Ott 1986, “Der Habilitand Martin Heidegger und das von Schaezler’sche Stipendium,” Freiburger Diözesan-Archiv 106 (1986); and Ott, Heidegger, 78–84/76–82. See also “Heidegger’s Lehrjahre,” 107–12.
1913–1915
Finke, Rickert Heideggers Teilnahme in ihren Seminaren über historisch und logische Methoden in Vorbereitung für seine Habilitationsarbeit.  

WS 1913–1914
Finke Die Ursachen der Reformation, 4st.
Finke Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Weltanschauung und geistigen Kultur, 4st. Übungen für Fortgeschrittene im Anschluss an die Vorlesungen
Rickert Die deutsche Philosophie von Kant bis Nietzsche (historische Einführung in die Probleme der Gegenwart), 4st.
Rickert Seminar: Übungen zur Geschichtsphilosophie (Methodenlehre der Kulturwissenschaften)

SS 1914
Finke Einführung in das Studium der Geschichte, 4st.
Finke Geschichte der deutschen Kirchenverfassung, 2st. Übungen für Fortgeschrittene im Anschluss an die Vorlesungen
Rickert Seminar: Übungen zur Erkenntnistheorie
Wm. Vöge Die Gotik, ihr Zusammenhang mit den romanischen Schulen, ihr Wesen und ihre Entwicklung im Frankreich, 4st.

WS 1914–1915
Finke Politische Geschichte des Mittelalters im Überblick, 4st.
Finke Quellenkunde, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung Deutschlands vom 6. Jhr. bis zum dreissigjährigen Krieg, 3st.
Finke Übungen für Fortgeschrittene im Anschluss an die Vorlesungen
Rickert Seminar: Übungen zur philosophischen Systematik im Anschluss an Hegel

SS 1915
Rickert Seminar: Übungen (Lotzes Logik)

“Toward the Attempted Lifting [Aufhebung] of the Limits of Concept Formation in the Natural Sciences.” I am indebted to Alfred Denker for the exact titles of Rickert’s seminars that Heidegger attended in 1912–1915. The titles of Finke’s courses and their parallel seminars in 1913–1915 are drawn from the pertinent university catalogs archived in Freiburg.
July 1915
Rickert (Director)\textsuperscript{3} Habilitation: The Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus [GA 1]

July 10, 1915
lecture Question and Judgment (in Rickert’s seminar)\textsuperscript{7}

July 27, 1915
test lecture The Concept of Time in the Science of History [GA 1]

July 27, 1915
habilitation Philosophical Faculty grants Heidegger the license to teach in philosophy.\textsuperscript{8}

\textbf{Beginning of Teaching as Instructor}

\textbf{WS 1915–1916}
lecture-course The Basic Trends of Ancient and Scholastic Philosophy, 2hr.\textsuperscript{9}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{7} This student seminar-lecture has been published in Martin Heidegger and Heinrich Rickert, \textit{Brie\ss\ German Nachlass und andere Dokumente}, ed. Alfred Denker (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2002), 80–90. An English paraphrase of this lecture is in chapter 6 of this volume. At about the same time in 1915, “the logical problem of the question” is listed as a second choice of topic for the test lecture. The topic is mentioned in the 1912 overview on logic (chapter 4) and a nearly finished “essay on the question” is mentioned in Heidegger’s letter to Engelbert Krebs on July 14, 1914 (see appendix II). A letter to Rickert on July 3, 1914, suggests that the issue is joined in their differing interpretations of Lask’s books: “The basic idea of my position dawned on me with the problem of the question, which I would soon like to treat in an extended essay in which I would ask: What sort of ‘being’ does the ‘sense’ of a question have? Certainly not validity. But what stands outside validity if not the false? In the end not even that; perhaps something ‘in between’?” (Heidegger and Rickert, \textit{Brie\ss\ English Nachlass}, 19).
\item \textsuperscript{8} Thus, on the same day that Heidegger presented his test lecture, “Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft” (FS, 355–75; English translation in chapter 7 of this collection), as the final formal requirement in the habilitation process, the Philosophical Faculty addresses a letter to the Academic Senate requesting that the \textit{venia legendi} (the license to teach in the German university system) be granted to Heidegger. The text of the formal letter is to be found in both German and English in Sheehan, “Heidegger’s \textit{Lehrjahre},” 77–137, esp. 81 and 120–21 n. 11. On August 5, 1915, the formal machinery of granting is concluded and Heidegger officially becomes a \textit{Privatdozent} (instructor) at Freiburg.
\item \textsuperscript{9} Sheehan (“Heidegger’s \textit{Lehrjahre},” 82 and nn. 15 and 17) has pulled the various strands of evidence together regarding the title of this very first university course taught by Heidegger. Out of the record of the time, two witnesses (Heinrich Finke and Elfride Petri
Juli 1915
Rickert (Direktor)\(^3\) Habilitation: Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus \([GA 1]\)

10. Juli 1915
Vortrag Frage und Urteil (in Rickerts Seminar)\(^7\)

27. Juli 1915
Probevortrag Der Begriff der Zeit in der Geschichtswissenschaft \([GA 1]\)

27. Juli 1915
Habilitation Philosophische Fakultät erteilt Heidegger die *venia legendi* für Philosophie.\(^8\)

Beginn Lehrtätigkeit als Privatdozent

WS 1915–1916

Vorlesung Die Grundlinien der antiken und scholastischen Philosophie, 2st.\(^9\)
Seminar Über Kant, *Prolegomena*

Heidegger) and a letter to Rickert in November 1915 give the listed title. Heidegger in a letter of December 1915 speaks generically about his current course “on the history of ancient and scholastic philosophy,” and the bursar’s rolls (*Quästur-Journal*) list students for a course on “History of [Ancient] Philosophy.” Given the weight of these various shreds of evidence, the specialized title reported by Richardson from the university catalogue, “Über Vorsokratiker: Parmenides,” (William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* [The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963], 663) cannot be the title of the course which was in fact given.

a) This will not be the only discrepancy between the course titles in Richardson’s list, drawn from university catalogues and authorized by Heidegger himself, and the titles reported in student transcripts, other university acts, and miscellaneous archival evidence. Our list is accordingly a search for the *title which Heidegger in fact gave to his course, seminar or talk as be taught it or presented it*, or, when that is not forthcoming, for the most suitable, adequate, telling title in the historical context of Heidegger’s development. The titles listed here are thus also at times at variance with the titles used for the *GA*-volumes in which the corresponding courses are now published. *Was heisst ein Titel? What can we learn from a title? In the case of Heidegger, usually quite a bit, even from the titles of his cancelled courses. His titles are not always brief, especially for the seminars, but they are by and large carefully crafted: sometimes he would spend the opening period (the course of SS 1925 in fact entitled “History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena to a Phenomenology of History and Nature”), days, or even weeks (the course of WS 1920–1921) carefully glossing every word of his chosen title.

b) Heidegger is reported to have informed others that the manuscripts for all three of the courses he taught in 1915–1917 were “destroyed” (*vernichtet*). *Aber was heisst Ver-
SS 1916

course  
German Idealism, 2hr.\textsuperscript{10}

seminarpriseum on Texts from Aristotle’s Logical Writings (with E. Krebs)\textsuperscript{11}

WS 1916–1917

course  
Basic Questions of Logic, 2hr.\textsuperscript{12}

1917–1918

As a “serviceman,” Docent Heidegger is nevertheless formally mandated to announce the following 2-hour courses in the university catalogue: SS 1917, Hegel; WS 1917–1918, Plato; SS 1918 and WS 1918–1919, Lotze and the Development of Modern Logic. But none of these courses were taught, since 1) Joseph Geyser was appointed to Freiburg’s chair of Catholic philosophy in SS 1917, and since 2) Reservist Heidegger is called up for basic training at Camp Heuberg from January through May 1918, for further training as an airman in meteorology in Berlin-Charlottenburg in July and August, and is stationed with the Front Weather Watch in the Verdun sector from the end of August to mid-November.\textsuperscript{13}

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nichten? Heidegger had in fact relegated these notes to a ‘scratch’ paper bin, and some of these have resurfaced in the Deutsches Literaturarchiv in Marbach as the reverse side of notes added to the course manuscript of WS 1925–1926. The numbered fragments thus found indicate that the young Heidegger in WS 1915–1916 lectured at least from Pythagoras to Aristotle and then on to Eckhart.

c) Finally, “two hours” in the extraordinary circumstances of the war years, with \textit{Landsturmmann} (Reservist) Heidegger already serving full time in the army in the capacity of military censor at the Freiburg Post Office, in fact meant that this course was taught every other week for four hours.


11. Rev. Engelbert Krebs (1881–1950), doctorate in philosophy (1903) and in theology (1909) at Freiburg, ordained a priest in 1906. He and the young Heidegger entered into a friendship of mutual assistance from mid-1913, even though the two were vying for the same Catholic chair in philosophy at the time. In March 1917, Krebs would officiate at the marital rites between Martin and Elfrith Petri Heidegger. The details of this Freiburg friendship have been archivally documented and exposited especially in the various works by Hugo Ott; see e.g. his “Engelbert Krebs und Martin Heidegger 1915,” \textit{Freiburger Diözesan-Archiv} 113 (1993), 239–48.

12. “Heidegger gave a course on ‘Basic Questions of Logic,’ drew a sizable audience from the secular faculties, but was not especially understood by the theologians, since he has a difficult terminology and the way he expresses himself is too complicated for beginners.” This entry from Engelbert Krebs’s diaries is cited in part by Casper, “Martin Heidegger,” Heidegger in this semester was temporarily filling in for the position in Catholic philosophy, which was then occupied on a permanent basis in the following semester by Joseph Geyser.
SS 1916
Vorlesung  Der deutsche Idealismus, 2st.10
Seminar  Übungen über Texte aus den logischen Schriften des Aristoteles (mit E. Krebs)11

WS 1916–1917
Vorlesung  Grundfragen der Logik, 2st.12

1917–1918

But the seminar for this semester (whose title is not known) is apparently being funded by the secular side of the Philosophy Department (Husserl's Seminar I and not the Catholic Seminar II). See the entry for October 10, 1916 in Karl Schuhmann's Husserl-Chronik: Denk- und Lebensweg Edmund Husserls (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977), 207.

13. The formality conformed to university rules for maintaining the license to teach in the university system during military service. Since Heidegger’s remark at this point in Richardson’s list, “Did not lecture, since drafted for frontline duty,” has evoked some heated discussion, I have taken pains to outline what is known of Heidegger’s military service in the last year of the war. For the supporting documents, see Sheehan, “Heidegger’s Lehrjahre,” 121 n. 13; Ott, Heidegger, 103–5/103–5, and the Vita of 1934 (GA 16, 247). Heidegger’s whereabouts in 1918 can also be traced through his correspondence with Husserl, Heinrich Ochsner, and Elisabeth Blochmann, as well as Krebs’s diaries and incidental letters like Edith Stein to Roman Ingarden on June 8, 1918. The fact that Heidegger opted not to teach in his accustomed setting of Catholic philosophy in SS 1917 may also have been for reasons that go deeper than the academic politics of the Philosophy Department. In his famous letter to Krebs on January 9, 1919, on his philosophical conversion (translated in chapter 10), Heidegger opens with a summary of the two-year leave he had just taken from teaching: “In the past two years, in an effort to arrive at a fundamental clarification of my philosophical orientation, I have laid aside all particular scientific projects. This has led me to results for which I could not have preserved my freedom of conviction and academic freedom, had I any commitments beyond philosophy itself.” The major result was a “transformation of my fundamental standpoint” which “made the system of Catholicism problematic and unacceptable to me.”
### KNS 1919

**course**  
The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldviews, 2hr. \([GA\ 56/57]\)^14

### SS 1919

**course**  
Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy of Value, 1hr.  
\([GA\ 56/57]\)

**course**  
On the Essence of the University and Academic Studies, 1hr.  
\([GA\ 56/57]\)

**seminar**  
Introduction to Phenomenology in Connection with Descartes’s *Meditations*

### WS 1919–1920

**course**  
Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 2hr. \([GA\ 58]\)^15

**seminar**  
Practicum in Connection with Natorp’s *General Psychology*

### Mid-April 1920

**lectures**  
Two lectures on Oswald Spengler at a “Scientific Week” in Wiesbaden^16

### SS 1920

**course**  
Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression: Theory of Philosophical Concept Formation, 2hr. \([GA\ 59]\)

**seminar**  
Colloquium in Connection with the Course

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14. With this “war emergency semester” (*Kriegsnotsemester*, or KNS), we can also begin citing the published (or soon to be published) edition of the course in Martin Heidegger’s *Gesamtausgabe (GA)* by its pertinent volume number; but not by the published title, which for various reasons may at times vary from the title we are seeking to establish here, namely, the title given by Heidegger himself to his course or seminar at the time that he presented it. For the published titles, see the “Bibliography of *GA* Editions of the Lecture Courses, 1919–1930,” at the end of this volume.

The lectures in the extraordinary KNS were held from February to mid-April. Despite the extra burden of this “interim semester,” SS 1919 took place roughly at its traditional time, from May through July, while the subsequent WS 1919–1920 was held somewhat earlier than normal, from October through January. Typically, the winter semester in the German university calendar runs roughly from November through February, with an interim month off for the holiday period.

A letter from Heidegger to Elisabeth Blochmann on January 24, 1919, indicates that Heidegger also held a seminar in KNS. It was perhaps a colloquium on the course, but I have not been able to verify this, let alone establish its title. See Martin Heidegger and Elis-
KNS 1919

Vorlesung  Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem, 2st. [GA 56/57]

SS 1919

Vorlesung  Phänomenologie und transzendentale Wertphilosophie, 1st. [GA 56/57]
Vorlesung  Über das Wesen der Universität und des akademischen Studiums, 1st. [GA 56/57]
Seminar  Einführung in die Phänomenologie im Anschluss an Descartes, Meditationes

WS 1919–1920

Vorlesung  Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, 2st. [GA 58]
Seminar  Übungen im Anschluss an Natorp, Allgemeine Psychologie
Mitte April 1920
Vorträge  Zwei Stunden über Oswald Spengler bei einer “wissenschaftlichen Woche” in Wiesbaden

SS 1920

Vorlesung  Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks. Theorie der philosophischen Begriffsbildung, 2st. [GA 59]
Seminar  Kolloquium im Anschluss an die Vorlesung

15. Even though the two one-hour courses reported by Richardson from the university catalogue were combined into one two-hour course, with the cancellation of the course entitled “Die philosophischen Grundlagen der mittelalterlichen Mystik,” it is worthy of note that Heidegger was in a position to, and in fact did begin to prepare a course with this content. The reason given for cancelling it, pertaining to the pressures of an already over-crowded academic year, is to be found in Heidegger’s letter to the Philosophical Faculty on August 30, 1919. See Sheehan, “Heidegger’s Lehrjahre,” 94–95 and n. 81.

16. “Some time ago I was asked to speak for two hours on Spengler at a ‘scientific week’ in Wiesbaden. Other speakers include [Max] Born (Frankfurt) on Einstein’s laws, [Hermann] Oncken (Heidelberg) on recent history and Wolzendorf (Halle) on a juridical problem. . . . Perhaps I can repeat the lectures here [in Freiburg] in the summer.” From Heidegger’s letter to Karl Löwith on March 23, 1920. Spengler is first mentioned in Heidegger’s courses toward the end of WS 1919–1920 and treated in some detail in WS 1920–1921 and SS 1923.
WS 1920–1921

course  Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion, 2 hr. [GA 60]

seminar  Phenomenological Practicum for Beginners in Conjunction with Descartes’s Meditationes

SS 1921

course  Augustine and Neoplatonism, 3 hr. [GA 60]

seminar  Phenomenological Practicum for Beginners in Connection with Aristotle’s De anima

WS 1921–1922

course  Phenomenological Interpretations relating to Aristotle: Introduction to Phenomenological Research, Einleitung, 2 hr. [GA 61]

17. We get a glimpse of the direction this seminar takes from Heidegger’s advice to Löwith on how to prepare for it: “For the ‘Cogito,’ all of Christian philosophy comes into question for me, since I want to see it backwards, look at it in verso, so to speak. It is only important that you know something of the other metaphysical treatises and the Regulae, so that the perversity of the epistemological resolution can be studied.” Letter of September 13, 1920.

18. The bursar’s rolls have Heidegger at this time regularly conducting the seminar entitled “Phenomenological Exercises for Beginners,” and yet advanced students like Oskar Becker and Karl Löwith just as regularly enrolled for it, seemingly undermining the purpose of a seminar “for beginners” and serving to render the phrase meaningless. A glance at the Freiburg catalogs explains the real meaning of the distinction: the seminars entitled “Phenomenological Exercises” were regularly divided into two sections: a) “for beginners” and b) “for advanced students,” where the (b) section was invariably taught by Husserl and the (a) section by his assistant, Heidegger! Hans Jonas, who came to Freiburg in SS 1921 and so found himself enrolled in the “beginners’” seminar on Aristotle given by Heidegger, later noted: “The rules . . . Husserl had introduced, made it so that young philosophy students were not allowed to begin by entering Husserl’s seminars. First, they were sent to an introductory seminar, which was given by his young assistant Martin Heidegger. I therefore simultaneously had the double impact of these two powerful and very individual teacher personalities, thinker figures: Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger.” Günther Neske and Emil Kettering (eds.), Martin Heidegger and National Socialism, trans. Lisa Harries (New York: Paragon House, 1990), 197–98.

19. This three-part title is the full title given by Heidegger in the autograph to his course. The published edition drops the final title, “Einleitung.” But the title recorded in the course transcript of Franz Josef Brecht speaks not of an Einführung but of an Einleitung to Phenomenological Research, and the subtitle in Helene Weiss’s transcript is simply the single word “Einleitung.” The addition of this third title is by no means as trivial and insignificant as it may seem (I have therefore underscored it), if it is put back into the context of the documentary story of Heidegger’s development at this time. The editorial deci-
### WS 1920–1921

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vorlesung</th>
<th>Einführung in die Phänomenologie der Religion, 2st. [GA 60]</th>
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<tr>
<td>Seminar</td>
<td>Phänomenologische Übungen für Anfänger im Anschluss an Descartes, <em>Meditationes</em>&lt;sup&gt;17&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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### SS 1921

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<tr>
<th>Vorlesung</th>
<th>Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus, 3st. [GA 60]</th>
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<tr>
<td>Seminar</td>
<td>Phänomenologische Übungen für Anfänger im Anschluss an Aristoteles, <em>de anima</em>&lt;sup&gt;18&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
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### WS 1921–1922

| Vorlesung                          | Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung, *Einleitung*, 2st. [GA 61]<sup>19</sup> |

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The use of *Einführung* so unqualifiedly in the published title is not the responsibility of the Bröckers, who were the initial editors of the volume and in their Afterword likewise underscore the importance of this keyword, since Heidegger identified the entire course manuscript as his “*Einleitung*” (*GA 61*, 201–2 and Table of Contents, v) and referred to it as such already within the course itself (110, 112) as well as the notes appended to it (182 n., 183, 187–88, 197) and in later references to this course (*GA 63*, 47). For what we have here is the very first of several drafts of the “Aristoteles-*Einleitung*,” of which the most famous, drafted in October 1922 in support of Heidegger’s candidacy for a chair at Marburg and at Göttingen, was recently discovered in its entirety in the archives at Göttingen. This *Einleitung* to a projected book on Aristotle was the center of Heidegger’s philosophical existence from early 1922 to early 1924 and, in his struggles to compose a satisfactory version of it, he constantly referred to it in this way in his correspondence, for example, in seven letters to Löwith between 1922 and 1924: “Die Quasi Einleitung macht mir viel Arbeit . . . — sie ist nichts weniger u. mehr als meine ‘Existenz’” (September 20, 1922); “Natorp, der Einl. u. Übers.[icht] zu Arist. hat, ist ergriffen” (November 22, 1922); “Meine ‘Einleitung’ nimmt mich sehr mit” (July 30, 1923); “Die Einleitung macht mir noch viel Arbeit” (March 19, 1924). After this very last reference to the “Einl.” to an Aristotle book, according to him the “most satisfying” draft, Heidegger gave the talk on “*The Concept of Time*” to the Marburg Theologians in July 1924 (chapter 16); thereafter “Die Zeit” became the focus in the Löwith letters and in Heidegger’s philosophical existence.

20. Note that volume 2 of *Logical Investigations* begins with the First Investigation entitled “Expression and Meaning” and includes a discussion of “occasional expressions” (§§ 26–28) like ‘I’, ‘here’, ‘now’, ‘this’, and *es gibt*, the components of what Heidegger at this time is already beginning to call “Dasein” (its *Jeweiligkeit*, however, is first mentioned in the seminar of WS 1922–1923). This seminar of 1921–1922 thus became famous among students for its elaboration of precisely such topics. Ludwig Landgrebe, e.g., who heard accounts of this seminar when he first arrived in Freiburg in SS 1923, has mentioned this story often both orally and in print. Günther Stern (later Günther Anders), who took part in this seminar, will later do his doctoral dissertation on this topic under Husserl, while acknowledging Heidegger for the (then) unpublished ideas he obtained directly from lecture courses and seminars: “Die Rolle der Situationskategorie bei den ‘Logischen Sätzen,’” Freiburger Diss., 1924. See also Günther Stern, *Über das Haben. Sieben Kapitel zur Ontologie der Erkenntnis* (Bonn: Friedrich Cohen, 1928), esp. chap. 7, “Satz und Situation.”

The following semester will include a continuation of this seminar by a phenomenological interpretation of the Second Investigation of the *Logical Investigations*. Recalling this period, the old Heidegger also reports that “in addition to my lecture courses and regular seminars, I worked through the *Logical Investigations* weekly with advanced students in special study groups.” See Martin Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969), 87; English translation: *On Time and Being*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 79.

21. The title reported by Richardson from the university catalog is not so much incorrect as it is cumbersome. We have therefore reported the more streamlined title which Heidegger announced to his class, as recorded in the extant student transcripts of Helene Weiss, Walter Bröcker and Franz Josef Brecht. For one thing, it has the advantage of establishing
continuity with the similarly worded title of the lecture course of WS 1921–1922 as well as with one of the seminar titles of the coming semester. For Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles is likewise the title of the projected book that Heidegger is writing at this stage, and so appears again as the overall title of the “Einleitung und Übersicht” which he wrote in October 1922 and dispatched to Marburg and Göttingen (see n. 19 above and chap. 14). Thus, the courses of WS 1921–1922 and SS 1922 and the seminar of WS 1922–1923 (continued in SS 1923) also give us glimpses into the contents of the Aristotle book that Heidegger was working on at this time.

22. This is the exact title found in Oskar Becker’s transcript of the seminar, who observes that it was continued in SS 1923. It is the very first semester since the war in which Heidegger does not hold a lecture course (letter to Jaspers, November 19, 1922; to Löwith on September 20). He is presumably freeing time so that he can concentrate on his book: see Edmund Husserl, Briefe an Roman Ingarden (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1968), 25. But once again, the title of the cancelled course, “Scepticism in Ancient Philosophy,” is indicative of the kinds of issues that are troubling Heidegger at the time. The issue of scepticism is tied to the radical questionability of the philosophical endeavor, which prompts Heidegger to proclaim the radical “atheism” of philosophy and the peculiar “asceticism” of the scientific life (GA 61, 195–99).

This peculiar constellation of themes was in part prompted by the posthumous publication of Franz Overbeck’s Christentum und Kultur in 1919, and by 1922 Heidegger is deeply involved in an intensive study of all the works of this ‘atheistic’ theologian and friend of Nietzsche. He will be raising such issues through his Marburg years with Bultmann and his circle.
seminar

Colloquium on the Theological Foundations of Kant’s *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* (selected texts; for advanced students; with Ebbinghaus)\(^{23}\)

seminar

[Practicum: Phenomenological Interpretations relating to Aristotle (continued from WS 1922–1923)]

University of Marburg

**Heidegger as Associate Professor (Personal Professor)**

**WS 1923–1924**

course

Introduction to Phenomenological Research, 4hr. [*GA* 17]\(^{24}\)

seminar


seminar

Phenomenological Practicum for Advanced Students: Aristotle, *Physics* II

December 7, 1923

lecture

Tasks and Ways of Phenomenological Research (lecture to the Hamburg group of the Kant Society)\(^{25}\)

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23. We might perhaps get an idea of the upshot of this seminar from Julius Ebbinghaus, “Luther und Kant,” *Luther-Jahrbuch* IX (1927), 119–55. This joint colloquium developed from the habit that the two had since 1921 of spending one evening a week together to read the works of the young Luther and Melanchthon, mentioned by Ebbinghaus in Ludwig J. Pongratz (ed.), *Philosophie in Selbstdarstellungen* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1975), 3: 33–34.

The continuation of the advanced seminar on “Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles” from the previous semester apparently was held in SS 1923 outside of the official university program. On April 21, 1923, Heidegger writes to Löwith: “The Aristotle seminar will only be two hours in order to bring the study plan proposed in the winter to a conclusion. The seminar with Ebbinghaus will hopefully ‘fizzle out.’ The only one into which I shall put real effort is the Aristotle seminar for beginners on the *Nicomachean Ethics*.” But whether official or unofficial, it was for Heidegger a single—and heavy—teaching load: “This semester I have a 1-hour lecture course and 3 seminars (6 hours).” Letter 16, to Jaspers on July 14, 1923, in Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers, *Briefwechsel 1920–1963*, ed. Walter Biemel and Hans Saner (Frankfurt: Klostermann; Munich: Piper, 1990), 41. It should be noted that the edition of this vital correspondence continues to be plagued by errors of fact stemming from Richardson’s list (e.g., n. 4 to letter 12, p. 227; n. 4 to letter 16, p. 229; n. 1 to letter 17, p. 230) and a lack of awareness of the story of the Aristotle “Einleitung” (p. 41 and n. 3 to letter 16, p. 229, and *no* note to letter 12, p. 34, line 3).
Seminar  Kolloquium über die theologischen Grundlagen von Kant, Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, nach ausgewählte Texten, für Fortgeschrittene (mit Ebbinghaus)

Seminar  Übungen über: Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Fortsetzung)

Philpps-Universität zu Marburg

Heidegger als Extraordinarius (persönlicher Ordinarius)

WS 1923–1924

Vorlesung  Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung, 4st. [GA 17]


Seminar  Phänomenologische Übung für Fortgeschrittene: Aristoteles, Physik B

7. Dezember 1923

Vortrag  Aufgaben und Wege der phänomenologischen Forschung (in der Hamburgischen Ortsgruppe der Kantgesellschaft)

24. This is the title recorded in all of the extant student transcripts and in the bursar’s rolls in Marburg (Einnahme-Tagebuch und Dozenten Handbuch). A month before the semester, Heidegger had two 2-hour courses in mind for WS 1923–1924, but obviously eventually managed to combine their contents into a single 4-hour course: “I will lecture on ‘Introduction to Phenomenology’ two hours and two hours on Aristotle” (letter to Löwith on September 27, 1923).

25. See BT, 51 n. See also the similarly titled lecture of December 4, 1926, “Begriff und Entwicklung der phänomenologischen Forschung,” announced for publication in GA 80; likewise, the title given to the Preliminary Part of SS 1925, “Sinn und Aufgabe der phänomenologischen Forschung,” and to Kassel Lecture no. 5, “Wesen und Ziele der Phänomenologie.” So the topic seems a bit premature for 1923, although Heidegger did cancel classes on the 6th and 7th of December in WS 1923–1924 and he did give a lecture in Hamburg “at the Philosophical Society before Christmas” (Heidegger to Georg Misch on January 6, 1924).
February 14–21, 1924

seminar-report
The Problem of Sin in Luther (last 2 hours of Bultmann’s seminar, “Paul’s Ethics”)26

SS 1924

course
Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy, 4hr. [GA 18]27

seminar
Advanced Students: The High Scholastics and Aristotle (Thomas, On Being and Essence; Cæcilian, On the Analogy of Names)

July 25, 1924

lecture
The Concept of Time (lecture at Marburg Theological Faculty)28

WS 1924–1925

course
Interpretation of Platonic Dialogs (Sophist, Philebus), 4hr. [GA 19]


27. This is the title recorded in the bursar’s rolls and in the extensive transcript of Walter Bröcker (typescript by Herbert Marcuse); Helene Weiss’s transcript varies only slightly: “Über einige Grundbegriffe Aristotelischer Philosophie.” The title alludes to the starting point of the course in Aristotle’s philosophical lexicon of Metaphysics V. Heidegger’s selection of concepts for discussion will eventually be guided by the problem of speech (logos) and the passions (pathai) in the Rhetoric, which in part accounts for the title in Löwith’s transcript, “Aristoteles: Rhetorik,” to which Richardson adds “II.”

As early as July 30, 1923 (letter to Löwith), Heidegger had planned a 4-hour lecture course on Augustine in SS 1924. During the course of WS 1923–1924 he took more than one occasion to announce to his students that such a course would be concerned with the connection of “vita et veritas,” with the non-theoretical character of the truth of faith as this is developed in the New Testament up to Augustine. Just before WS 1923–1924 concludes, Heidegger spells out the projected content of next semester’s course in some detail. In tracing the history of Christian theology, he would be concerned not only with the non-theoretical comportment connected with verum but also with that of bonum, the purported analogy between the two, and how truth itself came to be regarded as a ‘value’ as well as a certainty. “In my course on Augustine, I will have to elaborate this in connection with the Augustinian concepts of summum bonum, perfectio, fides, timor castus, gaudium, peccatum, delectatio, beatitudo. In a certain sense, Augustine becomes the focal point of the various possibilities which the problem of bonum as a category of existence includes, from which its effects on the medieval and modern age then originate” (Weiss transcript, February 23, 1924; see now GA 17, 276/212). But several weeks later, Heidegger resolves,
14.–21. Februar 1924
Referat Das Problem der Sünde bei Luther (letzte Stunden des Bultmannschen Seminars, ”Die Ethik des Paulus“)26

SS 1924
Vorlesung Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie, 4st. [GA 18]27
Seminar Fortgeschrittene: Die Hochscholastik und Aristoteles (Thomas, de ente et essentia; Cajetan, de nominium analogia)

25. Juli 1924
Vortrag Der Begriff der Zeit (vor der Marburger Theologenschaft)28

WS 1924–1925
Vorlesung Interpretation Platonischer Dialoge (Σοφιστής, Φιλήβος), 4st. [GA 19]

whatever the cost, finally to bring out the book on Aristotle. “So the Augustine gets dropped and I will lecture on Aristotle and hold only a medieval seminar. To the extent that I am able, I will hold an Augustine seminar privatissimum every two weeks” (letter to Löwith on March 19, 1924). There appears to be no evidence to verify that an Augustine seminar was in fact held.

28. Martin Heidegger, Der Begriff der Zeit. Vortrag vor der Marburger Theologenschaft Juli 1924, ed., with a postscript, by Hartmut Tietjen (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1989); English paraphrase in chapter 16 of this collection. Heidegger may here have simply been taking his turn to speak, after sharply criticizing others in the Marburg Theological Faculty in which he took an active part from the very beginning of his stay in Marburg. His interventions in the post-lecture debates of the faculty, as well as his participation in Bultmann’s seminars, have become legendary, and so are, in this context, in need of precise documentation. See n. 26 of this chapter and chapter 15 of this collection, “The Problem of Sin in Luther.” Bultmann alludes to Heidegger’s remarks on the lecture given by his colleague, Heinrich Hermelink, on Luther and the Middle Ages: Bernd Jaspert (ed.), Rudolf Bultmanns Werk und Wirkung (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1984), 202. Eduard Thurneysen’s talk on dialectical theology also took place in this first semester (on February 20, 1924), followed by Heidegger’s Overbeckian intervention which Gadamer, in his repeatedly published article on “Heidegger and Marburg Theology,” has in fact made legendary. Heidegger noted the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of Overbeck’s death, June 26, 1925, “which I at least celebrated,” in an intervention to W. Heitmüller’s talk, “On Interpreting the New Testament,” given at the faculty the next day (Heidegger’s text is in Ernst Grumach’s Nachlass, DLA, Marbach). “[B]ut I expressed my skepticism clearly enough in a disputation which recently ‘came off’ on the occasion of a lecture by Heitmüller (Tübingen) on understanding and interpreting the New Testament” (letter to Löwith on August 24, 1925). Finally, there is an unconfirmed report that Heidegger took part in Bultmann’s seminar in SS 1927 and gave a talk on Luther’s Commentary on Galatians. See Heinrich Schlier’s remarks in Günther Neske (ed.), Erinnerung an Martin Heidegger (Pfullingen: Neske, 1977), 219.
December 1–8, 1924

lecture Being-Here and Being-True According to Aristotle: Interpretation of Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (lecture for the local groups of Elberfeld-Barmen, Cologne and Dortmund in the regional group “West German Industrial Region” of the Kant Society)  

April 16–21, 1925


SS 1925

course History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena toward the Phenomenology of History and Nature, 4hr. [GA 20] 

seminar Beginners’ Practicum in Connection with Descartes’s *Meditations*

WS 1925–1926

course Logic, 4hr. [GA 21] 

seminar Beginners: Phenomenological Practicum (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*) 

29. English translation in chapter 17 of this collection. In their program report of WS 1924–1925 (see *Kant-Studien* 29 [1924], 626), this regional group of the Kant Society announced a lecture series by Heidegger in six cities in the Rhine-Ruhr region from the 1st to the 8th of December, 1924, in which he would repeat a lecture bearing this title. In their report of the following year (*Kant-Studien* 30 [1925], 611–16), three local groups reported that this lecture had in fact taken place: on December 1 or 2 in Elberfeld-Barmen, December 4 in Cologne, and December 8 in Dortmund. (Hagen, Düsseldorf, and Essen did not report.) In a letter to Löwith on December 17, 1924, Heidegger writes: “In Cologne I spent 3 days with Scheler and stayed at his house.” 

The Klostermann prospectus reverses the title—“Wahrsein und Dasein. Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea Z”—and indicates that the lecture was held in the “Kant-Gesellschaft Köln WS 1923–24.” In view of the evidence just cited, I take this instead to be the period of composition of a first draft and presume that, because of the turmoil caused by the rampant inflation in late 1923 following upon the French occupation of the Ruhr valley, the lecture itself was postponed and not in fact delivered until a year later.
Seminar Übungen zur Ontologie des Mittelalters (Thomas, *de ente et essentia, summa contra gentiles*)

1. – 8. Dezember 1924


16. – 21. April 1925

Vorträge Wilhelm Diltheys Forschungsarbeit und der Kampf um eine historische Weltanschauung (eine Reihe von 10 Vorträgen für das Publikum in Kassel im Rahmen der “Kurhessischen Gesellschaft für Kunst und Wissenschaft”: Die ”Kasseler Vorträge”)

SS 1925

Vorlesung Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs. Prolegomena zur Phänomenologie von Geschichte und Natur, 4st. [*GA* 20]

Seminar Anfangsübungen im Anschluss an Descartes, *Meditationes*

WS 1925–1926

Vorlesung Logik, 4st. [*GA* 21]

Seminar Anfänger: Phänomenologische Übungen (Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*)


31. Both WS 1925–1926 and SS 1928 as presented by Heidegger at the time were entitled simply “Logik.” To distinguish her two transcripts, Helene Weiss entitled them respectively “Logik (Aristoteles)” and “Logik (Leibniz).” And these were the planned publication titles announced in the first two *GA*-prospectuses during Heidegger’s lifetime (October 1974 and November 1975). But then Heidegger, in perhaps the last editorial decision he made concerning his *Gesamtausgabe*, suggested instead the eventual publication title of *GA* 21, “Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit” (I report all this thanks to a private communication from its editor, Walter Biemel). As to SS 1928, its editor, Klaus Held, took his eventual book title from an internal title found within the course itself, as he explains in his editor’s postscript of *GA* 26.
“The Hegel and Kant seminars are giving me an unusually great deal of pleasure, and I am glad that I am only now coming to these matters, at a time when, at least relatively, there is the possibility of understanding something” (Heidegger’s letter to Jaspers on December 10, 1925, Briefwechsel, 57). This unexpected delight of insight from the seminars impacts on the course when, immediately after the holidays, Heidegger abruptly plunges into his very first detailed analysis of Kant’s Doctrine of the Schematism of the Understanding. The course of WS 1925–1926, which at first could have been entitled “Logik (Aristoteles)” — it is in Weiss’s transcript — thus becomes “Logik (Kant).” This sea-change in attitude toward the original texts of Kant and Hegel also marks the beginning of a decade-long “deconstruction” of the texts of German idealism beginning with the proto-idealist Kant, immediately reflected in the titles of the seminars and courses that now follow, whereby Heidegger would find elements of his own Daseinsanalytic at the core or “birth certificate” of these “idealistic” texts (see the lexicon article in chapter 22 of this collection).
B. HEIDEGGER: COURSES/LEHRVERANSTALTUNGEN, 1909–1930

Seminar
Fortgeschrittene: Phänomenologische Übungen (Hegel, Logik, I. Buch)\(^{32}\)

SS 1926
Vorlesung
Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie, 2st. \([GA\ 22]\)^{33}

Seminar
Übungen über Geschichte und historische Erkenntnis im Anschluss an J. G. Droysen, Grundriss der Historik

24. Mai 1926
Vortrag
Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (in der Akademischen Vereinigung Marburg)\(^{34}\)

WS 1926–1927
Vorlesung
Geschichte der Philosophie von Thomas v. Aquin bis Kant, 4st. \([GA\ 23]\)

Seminar
Übungen im Anschluss an die Vorlesung

4. Dezember 1926
Vortrag
Begriff und Entwicklung der phänomenologischen Forschung (im Marburger kulturwissenschaftlichen Kränzschens)

SS 1927
Vorlesung
Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, 4st. \([GA\ 24]\)

Seminar
Fortgeschrittene: Die Ontologie des Aristoteles und Hegels Logik

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33. There is an indication that Heidegger also held a seminar in conjunction with this course on Greek concepts. In this seminar, Georg Picht recalls, “he interpreted the first chapter of Book IV of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics. He discussed the analogia entis.” (Was it perhaps the seminar of WS 1926–1927?) See Neske and Kettering (eds.), *Martin Heidegger and National Socialism*, 164.

34. An English translation of a transcript of this talk is to be found in chapter 19 of this collection. Presented on the holiday celebration of the coming of the “Spirit of Truth” to an informal study group of 12 or so “volunteers” which Heidegger had a hand in running, the talk in fact arose in the context of the final drafting of § 44, “Dasein, Disclosedness, and Truth,” for the clean copy of the manuscript of *Being and Time* that Heidegger was sending piecemeal to the printers at this time. See Heidegger and Jaspers, *Briefwechsel*, 57–58, 64, 236, and Kisiel, *Genesis*, appendix C.
July 8, 1927
lecture  Phenomenology and Theology (at the Evangelical Theologians’ Society in Tübingen)\(^\text{35}\)

**Heidegger as Professor**

WS 1927–1928

course  Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*, 4 hr. \([GA 25]\)

seminar  Phenomenological Practicum for Beginners on Concept and Concept Formation

seminar  Phenomenological Practicum for Advanced Students (Schelling, *On the Essence of Human Freedom*)

December 5–9, 1927

lecture  Kant’s Doctrine of the Schematism and the Question of the Meaning of Being (in Cologne with Max Scheler and in Bonn)\(^\text{36}\)

February 14, 1928

lecture  Theology and Philosophy (in Marburg)\(^\text{37}\)

SS 1928

course  Logic, 4 hr. \([GA 26]\)

seminar  Phenomenological Practicum on Aristotle, *Physics* III

\(^{35}\) Martin Heidegger, *Phänomenologie und Theologie* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1970); also *GA* 9, 45–78. This publication is basically a revised version of the second presentation of the talk seven months later in Marburg under a variant title (see below). The first version is given a subtitle in Klostermann’s prospectus: “I. Teil: Die nicht-philosophischen als positive Wissenschaften und die Philosophie als transzendentale Wissenschaft” [The Non-philosophical Sciences as Positive Sciences and Philosophy as Transcendental Science]. From the 1970 Foreword, we can likewise presume a subtitle for the second version: “Die Positivität der Theologie und ihr Verhältnis zur Phänomenologie” [The Positive Character of Theology and its Relationship to Phenomenology]. English translation by James G. Hart and John C. Maraldo in *The Piety of Thinking: Essays by Martin Heidegger* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), 3–21; now also in Martin Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 39–54.

\(^{36}\) Dated January 26, 1927, in *GA* 26, 182 n., following a report of the Cologne group in *Kant-Studien* 32 (1927), 451. But other archival evidence indicates that the talk
8. Juli 1927
Vortrag Phänomenologie und Theologie (vor der evangelischen Theologengesellschaft in Tübingen)\(^{35}\)

Heidegger als Ordinarius

WS 1927–1928
Vorlesung Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, 4st. \([GA 25]\)

Seminar Phänomenologische Übungen für Anfänger über Begriff und Begriffsbildung

Seminar Phänomenologische Übungen für Fortgeschrittene (Schelling, *Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit*)

5.–9. Dezember 1927
Vortrag Kants Lehre vom Schematismus und die Frage nach dem Sinn des Seins (in Köln bei Scheler und in Bonn)\(^{36}\)

14. Februar 1928
Vortrag Theologie und Philosophie (in Marburg)\(^{37}\)

SS 1928
Vorlesung Logik, 4st. \([GA 26]\)

Seminar Phänomenologische Übungen zu Aristoteles, *Physik III*

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was in fact postponed until December: On Sunday, December 11, 1927, Heidegger writes to Georg Misch: “last week in Cologne and Bonn I had to hold some lectures which cost me some time in preparation.” And the day before to Blochmann: “In Cologne and Bonn I had a nice time and some real success.” In a letter to Manfred Frings on August 6, 1964, Heidegger recalls: “In WS 1927–1928 Max Scheler invited me to give a lecture in Cologne for the Kant Society which he headed. I spoke on the schematism chapter in Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*. On that occasion (I stayed with Scheler for three days), we had our very last conversation and expressly discussed the relationship of the question posed in *Being and Time* to metaphysics and to his idea of phenomenology.” See Manfred Frings, *Person und Dasein* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1965), xii. This very last conversation shortly before Scheler’s death took place in December 1927 \((GA 26, 165)\).

\(^{37}\) In a footnote to the typescript of this talk, Heidegger explains the change in title from the Tübingen talk: “Essentially the content of the second part of a talk, ‘Phenomenology and Theology’, held at the invitation of the Department of Evangelical Theology at Tübingen on 8 July 1927.” Heidegger and Blochmann, *Briefwechsel*, 141.
Mid-September 1928

lectures On "Kant and Metaphysics," at the Summer University Courses of the Herder Society in Riga

University of Freiburg

WS 1928–1929

course Introduction to Philosophy, 4hr. [GA 27]

seminar Phenomenological Practicum for Beginners: Kant, *Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals*

seminar Phenomenological Practicum for Advanced Students: The Ontological Principles and the Problem of Categories

January 24, 1929

lecture Philosophical Anthropology and Metaphysics of Dasein (at the Kant Society of Frankfurt)

March 17–27, 1929

lectures Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the Task of a Foundation of Metaphysics. Also: Disputation in a Working Group between Cassirer and Heidegger (Second Annual Davos University Course)

April 8, 1929

speech To Edmund Husserl on his Seventieth Birthday (with the presentation of the festschrift in the university auditorium)

38. These data are drawn from a letter fragment of the Herder Society to Heidegger on August 10, 1928. The exact title of these lectures is not known but, as Heidegger reports in his Foreword to the first edition in 1929, the content bears upon the same themes as the book, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. It can, by chronological proximity, be connected to the course of WS 1927–1928. For the circumstances surrounding the trip to Riga, and the "Rigenser Tage," followed by the mandatory pilgrimage to Kant’s Königsberg, see Heidegger’s letter to Jaspers on September 24, 1928 and especially to Blochmann on October 17, 1928, whom the Heideggers visited underway.

39. Max Müller, in this his first semester at Freiburg invited to attend the "upper seminar" by Heidegger himself, reports a different title: "Phänomenologische Übungen zu Aristoteles." Neske and Kettering (eds.), *Heidegger and National Socialism*, 178. (Here, of course, I have reverted back to the title in the original German first reported in *Freiburger Universitätsblätter* 92 [June 1986], 15).

40. This involved three lectures and several sessions of a working group, together with Ernst Cassirer, although he was ill during part of those ten days. Heidegger’s summary of his three lectures and the disputation (compiled by Joachim Ritter and O. F. Bollnow) of this Davos University Course are reproduced in the appendix to Martin Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 4th ed., 1973), 243–68; also ap-
Mitte September 1928

Vorträge Zum Thema Kant und die Metaphysik, an dem Ferienhochschulkurse der Herdergesellschaft zu Riga

Albert-Ludwigs-Universität zu Freiburg

WS 1928–1929

Vorlesung Einleitung in die Philosophie, 4st. [GA 27]
Seminar Phänomenologische Übungen für Anfänger: Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten
Seminar Phänomenologische Übungen für Fortgeschrittene: Die ontologischen Grundsätze und das Kategorienproblem

24. Januar 1929

Vortrag Philosophische Anthropologie und Metaphysik des Daseins (in der Kant-Gesellschaft Frankfurt)

17.–27. März 1929

Vorträge Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft und die Aufgabe einer Grundlegung der Metaphysik. Dazu: Disputation in einer Arbeitsgemeinschaft zwischen Cassirer und Heidegger (II. Davoser Hochschulkurse)

8. April 1929

Festrede Edmund Husserl zum siebzigsten Geburtstag (mit der Überreichung der Festschrift in der Aula der Universität Freiburg)

Appendix to GA 3. For autobiographical details on the chronology and context of events, compare the preface to this edition with Heidegger’s letter to Jaspers on December 21, 1928, and to Blochmann on April 12, 1929. A stenographic copy of the protocol of the disputation which was distributed at Davos, “Kontroverse in einer Arbeitsgemeinschaft” (Bericht, Davos, 25. 3. 1929, 25 pp.), is to be found in the Herbert Marcuse Archive in Frankfurt. “The high point of the conference for us students was the confrontation between Heidegger and Cassirer.” So in one of two accounts of this three-week meeting in the Swiss Alps to be found in Guido Schneeberger, Nachlese zu Heidegger: Dokumente zu seinem Leben und Denken (Bern: private circulation, 1962), 1–9, here 4.

41. English translation in Appendix II of this volume. This brief but important speech was first published in Akademische Mitteilungen. Organ für die gesamten Interessen der Studentenschaft an der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität in Freiburg i. Br., Vierte Folge, IX. Sem., no. 3, (May 14, 1929), 46–47. Heidegger’s essay, “Vom Wesen des Grundes,” first appeared in Husserl’s festschrift, which made up a “supplementary volume” to that year’s Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, Ergänzungsbänd. Festschrift, Edmund Husserl zum 70. Geburtstag gewidmet (Halle: Niemeyer, 1929).
SS 1929

course: German Idealism and the Present Problem Situation of Philosophy, 4 hr. [GA 28]

course: Introduction to Academic Studies, 1 hr.  

seminar: Beginners: On Idealism and Realism in Connection with the Main Courses (Hegel’s Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit)

seminar: Advanced: On the Essence of Life with Particular Regard to Aristotle’s De anima, De animalium motione, and De animalium incessu

July 24, 1929

lecture: What Is Metaphysics? (inaugural lecture in the university auditorium)  

WS 1929–1930

course: The Basic Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Individualization, 4 hr. [GA 29/30]  

seminar: For Middle and Upper Semesters: On Certainty and Truth in Connection with Descartes and Leibniz

March 21–22, 1930

lectures: 1. The Problem Situation of Philosophy Today  
2. Hegel and the Problem of Metaphysics  
   (Two lectures at the Scientific Union in Amsterdam)  

42. Now appended to GA 28 is a nine-page transcript of the opening hours of this short but important course, breaking new “alethic” ground through the interpretation of Plato’s allegory of the cave. The transcript is to be found in the Herbert Marcuse Archive in the City and University Library of Frankfurt. In a letter to Maximilian Beck on May 9, 1929, the new student Marcuse gives his first impressions of Heidegger’s courses and seminars of SS 1929 and of the typical “Heidegger student,” along with a telling description of Heidegger himself, obviously in the throes of a radical transformation in his thought.


43. The Heidegger-Jaspers correspondence in June 1929 speaks of the phenomenon of Heidegger’s “public existence” having begun after Davos, so he was now very much in demand: he repeated this inaugural lecture three more times in 1929: first, “beginning of October to a small group in Frankfurt” (letter to Blochmann on December 18, 1929), being invited there by Kurt Riezler (who was at Davos) from about the 9th to the 14th (to Jaspers on October 8, 1929); 2) “4. Dezember in der Kant-Gesellschaft Karlsruhe” (to Blochmann on December 18); 3) “5. Dezember vor der Deutschen Fachschaft an der Universität Heidelberg” (letter to Jaspers on October 18, 1929), before it appeared in print around Christmas: Was ist Metaphysik? (Bonn: Friedrich Cohen, 1929), 29 pp.

44. But the Gesamtausgabe overseers insist on retaining Einsamkeit (solitude, loneliness), which Heidegger never quite got around to changing to Vereinzelung (individual-
B. HEIDEGGER: COURSES/LEHRVERANSTALTUNGEN, 1909–1930

SS 1929

Vorlesung  Der deutsche Idealismus und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart, 4st. [GA 28]

Vorlesung  Einführung in das akademische Studium, 1st. [GA 28] 42

Seminar  Anfänger: Über Idealismus und Realismus im Anschluss an die Hauptvorlesungen (Hegels Vorrede zur Phänomenologie des Geistes)

Seminar  Fortgeschrittene: Von Wesen des Lebens mit besonderer Berücksichtigung von Aristoteles, de anima, de animalium motione und de animalium incessu

24. Juli 1929

Vortrag  Was ist Metaphysik? (Antrittsvorlesung in der Aula der Universität Freiburg) 45

WS 1929–1930


Seminar  Für mittlere und höhere Semester: Über Gewissheit und Wahrheit im Anschluss an Descartes und Leibniz

21.–22. März 1930

Vorträge  1. Die heutige Problemlage der Philosophie.
          2. Hegel und das Problem der Metaphysik.
          (2 Vorträge in der wissenschaftlichen Vereinigung zu Amsterdam) 45

45. “As my general lecture I propose ‘The Problem Situation of Philosophy Today.’ As the theme for the lecture in the smaller circle ‘Hegel and the Problem of Metaphysics.’ I will make a point of starting from my Kant-book and so take advantage of the preparation of the auditors” (Heidegger to Hendrik J. Pos on January 14, 1930; from an unpublished letter in the possession of the Amsterdam Public Library). This first visit to Amsterdam also gave Heidegger a first-hand look at Vincent van Gogh’s paintings, including “The Shoes.” In a letter to Blochmann on July 7, 1931, Heidegger writes: “On the first of August I am going to Holland, where I shall discharge a promise made during my first visit to lead a small group for a week in working through Being and Time.” These two visits came about because Heidegger’s student in WS 1922–1923, Hendrik J. Pos, became Professor of Philology at the University of Amsterdam and, in that capacity, also lectured in the Davos University Courses of 1929.
SS 1930

course  On the Essence of Human Freedom: Introduction to Philosophy, 4hr. [GA 31]

seminar  Beginners: Selected Chapters from Kant’s Critique of Judgment

July 14, 1930

lecture  On the Essence of Truth (at the “Congress of Leading Baden Citizens in Science, Art and Commerce” in Karlsruhe)

October 8, 1930

lecture  On the Essence of Truth (at the Philosophical Society of Bremen)

October 26, 1930

lecture  Augustine: What is Time? Confessions, Book XI (at the monastery of Beuron)

WS 1930–1931

course  Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, 2hr. [GA 32]

seminar  Augustine, Confessions XI (on Time)

seminar  Advanced: Plato’s Parmenides (with Wolfgang Schadewaldt)

December 5, 1930

lecture  Philosophizing and Believing: The Essence of Truth (at the Department of Evangelical Theology in Marburg)

December 11, 1930

lecture  On the Essence of Truth (in Freiburg)

46. Schneeberger, Nachlese zu Heidegger, 9–13. Also Heidegger’s letter to Jaspers on July 15, 1930. A summary of the talk in the Badische Presse on July 15, 1930 indicates that the now well-known movement from truth as judicative conformity to letting-be to free resolve/openness then opens, for this home audience, onto the still concealed autochtony and rootedness in one’s native soil (Bodenständigkeit), which culminates in the formula “We do not guard and preserve the homeland, the homeland guards us.” I wish to thank Alfred Denker for this rare reference.


48. The catalog of the library of the Archabbey St. Martin at Beuron indicates that the transcript of the talk in its possession bears the title, “Des heiligen Augustinus Betrachtungen über die Zeit (Confessiones, liber XI)” [St. Augustine’s Contemplations on Time (Confessions, Book 11)]. Heidegger’s regular visits to the Benedictine monastery at Beuron, which date at least as far back as the war years and his association with Pater Engelbert Krebs
SS 1930

Vorlesung

Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie, 4st. \([GA 31]\)

Seminar

Anfänger: Ausgewählte Kapitel aus Kants \textit{Kritik der Urteilskraft}

14. Juli 1930

Vortrag

Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (am “Kongress der führenden Badener in Wissenschaft, Kunst und Wirtschaft” in Karlsruhe)\(^{46}\)

8. Oktober 1930

Vortrag

Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (in der Philosophischen Gesellschaft Bremen)\(^{47}\)

26. Oktober 1930

Vortrag

Augustinus: \textit{Quid est tempus? Confessiones} lib. XI (im Kloster Beuron)\(^{48}\)

WS 1930–1931

Vorlesung

Hegels \textit{Phänomenologie des Geistes}, 2st. \([GA 32]\)

Seminar

Augustinus, \textit{Confessiones} XI (\textit{de tempore})

Seminar

Fortgeschrittene: Platons \(\Pi\alpha\rho\mu\varepsilon\nu\delta\sigma\varsigma\) (mit Wolfgang Schadewaldt)

5. Dezember 1930

Vortrag

Philosophieren und Glauben. Das Wesen der Wahrheit (vor der Evangelisch-theologischen Fachschaft in Marburg)\(^{49}\)

11. Dezember 1930

Vortrag

Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (in Freiburg)\(^{50}\)

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\(^{49}\) Data taken from a transcript of the lecture. The variant title suggests that Heidegger from the start adapted his oft-repeated lecture “On the Essence of Truth” to the occasion and audience. The connection between truth and “autochthony” (\textit{Bodenständigkeit}) reportedly made when it was first delivered during this period, in July 1930 to an audience purportedly receptive to “Blubo” talk (see n. 46), may therefore not be too far from the “truth.”

\(^{50}\) Data from Herbert Marcuse’s transcript of the lecture, preserved in the City & University Library of Frankfurt. In the postscript to a 1945 letter, Heidegger asserts that he gave the lecture “twice in the winter of 1930 at the university here [in Freiburg]”; \textit{Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal} 14, no. 2–15, no. 1 (1991), 554–55. The last presentation of the lecture would be in Dresden in the Spring of 1932. It was first published in 1943.
C. Heidegger’s Early Occasional Writings: A Chronological Bibliography

This bibliography of Heidegger’s early occasional “writings” from 1909 to 1930 lists all of the occasions for which an extant “text” has been found to be available, whether published or still unpublished, whether from Heidegger’s hand or as a second-hand auditor’s transcript, whether a rounded text or a mere collation of notes. This bibliography does not include Heidegger’s seminars and lecture courses, which are listed in section B above and in bibliographical fashion at the conclusion of this volume. The ordering of data in the entries roughly follows the format of section B: date of composition (or if this is not available, date of original publication), genre and occasion, title, history of its publication, reprinting in the Gesamtausgabe, extant English translations, and informative translations of the less transparent German titles provided for the non-German reader.

Collections in which some of the items listed below have been reprinted include:


GA 60. Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens (1995). Translated by Matthias Fritsch and Jennifer Anna Gossetti-Ferencei as The Phenomenology of Religious Life (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004). Noteworthy in this volume is its concluding addendum that publishes the texts of 21 of the 26 notes that the young Heidegger had accumulated from 1916 to 1919 for a project on the phenomenology of religious consciousness/life.


The following annotated bibliography has been greatly assisted by a bibliography supplied to us by Alfred Denker that is somewhat more extensive than the one that appears in his Historical Dictionary of Heidegger’s Philosophy (Landham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2000), 247–71. Among other things, that bibliography attempts to chronologize (see 247) the individual notes drawn from a joint file of 45 pages of notes gathered together by Heidegger in a file bearing the title, “Phänomenologie des religiösen Bewußtseins/Lebens,” where, somewhere in the course of
the accumulation of the 26 distinct notes, *Bewusstsein* (consciousness) is replaced by *Leben* (life) in the title. We have done the same in the bibliography below for the entire cluster of handwritten notes (including notes left unpublished) on file in the Heidegger Archive at the Deutsches Literaturarchiv (= DLA) in Marbach am Neckar under the archival title, “Notizen, ‘Phänomenologie des relig[iösen] Lebens,’” contained within a larger file designated by the archival access number (Zugangs-Nr.) 75.7044, Group A 2. The detailed chronology of the complete file of notes, which in the bibliographical entries below are marked with an asterisk (*) in a time frame from 1916 to 1919, also constitutes a correction of the publication of a select number of these notes (21 out of a total of 26 notes on file) in a concluding addendum to *GA* 60 under the misleading and erroneous editor’s title, “Outlines and Sketches for a Cancelled Course, 1918–19” (*GA* 60, 301/229), namely, the lecture course announced for WS 1919–1920 under the title “Philosophical Foundations of Medieval Mysticism.” In point of fact, the motivation for the project of a “phenomenology of religious consciousness/life” was first announced in the 1915 introduction to the Scotus dissertation: In order to establish the thoroughly non-psychologist character of medieval scholasticism’s notion of intentionality, which anticipates modern phenomenology’s central discovery, the young Heidegger concludes his introduction by uncharacteristically reverting to the first person singular, as if to make the task his own, in proclaiming that “I regard the philosophical, more precisely, the phenomenological elaboration of the mystical, moral-theological, and ascetic writings of medieval scholasticism to be of special urgency” (*FS*, 147). It is in this call for a hermeneutical examination of the full spectrum of documents on the religious experience in the life-world of the middle ages that the young Heidegger’s personal project of a “phenomenology of religious life” is born. The surviving 45 pages of notes (divided into two groups of 22 and 23 pages) from the period 1916–1919 thus chart a continuing interest in the religious experience of the middle ages (first and foremost Eckhart, then Bernard of Clairvaux and Theresa of Avila) supplemented, after a deconstruction in 1917 of the scholastic constructions that bar the way to religious experience, by the modern Protestant hermeneutics of Schleiermacher and Dilthey calling for a return to the early Christian experience and its development by early church fathers like Augustine. This history of Christian factic life-experience through Luther and the German idealists will then constitute the very first target for the deconstruction of the entire history of Western philosophy/theology proposed by the early Heidegger in 1922 (chapter 14). For a complete and thorough analysis of these notes toward a treatise on the phenomenology of religious life, see Kisiel, *Genesis*, chap. 2, “Theo-logical Beginnings: Toward a Phenomenology of Christianity.”

For an even more detailed account that presents the five notes in the file of 26 notes that were left out of the published version of notes see Theodore Kisiel,

**Student Years (at the University of Freiburg, WS 1909–1910 to SS 1915)**

November 1909. Newspaper article. “Allerseelenstimmungen” [All Souls’ Moods], *Heuberger Volksblatt* [Heuberg People’s Newspaper] 11, no. 133, November 5, 1909. This very first article in which Heidegger first breaks into print under his own name was discovered by Alfred Denker in the Messkirch archives.


April 1911. Poem. “Wir wollen warten” [We will wait], *Allgemeine Rundschau* 8, no. 14 (April 8, 1911), 246. Reprinted in *GA* 13, 6.


February 1914. Outline-Plan (Disposition) of a Seminar Lecture for presentation in Rickert’s “Seminar on the Philosophy of History (Methodology of the Cultural Sciences)” in WS 1913–1914. “Zur versuchten Aufhebung der Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung” [On the Attempted Lifting of the Limits on the Concept Formation in the Natural Sciences], published in Heidegger and Rickert, Briefe und andere Dokumente, 77–79. [This outline is a first attempt to explore a middle ground between the generic concepts of the natural sciences and the individualizing concepts of the historical/cultural sciences.]


July 1914. Book review. “Charles Sentroul, Kant und Aristoteles,” Literarische Rundschau für das katholische Deutschland 40, no. 7 (1914), col. 330–32. Reprinted in GA 1, 49–53. [Significantly, Heidegger cites this review in his Scotus dissertation, FS, 139 n. and GA 1, 197 n., since it raises some of the most basic issues of that dissertation, like the distinction between logical and ontological truth and the universality of “inexpressible individuality.”]


July 2, 1915. Cover letter accompanying the submission of the Scotus dissertation above. “Bewerbung des Dr. phil. Martin Heidegger aus Messkirch (Baden) um die Habilitation betr[effend]” [Re. the Application for Habilitation by Dr. phil(osophy) Martin Heidegger from Messkirch (Baden)]. First published in 1988 as note 5 of Sheehan’s “Heidegger’s Lehrjahre,” 119–20. Reprinted in letter format in Heidegger/Rickert, Briefe und andere Dokumente, 94. [In the letter, Candidate Dr. Heidegger proposes the following three topics, in order of preference, for the test lecture that is to be delivered at the time of the dissertation defense: “1. The Concept of Time in History. 2. The Logical Problem of the Question. 3. The Concept of Number.”]


Early Freiburg Period (Instructor at the University of Freiburg, WS 1915–1916 to SS 1923)


*1916. First extant note for a treatise on the “Phenomenology of Religious Consciousness/Life”: “Ursinn der Geistigkeit in ihrer zentralen Lebendigkeit. Vgl. Meister Eckhart (Pfeiffer)” [The Original Sense of Spirituality in its Central Vitality. See (Franz) Pfeiffer’s (1857) edition of Meister Eckhart]. Two-page note omitted (without explanation) from the collection of notes published in the addendum to GA 60. The original in the young Heidegger’s distinctively coarse pen is to be found in the “old” book of notes of 23 pages archived together with a “new” notebook of 22 pages (see GA 60, 348/260) under the title “Notizen, Phänomenologie des relig[iösen] Lebens” in a larger file designated with the archival access number (Zugangs-Nr.) 75.7044, Group A 2, in the Heidegger Archive at the Deutsches Literaturarchiv (DLA) in Marbach am Neckar. Now published in bilingual form in Kisiel, ‘Notes for a Work on the ‘Phenomenology of Religious Life’ (1916–19).” [The note consists of citations from Eckhart’s Middle High German sprinkled with Heidegger’s comments in Modern High German. The stated goal of the note is to determine the place (stat, Stätte) and the power of the human being in which the Eternal Word is “most properly” born in the mystical experience. Specific work on Eckhart’s mysticism is already announced by...
Heidegger in the Conclusion to the Scotus Dissertation (FS 344 n. and 352; also chapter 8 of this volume).]


*Mid-1917. Note for a treatise on the “Phenomenology of Religious Consciousness/Life.” “Das religiöse Apriori,” GA 60, 312–15/237–39. [This note coincides with the young Heidegger’s “crisis of faith” with Scholastic Catholicism, registered in his acerbic remarks against “dogmatic and casuistic pseudo philosophies that pose as philosophies of a particular system of religion. . . . Hence, the inherent worth of the religion, its tangible sphere of meaning, must first be experienced through a tangled, non-organic, dogmatic hedgerow of propositions and proofs that are theoretically wholly unclarified, which as a canonical statute with police power in the end serves to overpower and oppress the subject and to shroud it in darkness.” (GA 60, 313/237–38).]

This note of mid-1917 is also reproduced on pp. 15–17 of the first archival entry in the “Martin Heidegger-Barbara Fiand Collection,” which consists of a collection of typescripts made from Heidegger’s handwritten manuscripts by his brother, Fritz Heidegger of Messkirch, a copy of which is deposited in the University Library of Loyola University of Chicago. The first entry in the Fiand Collection (Box 1, Folder 1), entitled “Augustinus Erkenntnis und Glaube (1918/1919),” is in fact a rather rough and selective transcription of the “Notizen, Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens” found in the DLA-Collection in Marbach under the access number 75.704/4 A 2. The top note in both collections, entitled “Augustine: Knowing and Believing,” is in fact from 1919, but at least one of the 26 notes in the original bundle of notes dates back to 1916 and several to 1917, so that "1918/1919" is an erroneous dating, as well as the narrow association of the entire bundle with a “cancelled lecture course 1918/19” (GA 60, 301/229), i.e., a course on Medieval Mysticism in WS 1919–1920 which was announced but then cancelled (GA 60, 348/261).

*August 2, 1917. Informal table talk from jotted notations which then became one of the notes for a treatise on the “Phenomenology of Religious Consciousness/Life.”; “Zu Schleiermachers zweiter Rede ‘Über das Wesen der Religion,’” published in GA 60, 319–322/241–44 (typed in Fiand 21–23). Supplemented and thus paraphrased by Theodore Kisiel as “On Schleiermacher’s Second Speech ‘On the Essence on Religion’” in chapter 9 of this volume. See the introduction to chapter 9 for more on the circumstances surrounding the “occasion” of this table talk.

1918. Notes for a treatise on the “Phenomenology of Religious Consciousness/Life.” In estimated order of composition: “Probleme,” GA 60, 328/248 (Fiand 28); “Glaube” [Faith (or) Belief], GA 60, 329/248–49 (Fiand 29).

June 1918: Notes for a treatise on the “Phenomenology of Religious Consciousness/Life.” “Zu: Adolf Reinach, Das Absolute,” GA 60, 324–27/245–48 (Fiand 26, 26a, 27); “Zu: Schleiermacher, Der christliche Glaube – und Religionsphänomenologie überhaupt” [On Schleiermacher’s The Christian Faith – and Phenomenology of Religion as Such], GA 60, 330–32/249–51 (Fiand 30–31). [Back home in Freiburg on leave from military training, Heidegger gets access to one of the typescripts then in circulation in Husserl’s intimate circle of students of fragments on the phenomenology of religion written by Adolf Reinach while serving as an officer on the Western front. Reinach’s expressed feelings of utter dependence on God and trust in God derived from a feeling of being sheltered by Him prompted Heidegger to go back to the source of such expressions in Schleiermacher.]


September 6 and 10, 1918 (“an der Front”). Notes for a treatise on the “Phenomenology of Religious Consciousness/Life.” “Zu den Sermones Bernardi in canticum cantiorum (Serm. III)” [On Bernard of Clairvaux’s Sermon 3 on The Song of Songs], GA 60, 334–36, line 2/252–53 (Fiand 34, without last 10 lines); “Das Phänomen der (inneren) Sammlung (zu Theresia von Jesu, Die Seelenburg)” [The Phenomenon of (Inward) Gathering (On Theresa of Avila’s Inward Castle)], GA 60, 336, line 3 to 337/254 (Fiand 35).


1919–. Correspondence with Karl Löwith. As yet unpublished by Klostermann. Excerpts translated by Theodore Kisiel in appendix II of this volume. Three letters by Löwith to Heidegger translated by Theodore Kisiel in chapter 20 of this volume.

Ott, Heidegger, 106–7/106–7, with a translation by Allan Blunden. Translated by Thomas Sheehan in chapter 10 of this volume.

*May–August 1919. Notes for a treatise on the “Phenomenology of Religious Consciousness/Life” only at this time include the following eight notes (all in the “new book” of 22 pages of notes) that are in fact from the cancelled course of WS 1919–1920, “Die philosophischen Grundlagen der mittelalterlichen Mystik” [The Philosophical Foundations of Medieval Mysticism], in the fine penmanship characteristic only from early 1919 on: “Die philosophischen Grundlagen der mittelalterlichen Mystik,” GA 60, 303–6/231–33 (with a paragraph omitted also in Fiand 6–7); “Mystik in Mittelalter,” GA 60, 306–7/233–34 (Fiand 8–9); “Mystik (Dichtungen) [corrected title],” GA 60, 308/234 (Fiand 9–10); “Aufbau (Ansätze)” [Structure (Approaches)], GA 60, 309/235 (Fiand 10–11); “Glaube und Wissen” [Faith and Knowledge], GA 60, 310/235–36 (Fiand 12–11); “Frömmigkeit – Glaube” [Piety – Faith], GA 60, 329–30/249 (Fiand 29); August 14, 1919: “Irrationalismus,” GA 60, 311/236 (Fiand 14); “Historische Vorgegebenheit und Wesensfindung” [Historical Pregivenness and the Finding of Essence], GA 60, 311–12/237 (Fiand 13).

Also omitted from the addendum to GA 60 are notes in the fine penmanship of 1919 which are to be found in Marbach’s archival file entitled “Notes, Phenomenology of Religious Life,” on “Augustinus. Erkenntnis – Glaube” [Augustine: Knowing – Believing] (also in Fiand 1–2); on “Das christliche Erlebnis” [The Christian Experience] (Fiand 3–5) as it is explicated out of two key chapters of Part Two of Dilthey’s Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (1883). These two substantial notes are likewise now published in bilingual form in Kisiel, “Notes for a Work on the Phenomenology of Religious Life” (1916–1919), in Companion to Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Religious Life, ed. Andrew Wiercinski and Sean McGrath (Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi, 2010).


**Marburg Period (Associate Professor at the University of Marburg, WS 1923–1924 to SS 1928)**


ment summarizing the contents of the lectures is reprinted in GA 16, 49–51. Translated by Theodore Kisiel as “Wilhelm Dilthey’s Research and the Current Struggle for a Historical Worldview” in chapter 18 of this volume.


July 8, 1927. Talk at the Evangelical Theological Faculty at the University of Tübingen. “Phänomenologie und Theologie.” To be published as “Phänomenologie und Theologie. I. Teil: Die nichtphilosophischen als positive Wissenschaften und die Philosophie als transzendente Wissenschaft” in GA 80, Vorträge (forthcoming). See the second half of this talk on February 14, 1928, below for further publication data.


October 22, 1927. Draft of an article on “Phenomenology” for the Encyclopaedia Britannica with an accompanying letter to Edmund Husserl. “Versuch einer zweiten Bearbeitung.” In Edmund Husserl, Phänomenologische Psychologie, ed. Walter Biemel,


Later Freiburg Period (Professor at the University of Freiburg, from WS 1928–1929)


February 24, 1929. Letter to Freiburg colleague and biologist Hans Spemann, congratulating him on his election to the Berlin Academy of the Sciences. In GA 16, 55.

March 17–27, 1929. Heidegger’s summary of three lectures under the title “Kants Kritik


April 8, 1929. Speech on the occasion of Husserl’s seventieth birthday in conjunction with the presentation of the Festschrift (edited by Heidegger) to Husserl. “Edmund Husserl zum 70. Geburtstag,” Akademische Mitteilungen: Organ für die gesamten Interessen der Studentenschaft von der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität in Freiburg i. Br. 4, 9th Semester, no. 3 (May 14, 1929), 46–47. Reprinted in GA 16, 56–60. The speech itself was first translated by Thomas Sheehan in Edmund Husserl, Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927–1931), 475–78. The entire article including the speech has been translated by Thomas Sheehan as “For Edmund Husserl on his Seventieth Birthday” in appendix II of this volume.


December 4, 1929. Talk at the Kant Society in Karlsruhe, which was repeated at the Amsterdam Academic Association on March 21, 1930. “Die heutige Problemlage der Philosophie” [The Problem Situation of Philosophy Today]. In GA 80: Vorträge.


May 10, 1930. Letter to Adolf Grimm, Minister of Science, Art, and Education, refusing the offer of the Ernst Troeltsch Chair at the University of Berlin. Published under the title “Entscheidung gegen Berlin” in GA 16, 61–62.


July 14, 1930. Talk. “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,” speech at the Congress of Leading Baden Citizens in Science, Art, and Commerce in Karlsruhe. This version of “On the Essence of Truth” is notorious for its search of the most basic truths in autochthony, rootedness in one’s native soil, attachment to one’s homeland. See Guido Schneller, Nachlese zu Heidegger. Dokumente zu seinem Leben und Denken (Bern: Suhr, 1962), 11–13. The summary in the Badener Presse on July 15, 1930 speaks of Heidegger’s final “obscure turn” to “autochthony as a movement and discursive gathering” peaking in the locution, “We do not guard the homeland, the homeland guards us.” The succeeding versions omit such turns of phrase, which however are already to be found in the 1924 talk on truth out of an Aristotelian context of autochthony (in chapter 17 of this volume).


Becoming Heidegger
Part I

Student Years, 1910–1917
1. Curricula Vitae

As Thomas Sheehan observes in “Heidegger’s Lehrjahre,” his biographical-philosophical account of Heidegger’s student years, both the “Curriculum Vitae 1913” and “Curriculum Vitae 1915” were part of the package of obligatory documentation in support of the application for an advanced degree at a German university. “Curriculum Vitae 1913” was accordingly submitted with Heidegger’s application for the first advanced degree of doctor of philosophy; and the requisite, more detailed “Curriculum Vitae 1915” was submitted for the habilitation level, which brought with it the license to teach at the university level. The latter accordingly spells out what university committees nowadays call a “research program,” a direction of investigation that the candidate proposes to take in embarking

The three vitae in this chapter—“Curriculum Vitae 1913,” “Curriculum Vitae 1915,” and “A Recollective ‘Vita’ 1957”—have been edited, with appended notes, by Theodore Kisiel.

Heidegger’s original manuscript of “Curriculum Vitae 1915” was discovered by Thomas Sheehan in 1977 in the archives of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Freiburg and was first published in Sheehan’s translation in “Heidegger’s Lehrjahre,” 78–80, with a transcription of the original German manuscript appended at 115–17. A different transcription of Heidegger’s handwritten copy was later found by Hugo Ott in the Stuttgart archive of the Ministry of Culture of Baden-Württemberg and was published in Hugo Ott, “Der junge Martin Heidegger: Gymnasial-Konviktszeit und Studium,” Freiburger Diözesan-Archiv 104 (1984), 315–25, esp. 323–25, and again in Ott, Heidegger, 85–87/84–86, with an English translation by Allan Blunden. “Curriculum Vitae 1915” has recently been reprinted in GA 16, 37–39. We owe a debt of gratitude to the Freiburg University Library for access to the original manuscript.

What is here entitled “A Recollective ‘Vita’ 1957” is in fact Heidegger’s inaugural address upon his nomination for membership in the Heidelberg Academy of the Sciences, which was first published in the Jahreshefte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften 1957/58 (Heidelberg 1959), 20–21. Heidegger cites this brief address in its entirety in his preface to the 1972 edition of his Early Writings (FS, ix–xi) in order to depict the bygone “intellectual world that implicitly defined my early essays.” The address was first translated into English by Hans Seigfried in Man and World 3 (1970), 3–4, and reprinted in Thomas Sheehan (ed.), Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker (Chicago: Precedent, 1981), 21–22. We wish to thank Professor Seigfried for once again allowing us to use his translation in this collection.

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on his or her career, and has already taken with the second dissertation or habilitation text submitted with the application. Thus, Heidegger’s narrative of his intellectual development up to this point concludes with the commitment to a “life’s work” of “a comprehensive presentation of medieval logic and psychology in the light of phenomenology, with a simultaneous consideration of the historical position of individual medieval thinkers.” This statement alone in its basic terms already gives us much to mull over in the mutations and shifts that they will undergo as the young Heidegger rapidly develops toward his more characteristic insights. Heinrich Rickert, Heidegger’s director for the habilitation, had, for example, in his evaluation of it (see appendix I), already advised the young Heidegger against recourse to the “historical” in favor of a more strictly “systematic” approach to the problems. But Heidegger will persist, despite some hesitation expressed in “Curriculum Vitae 1915” (perhaps to appease Rickert) in regarding the two “simultaneously” or, to use a Laskian term employed now and then in the habilitation, as “equiprimordial” or “equally original” (gleich ursprünglich) in a phenomenological approach.

The recollective “Vita” of 1957 is a far richer statement of Heidegger’s influences, already purportedly felt during the student years at least by way of incubation. It is of course richer because of the vantage of hindsight, a retrospective invested with an overview of the suggestive vectors that were in fact taken up and pursued in the intervening forty years. It therefore must be regarded as a bit more fanciful and quasi-factual reminiscence, as compared to the immediate and virtually contemporary witness out of the times that the prior vitae provide. It is nevertheless too rich to ignore, as Heidegger’s own nostalgic account of his student years, the one he himself invoked as an entry into his Early Writings.

✧ ✧ ✧

Curriculum Vitae 1913

I, Martin Heidegger, was born in Messkirch (Baden) on September 26, 1889, the son of the sexton and master cooper Friedrich Heidegger and of Johanna, née Kempf, both of them citizens of Baden and members of the Catholic Church. From 1899 to 1903 I attended the middle school of my hometown, and in the fall of 1903 I entered the first year of the gymnasium in Constance. Since 1906, after the third year of high school, I attended the Berthold Gymnasium in Freiburg in Breisgau, and there in the summer of 1909 I passed the final comprehensive examination. In the fall of the same year I matriculated at the University of Freiburg in Breisgau as a theology student. In the winter semester of 1911 I changed departments and enrolled in the Department of Natural Sciences and Mathematics. I attended lecture courses in mathematics, physics, chemistry, and botany. Throughout the entire period of my university studies I attended lecture courses in philosophy.
Curriculum Vitae 1915

I, Martin Heidegger, born on September 26, 1889, in Messkirch (Baden), the son of the sexton and master cooper Friedrich Heidegger and of his wife Johanna née Kempf, attended elementary and middle school in Messkirch. Beginning in 1900, I received private instruction in Latin, so that in 1903 I was able to enter the first-year class [Untertertia] of the gymnasium in Constance. I am grateful to Dr. Konrad Gröber, at that time rector of the minor seminary and currently pastor in the city of Constance, for decisive intellectual influence. After completing the third year of high school [Untersekunda] I attended the Berthold Gymnasium in Freiburg in Breisgau until reception of the high-school baccalaureate (summer 1909).

During the fourth year [Obersekunda], when instruction in mathematics moved away from merely solving problems and more onto the theoretical plane, my preference for this discipline became a really focused interest, which extended to physics as well. Incentives also came from religion classes, which led me to do extensive reading in the theory of biological evolution.

In the last year of high school it was above all the Plato classes of Gymnasium Professor Widder, who died several years ago, that introduced me to philosophical problems more consciously, though not yet with theoretical rigor.

After completing the gymnasium, I entered the University of Freiburg in Breisgau in the winter semester of 1909, and I remained there without interruption until 1913. At first I studied theology. The lecture courses in philosophy that were prescribed at the time did not satisfy me much, so I resorted to studying Scholastic textbooks on my own. They provided me with some schooling in formal logic, but as regards philosophy they did not give me what I was looking for and had found in the area of apologetics through the works of Herman Schell.
Besides the Small Summa of Thomas Aquinas and some of the works of Bonaventure, the *Logical Investigations* of Edmund Husserl was decisive for the course of my scientific development. The earlier work by the same author, *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, at the same time placed mathematics in a whole new light for me.

After three semesters, my intense engagement with philosophical problems, along with the tasks of my own professional studies [in theology], resulted in severe exhaustion.

My heart trouble, which had come about earlier from playing too much sports, broke out so severely that any later employment in the service of the church was taken to be extremely questionable. Therefore in the winter semester of 1911–1912 I enrolled in the Department of Natural Sciences and Mathematics.

My philosophical interest was not lessened by the study of mathematics. On the contrary, since I no longer had to follow the compulsory lecture courses in philosophy, I could attend a larger number of lecture courses in philosophy and above all could take part in the seminar exercises conducted by Privy Councilor Rickert.  

In this new school I learned first and foremost to understand philosophical prob-

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4. Heinrich Rickert (1863–1936), philosopher at Freiburg 1894–1916, who along with Wilhelm Windelband in Heidelberg was a leader of the Southwest German school of neo-Kantianism, which sought to develop a transcendental philosophy of value. In 1915, director of Heidegger’s habilitation, which applies the methods of modern philosophical logic to a Scotian transcendental logic and speculative grammar. Heidegger in his early career tends to cite the following of Rickert’s principal publications: *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis* [The Object of Knowledge] (1892; 2nd ed., 1904; 3rd ed., 1915); *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung. Eine logische Einleitung in die historischen Wissenschaften* [The Limits of Concept Formation in the Natural Sciences: A Logical Introduction to the Historical Sciences] (1st half, 1896; 2nd half, 1902; 2nd ed., 1913); *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft* (3rd ed., 1915); *Zur Lehre von der Definition* [On the Theory of Definition] (2nd ed., 1915). Heidegger’s favorite article: “Das Eine, die Einheit und die Eins. Bemerkungen zur Logik des Zahlbegriffs” [The One, Unity, and One: Comments on the Logic of the Concept of Number], *Logos* II (1911), 26–78. ‘Privy Councilor’ (*Geheimrat*) was a largely honorific title that the Second Reich conferred on favored senior professors.
lems as problems, and I acquired insight into the essence of logic, the philosophical discipline that still interests me the most. At the same time I acquired a correct understanding of recent philosophy from Kant onward, a matter that I found sparsely and inadequately treated in the Scholastic literature. My basic philosophical convictions remained those of Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy. With time I recognized that the intellectual wealth stored up in it must permit of—indeed, demands—a far more fruitful exploitation and utilization. Therefore, in my dissertation on *The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism*, I took my bearings both from modern logic and from basic Aristotelian-Scholastic premises and sought to find a basis there for further investigations of a central problem of logic and epistemology. On the basis of this work, I was allowed by the Philosophical Faculty of Freiburg University to take the oral examination for the doctorate, which I passed on July 26, 1913.

As a result of my study of Fichte and Hegel, my intense engagement with Rickert’s *The Limits of Concept Formation in the Natural Sciences*, the investigations of Dilthey, and not least of all lecture courses and seminar exercises with Privy Councilor Finke, my aversion to history, which had been nurtured in me by my predilection for mathematics, was thoroughly destroyed. I recognized that philosophy should not be oriented one-sidedly either to mathematics and natural science or to history, but that the latter, precisely as the history of spirit (*Geistesgeschichte*), can fructify philosophy to a far greater degree.

My increasing interest in history facilitated for me a more intense engagement with the philosophy of the Middle Ages, an engagement that I recognized as necessary for a radical extension of Scholasticism. For me this engagement consists not primarily in a presentation of the historical relations between individual thinkers, but rather in an interpretative understanding of the theoretical content of their philosophy with the means provided by modern philosophy. This resulted in my investigation into *The Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus*.

This investigation has also engendered in me the plan for a comprehensive presentation of medieval logic and psychology in the light of modern phenomenology, together with a consideration of the historical position of individual medieval thinkers. If I am permitted to assume the duties of scientific research and teaching, my life’s work will be dedicated to the realization of this plan.

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5. Heinrich Finke (1855–1938), Catholic historian specializing in medieval history, from 1899 professor at Freiburg, from 1924 president of the Görres-Gesellschaft. Finke played a central role in promoting, and then stifling, his student Heidegger’s budding career within the relatively large branch of Freiburg’s Philosophical Faculty that officially represented the “Catholic worldview.”
A Recollective “Vita” 1957

The indicated path, in retrospect and in prospect, appears at every juncture in a different light, with a different tone, and stirs different interpretations. Several traits, however, although hardly recognizable to oneself, run continuously throughout the regions of thought. This facet is shown in the little pamphlet, *The Pathway*, written in 1947–1948.

At the humanistic gymnasiums in Constance and Freiburg in Breisgau, between 1903 and 1909, I enjoyed fruitful learning under excellent teachers of Greek, Latin, and German. Likewise, besides my formal education—or rather, during it—I acquired everything that would last and persist over the years.

In 1905 I read, for the first time, Adalbert Stifter’s *Motley Stones* [*Bunte Steine*]. In 1907, a fatherly friend from my hometown and later the archbishop of Freiburg in Breisgau, Dr. Conrad Gröber, presented me with Franz Brentano’s dissertation, *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle* (1862). Its many lengthy quotations from the Greek original took, for me, the place of Aristotle’s collected works, which nevertheless were on my student desk one year later, borrowed from my boarding school library. The quest for the unity in the multiplicity of being, then only obscurely, unsteadily, and helplessly stirring within me, remained, through many upheavals, erratic detours, and perplexities, the relentless impetus for the treatise *Being and Time* which appeared two decades later.

In 1908 I found my way to Hölderlin through a small Reclam paperback of his poems, still in my possession.

In 1909 I began my studies by taking theology for four semesters at the University of Freiburg in Breisgau. In the following years, philosophy, the humanities, and the natural sciences completed my course of study. Beginning in 1909 I attempted, although without adequate guidance, to grasp the meaning of Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*. Rickert’s seminars introduced me to the writings of Emil Lask who, mediating between Rickert and Husserl, attempted also to listen to the Greek thinkers.

What the exciting years between 1910 and 1914 meant for me cannot be adequately expressed; I can only indicate a bit of it by a selective listing: the second, significantly enlarged edition of Nietzsche’s *The Will to Power*, the works of

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6. See n. 1 above.
7. See n. 4 above.
8. Emil Lask (1875–1915), philosopher, student of Windelband and Rickert, associate professor at Heidelberg, as a volunteer officer killed on the Russian front on May 26, 1915, prompting Heidegger’s dedication of the habilitation to Lask “in his distant soldier’s grave.” Principal publications: *Fichte’s Idealismus und die Geschichte* [Fichte’s Idealism and History] (1902); *Die Logik der Philosophie* [The Logic of Philosophy] (1911); *Die Lehre vom Urteil* [The Theory of Judgment] (1912).
Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky in translation, the awakening interest in Hegel and Schelling, Rilke’s works and Trakl’s poems, Dilthey’s *Collected Writings*.

The decisive, and therefore ineffable, influence on my own later academic career came from two men who should be expressly mentioned here in memory and gratitude; the one was Carl Braig,9 professor of systematic theology, who was the last in the tradition of the speculative school of Tübingen which gave significance and scope to Catholic theology through its dialogue with Hegel and Schelling. The other one was the art historian Wilhelm Vöge.10 The impact of each lecture by these two teachers lasted through the long semester breaks, which I always spent in uninterrupted work at my parents’ house in my hometown of Messkirch.

What later succeeded and failed on the path that I chose defies self-inter-pretation, which could only name that which does not belong to one’s self. And therein resides everything essential.

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10. Wilhelm Vöge (1868–1952), art historian, 1890 doctorate at Strasbourg, 1895 licen-se to teach with a habilitation on *Raffael und Donatello* (1896), 1897 scientific assistant at the Kaiser Friedrich Museum in Berlin, 1909 associate professor of art history at Freiburg, 1910 professor of the history of modern art at Freiburg, May 18, 1911 inaugural address “Über die Bedeutung der Persönlichkeit in der französischen Kunst des Mittelalters” [On the Significance of Personality in Medieval French Art], 1916 early retirement due to a serious nervous condition. Books include *Eine deutsche Malerschule um die Wende des 1. Jahrtausends* [A School of German Painters around the Turn of the First Millennium] (1891); *Die Anfänge des monumental en Stils* [The Beginnings of the Monumental Style] (1894); and *Niklaus Hagnower, der Meister des Isenheimer Altars und seine Frühwerke* [Niklaus von Hagenau, Master of the Isenheim Altarpiece, and His Early Works] (1926). Articles on various German medieval artists, such as Konrad Miet, Nikolaus von Leyden, and Jörg Syrlin. An attempt on the part of Kurt Bauch, art historian at Freiburg, to have the aging Vöge awarded the Goethe Medal, for which Heidegger wrote a letter of support, came to naught in the Nazi bureaucracy of 1942–1943. Upon Vöge’s death in 1952, Heidegger would recall to his students at the time (e.g., Hartmut Buchner) how Vöge’s slow, deliberate, and clear style of lecturing had a great impact on him as a student, which Heidegger would then emulate in his own teaching.
2. Two Articles for *The Academician*

Heidegger began his publishing career as a twenty-year-old student of Catholic theology with an article in his local newspaper on “All-Souls Moods” before he left for Freiburg for his first university semester of studies. After the first semester, he began writing a series of review articles for the newly founded monthly journal of the Catholic Academic Association, which from its inception was committed to the anti-modernist science policies promulgated in the “Modernism Encyclical” by Pope Pius X in 1907. The young Heidegger’s already manifest philosophical penchant thus gravitates toward an exploration of the philosophical foundations of modernism from Descartes to Nietzsche in relation to the question of the church’s authority not only over scientific theology but in the human sciences in general and the academic life as such. Presenting himself as a committed Catholic academic, the young Heidegger in his reading of modern literature takes particular issue with individualism understood as the cult of the “personality” aesthetically in search of “experiences” (*Erlebnisse*). While questioning the starting point of Protestant theology in subjective religious experience as the sole foundation of faith, the young Heidegger, following his realist Aristotelian-scholastic mentors as well as (tacitly) Husserl, at once grants the validity of the modern discipline of psychology of religion insofar as it studies the “laws” that govern the contents of consciousness in phenomena like faith, hope, prayer, conversion, ecstasy, doubt, etc. But in his longest article for *The Academician*, “Psychology of Religion and the Subconscious,” Heidegger puts the concept of the “subconscious”...
in question as a quasi-mystical explanatory construct meant to displace the more traditional concept of “conscience,” which as such can be made manifest not only through introspective “observation” but from the observations of others in the tradition (hagiography and other religious documents). The latter observation is the closest that the young Heidegger comes at hinting at his own brand of phenomenology as hermeneutical. His curriculum of theology courses at this time included not only hermeneutics (“exegesis”) but also a “thorough education” in apologetics. Apologetics is particularly evident in the two early articles included in this chapter, as Heidegger promotes the “treasure” of eternal truths of the Catholic Church in providing “fulfilled, fulfilling answers to the ultimate questions of being” that serve as an antidote to anti-intellectualist, “illogical” individualism. The young Heidegger’s strong commitment to Aristotelian-Thomistic scholasticism nevertheless does not lead him to regard it as a closed and complete textbook-system of “doctrinal statements.” It is rather an ongoing “struggle after truth” open to advances in more recent philosophy, as in modern logic, which Heidegger will apply to his two still scholastic dissertations. The two articles presented here thus constitute a kind of zero-point for Heidegger’s developing attitudes toward religion regarded as a worldview in its relation to philosophy, science, and the academic life, about which he will speak out in various forums for the rest of his life.

For overt testimony of the first of these changes in attitude toward the “Catholic worldview,” see the letters to Krebs in 1919 (chap. 10) and to Misch in 1922 (chap. 12). The earliest evidence of Heidegger’s qualms about the anti-modernist oath that all Catholic academics were then required to take, and the ensuing “thought control” that the Italian papacy sought to impose upon German Catholicism, comes to light in an ironic personal letter to his priest friend and university teacher, Engelbert Krebs, on July 19, 1914 (in appendix II): “Perhaps you as an ‘academic’ can apply for better treatment, so that all those who allow themselves to have independent thoughts could have their brains removed and replaced by Italian salad. Philosophical demand could be met by setting up vending machines in the train stations (gratis for those without means). I have a dispensation that covers the period of my studies.”

Book Review (Der Akademiker 2, no. 7 [May 1910], 109–10)

Fürer, Fr. W., Authority and Freedom: Observations on the Cultural Problem of the Church (Kempten/Munich: Kösel).

The fundamental ideas and directives of the latest “Fürer” have already been presented in the March issue of this journal (Akad. 2, no. 5), which published its foreword. The shrill contradictions of our age—on the one hand the obstinate fanaticism for reality in the naturalist and socialist organization of life, on the other
the new worlds of ideas and their philosophy of immanence with its construction of values for existence \([Dasein]\)—are the end results of an unchecked autonomism. Förster now raises the question of competence: Is modern individuality capable of and justified in solving the deepest problems of religious and ethical life according to its own sense or at all? Inductively, the author concludes with a decisive “No.” Already the single almost overwhelming fact that most people do not find the truth on their own, do not want to struggle for it and would much rather nail it to the cross, takes away the ground for the possibility of any individualistic ethics. Furthermore, the fundamental truths of life do not allow themselves to be a priori scientifically constructed. Rather, a rich and profound life experience \([Lebenserfahrung]\) as well as one’s own spiritual freedom standing over against the world of impulses must also be required. The much ballyhooed cult of personality can thus only flourish when it remains in intimate contact with the richest and deepest source of religious and ethical authority. This cannot by its very nature dispense with a venerable outer form. And the church will, if it is to remain true to its eternal treasure of truth, justifiably counteract the destructive influences of modernism, which is not conscious of the most acute contradictions in which its modern views of life stand in relation to the ancient wisdom of the Christian tradition. Its superabundance of great thoughts about life, its clear and lucid structure, the irresistible deduction of proofs that takes into consideration all objections, in short, its entire philosophic disposition proclaims aloud the inestimable worth of this book. Along with the interspersed glosses providing a deeper understanding of Nietzsche, the remarks on biblical criticism, the Christ myth, and so on, one occasionally finds, precisely at the end of the book where the author deals with modernism, passages which call for a critique or at least a sharper distinction. Whoever has not set foot on the path of error and have not allowed themselves to be blinded by the illusory radiance of the modern spirit, whoever embarks upon life’s journey in true, deep, and well-founded relinquishment of the self in the glaring light of truth, to them this book announces a great joy, to them this book restores with surprising clarity the great fortune of possessing the truth. In reading this book, one is readily reminded of a saying of the great Görres: “Dig deeper and you will hit upon Catholic ground.” Förster has the bold courage of one who digs more deeply, never shrinking from the consequences. Indeed, \(grandes passus extra viam\) [great journeys depart from the normal path].

Freiburg i. Br. Heidegger, theology
On a Philosophical Orientation for Academics  
(Der Akademiker 3, no. 5 [March 1911], 66–67)

Philosophy, in truth a mirror of the eternal, today often only reflects subjective opinions, personal moods and wishes. Anti-intellectualism also makes philosophy into “lived experience” [Erlebnis]. One acts like an Impressionist, clings to “momentary values,” as an “eclectic” in his dark urges fuses together the most mutually contradictory thoughts into a worldview—the system is complete. To be sure, there is some system in the way they today “construct worldviews.” A strict, ice-cold logic is inimical to the refined feelings of the modern soul. “Thinking” can no longer allow itself to be confined within the unshakeable eternal limits of fundamental logical positions. There we have it already. To strictly logical thought, which hermetically seals itself off against any affective influence of the soul, to each truly presuppositionless scientific work there belongs a certain base of ethical power, the art of getting hold of oneself and externalizing oneself.

It is indeed already a banality: today worldviews are cut to fit “life,” instead of vice versa.

And with this fluttering back and forth, with the connoisseurship in philosophical questions that has gradually become a sport, the longing breaks out unawares—despite all the awareness and self-smugness—for fulfilled, fulfilling answers to the ultimate questions of being. Those questions at times suddenly flash up and then lie unresolved, like lead weights in the tortured, lost, and wandering soul.

Nowadays we know how to pose ever new tasks for academics with a certain virtuosity, how to set “illuminating” new goals. Such a variety of often quite problematic matters needs to be recognized and taken into account. And finally students lose themselves in the face of all the various things which distract, interest, and mobilize them. An illogical, unhealthy condition is thereby created. Here a justified egoism must again be more strongly emphasized, one which ranks intellectual and ethical consolidation and development of one’s own personality as a basic requirement over and above all other projects and occupations.

This is not meant to launch a polemic against any specific tendency among the students. Only this should be set in the foreground: personal development should not take a back seat to outside involvements which are becoming ever more intrusive.

To be sure, this basic demand brings with it, along with its lofty intrinsic worth, the full difficulty of how to adequately fulfill it. It is then all the less appropriate to distract the academic from this problem; one must face up to it all the more energetically. No doubt obtains about the urgency of a more thorough apologetic education. Academic lectures on religion instill contemporary ideas: conceived with wide-ranging scope, presented in finely crafted speech, the basic truths of Christianity in their eternal greatness appear before the soul of the
The notes for this chapter are Heidegger’s. Interpolations by the editors are in brackets.

1. Some of the better known authors of such philosophical textbooks: Gutberlet, Mercier, Braig, Lehmen, Steuer, Hagemann-Dyroff, Donat.

2. Sammlung Kösel no. 37, 1910. The Kösel collection as a whole has already been appraised in this journal (Akad. 3, no. 2). Of the series of philosophical pamphlets, that of M. Wittmann, Die Grundfragen der Ethik [The Basic Questions of Ethics] is worth mentioning here. In my opinion, far too little attention has been paid to this little book, which in structure and method as well considers the prevalent currents in ethics.

3. On the recent currents of modernism, see the latest work by Klimke, Der Monismus. Beiträge zu einer Kritik moderner Geistesströmungen [Monism: Contributions to a Critique of Modern Intellectual Movements] (Freiburg, 1911).
cise delimitation of the essence and task of a worldview, [Klimke] provides the possibility of orienting oneself properly on the tortuous paths of modern “worldviews” of the most differentiated kinds, of separating the chaff from the wheat and making some use of it for oneself. In accordance with the results of these thoughts, the author deals with “The Factors of Worldviews” in the first part, and “The Systems of Worldviews” in the second part of the work. One should especially point out the chapter, “The Intellectual Factors of Worldviews” (pp. 59–67). Precisely today, where epistemology has become the “fundamental science,” these questions must be granted doubled attention. In the second part (87), the author schematically groups the different worldviews according to their sources, methods, limits, and the number and quality of their principles. At the conclusion of this extremely stimulating booklet, there is a literature index, in which the works in question are accurately characterized in lapidary style. This extremely practical feature should also be recommended for the other booklets of the Kösel collection. Would that Klimke’s work find the same well-deserved attention in academic circles as Willman’s “Philosophical Technical Terms.”


5. The work of Joseph Geyser is wholly oriented in this direction, with extensive references to the literature. See his *Grundlagen der Logik und Erkenntnislehre. Eine Untersuchung der Formen und Prinzipien objektiv wahrer Erkenntnis* [Foundations of Logic and Epistemology: An Investigation of the Forms and Principles of Objectively True Knowledge] (Münster, 1909). [Reviewed by Heidegger in his “Recent Research in Logic” in 1912; see chap. 4 of the present collection.]
3. The Problem of Reality in Modern Philosophy

This essay from Heidegger’s early student years first appeared in the Catholic journal, Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görresgesellschaft, in 1912. It claims to be a “transcendental” investigation into the possibility of the “healthy realism” of the natural sciences, a realism that unproblematically and with great success both posits and defines objective, mind-independent realities. Before a positive account of this possibility can be suggested in the final sections (II: 3, 4), Heidegger must first confront the two dominant epistemologies of his time that deny the possibility of such a realism: “conscientialism” and “phenomenalism.” Conscientialism, which Heidegger traces back to the empiricism of Berkeley and Hume, denies the possibility of either positing or defining mind-independent realities. According to this view, thought and being are united in the concept of consciousness, and can be separated only by an act of abstraction. Mind-independent reality is not even possible on this view, since it claims that being is a moment of consciousness and nothing beyond that. Phenomenalism, on the other hand, which Heidegger attributes to Kant, requires the positing of a mind-independent reality (the “mysterious thing in itself”) as the suprasensible cause of our sense impressions, but denies that this reality can be defined. The thing in itself must remain an enigmatic something = X. Heidegger’s cursory refutation of these two theories should remove the primary obstacles to the possibility of both positing and defining mind-independent realities, and thus clears the way for the positive account of “critical realism” (inspired by Oswald Külpe) that is sketched in the final sections of the essay.

Heidegger considers three different arguments for conscientialism (the a priori,
empirical, and methodological arguments), to which he raises a number of objections. The primary confusion, however, from which all three suffer is the psychologicist conflation of the ideal content (or meaning) of a mental act and the psychic existence of the act itself. The \textit{a priori} argument claims that the concept of a mind-independent reality contains a contradiction, since merely by thinking this concept, it thereby becomes dependent upon thought. As Heidegger points out, however, if we distinguish the ideal content of a thought from the psychic existence of the act of thought itself, then merely thinking an object does not imply that the \textit{object of thought} is a mental act. Similarly, the empirical argument claims that only facts of consciousness are given to us, and that all knowledge is constructed from these facts according to principles that are themselves merely facts of consciousness, without any recourse to transcendent realities. Once again, this argument rules out the possibility of positing mind-independent realities only if we conflate the meaning of these facts with their psychic existence. As Heidegger points out, however, the content of the principles of knowledge is distinct from the existence of empirical, mental acts. Indeed, the principles of knowledge are not inductively grounded laws of subjective mental events, but \textit{a priori} and universally valid principles that govern the \textit{content} of thought. Finally, the methodological argument claims that a certain foundation for knowledge is provided only by the immediately given and therefore indubitable facts of consciousness, and not by questionable transcendent entities of which we have no direct experience. This argument fails, however, because it mistakenly attributes a justificatory role to the mere \textit{existence} of psychic facts which can be performed only by the \textit{meaning} of such facts. As Heidegger writes: “Facts simply \textit{are} or are not. Only knowledge can be certain, and, as we saw above, knowledge cannot be obtained from the data of consciousness alone.”

In contrast to conscientialism, phenomenalism requires the positing of a mind-independent reality as the suprasensible cause of our sense impressions, but denies that this reality can be defined any further. Among the flurry of brief objections that Heidegger raises against this view, most of which—it must be said—are based upon extremely uncharitable readings of Kant, there seem to be two principal contentions: first, that the subjectivity of the formal conditions of knowledge does not rule out the definition of supersensible realities; and second, that thought is restricted neither by Kant’s sensible (the forms of intuition) nor by his intellectual (the categories) conditions of knowledge, but is free to posit entities that are neither sensible nor categorial. Kant’s own categories as well as the objects of logic (concepts, judgments, conclusions) should be examples of non-intuible objects of thought, and “the unordered, chaotic matter of sensory impressions” should be an example of the non-categorical.

In support of the first contention, Heidegger claims that the “modifying function” of the pure forms of thought and intuition is “an utterly dogmatic assumption.” Although Heidegger concedes that appearances are subjectively constituted,
and cannot be posited as objective realities just as they present themselves to us, he nonetheless argues that it is possible to filter out the “modes of apprehension and additions of the knowing subject” in order to isolate what is objective in perception. In particular, Heidegger argues that the regularities in perception are indicators of suprasensible causes that must be postulated and regulatively defined. Ultimately, Heidegger’s criticism of Kant on this point seems to be that, despite the subjective constitution of sense-impressions, it is nonetheless possible to postulate and to define in a regulative way suprasensible entities that would be causally responsible for the regularities in our perception.

Heidegger’s own view departs from this critique of Kant and, in this light, could be understood as a revision of Kant’s philosophy that retains many of its essential features. It seems clear that Heidegger accepts Kant’s distinction between subjectively constituted appearances and the suprasensible realities that incite them. Both the coercive and the public nature of objects require that we posit a suprasensible reality as the cause of appearances. To that extent, Heidegger agrees with Kant against the conscientialists who reject the positing of mind-independent realities. But, as we have seen, Heidegger does not draw Kant’s conclusion that the suprasensible realities are beyond all definition. This is not because Heidegger thinks we have a kind of access to these realities that Kant does not recognize; on the contrary, “only experience can give us information about whether real objects exist.” And it is not because appearances are taken to be faithful likenesses of things in themselves, for the contents of perception are partly subjective formations, and, as Heidegger explicitly warns, we may not infer the nature of the causes of perception from their effects. Rather, Heidegger’s view seems to be that suprasensible realities may be regulatively defined, or hypothesized, according to a kind of “best explanation” model. Such definitions, Heidegger explains, will be regulated in their content by the observed relations, “i.e., the definition must present the relata as capable of bringing about real events.” This emphasis on “bringing about real events” seems to direct us to the laboratory, where theoretical entities must generate reliable predictions under experimental conditions. Moreover, this postulating and defining of suprasensible causes should not be restricted by sensible or categorial conditions, which makes room for the intuitively bizarre mathematical entities we are familiar with from contemporary physics.

Aaron Bunch

P.S. It should finally be noted that Külpe’s form of scientific realism will persist in Heidegger into Being and Time and beyond. In the later years, the scientific positioning of “reality” raised to a global level becomes a central feature of the technological transformation of the essence of modern science into Ge-Stell, the syn-thetic com-posit(ion)ing of global matrixes, such as the World Wide Web,
The Internet, GPS, and air traffic control grids, all pervaded by the all-pervasive digital (“positing”) logic of computerization.

Theodore Kisiel

The Problem of Reality in Modern Philosophy

In his characteristic manner, the witty Frenchman Brunetière writes concerning the problem of the external world: “Je voudrais bien savoir, quel est le malade ou le mauvais plaisant, et je devrais dire le fou, qui s’est avisé le premier de mettre en doute ‘la réalité du monde extérieur,’ et d’en faire une question pour les philosophes. Car la question a-t-elle même un sens?”¹ In this case, the critical thinker who coined the phrase “the bankruptcy of science” did not look deeply enough. His appeal to “common sense,” a subject on which Kant recorded some rather pointed views,² falls far short of any methodically scientific treatment of our question. If we distinguish the naive (albeit for practical life wholly adequate) view that presumes to grasp the “real” at a single glance, from the methodically executed theoretical positing and defining of realities in science, we are then faced with a definite problem. An all-out effort to first free ourselves from the leaden weight of the presumed self-evidence [of naive “common sense”] is therefore the necessary precondition for coming to a deeper understanding of the problem.

In order to secure the historical basis for the discussion of this problem, we might briefly note that the mentality of Greek philosophy was oriented by a critical realism. The Neo-Platonists as well as the philosophers in both the medieval and modern era also all thought realistically. Though a wide variety of views about the definition [Bestimmung] or determination of the real can be found, there is complete agreement over the positing [Setzung] of something trans-subjective. It was not until Berkeley³ that the position of realism becomes tenuous. With his esse est percipi, i.e., the identification of being and being-perceived, he asserts the iden-

¹. Sur les chemins de la croyance: 1ère étape (l’utilisation du positivisme) [On the Roads to Belief: First Step (The Utilization of Positivism)] (Paris, 8th ed., 1910), 25 n. [Translation: “I should very much like to know what sick person or sorry joker—and I must also say the fool—it was who first got it into his head to doubt the reality of the external world and make it a question for philosophers. Does such a question even make any sense?”]
². Prolegomena (Leipzig), 34 [= Kant’s Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics].
³. Cf. Fr. Klimke, Der Monismus und seine philosophischen Grundlagen [Monism and its Philosophical Foundations] (Freiburg, 1911), 382 ff: This work, whose title is not even remotely indicative of the wealth of thought that it elaborates, deals in Book IV (pp. 371–533) with the movements of conscientialism and phenomenalism, which will be ex-
tity of the physical and the psychical. The existence of an independent material world transcendent to consciousness is abolished. Psychologically, of course, Berkeley is still a realist so that, along with the substance of the soul, he still assumes [the existence of] a multitude of minds. Berkeley’s successor, Hume, then thought this sensationalism through to its final consequences. The basic concepts of substance and causality are stripped of their objective and real characters, in that each is dissolved into a “bundle of perceptions” which in turn is traced back to a subjective feeling of constraint. On the basis of this “felt force of association” (Hume), the associatively conjoined reproductions of certain simultaneous perceptions are thought to be in an objective relation. Kant, who sought to overcome the dangerous one-sidedness of English empiricism and to secure a universally valid and necessary knowledge for human beings within certain limits, could do no better than to posit a mysterious “thing in itself.” And when one considers that, in his investigation of the question of how pure mathematics, the natural sciences, and metaphysics (in a rationalist sense) are possible, Kant ultimately applied his transcendental method only to the formal sciences, it becomes clear that the problem of reality simply has no place in his epistemology. To be sure, towards the end of his life Kant did try to bridge the gap between metaphysics and physics. But by then it was no longer possible for him to find a solution. And it is abundantly clear that philosophy immediately after Kant, which culminates in the extravagant idealism of Hegel, distanced itself more and more from reality and from an understanding of how this reality is to be posited and defined. When, after the downfall of the Hegelian philosophy, the particular sciences forcibly tore themselves away from the tutelage of philosophy and threatened to completely stifle it (one need only consider the precarious position and dependent function of philosophy in positivism), the only salvation seemed to be to go “back to Kant.” Thus it is that philosophy today lives in the spirit of Kant, but is no less influenced by the tendencies of English and French empiricism. There is good reason to regard Hume as the true spiritus rector [guiding spirit] of contemporary philosophy. Hence, the dominant epistemological tendencies are characterized by conscientialism (immanentism) and phenomenalism, views which attempt to show that a definition of the “real” or even (in the first view) the mere positing of an external world independ-
ent of consciousness is inadmissible and impossible. Simultaneously with this rise and growth of modern philosophy, the empirical research of the natural sciences continued its work undaunted, in the spirit of a healthy realism that brought it splendid results.

Is the dichotomy indicated here between philosophical theory and the practice of the natural sciences a genuine split? Or is it the case that, as “disciplines that twist and turn over formalistic ideas,” the standpoint of actuality \([\text{Wirklichkeitsstandpunkt}]^6\) and phenomenalism have perhaps outlived their time? An epistemological investigation that sees its task in the application of the transcendental method to an established science—in our case therefore seeks to resolve the problem of “how is empirical natural science possible?”—will on the basis of its results have to give an affirmative answer to the above question. In light of what has been said thus far, it is understandable how O. Külpe could write at the conclusion of his work \(\text{The Philosophy of the Present in Germany}\) that “at the threshold of this philosophy of the future . . . stands the \text{problem of reality} \([\text{Realität}]^7\).” More than any other thinker, this professor of philosophy at Bonn seems to have dedicated his research to this particular problem. In his more recent works, he repeatedly returns to this problem. At the philosophical congress this year in Bologna, he delivered a paper on the history of the concept of \(\text{Realität}^8\). And in a work that appeared last year, \(\text{Epistemology and the Natural Sciences}\), he provides a substantial discussion of the problem of reality with particular reference to the natural sciences.\(^9\)

As already noted, the undeniable, epoch-making state of affairs of the natural sciences has brought our problem to the focus of interest. When the morphologist determines the structure of plants and animals; when the anatomist explicates the internal structure of living creatures and their organs; when the cellular biologist undertakes the study of the cell, its construction and development; when the chemist investigates the elements and combinations of chemical compounds; and

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6. Translator’s note by Philip J. Bossert, abridged: The distinction here between \(\text{Wirklichkeitsstandpunkt}\) (standpoint of actuality) which Heidegger is criticizing and \(\text{Realitätsstandpunkt}\) (standpoint of reality) which he is defending is a distinction he accepts directly from Oswald Külpe (Cf. his \text{Einleitung in die Philosophie} (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1907), 147–65, esp. 148). The distinction is between reality that is dependent upon consciousness for its existence—i.e., the reality of or with consciousness, \(\text{Wirklichkeit}\) (actuality)—and reality that exists independently of, outside of or beyond consciousness—\(\text{Realität}\). [N.B.: Both \(\text{Realität}\) and \(\text{Wirklichkeit}\) are commonly translated into English as ‘reality’—but not in this essay.]

7. Oswald Külpe, \(\text{Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Deutschland}\) [Contemporary Philosophy in Germany] (Leipzig, 5th ed., 1911), 136.

8. A. Ruge, “Unter den beiden Türmen” [Under the Two Towers]. On the philosophical congress in Bologna, see \(\text{Der Tag}\), no. 99 (1911).

9. Hereafter we shall use the following abbreviations of Külpe’s works in our references: \(K = \text{I. Kant}\) (Leipzig, 2nd ed., 1908); \(E = \text{Einleitung in die Philosophie}\) (Leipzig, 5th ed., 1910); \(EN = \text{Erkenntnistheorie und Naturwissenschaft}\) (Leipzig, 1910); \(Ph = \text{Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Deutschland}\) (Leipzig, 5th ed., 1911).
when the astronomer calculates the position and orbit of the celestial bodies, then these researchers in these various branches of science are convinced that they are not analyzing mere sense-data [Empfindungen] or working on pure concepts, but rather positing and defining real objects that exist independently of them and their scientific research.

How is this “realizing” [Realisierung] or, more exactly, this positing and defining of trans-subjective objects possible? The positive solution to this problem that has been raised must be preceded by a critical laying of foundations in order to decide if it is at all admissible to go beyond the actuality of consciousness [Bewusstseinswirklichkeit], i.e., to admit and to characterize realities [Realitäten]. Such an investigation amounts to a contestation of conscientialism and phenomenalism. Consequently, the whole problem is reduced to four sharply circumscribed questions (EN, 9 ff.):

1. Is positing the real admissible?
2. How is positing the real possible?
3. Is defining the real admissible?
4. How is such a definition possible?

To proceed methodically, we shall begin with a discussion of the first and third questions, and in treating the other two will come back to Külpe’s above-mentioned text [EN].

II

1. [Is positing the real admissible?] By way of introduction, we mentioned Hume’s significance for the development of modern epistemology. In our own time, English empiricism has undergone a variety of modifications. Richard von Schubert-Soldern has worked out a theory of solipsism and considers it a self-evident fact that requires no further proof. The consciousness of the knower, and this alone, is the object of knowledge. This philosophy of immanence finds its chief representative in Schuppe. He has clarified and attempted to ground his position in his Epistemological Logic.10 All being [Sein] is being-conscious [Bewusst-Sein]. The concept of consciousness includes both the conscious subject and the object of consciousness. But these two moments are separable only by abstraction. The result of this is the indissoluble concatenation of thought with being. A close relative to this philosophy of immanence is the empirio-criticism of Richard Avenarius who, in his three major works,11 sets himself the goal of determining the one and only true concept of the world. Finally, we should mention Ernst Mach, the founder of so-

10. Wilhelm Schuppe, Erkenntnistheoretische Logik (Bonn, 1878).
called sense-data monism. He has best developed his ideas in the book, *Contributions to the Analysis of Sense Data*. A thing, a body, or matter is nothing other than the nexus of elements (i.e., sense data), of colors, tones, etc., nothing other than the “marks,” the sensed features.

With a refutation of conscientialism, realism would at least become a possible position. This refutation will pursue the surest route by concentrating on bringing out the core idea of conscientialism, namely, the *principle of immanence*. The negative arguments in favor of the “standpoint of actuality,” which are supposed to undermine the positive arguments usually brought forth in support of realism (e.g., the application of the law of causality to the contents of consciousness as such), all suffer from the same logical mistake, inasmuch as they are based upon a principle of immanence that in fact still needs to be established. Closer consideration is warranted for the direct, positive arguments which Klimke narrows down to three: an *a priori* argument, an empirical argument, and a methodological argument.

The first argument purports to see a contradiction in the concept of being as something that is independent of thought. In thinking about such a reality, the *reality* becomes dependent upon thought and thereby upon the *actuality* of consciousness. But a being [*Seiendes*] that is thought is by no means identical with being in thought [*Sein im Denken*]. What is (phenomenally) “in being” [*seiend*] here is the concept, whose content is intentionally related to the transcendent being [*Sein*]. The psychic existence of a concept and the ideal being of the content of this concept are two completely different things. Of course, the real being is thought through the concept, but this in no way means that this being is taken into the subject and transformed into psychic being. In my opinion, Geyser is not wrong when he writes: “The whole alleged difficulty is nothing but a glaring sophism of dialectical pseudo-logic.” One has but to draw out the consequence of this procedure, which identifies the act and the content of a concept, and it then becomes clear that accepting the correctness of the above assumption would bring all intellectual life to a standstill. If the act itself were essential to the content, then for this content to be thinkable time and again in an identical way, the very same act as well as the same accompanying milieu of consciousness would have to appear

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12. A penetrating critique [of Mach can be found] in Ph, 23 ff. and in Klimke, ibid., 416 ff.


15. Külpe distinguishes a logical, empirical, formal, teleological, and genetic argument.

each and every time [jeweils]. However, the very fact of the continual flux of psychic events proves this to be an impossible requirement, since, as we know from experience, each and every moment of time presents a different and changing picture of our psychic life.

The empirical argument contains the claim that only the facts of consciousness are actually given and that, from these facts, all knowledge is immanently constructed without any transcendent moment toward any direction whatsoever. But the pure summation of the data of consciousness produces no knowledge (who is to do the summing and who is to recognize the sum for what it is?). Simply lining up perceptions and ideas one after another according to no particular principle can only lead to a chaotic picture. Instead, we find that certain fundamental principles of all knowing, namely, the basic principles of logic, direct our knowledge in immutable and absolutely valid ways. But then the conscientialists say, in order to block the way for us: ‘these real laws, in connecting acts of thought, are also psychic matters of fact, i.e., causal laws of psychic events, and hence no argument against our claims.’ It is here that the erroneous identification of psychic act and logical content once again comes to the fore. The fundamental principles of logic are not inductively grounded, and accordingly are not valid causal laws of subjective psychical events. Rather, we see in them immediately evident, objective, ideal principles “whose content exhibits the most universal relations between intentional thought and the object (in the logical sense).”17 And finally, this empirical argument conflicts with psychological experience. For even being aware of having the contents of consciousness present to oneself already implies a transcending of the given sphere of consciousness in itself. And thus this given sphere of consciousness can never proffer the original stasis [Urbestand] of experience. This can be extracted only by an abstracting activity of thought that transcends the immediately given.18 And besides, how should the degree of certitude required for scientific knowledge be achieved by the mere possession of facts of consciousness?

To be sure, says the third methodological argument, the goal of science is the absolute certainty and universal validity of its propositions. But such propositions cannot be based on presuppositions and hypotheses that have been arbitrarily introduced. Only what is immediately and undeniably given in consciousness can provide a secure, unshakeable foundation. In reply to this, it need only be remarked that certitude cannot be predicated of pure facts (nor of judgments considered as psychic acts). Facts simply are or they are not. Only knowledge can be certain, and, as we saw above, knowledge cannot be drawn from the data of con-

sciousness alone. Concerning this sort of certainty, which is postulated especially by Mach, Külpe writes, “This certitude is certainly unshakeable, but not because it survives disputation, not because it holds out and prevails against opposition, but because no disputation and opposition are even possible.”

2. [Is defining the real admissible?] Basically, our problem does not even exist for conscientialism, whose argumentation we have just shown to be unsound. Not quite so radical, however, is the epistemological direction of phenomenalism. It considers the positing of the real both possible and necessary, but only that. A definition of the real is forbidden by the rule book of phenomenalism. An unknown X, i.e., the mysterious thing in itself, functions as the substrate for the sensations stimulated in the subject from outside. The classic representative of phenomenalism is Kant. According to Kant, the transcendental conditions of intuitive and categorical knowledge have a genetically a priori, subjective character, as he attempted to demonstrate in his “Transcendental Doctrine of Elements.” Accordingly, we know things only in the subjective cloak of their appearance to us. Quite apart from the fact that the inference from the a priori and subjective character of the pure forms of intuition and understanding to the assumptions of phenomenalism is not justified—as a superficial consideration of the problem might seem to indicate—the claim that these forms have a modifying function in a subjective sense remains a purely dogmatic assumption. It will never be possible to provide justification for this presupposition. Kant himself abandoned his thesis that only what is intuited can be an object of thought, and consequently that the understanding has no specific object, when he made the pure concepts of the understanding and their deduction the object of his investigation. When Kant writes, “We shall therefore follow the pure concepts back to their very first seeds and dispositions in the human understanding, in which they lie prepared, till at last, on the occasion of experience, they are developed, and by the same understanding are exhibited in their purity, freed from the empirical conditions attaching to them,” this labor of thought can be realized only on the assumption that what is not intuited, namely, “pure concepts,” can also be an object of thought. It is likewise possible, contrary to Kant’s assertion, to think without categories. Külpe rightly notes, “Even an unordered, chaotic matter of sensations, such as Kant presupposes to be the stuff of sense knowledge, can indeed be thought, but hardly represented and definitely not experienced. If thought were necessarily tied to the application of categories, then such chaos could not be thought at all” (K, 85). And in logic, furthermore, concepts, judgments, and conclusions are raised to the level of objects of thought, and so here as well as in the formulation of universal laws, the non-intuitive is being

19. Külpe, Ph, 27.
thought. Thus, the empiricist contention of Kant concerning the intuitive nature of all objects of thought cannot be maintained. The given, what we find in our experience, provides the material foundation for thinking about the Realität that manifests itself in this given. And the determination of this reality, and not merely of its appearance, is the goal of science. But in Kant, the processing of the experiential material by the understanding operates in a way that is precisely the opposite of realization [Realisierung]. Instead of having the subjective ingredients eliminated by the understanding, the object of knowledge undergoes an increased subjectification by way of the categories. Knowing distances itself even further from its proper object.

It is not difficult to see that a correct determination of the relationship between experience and thought is of fundamental importance for the possibility of defining the posited realities. The sensualism of recent psychology has stripped thought of its independent character. In actuality, however, what is proper to thought is an activity independent of the activity of sensation and the processes of association. This activity of thought governs empirical content by accepting it and processing it according to objective, universally valid, and ideal principles, and in the process analyzes and completes this content. Külpe may well agree with this when he writes: “If it is asked what constitutes the lawfulness of thought if it never influences its object, it can be answered that thought accommodates itself to [sich richten nach] its objects. The laws of thought are the laws of its objects, and thus the Copernican revolution that Kant claims for his theory of knowledge (namely, that objects should accommodate themselves to thought) does not apply to thought itself.” “Thought can well be characterized by the possibility of intending something whose existence and essence is independent of this intending and the intending subject” (K, 98, 97).

With the repudiation of conscientialism and phenomenalism, positing realities and defining them are shown to be possible. As opposed as these two movements have proven to be to the process of realization, they have nevertheless indirectly driven us to a deeper comprehension of this problem and to a comprehensive and more securely founded solution to it. Two questions now remain to be considered for the fulfillment of the positive side of our task: how is the positing and how is the definition or determination of real objects possible?

3. [How is positing the real possible?] The goal of realization is to define the given, or what is already found as it is in itself, while eliminating the subjective

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22. Regarding the “objective character of thought,” a good orientation can be found in August Messer’s Einführung in die Erkenntnistheorie [Introduction to Epistemology], in Philosophische Bibliothek 118, chap. 2, § 4, pp. 14 ff. The same book also deals with naive and critical realism (pp. 41–61). Particularly lucid are the objections against naive realism, although the first objection “from the side of religious doubt” does not seem especially convincing.
modifications that accrue to the given from the knowing subject’s ways of apprehending it. The time-space relations of the objects of experience, their co-existence and succession, the gaps in perception, and the relationships among the contents of consciousness that force themselves upon us and are not determinable by our will—all of these reveal indisputably a law and order that is independent of the experiencing subject. The positing of realities transcendent to consciousness is demanded above all by the fact that one and the same object is immediately communicable to different individuals. Geyser, who—admittedly in a different context—devoted an exhaustive and penetrating study of our topic, pointedly writes, “This communication is a fact, and is simply fundamental for the possibility of any universally valid science of experience.”

To proceed in the manner of naive realism and to posit the contents of perception in the form in which they present themselves to us as objective realities, would be a precipitous move. The sense-organs—more particularly, the peripheral filaments into which the sensory nerves branch out—are stimulated by mechanical, physical, and chemical influences. The sensory nerve fibers then convey the stimulated impulses to specific nerve centers, and thereby make us conscious of events in the external world. Facts such as the presence of a stimulus threshold and intensity of stimulation, or disturbances in the physiological organization (e.g., total or partial color-blindness, differences in the keenness of vision), clearly indicate that not only the existence of perceptions but also their contents are essentially dependent upon subjective factors, and that in the contents of perception we are thus confronted with phenomenal formations that have been produced with the help of the subject. Even if the relata that are connected by the law-like relations of our perceptions undergo subjective modifications on the basis of the laws of the specific energy of our senses, the relations themselves must be posited as objectively real lawful relations. Abstraction from the subjective moments, which constitutes the negative task of the special act of realization, and the extraction of objective states of affairs from the world of the actuality of consciousness, can only be accomplished by experience and thought. Pure thought is not a competent court for deciding between ideal and real being. Only experience can inform us about whether real objects exist, but even this does not in such a way as to be the singular authority for deciding this question. Sense impressions as such are not already reality so they cannot be used without further ado to define reality. It is only where empirical and rational moments work together that our experience “rings” true. When the external world is posited as the cause of our sensations, there is a hybrid criterion at work. Külpé does not believe that this particular criterion, which has acquired such special significance since Schopenhauer, is completely appropriate, because “the proper motive of scientific realism is then misunderstood and the impression is

given that the character of the objective causes could be inferred from the subjective effects" (EN, 24). A causal relationship between external world and sense impression must undeniably exist, but this says nothing at all about the quality of the stimulating cause. As scientific experience has shown, sense stimuli (kinetic events) are not comparable to perceived objects like color, tone, smell, and taste. Manifestly in order to fend off a mistaken opinion, Külpe has articulated the above criterion in another and obviously more specific form when he sees the external world as “the carrier of the externally ordered [fremdgesetzlich = heteronomous] relations of our sense impressions.” By analogy with a physical phenomenon (forced motion), he characterizes these relations as compelling, pressing, and “forced upon us.” That even this is a causal relation is clear.

4. The final special question now arises: how is it possible to define these realities, i.e., the compelling factors? This definition is regulated in its content by the observed relations, i.e., the definition must present the relata as capable of bringing about real occurrences. Külpe puts the idea briefly: “Natural substances are quintessential models of capacities that are capable of letting the real relations, real states, and real changes connected with these substances to take place” (EN, 27). A perfectly valid and adequate definition and determination of the posited realities will remain an ideal goal for the real sciences. Even if all experienceable relations could be exhibited, it must still be kept in mind that there are dependent realities that we can never reach with our sense knowledge, even with the most refined instruments to aid our sense organs. And the question remains whether the proper nature of realities can be unequivocally defined. Regardless of the answer to this question, there still remains a broad field to be cultivated by science. In addition to material progress, the history of the sciences definitely exhibits advances in the normative definition of its objects.

And yet, would not the definition of reality that is pursued in the spirit of critical realism be brought to a halt at the barrier that is apparently raised by the principle of the subjectivity of sensory qualities? When we follow this principle, realities will indeed lose their intuitive character, but this certainly does not eliminate these realities as such. It does mean, however, that we must break with the epistemological dogma of sensationalism, in which all knowledge remains linked to what can be intuited. The actual practical procedure of the real sciences is not privy to this prejudice.24

In light of the current direction of thought which is already permeated with pragmatist ideas (scientifically quite shallow), Külpe is also looking for an answer

24. In the area of psychology, the work of the Würzburg school of psychology concerning higher intelligent life has initiated a vigorous attempt to escape from the sensationalistic psychology that considers sensations and their reproductions as the only elements of consciousness. Cf. Geyser, Einführung in die Psychologie der Denkvorgänge [In-
to the question of whether critical realism receives noteworthy significance even from this recent point of view, though admittedly for science this alone is not the decisive point of view. Justifiably, the answer turns out to be affirmative. Külpe shows in his exceedingly lively manner of presentation that, in the last analysis, the opposing viewpoints of conscientialism and phenomenalism shunt the tasks of the real sciences and their fulfillment onto a dead-end track. He writes, “There is nothing more uninspiring than the overly hedged accounts, brimming with restrictive clauses, of those researchers of nature who in the spirit of this [conscientialistic] epistemology continually assure us that they obviously do not want to associate any realist views with their choice of realist expressions. They import into their accounts conceptions that are alien to the very field they are investigating, and forget that caution is the mother not only of wisdom but also of inaction. Only those who believe in the definability of a real nature will invest their energies in realizing it in knowledge” (EN, 38).

Even if one cannot agree with Külpe throughout, especially with regard to his conception of “inductive” metaphysics, its hypothetical character and its grounding, his merit will remain in having returned epistemology to its proper [ontological] task after it had strayed so far from this path.25 Aristotelian-scholastic philosophy, which has always thought realistically, will not lose sight of this new epistemological movement. Positively progressive work must always be its concern.

25. The influence of Eduard von Hartmann and his “transcendental realism” has done the most from the perspective of philosophy to prepare for a realist way of thinking.
4. Recent Research in Logic

This review of the advanced literature in logic at the fin-de-siècle by the 23-year-old Heidegger, clearly one of his “juvenilia,” is nevertheless of seminal importance for his future development. The theme of “logic” will recur throughout Heidegger’s path of thought, first as a student who will write his two dissertations on logical problems, the first on “judgment in psychologism” and the second on the onto-logical problems of “category” and “meaning.” The overwhelming influence of Emil Lask’s Logik der Philosophie on the second dissertation will already be remarked in 1915 by Lask’s teacher and Heidegger’s Doktorvater, Heinrich Rickert, “perhaps even more than he [Heidegger] is himself aware” (see appendix I). This influence will persist in Heidegger’s overt orientation toward a philosophical (transcendental, phenomenological, hermeneutical, ontological) logic in the various Logik courses of his teaching career (WS 1916–1917, WS 1925–1926, SS 1928) and beyond, which inevitably become courses in the philosophy of language (SS 1934, WS 1937–1938, SS 1944). Already in the 1912 review, Heidegger’s proclivity toward the grammatical fringe phenomena is apparent: the exclamatory impersonal, the question, the existential sentence, even the negative judgment. The difference between the existential and the logical expressed most graphically in the neo-Kantian Lotze’s impersonal “It ‘is’ not, rather It holds [gilt = carries weight, is effective, valid],” which at several points in this review is expressed variously as the difference between the entitative and the validating, psychological occurrences and their logical content, beings and their meaning, objects and their objectivity, things and their thingliness, emerges as Heidegger’s very first model for the ontological
difference between beings and their be-ing. The historical oblivion of this difference is already articulated in Lask’s plaint against the “hypostasizing” of the logical into the metaphysically entitative (Platonism) and sensorially entitative (psychologism). Lask’s effort to free the “domain of validity” from its admixtures with the entitative “is a demand which in the entire history of philosophy has never been fulfilled in a fully conscious and consequential fashion.” The young Heidegger’s obvious fascination with the transcendental value of the valid, “this treasure of the German language,” will later be denounced by him in Being and Time (156) as a “word idol.” What remains after the disenchantment with value and validity is the phenomenological domain of sense, meaning, “truth,” now understood as prelogical “existentials” of Dasein.

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Recent Research in Logic

I

Ever since the turn of the century, scientific logic has been conducting a full-scale clarification of its own principles. The very possibility and fact of such a critical meditation-on-its-sense [Besinnung] basically serves to undermine the traditional idea of logic as a finally fixed summary of forms and rules of thought which are not subject to any further expansion or deepening. The “sublation” (in Hegel’s full sense of Aufhebung) of this traditional view has warranted the continuation of logical problems that are now found to include undeveloped fields of research. A thoroughgoing cognizance of the sense and scope of this battle over principles assumes an appearance of strangeness with the affirmation of a continuing store of logical problems, but it also positively illuminates the way for the demonstration of these problems. The general structure of the following overview has accordingly already been made transparent. Nevertheless, I regard an addendum on method not unnecessary, because this method in no way immediately emerges in the special character of the works to be mentioned, nor does it emerge from the task before us of presenting an overview and orientation.

Our overall goal of reporting the current logical problems brings with it a double duty.

1. Since the problems in philosophy are intimately bound together, where one problem engenders or supersedes another, a certain context of connections will have to be established, even though it will not be strictly systematic. A complete and closed systematics would be an overly daring venture in view of today’s plethora of unresolved questions, but would also take us away from our assigned task.

2. This task yields its own principle of selection of the pertinent literature. Investigations of ground-laying significance, works that advance research and those that offer critical points of contact shall be identified. The many compre-
hensive surveys of logic and the like will naturally go unnamed, which in no way implies a value judgment, while attention will be drawn more to special investigations whose value has come to be appreciated by the scientific philosophy of the present. That a certain lack of balance in content and presentation will still remain is something of which the reviewer is perhaps best aware.

Before proceeding any further, an endeavor such as ours must provide a suitable answer to the question, *What is logic?* Already here we stand before a problem whose solution is reserved for the future. Basically, however, the current lack of a univocal and universally acceptable definition of logic cannot impair the progress of research in its domain. This irrelevance by no means frees us from the urgency of becoming acutely aware of the authentic essence and object of logic. This demand has found its fulfillment in the already noted clarification of principles which coincides with a vigorous renunciation of *psychologism.* That psychologism cannot be understood merely as a “philosopher’s fad” can be demonstrated without difficulty by a meditation-on-the-sense of the history of the problem. The widespread psychological research that is pursued virtually to a passion, the psychological attitude in ethical and aesthetic investigations, the dominance of psychological method in pedagogy and juridical practice, the extremes to which “psychological sensitivity” is taken in literature and art, all these attest to the “age of psychology.” It should accordingly not be surprising if this general trend toward the psychological would also affect logic. The state of affairs is however actually just the reverse. The antagonism in critical idealism between psychological and transcendental method coupled with the long dominance of the *psychological* interpretation of Kant founded by Schopenhauer, Herbart, Fries, has with the rise of natural science likewise raised psychology to a comprehensive significance and given rise to a “naturalization of consciousness.” The problem of psychologism in its broader aspect has been elaborated by O. Ewald in conjunction with the concrete historical (but not philological) question, “whether it is psychologism or transcendentalism that was grounded in the essence of Kantian philosophy.”¹ The question is today probably decided in favor of the view of transcendental logic, which since the seventies is basically represented by Hermann Cohen and his Marburg school as well as by Windelband and Rickert. According to this trend, Kant in his *Critique* did not investigate the psychological origin of knowledge but instead the logical value of its validity. This *logical* interpretation of Kant and its further development is of importance for our problem in its elevation of the proper value of the logical. Natorp can accordingly say with some justification “that for them [the Marburgers], there is not all that much left to learn from Husserl’s elegant arguments (in the first volume of the *Logical Investigations*), which we can only welcome.”²

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¹ O. Ewald, *Kants Methodologie in ihren Grundzügen* [Kant’s Methodology in its Basic Features] (Berlin, 1906), 29.
Nevertheless, we ourselves are inclined to attribute a far-reaching significance to Husserl’s penetratingly profound and very propitiously formulated *Investigations*, for they have truly broken the psychological spell and brought the above-mentioned clarification of principles into play. Husserl here does not hesitate to express his gratitude for the influential suggestions that he received from the *Wissenschaftslehre* (1837) of the Austrian mathematician and philosopher, Bernard Bolzano. The planned reprint of this now rare book will probably soon appear. In this connection, the name of a German mathematician cannot be left unmentioned. Gottlob Frege’s logical-mathematical researches are in my opinion not yet appreciated in their true significance, let alone exhausted. What he has written in his works on “Sense and Meaning” and on “Concept and Object” cannot be disregarded by any philosophy of mathematics. But it is also equally valuable for a universal theory of the concept. While Frege overcame psychologism in principle, Husserl in his *Prolegomena to a Pure Logic* has systematically and comprehensively confronted the essence, relativistic consequences, and theoretical worthlessness of psychologism. Husserl’s critique is directed in particular against John Stuart Mill, Christoph Sigwart, Bruno Erdmann, and Theodor Lipps. Recently, however, Lipps seems to have retreated from his earlier position, a move which may disencumber his conception of psychology and its tasks, which in many of its parts manifests an affinity with Husserl’s conception. But the continuing attempt to maintain psychologism is demonstrated by the otherwise discerning work of G. Heymans, *The Laws and Elements of Scientific Thought*.

Psychologism in general may be regarded as the prevalence of psychological principles, methods, and modes of demonstration in the practice of logic. Logic deals with thinking. Thinking undeniably has to be organized within that complex

8. G. Heymans, *Die Gesetze und Elemente des wissenschaftlichen Denkens* (Leipzig, 2nd ed., 1905). This work, which teems with inconsistencies almost on every page, will be cited in the next paragraphs in order to characterize psychologism in a more concrete illustration. Moreover, in the present state of logical research, the attempt to refute all psychologistic errors is an exercise in futility.
of facts that characterizes a totality of psychic processes. From this, it at once follows that psychology is the truly basic science that must formally absorb logic into itself. The bases for this claim can be reinforced further. Logic is concerned, among other things, with the “laws of thought,” whose paramount significance must be acknowledged. But where are these “laws” of thought to be drawn with more precise methodological certainty if not with the operative means of the exact science called “experimental psychology”? Heymans enlarges the task and elevates the competence of psychology still further. It must examine the facts of consciousness given in knowledge and in scientific convictions in relation to their conscious and unconscious (!) causes. Such a “psychological investigation of the appearances of thought can then lead to their justification; […] a decision regarding the cognitive value of our knowledge can be methodically investigated only by way of psychological investigation.” Heymans even speaks of an “epistemological experiment,” by which he means the contemporaneous presence in consciousness of proof and the scientific conviction that it causes, the experimental setup, so to speak, within which the essence and law of knowledge can be studied. The proclaimed similarity of epistemology and chemistry totally dispels any doubt over whether H. really regards the theory of knowledge, epistemology, as an empirical science. His views on logic in the strict sense now likewise become fully comprehensible. Logic contains realities, psychic actualities, as its objects. The so-called basic laws of thought are laws of facts, and these factual laws regulate the psychic process of thought. The basis for their necessity and universal validity is a particular logical-psychological organization of the intellect. By this, however, H. in no way claims that precisely this intellectual structure is the only possible and necessary structure. The genus Man would also have to be thought to accord with other laws.

It is at this point that the empiricistic and relativistic tendency of psychologism becomes obvious. The argument that psychologism in general is internally contradictory has been thoroughly substantiated and widely applied by Husserl. A valuable contribution to the critique is also provided by Geyser. While it brings nothing essentially new in critical viewpoints, the work is especially valuable in its historical second part, which shows that psychologism is not just today’s “-ism.” Whether Kant in his basic critical tendency actually should be included among the psychologists cannot in my opinion merely be left undecided but must be emphatically denied, despite the many passages that speak against this, without having to side with the extreme neo-Kantians for the corroboration of this thesis.

9. Joseph Geyser, “Systematische und historische Darstellung der anthropologischen Auffassung des Erkennens” [Systematic and Historical Presentation of the Anthropological View of Knowledge], Jahrbuch des Vereins für christliche Erziehungswissenschaft 4 (1911), 98–183. We shall come back to this author’s Grundlagen der Logik und Erkenntnislehre [Foundations of Logic and Epistemology] (see provisionally this review, Literarische Rundschau [1911], 287) in another context.
Fundamental for the recognition of the absurdity and theoretical barrenness of psychologism is the distinction between psychic act and logical content, between the real occurrence of thought in the course of time and the ideal, extratemporal, identical sense [Sinn], in short, the distinction between what “is” and what “holds” with binding validity. This pure sense, intrinsically durable [in sich Bestand habender] as it is in its content, is the object of logic. Thus, logic is from the start stripped of the very character of an empirical discipline. The “function” of the basic logical laws as norms of thought upon deeper consideration proves to be a derivative dimension. The principles of contradiction and excluded middle are ideal relations between the objects of thought as such, for which it is totally without import as to when and how they are actually thought. The designation “laws” should therefore be consistently avoided for these relations of meaning in order to mark them off from the laws of nature even linguistically.

It is only after these fundamental distinctions have become clear that the definition of the essence and task of a pure logic can follow a secure course. The final goal of knowledge is a complete objective unity of the contents of knowledge. This unity is produced by the unity of a “coherence of reasons” or “foundational context” [Begründungszusammenhang] in its connection to and through “laws.” In the purely theoretical sciences, the investigation will encounter basic laws that govern any context of knowledge whatsoever. Whatever the empirical sciences need from the theoretical for their durable content, they draw from the “nomological” disciplines.

The basic question of logic now passes over to the conditions of knowledge in general. Logic is the theory of theory, a study of science. Along with the primally theoretical [Urtheoretisches], the fundamental concepts (categories), their relations and their systematics, it studies the logical structure of the particular sciences, seeks to show the distinctive moments of their construction and method, demarcates them in their specific provinces, and finally strives to find a unity again in a system of the sciences. To fulfill its task, logic must remain in constant contact with the other sciences. It also becomes evident that this task, despite the profitable and not yet exhausted preliminary works, will not be brought to a close so soon.

The examination and critique of psychologism has brought out the heterogeneity of the psychical, here a spatio-temporal reality, and the logical. This logical realm of the valid must now be brought into relief over against the sensorial enti-

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10. I am thinking of Wundt’s Logic, but especially of Sigwart’s “Theory of Method,” the second part of his Logic, which is now in its fourth edition edited by Heinrich Maier. Reference may also be made to the newly edited edition of Lotze’s Logik, Philosopische Bibliothek 141 (Leipzig, 1912), which may still be regarded as the basic book of modern logic, even though it has been superseded in some of its parts (theory of judgment, ethicizing tendency).
RECENT RESEARCH IN LOGIC

This is a requirement which in the entire course of the history of philosophy has never been fulfilled in a thoroughly conscious and consequential fashion. Plato will always remain the prototype for the “hypostasizing” of the logical into the metaphysically entitative [metaphysisch Seiendes]. Lask, in a sweeping and penetrating study on the Logic of Philosophy, has formulated the above requirement quite clearly and thus has at once paved the way for a more precise conceptual definition of philosophy as a science of values. The work as a whole is a broadening and deepening of Kant’s transcendental logic developed on the basis of transcendental-logical Criticism. It is a broadening because Lask, contrary to Kant’s containment of the problem of the categories to the sensorial entitative realm, commandeers a “new domain of application” for the category, namely, philosophy itself. Lask aspires to a theory of categories that embraces the totality of the thinkable in its two hemispheres of the entitative and the valid. His attempt should with good reason be placed among the series of great thinkers who have already devoted themselves to a theory of categories.

The logic of the categories of being [Sein] was created by Kant. Proper understanding of these categories requires that we bear in mind that being has here forfeited its translogical autonomy, that being has been transformed into a concept of transcendental logic. That does not mean that the objects are “stamped with a clear and distinct logical content”; only the objectivity of the objects, the thingliness over against the thingly, the being over against the beings is of logical value, a form-content. The union of form (category) and material is called “sense” [Sinn]. Knowing for transcendental philosophy means the enclosing of material (the sensory) with the category. Logic, whose cognitive objects are precisely the categories, can therefore know these forms only by in turn surrounding them anew with other forms. The philosophical category is therefore the form of form. If being is the “regional category” for sensory-intuitive material, then validating [Gelten] is the constitutive category for non-sensory material. What was formerly taken to be a simple form proves to be an interrelation of validating and validated. Consistently, the logical form of validity in turn stands in the category of validating. We thereby arrive at the form of the form of the form. Lask does not downplay the regressus in infinitum that has been opened up here. It signifies nothing less “than that the category is capable of becoming the infinite material of the category” (p. 112). A doubling, a pairing of constitutive content now runs through the entire system of categories. “The idea of having the constitutive category of being and the philosophical-constitutive content stand next to one another provides the basis for a

complete understanding of any general logical forms whatsoever” (p. 138), as these are to be found in reflexive categories. For his discussion of the type of reflexive category, Lask makes the categories of identity basic.\textsuperscript{12} Up to this point, the meaning-differentiating moment of the pure logical form in the two constitutive regions had been, respectively, the sensory or non-sensory material. But the shaping of meaning [Bedeutung] can also be effected by the “subject-object duplicity.” The subjectivity is the creator of the reflexive sphere. Its regional category is identity, the category for “something in general” or “anything whatsoever” [Etwas überhaupt]. All distinctions of categorial content disappear in the reflexive category, which declares only its own formal meaning and not the meaning of its material content. Even though the reflexive region owes its “being” to subjectivity, once it has attained duration and persistence [Bestand] it holds objectively, it validates [es gilt]. There are formal relations that in their validity are removed from the arbitrariness of thinking, but only to the extent that thought itself is granted the power of being able to seize and commandeer [bemächtigen] any content whatsoever without regard to its special constitutive character. The peculiar character of the reflexive forms is their general meaning. Furthermore, Lask investigates the relations between the reflexive and constitutive categories, the table of philosophical categories (p. 169), dedicates a special chapter to philosophical knowledge, and concludes his work with an instructive historical excursus on the philosophical categories in theoretical philosophy.

In its own interest, critique of these detailed as well as sketchy declarations will be reserved in anticipation of the promised complete system of logic.

II

It seems to me that the same reserve must be extended to a completely new science which it is necessary to sketch out a bit in our context. This is the Theory of Objects of Meinong\textsuperscript{13} and his students, which upon its first appearance was assessed in so many different ways. Even if the sudden emergence of a new and—as the theory of objects claims to be—comprehensive science immediately arouses doubt, our first obligation still remains to try to understand it. “Everything that is something is called an object. The region of objects thus includes everything in general, regardless of whether it is thought or unthought or at all thinkable. In particular, it is not even a determination of the object for it to be, that it exists or persists. Every object is something, but not every something is.”


\textsuperscript{13} Alexius Meinong, Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie [Investigations in the Theory of Objects and Psychology], ed. Meinong (Leipzig, 1904). Cf. in addition Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 129 (1906), 130 (1907).
Every object has a being-so that is independent of its being: this is a sentence which upon being reversed is no longer valid. An object with a contradictory being-so (square circle) cannot be, it is an impossible object. Meinong designates being and being-such/being-so as objectives and the objects to which they pertain—non-being as well as being is a being-objective—as objects in the strict sense.

These kinds of terminological stipulations cover a large space, but in my view of philosophy their “object” is by no means new. The investigations wish to be regarded as provisional and offer nothing conclusive. Ameseder attempts to group the already known and named objects “even if this grouping corresponds to no objective division and distribution.” He distinguishes the two main groups into non-founding objects and founding objects (comparative relations).

The first group includes the “objects of things” (matter) that are exclusively objects, since objectives never have actuality. Also to be counted in this group are the “objects of sensation,” colors, sounds, etc. These objects may well be but not exist, while they are at once “co-apprehended” with determinations of time and place. Ameseder now brings out several relations between “apprehended” and “co-apprehended,” e.g., that color requires a determination of place but not this particular determination. Valid as comparative relations are sameness, similarity, and difference. Between the last two, Ameseder stipulates certain relations like coincidence, which means that “two objects cannot be similar without also being different and, inversely, cannot be different without also being similar” (p. 100).

To my mind, the inversion does not in general hold. The author in fact conceives “different” quantitatively. Similarity and difference therefore persist between objects of the same kind. Objects that are different in kind—let me name triangle and electrometer—are accordingly not different, no more, of course, than they are the same. The concept of similarity is nowhere defined. The determination of nearness as temporal or locational similarity in opposition to remoteness as an equivalent kind of difference prompts one to conjecture that the two concepts differ only quantitatively. According to the author, therefore, infinite remoteness is zero-valued nearness. The unilateral regard for the quantitative moment prevents the author from developing the concept of similarity in general, which in mathematics receives an exact definition. But whether this mathematical concept is the concept of similarity in general and not a special one remains to be seen. In any case, an acute-angled and an obtuse-angled triangle are two triangles, just as nearness and remoteness are two stretches of distance. But their difference in no way gives us similarity. In addition, Ameseder discusses “objects of configuration” and “objects of combination,” e.g., “a and b.” Among the latter objects, which are to have all magnitudes, a sharp distinction should be made between “and” and “+.”

The present overview has not broached special questions for the purposes of a proper critique, but only wishes to show that the investigations in the theory of objects actually have their problems. Whether they of are a kind that is intrinsic to a unique new science in need of construction should at this point be briefly explored. The reason why the above investigations have been briefly outlined in our context is to raise the question of whether the theory of objects constitutes a particular region of logic. Meinong says it does not, and this denial is justified by his conception of logic as a theoretically practical discipline. It has to establish the rules and laws that lead to a maximum of knowledge. However, logic as the study of an art presupposes the theoretical and cannot be regarded, purely and simply for itself, as a science. If we recall our earlier conceptual definition of “pure logic,” it will not be difficult to recognize that the theory of objects belongs in it. Worthy of note here is the external circumstance that Meinong (p. 22) explicitly remarks that his are the “very same goals” that drove Husserl into his *Logical Investigations*. Meinong also explicitly designates “symbolic logic,” “logistics,” as a part of the theory of objects, as well as mathematics as a special region, which coincides exactly with the tendency to include mathematics within logic.

Accordingly, what is new is only the name and the profuse terminology. This is not to deny that the current investigations, especially those of Mally, are full of penetrating and subtle ideas that are significant for a still outstanding systematic theory of relations. In like fashion can the theory of judgment draw a wealth of suggestions especially from the study of the objectives, as can the still quite problematic theory of negation, among other disciplines. And finally, the new terminology should not even be totally seen as ballast, for there are actually some things in logic that remain unnamed. I am thinking of the fine distinctions that continue to be discovered in the ongoing analysis of meaning.

It should not be left unsaid that the purely logical character of the investigations is not preserved. Along with metaphysical “inclusions” (pp. 91–92), there are also entanglements in psychology, despite Meinong’s expressions of fundamental opposition to psychologism. That relapses into psychology are hard to avoid suggests that the sharp separation of logic from psychology perhaps cannot be maintained. We must make a distinction here. It is one thing for psychology to found logic in principle and to secure its value of validity, and another for it to assume the role of becoming an initial sphere of activity, an operational basis in logic. The second is in fact the case, since we have to do with the peculiar fact that harbors problems within itself that can perhaps never be fully clarified, namely, the fact that the logical is embedded in the psychical. But the position of psychology established in this way is still in need of further precision. Experimental psychology remains irrel-

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des Zahlbegriffs” [The One, Oneness, and One: Remarks on the Logic of the Concept of Number], *Logos* II (1911–12), 50 ff.
evant for logic. However, even the so-called “self-observational” psychology only becomes useful in a particular attitude. The investigation passes over to the meanings [Bedeutungen], the sense [Sinn] of the acts and thus becomes a study of meanings, a phenomenology\(^{15}\) of consciousness. With the critical rejection of psychologism, Husserl at the same time positively grounded phenomenology in a theoretical way and himself successfully put it to work in this difficult area. In the sense just established, psychology will always remain in philosophy’s nexus, even if it may otherwise constitute itself, and rightly so, as one of the research domains ordered next to natural science.

Let us now shift our attention away from these general logical problems to the special questions.

After Kant had made the basic problem of critical philosophy absolutely clear and went in search of a “Guiding Clue for the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding,” he felt compelled to return to the judgment. Kant’s recourse to a table of judgments is today rejected as a mistake in a number of respects. But there is still a kernel of truth here, since it is in the judgment that Kant touched the very nerve of knowledge. “But we can trace all actions of the understanding back to a judgment, so that the understanding in general can be represented as a faculty of judging.” It is the merit of recent logic for having made the judgment itself into a problem. The fact that there are a great number of theories of judgment available today may be taken as proof for the difficulty of the problem.

Judging is a psychic process, a distinctive concurrence and togetherness of representations. The judgment comes to us in the form of a grammatical sentence. The determination that every judgment assumes a position in the disjunction “true-untrue” marks the distinctiveness of the judgment. For this disjunction cannot meaningfully be applied to bare representations nor to volitional acts nor to mental movements. What precisely is true or untrue? From what has been said, it is the concurrence of representations. But can we say that the occurrence of a “process” is true or untrue? An occurrence is or is not and so stands outside the either-or of true-untrue. What is true is instead the representational content, what we mean, the sense. The judgment is a sense. With this, we have made the transition from psychology to logic. The sense of the judgment “Gold is yellow” has a particular structure. When we get to know this structure, we will also be able to define what a judgment is, logically considered. It has already been remarked that the judgment assumes a fixed form, so to speak, when it is put down in a grammatical sentence. This sentence shows its usual form in a conjunction of subject and predicate through the copula.

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This immediately prompts us to go further and say that the judgment combines the content of the subject-representation with that of the predicate-representation.

Was grammar actually the sure guide to knowledge of the logical structure of judgments? There is a cry of “Fire” from someone! [Es ruft jemand “Feuer”! = Someone is crying “Fire”!]\(^{16}\) The cry can be true or untrue, so it is a judgment. But where are the subject and predicate that are supposed to be combined by the copula? In the judgment “It’s thundering!” [Es donnert!] we search in vain for the subject-representation as well as the copula. Which of the three linguistic formulations is to provide direction for finding the logical articulation? Is the logical sense of “Fire!” not richer than the single word? And what is the meaning of the “It”? Is it permissible to see the subject in It? And if we grant that the judgment is normally a combination of two representational contents, how is the relation between the two to be characterized more precisely? Does “Gold is yellow” mean that gold belongs in the extension of the concept yellow? But this interpretation can in no way be imposed upon the judgment “a is greater than b.” When Lehmen\(^{17}\) declares that through the judgment the identity of the two concepts, or more precisely, the identity of what is known through the concepts, is maintained, then this definition, if it is at all tenable, totally excludes a hypothetical judgment like “If the temperature drops to 0° Celsius, water freezes.”

The impersonals and existential sentences have been from the start the cross of scientific logic. But they have also for the most part forced it to deliberate meticulously on the distinction between the grammatical sentence and the logical judgment. We should therefore not be misled into orienting logic upon grammar, even less so since many sentence-forms express no judgments whatsoever.\(^{18}\) In some cases, however, the productivity of investigations of language by way of descriptive psychology should not be underestimated. I am thinking especially of the problem of the question,\(^{19}\) which can be resolved neither purely logically nor purely psychologically.

\(^{16}\) [Editor’s note: The prolific usage of the impersonal judgment in German idiom far exceeds English practice, and therefore the possibility of accurate translation. But it is important here to convey the impersonal tone as much as possible in translation, with an eye (ear) to the later Heidegger’s coinages of exclamatory impersonals like “It’s worlding!” (Es weltet! already in 1919) to express the nuanced actions of being.

A favorite English substitute has become the “there is” of es gibt, a common German idiom which only the later Heidegger will exploit in its literal sense as “It’s giving!”]

\(^{17}\) Alfons Lehmen, Lehrbuch der Philosophie, vol. 1 (1909), 55 ff.

\(^{18}\) Alexius Meinong, Über Annahmen [On Assumptions] (Leipzig, 1902), chap. 2, § 6. The second edition (1910) was not available to me. Meinong wants to establish the “assumptions” as a region between representations and judgment. We shall especially take the logical dignity of assumptions into our consideration.

\(^{19}\) The “question” is not treated comprehensively. Definitive results regarding its “essence” are not available. Cf. Stadler, “Die Frage als Prinzip des Erkennens und die ‘Einleitung’ der Kritik der reinen Vernunft” [The Question as Principle of Cognition and the “Introduction” to the Critique of Pure Reason], Kant-Studien 13 (1908); Joseph Klemens Kreibig,
The wholly alien character of the domains of logic and grammar has been forcefully demonstrated by Lask in his work on the judgment.20

The question is: What is the basis for the univocal [einsinnig] “articulation of the statement’s content,” the “unchangeable” relational direction between subject and predicate? The theoretical structure of sense is to be reduced to the constitution of objects, which, however, without transgressing the region of the logical, only works for the logic oriented upon Kant. For this demonstration of the theoretically primal articulation, reference must be made to the previously reviewed work of the author [Lask, Logic of Philosophy]. In that work, Lask designated the union of categorial form and categorial material as “sense.” Knowing accordingly means the enclosing of material with form. In the judgment, accordingly, the categorial form (predicate) is asserted of the alogical material as subject. With his theory of predication, Lask attempts to bring Kant and Aristotle as close as possible to one another. For Kant, judging means subsuming the sensory-intuitive material under the categorial concepts of the understanding. Likewise in Aristotle, the categories are predicates of the basic category of substance; but these predicates are of a metalogical nature. The judgment “a is the cause of b” is according to the grammatical theory interpreted in such a way that “a” presents the subject and “cause of b” the predicate. Lask divides it into the material (a and b) and into the category causality. His theory can be applied to the impersonals without difficulty. The sensory-intuitive material “thundering” stands in the category existence. Lask directly confronts the difficulty that the division into alogical material and logical form cannot always be immediately carried out in the judgments, that moreover already finished concepts, i.e., formed material, appear in the subject position. The category reaches, so to speak, through the already effected categorial envelopment to the original material. This material can therefore be categorially affected in various directions and numerous ways. The relation between the judicative elements (material and form), the copula, has in the Laskian theory the indifferent character of a “relatedness in general.” Earlier attempts defined the “is” now as identity (Lotze), now as “classification of an object in the content of another” (Erdmann), or directly even as existing (Brentano).21


What Lask is after in the direction of transcendental philosophy, is sought by Geyser on an Aristotelian foundation and in kindred ways, and by Kreibig in the investigations that have already been cited. Geyser’s work must be granted fundamental significance because, for the very first time on the Aristotelian-Scholastic side, it has broken with the traditional conception and treatment of logic and has placed the problems in the foreground.

Geyser investigates the forms and principles of an objectively normative knowledge. The concept of the object here must be distinguished from the critical concept. Object (subject) of the judgment is “the real and non-real object that is intended to be presented by the judicative thought and that consequently stands over against this intention as measure and norm” (p. 51). Object is “objective givenness” which “serves as the norm of affirmation and negation” (p. 54) for a judgment. The judicative decision thus decrees whether the intentional thought is fulfilled or not fulfilled by the object. Likewise in Lask, the judicative decision stands before the question of truth, namely, whether accordance or contrariety of truth falls to the sense of the judgment in question. The two conceptions seem to converge and yet are far apart. Their ways separate over the concept of objectivity.

Geyser’s criticism of the “supra-individual I”\(^2\) does not seem to me to be wholly apt. The conception of the concept arose directly from the attempt to make truth and its validity independent of the individual subject. The concept should be understood purely logically as the system of validating forms of knowledge which in actual knowing are, to be sure, stored in an individual subject, just as Geyser has to require a “bearer” for pure intentional thought. Geyser’s “pure thoughts” approach what Meinong calls the “objectives.”\(^2\) And I regard this phenomenon, not in its prevalence but in its “nature” and structure, as problematic.

A special problem of the theory of judgment lies in the negative judgment. In cognitive dignity, the positive judgment unquestionably has the priority. But considered in their logical structure, the two prove to be equal in rank. In affirmation, the accordance of truth falls to the “fragment of sense,” i.e., to the value-indifferent relation between category and categorial material; in negation, the contrariety of truth. The “underlying support” for the judicative decision is the same in both kinds of judgments.\(^2\) For Geyser, “the negative judgment is not the simple counter-

\(^2\) See Jonas Cohn, *Voraussetzungen und Ziele des Erkennens. Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen der Logik* [Presuppositions and Goals of Knowledge: Investigations of the Basic Questions of Logic] (Leipzig, 1908). Cohn’s theory goes back to Heinrich Rickert’s *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis* [The Object of Knowledge] (Tübingen, 2nd ed., 1904). This work, which is foundational for the grounding of logic as a science of value, will appear shortly in a new and expanded edition. A student of Rehmke has recently written a critique: O. Schlunke, *Die Lehre vom Bewusstsein bei Heinrich Rickert* [The Theory of Consciousness in Heinrich Rickert] (Leipzig, 1911).

\(^2\) Meinong, *Über Annahmen*, chap. 7, 150–211.

\(^2\) Lask, *Die Lehre vom Urteil*, 181 ff.
image of the positive judgment, but is logically richer by one thought. This consists in the “negation of the preliminary positive judgment.” Geyser is perhaps led to his interpretation by the “not” occurring in the sentence, which expresses the non-fulfillment of the intentional thought in the subject. The positive judgment, however, posits the intention as fulfilled without express linguistic confirmation. In my view, Geyser’s theory of judgment itself requires the coordination of positive and negative judgment. Both are decisions confronting the value-neutral question: Is the “intentional thought” fulfilled in the object or not? The “synthetic intention” preceding the negative judgment seems to be identical with the “affirmative assumptions,” which Meinong allows to partake in the negative judgment. Geyser indeed wants his analysis to be regarded as a logical one, which has nothing to do with the psychological question of how the negative judgments come about. But the “attempted positive judgment,” which in each case has to found a negative one, is not a purely logical specific moment, because an “attempted judgment” can also precede the particular positive one. It is not asked how a particular negative judgment about the object is possible, but rather what the sense of precisely this transpired negative judgment is.

III

[Summary paraphrase: The young Heidegger concludes his tour through the extant logical literature by moving beyond the theories of the logical object and the logical judgment to theories of the logical argument, beginning with the reason-consequence relation of the hypothetical “judgment” and the simple syllogism that more overtly contextualizes conclusions with their evidence, where once again the concern focuses on purging all psychologistic vestiges from the “evident judgment” in order to place the decision of “justification” on the level of the “truth” of logical content. The final section concludes with the “coherent unity of reasons [Begründungszusammenhang] grounding a system of propositions” that logically constitutes the larger field of an entire science, especially as this is treated by a “new” direction in logic, that of “logistics” or “symbolic logic,” which is historically rooted in the Leibnizian mathesis universalis. Refinements of concepts and methods in the science of mathematics in the late 19th century led to a “philosophical” grounding of its theory of sets and groups. This work spilled over into formal logic, permitting it to go beyond the traditional logic of subsumption to a universal logic of relations by way of the application of algebraic methods and its symbols to logical problems. This in turn shaped the logical structure of mathematics. Thus, the new century brought the most complete “mathematical” systematization of logical problems in Bertrand Russell’s The Principles of Mathematics I (Cambridge, 1903) and its further devel-

26. Ibid., 54, 169–70.
opment in *Principia Mathematica* I (Cambridge, 1910) by Russell and Whitehead. A less rigorous presentation of the system is presented in Louis Couturat, *Les principes des mathématiques* (Paris, 1905; German trans. 1908). The young Heidegger thus concludes his overview with two paragraphs assessing this trend toward a “mathematical logic” originating from “across the channel.”

Such a “calculus” of judgments, of classes, and of relations deals with the basic logical concepts and functions. The proof that these *and only* these uphold the structure of mathematics at once gives the identity of logic and mathematics. This theory grants logic the new task of the demarcation of domains. With this resolution, it is in my view especially necessary to point out that logistics does not come out of mathematics at all and that it is incapable of proceeding to the genuine logical problems. I see the limits in the applications of mathematical symbols and concepts (in particular, the concept of *function*), which conceal the meanings of concepts and their *shifts in meaning*. The deeper sense of principles is left in the dark. The calculus of judgments is, for example, a calculating with judgments. Logistics is simply not familiar with the problems of the theory of judgment. Mathematics and the mathematical treatment of logical problems reach limits at which its concepts and methods fail, more precisely, there where the conditions of their possibility lie.

The work prescribed here must be carried out, and it will not be as quickly finished as the overcoming of psychologism. Tied to our question are precisely the philosophical problems of mathematics and pure natural science, which have not been settled since Descartes and have become more complicated with the unexpected advances of mathematics. These last thoughts have taken us into a broad domain of problems, the logic and systematics of the particular sciences, questions which must be given special treatment as the occasion arises.
5. Messkirch’s Triduum: A Three-Day Meditation on the War

The New Year of 1915 and the fifth month of the World War brought to Heidegger’s hometown of Messkirch, as well as to a host of other cities and hamlets in Germany, an extra observance in the already crowded liturgical calendar, perhaps in conjunction with the Feast of the Three Kings: a “war-triduum” called for by the German bishops, a three-day (in Messkirch two full days flanked by two half-days) religious meditation on the meaning (Be-sinnung) of the war for Germany and all its citizens. Reservist Heidegger, relieved of active duty because of a heart-and-nerve condition, accordingly spent his Christmas holidays as usual in the sexton’s house allotted to his parents by the neighboring parish church in the middle of Messkirch. No longer a seminarian but still on a Catholic scholarship at the university during this period of habilitation, the young Heidegger was obviously still involved in parish activities in his stays at home. Already known locally for his literary and even poetic talents, Heidegger took the invitation of reporting on the triduum commemoration in his hometown to expand upon his own philosophical assessment of the state of war-torn German and European “culture,” a favorite neo-Kantian as well as Nietzschean concept. The result proved to be a literary and dramatic tour-de-force for the local paper and a remarkable harbinger of things to come, with respect to tangible evidence of an early reading of Nietzsche’s Will to Power, one of the “exciting” events of pre-war German culture mentioned in retrospect in Heidegger’s 1957 “vita” (chap. 1), but especially with respect to the nature of meditation (Besinnung), understood as a process of taking thought over the radical situation in which we find ourselves by way of a phenomenological return to its meaning, or sense (Sinn, its direction). Cast in Aristotelian-Scholastic as well as phenomenological terms, meditation for the young philosopher is a “fathoming” (Ergründen) or a getting to the bottom or “grounds” (reasons) of a situation.
according to the intertwining interrogative vectors of its what, how, why, wherefore, whither and whence, i.e., according to the practical framework of Aristotle’s “causes.” Meditation is accordingly the questioning of the basic sense of a comprehensive practical situation. As Heidegger will put it decades later, in the face of the increasing technological encroachment of science, meditation allows one to come onto the trail of sense, as a dynamic medium of immersion that precedes the distinction of subject and object, and this venturesome embarkation into a pursuit that in fact draws us, this “admissive entry into sense,” is “releasement into the most worthy of questions.”¹ There is more than one indication in the earliest usages of the word that the deliberative “pause that takes thought” in the face of catastrophic situations like the war, nihilism, and technological inundation, is not at all a Cartesian meditation, that is, it cannot be construed as the “reflection” of a subject upon an object, as the dictionary definition of Besinnung prompts the English reader to assume as well as some of the neo-Kantian formulae used at this early stage might suggest.² Contrary to the Cartesian locus in a mental realm of clear and distinct thought, meditation is historically situated, contextually concrete, and supremely practical, in this chiaroscuro situation of interrogation and decision as much ontological as religious in its fathoming of sense. “The War-Triduum in Messkirch” is a remarkably early indication of this fundamentally concrete situational locus correlative to a non-objectifying thinking. Heidegger will soon situate meditation at a level of meaning more fundamental that any worldview, religious or otherwise, in an original domain from which phenomenology as the pretheoretical primal science of original experience takes its cues.

Later, meditation on comprehensive situational meaning becomes for Heidegger the instrument for the overcoming of European nihilism, including the nihilism of the “Christian worldview.” But in 1915, this newspaper article, written during the period of the first drafts of the Scotus dissertation, serves to document some of the elements of an early hermeneutic project posed in the dissertation’s introduction, namely, the “phenomenological elaboration of the mystical, moral-theological, and ascetic literature of medieval scholasticism” (FS, 147), as a way of access to the medieval “life-world” of concrete meaning out of which this seemingly lifeless school philosophy arose. Put in more phenomenological terms, such an exegesis of religious texts would have demonstrated the non-psychologistic, eidetically vital sense of “intentionality” which is already operative in scholastic psychology (ibid.) and,

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¹. Martin Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954), 68.
². The treatment of phenomenological method in the 1919 courses explicitly cultivates an overt antagonism between Reflexion in the Husserlian (and Natorpian) sense (GA 56/57, 99–102) and Besinnung in Heidegger’s and Dilthey’s “empathetic” senses (85, 164). The neo-Kantian usages of Besinnung (38–39, 129, 154) also tend to stop short of total objectification, even though the subject-object opposition ultimately prevails in this framework.
we might add, which is the proper domain of phenomenological meditation. The devotional texts alluded to in the newspaper article—Assisi’s “Fioretti,” the mystical writings of Tauler, Eckhart, and Seuse, Bonaventure’s “The Soul’s Itinerary toward God”—clearly would have been part of this reading program.3

* * *

**The War-Triduum in Messkirch**

For some time now, our entire European culture has been moving as toward a catastrophe, with a tormented tension that increases with each decade, restlessly, violently, precipitously, like a river that wants to end in a torrent, *that no longer deliberates, that is afraid to pause and take thought, to meditate.*4

— Nietzsche, *Will to Power* (1888), Preface

He who wrote these lines knew our modern age as no other, but also mistook the only sure way to fruitful meditation [*Besinnung*] as thoroughly as no other, so that he himself became the epitome of all of the inner tumult and absolute aimlessness of the age. He who wanted the “higher man” unleashed, in a misshapen form, the “blonde beast” in man.

Have we in Germany actually been afraid to meditate? Our soldiers being sent to the front have asked for three works “in soaring numbers”: The New Testament, Goethe’s *Faust*, and Nietzsche’s *Zarathustra* (cf. *Tümer*, November 2, 1914, p. 295). And this is the people that does not want to take thought and meditate? How much concern have we not expended on worldviews? How alive did the religious “sense” [*Empfinden*] become in the period just before the war? The most modern presses published the writings of the medieval mystics, Tauler, Meister Eckhart, and Seuse. Saint Francis of Assisi became the modern saint, everyone spoke and wrote of the “Franciscan movement” that took hold and stirred souls even in non-Catholic circles.

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4. “...der sich nicht mehr besinnt, der Furcht davor hat, sich zu besinnen.” § 2, Vorrede, *Wille zur Macht*, Grossoktav Edition, vol. 15, published in 1911; emphasis added by Heidegger. Walter Kaufmann translates *sich besinnen* in this passage as “to reflect,” but later observes (note to § 133) that *Besinnung* “has no exact English equivalent” while noting its roots in *Sinn*, and so translates *Besinnung* in a more practical sense as “stock-taking after the most terrible earthquake” (§ 133). For Nietzsche in § 2, the “catastrophe” is the advent of the history of two centuries of European nihilism, so that the call to “take stock” is the call to ponder the meaning of the advent of non-meaning!
But what did the new editions of the mystics’ writings, in content “deeply inebriate of God,” mean, when along with them there appeared Renaissance literature which was so retrograde with vulgarity like Simplicissimus and Youth [Der Jugend]? What was the meaning of the enthusiasm over the “Pauper of Assisi,” when his “Fioretti” (“Flowers”) were published in expensive deluxe editions on handcrafted paper decorated with elegant calligraphy, vignettes, and marginal ornaments (flowers!), and when on the next day one “feels” drawn with the same “enthusiasm” to Indian Buddhism, and on the following day to Sumerian sun-worship? How are we to comprehend someone who believes she is deeply moved and religiously mooded by the “Good Friday Spell” in Wagner’s Parsifal and on the next day attends “evenings of beauty” in order to “enjoy life to the fullest”? Who can understand someone who raves about the good old Meister Raabe and his robust old Teutonic style and afterwards devours with the same “great delight” the next best, i.e., the worst French novel of illicit love? How to account for someone who, upon returning from a trip to Italy, lectures on his unforgettable artistic experience of Michelangelo’s paintings on the Sistine Chapel ceiling and in the very next month, in brilliantly written essays and magazine articles, proclaims the artistic mischief and nonsense of futurism and cubism to be the deepest discoveries of art?

Is this meditation? Or is it in fact the opposite: the almost insuperable confusion, insecurity, and aimlessness of someone who is moved by momentary moods and drawn by the whims of the moment?

Yes indeed, Nietzsche was right, our culture is “afraid of pausing to take thought and to meditate.”

(To be sure, there have been serious attempts to deepen our cultural life by way of a return to a deeper content of life. But these remained fumbling attempts that above all lacked the power to effect far-reaching results.)

Then came the war.

Germany bristled with the bayonets of departing armies, boulevards where the elegant world once promenaded and mingled now rumbled with the trample of horses and clatter of heavy artillery. The first victories, the first dead: automobiles which only a few days before had sped to the theater and conveyed the exquisitely dressed to their evening parties now wended their way slowly and cautiously between light and dark to the hospital: the first wounded. The churches fill with citizens and supplicants. Those who once hurriedly crowded around the rear door at the eleven-o’clock Mass on Sundays today kneel before the front altar in silent and somber devotion. The events of the war spread and stubbornly persist. Month after month slips by, and the year of the war’s outbreak sinks into the past.

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5. Simplicissimus and Der Jugend were two avant-garde weekly pictorial magazines popular in Wilhelmine Germany around 1914. The first took its name from a Renaissance novel by Grimmelshausen, The Adventurous Simplicissimus.
Many became pensive, now and then overtaken by the muffled feeling that something was no longer quite right with our conduct and our comportment toward the war. Our troops at the front in their “baptism of fire” were also overtaken by the spirit of a more sober contemplation of life, and everyone on the home front vied with one another to provide comfort and assistance through charity drives.

Was this akin to the thoughtfulness of meditation? Has the war cured us of the “fear of meditation”? Or is all this but our immediate reaction to the suddenness, force, and ferocity of the primal violence unleashed in these new events?

What then is meditation actually, and properly speaking?

That about which I meditate I seek to apprehend just as it is. Meditation [Besinnung] is the fathoming of sense [Sinn] down to its source and ground. The sense of something is its what, how, why, what-for. My life is my life. Meditation on the bearing of our life is apprehension of the how, why, and wherefore of our life. Meditation on my life is self meditation. The sense of a sentence is that which is true, which irrefutably holds, is valid, which I must acknowledge, with which my thinking complies, in the face of which arbitrariness ceases. Sense is something lawful to which I must submit, subjugate myself.

Meditation is the apprehension and fathoming of what I am and ought to be. The ought requires my willing and, with the willing of what ought to be, also the willing of the ways and means which are uniquely capable of actualizing what ought to be. That is meditation. It is not submergence in the manifold fullness of pleasures, being thrown here, there, and everywhere by the whims of the moment. It is not being dominated by life but a domination of life.

Meditation is the unprejudiced knowledge of life and the consistent, resolute actualization of that which the sense of life demands.

The appeal of the German episcopate to observe a war-triduum was like the voice of one crying in the wasteland, in the desolation and shallowness of our present culture. It was the great call to meditation.

May its far-reaching significance for the innermost restoration of the health of our present culture now be evident.

Whether this war-triduum was everywhere observed with such a clear knowledge of its meaning and essence, I do not know. In any event, the Reverend Father Pacificus Wehner, Order of Friars Minor, has elaborated the essential features of the triduum with psychological refinement and logical precision and thus made the whole lucid, compelling, rousing, and irresistible.

Here in brief and rough outline is the division of his sermons:

On the first day repentance (the war and a humble act of contrition before God).

On the second day conversion (the war and a new life with God).

On the third day trust (the war and joyous confidence in God).

On the fourth day petition (the war and trusting supplication to God).
Add to this internally self-contained structure of ideas the style of the presentation and one will no longer be surprised at the glorious results that followed from taking part in the entire celebration and in the reception of the sacraments. The simple intimacy with God of Saint Francis of Assisi, the psychological depth and inexorable precision of thought of his monastic brother, the great Franciscan theologian Bonaventura, and the insight into our modern cultural life all came together in the powerful words of the preacher. Without exaggeration, it may be said that we in Messkirch were able to take part in a war-triduum of extraordinary power and depth. It is in keeping with the untiring care of our Reverend Father Lohr, pastor of Messkirch, for whom only the best is good enough for his flock.

We moderns have in many ways lost sight of the simple, we are fascinated by the complicated, the questionable; thus this dreadful fear of principles, which as such are always the simplest; thus the total indisposition toward the grand simplicity and quiet greatness of the Christian worldview and Catholic belief. If we do not want to be conquered by the victory in the future, we must in principle extricate ourselves from the lack of principles in the most elementary questions of life.
6. Question and Judgment

This seminar presentation can be regarded as the culmination of the student Heidegger’s active participation in Rickert’s regular seminars on logic and epistemology over a period of three years, beginning in SS 1912. In SS 1919, the teacher Heidegger had occasion to observe that his critical reception of Rickert’s works was grounded in the combined context of Husserl’s phenomenology coupled with the departures from Rickert’s epistemology made by his student, Emil Lask. “The basic direction of these critical considerations was already pursued in critical reports that I delivered in 1913 in Rickert’s seminar in connection with reviews of Lask’s Theory of Judgment, where I of course ran into stiff opposition. Needless to say, this in no way proved detrimental to my personal relationship with Rickert” (GA 56/57, 180–81). As Rickert’s habilitation student, the young Heidegger proposed three of Rickert’s favorite themes as possibilities for his test lecture in July 1915. First in rank was “The Concept of Time in the Science of History,” which was eventually chosen for presentation with the habilitation defense (see chapter 7). The second title proposed was “The Logical Problem of the Question” (see Sheehan, “Heidegger’s Lehrjahre,” 78). Heidegger’s interest in this problem is already evident in his 1912 overview of “Recent Research in Logic” (see chapter 4), where he observes that the problem “can be resolved neither purely logically nor purely psychologically,” but rather (by implication) phenomenologically. By the middle of 1914, the logically minded Heidegger is hard at work on a comprehensive essay dealing with the problem (letter to Krebs on July 19, 1914; see appendix II). In referring to their ongoing seminar disputation, Heidegger writes to Rickert on July 3, 1914:

The basic idea of the position I am taking dawned on me with the problem of the question, which I now want to treat in a larger essay in which I would ask: What sort of “being” does the “sense” of a question have? It is not that

The lecture bearing the title “Frage und Urteil,” was delivered by Heidegger on July 10, 1915 in the course of Heinrich Rickert’s regular seminar of SS 1915 on Lotze’s Logic at the University of Freiburg. It is scheduled for publication in GA 80, but it has been edited by Alfred Denker in Martin Heidegger and Heinrich Rickert, Briefe 1912 bis 1933 und andere Dokumente (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2002), 80–90. An English paraphrase of the original manuscript obtained from Alfred Denker is here presented by Theodore Kisiel.

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of validating. Something standing outside of validity, thus the false? In the end not even that. Perhaps something “in between”? (Heidegger/Rickert, Briefe, 19)

The seminar lecture of July 1915, which brings the “problem of the question” in close proximity, and contrast, with the “problem of the judgment” as Rickert treats it, alludes only at the end to the more comprehensive investigation from which the lecture is drawn. The phenomenological “problem of the question” becomes a recurrent theme of Heidegger’s postwar lecture courses beginning in 1919 (GA 56/57: 63–70, 158–59, 199, 213) and finds its “logical” denouement in the early pages of Being and Time (1927), in the section (§ 2) entitled “The Formal Structure of the Question of Being.”

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**Question and Judgment**

The first elaborations in Rickert’s *The Object of Knowledge* demonstrated that reality as a metalogical construct cannot be the object of knowledge. The question of the object of knowledge is thus raised anew.

We “possess” knowledge only in judgments. In the end, therefore, we can find the object of knowledge by asking about the object of the judgment, thus by seeking to expose “that toward which we direct ourselves whenever we judge” (86).2

It therefore becomes necessary to make the judgment itself into a problem. From the start, the judgment is viewed in regard to what it ought to be, namely, true. It therefore must be investigated in view of the structure that it must have in order to fulfill its goal of truth. This structure becomes evident when we understand the judgment as an answer to a question. With that, I believe that I have in all brevity characterized how the problem of *The Object of Knowledge* is posed.

Since the appearance of the second edition of this book, Rickert has published essays on “The Two Ways of Epistemology,”3 on “Judgment and Judging,”4 and “On Logical and Ethical Validity.”5 These essays and the remarks made in the last hour lead to the presumption that the investigations of “question and judg-

1. Heinrich Rickert, *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis* [The Object of Knowledge] (Freiburg: C. A. Wägner, 1892), 92 pp. This was Rickert’s habilitation under Wilhelm Windelband at the University of Freiburg.
5. ”Über logische und ethische Geltung,” *Kant-Studien* 19 (1914), 192–221.
In order to circumvent the danger of barging through an already open door, I would like to treat the problem of “Question and Judgment” without close reference to *The Object of Knowledge*. It is impossible to unravel this problem in all of its ramifications. We shall instead briefly treat some of the questions of potential interest to us in the present context.

1. In what sense is the judgment regarded when it is taken as an *answer* to a question? What requirements arise from considering it in this way? The answer: the judgment is regarded as an act. And when the judgment is juxtaposed to the question in order to highlight its peculiar status as an answer, the question must likewise be taken as an act and the specific character of this act must be identified.

2. Can the treatment of the problem presented in this way be carried out as such? The answer is No. It necessarily points beyond itself and forces us to confront the question and the judgment with one another also with regard to their content (*sense, Sinn*). No matter how sharply the two problems may be theoretically separated, characterization of the *acts* as opposed to characterization of their *content*, they still refer to one another. Only in the union of the two can we expect a satisfactory solution to the problem of “Question and Judgment.”

Whenever one seeks to clarify the essence of the question, one almost always brings it in connection with the judgment. For this is the answer to a question or at least *can* be taken in that way; it does not *have* to be considered in this way. A theory of judgment can be carried out without reference to the problem of the question, i.e., without raising the problem of the judgment in its function as an answer.

However, an answer cannot be conceived as an answer without taking it to be the answer to a question. As the answer demands the question as its correlate, so the question the answer. This does not mean that every question must already be linked with a ready answer, or that every formulation of a question must be immediately followed temporally by the positing of an answer. Rather, the correlation means that the ideal essence “question in general” can only be understood by way of the ideal essence “answer in general,” and vice versa. Question and answer thus form a particular unity. They must in a certain respect carry a common moment which makes this coordination possible.

Question and answer are acts and as acts are more than mere psychic realities that surface in the stream of consciousness and again submerge. They are constructions that achieve something. They are both achievements which neither as such beholds before the other has gone forward. In order to see this clearly, a dangerous equivocation contained in the word “achievement” must of course be avoided.

6. The completely reworked and expanded third edition (456 pp.) of *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis* first appeared in 1915 (Mohr [Siebeck]).
“Achievement” can first be understood as the “achieved,” the result of the achievement. It can also mean “achieving” as a deed, act, actualization of the achievement in the first sense of the word.

As achievements in the objective sense, i.e., in their content, question and judgment are not coordinated, as will be shown. But they are coordinated as achievements in the subjective sense, as acts. The essence of an act must be seen in its intentionality. If acts as acts are different from one another, their difference can only be that of intentionality (directedness of the subject toward . . .). This in turn is possible in a twofold sense:

1) the directedness as such is identically the same but aims at something different, which is intended in an identical sense while varying from case to case.

2) Or the directedness as such is different in having a definite quality.

If acts as such are studied in their difference, then it is a matter of directing our attention to the quality of the intentions.

If I regard the judgment as an answer to a question and seek to illuminate its essence along this path, it must as act be juxtaposed to the question as act. In the interest of a univocal solution to the problem, the following must be strictly avoided:

1) Promiscuous use of the distinction: questioning act and question-content—judging act and judgment-content.

2) Bringing the judgment as act into relation with the question as content, whereby it is said that the representational relation of the question lacks only the moment of decision when compared to the judgment (p. 96).

But as soon as we seek to clarify the specific intentionalities of the two acts of question and judgment, we tend to refer to the content of these constructions, to that toward which they direct themselves. This accounts for Rickert’s principle that the sense of the achievement of acts can only be explicated from the transcendent content.

For reasons that will first become clear at the end, it is expedient, and conducive to greater security, to take our starting point for the remainder of the investigation from the content of the judgment. Even if we consider the multiplicity of theories on the structure of the judicative content—their respective definitions divide the various epistemologies—it should still not seem prejudicial if we take our point of departure from such a problematic construction. For the purposes of our investigation, however, the structure of the judicative content (of the transcendent sense) first of all does not even come into question. It is only important to understand the mode of actuality of the content, that it does not exist temporally but is valid timelessly. In the dynamic whirl of psychic processes, it is the static and stable
moment. The content holds, is valid, has a non-sensory actuality centering in itself. Contrary to psychologistic confusions, it is identified as something that is eminently meaningful. With respect to the theory of judicative structure and the problem of truth, the relationship to validating sense, it continues to be a wholly universal determination.

But it is enough to carry our investigation further. Our question is accordingly: What character does this validating content of judgment impart to the sense of achievement of the acts that are directed toward it as validating acts? What quality can it give only to these intentionalities? The character that it imparts is the quality of deciding, of positing. The sense of achievement of the judicative act is something that is concluded, finished, final. The subject is in and through them released from all sensory states of tension. (Can this be made into a universal of the predicative determinations of acts? Constraint of expressions laden with graphic imagery taken from other objective domains.)

This arrival at a full stop and finality that the subject reaches in these acts is possible only because the content upon which they are founded itself possesses in itself the stay of a hold; i.e., it is valid.

Affirmation and negation both have the identical moment of position (negation is in no way a non-positing). What distinguishes the two forms of decision does not lie in their directedness, which is identical in both, but in the judicative content, which can be a positive or a negative content. Through affirmation and negation, “the representational relation” is therefore made “not to something . . . to which the predicates ‘true’ or ‘false’ can be applied.” Instead, these acts can first be performed with sense when the judicative content applicable through them is known as either validating or not validating.

Rickert is thereby justified to state: “We are therefore permitted to maintain that it is not possible to pronounce a logically perfect judgment without affirming or denying” (p. 101). For pronouncing a judgment necessarily includes these acts of decision; it consists precisely in these acts. Affirmation and negation are the modes of appropriation, the ways of taking knowledge into possession for and by the subject.

Let us now try to take the same route with the question, and so to explicate the sense of achievement of the act of the question from the content of the question. Can we also find in the question as in the judgment “a dependence of the subjective comportment on the objective possession with respect to the validity of value”? (Rickert, “On Logical and Ethical Validity,” 186).

There is no doubt that the act of the question relates itself to a content of the question, for something is always asked in the question. But this content of the question is neither valid nor is it non-valid. Rather, precisely with regard to this content, it is asked whether it is valid or not valid. But does it not hover before the questioning act directed toward it as something somehow persisting? Does it now
allow itself to be objectively grasped and characterized as such a disposed and specifically persistent content of the question independent of the act?

But when I reflect on this content-of-the-question detached from the act, I put it into judgments, it becomes a component part of the contents of judgments. It thereby loses precisely its relation to the act of the question. Furthermore, does the content of the question, analogous to the content of the judgment, have persistence in itself? Do questions persist without anyone ever asking them, just as judgments are true and valid without being pronounced?

Fermat’s theorem, “Can the sum of two powers n, where n ≠ 2, in turn be a power to the degree n?” exists even without the question actually being asked. But when it is solved, it no longer exists. The content of the question has a certain objective persistence, and again does not have it? How do we extricate ourselves from this discrepancy? In other words, how are we to characterize the content of the question?

As we raise these questions, it is becoming evident that the content of the question, when it is detached from the act, is a problematic construction, prompting us to surmise that the act of the question cannot be explicited from the content. With the question, we must instead follow the reverse path and define the content of the question first from the act of the question.

This is indeed the case. And this circumstance also explains the peculiar fact that disagreeably forces itself upon anyone who seeks to reflect on the detached content of the question, namely the fact that the essential dimension of the content of the question, its particular function as questioned content, always slips away from us in theoretical reflection [Besinnung]. As already stated, this indicates that the questioned content is much more closely tied to the specific act of the question than the content of judgment is to the act of judgment.

What then is the specific character of the sense of achievement of the act of the question? How is the quality of this intention to be defined? Is it simple or is it composed of several moments of sense? What kind of composition is it?

Surely this questioning is not a matter of mere representation, simply a presumptive intending of an object. Certainly in questioning, I always intend something, but this is the universal essence of every intention, and thus also belongs to the question.

But questioning is more. It is nevertheless not quite a decision. Is it perhaps a mere assuming? Not even that. Questioning is on the one hand more than assuming and on the other less. An assumption already documents the taking of a position toward a content already somehow conditioned. It has, like a decision, a certain character of finality, it is a certain conclusion, albeit only provisional, while questioning really leaves things open. Questioning thus does not go so far, and yet it goes further in that it manifests a tendency toward a decision. This indicates that the sense of achievement of the act of the question includes a moment of sense that
points toward the act of judgment. Accordingly, the characterization of the content implies the necessity that the content of the question must also be somehow ordered toward the content of the judgment. For the moment, we shall not investigate this question any further, but wish rather to pursue further the characterization of the sense of achievement.

In questioning I intend something. But this intention is colored or shaded by a certain interest. In the question something is willed. It is therefore simply an act of the will. Does this apply to the actual state of affairs? In an act of the will, I of course also intend something, but in a particular sense, namely, to do something, to carry something out practically. Is this moment of sense latent in questioning? Certainly not. Questioning is certainly a volitional act, a practical deed. But in the end, so is every act as an act of the subject.

The act of the question has a relation to the act of the will insofar as questioning is a possible project of the act of the will. The subject’s stance of wanting-to-question is however not the stance of questioning itself. To characterize questioning as “wanting to know” accordingly will not do. But perhaps what is meant by such a willing/wanting [Wollen] is better expressed by wishing. In fact, in the question I wish something: the answer. The question would accordingly be an act of wishing such that the object of the wish is quite specific, namely the judgment. But I can wish for a judgment without asking, without assuming the interrogative stance. Questioning is therefore not a mere wish for an answer, it is more.

Questioning makes something ready, creates a content which is meant to have the possibility of becoming a judicative content. In creating this content, questioning takes the content not merely as standing in this possibility, takes it therefore not merely in the sense shading [Sinnfärbung] of a wish. Rather, it takes the content in an intention in which these moments of sense are peculiarly intertwined such that they result in, e.g., a particular “tone shade” or “timbre” [Klangfarbe]: the peculiar intention that we call questioning.

In describing the sense of achievement of the act of the question in the way that it has taken place, I must necessarily dismember the full and unmarred sense of the act; only in this dismembering analysis can I identify one moment of sense after the other. Saying what questioning is all at once, so to speak in a single stroke, therefore can never be fully carried out. Even if I could identify these moments of sense all at once, the declaration would still miss their peculiar intertwining. What questioning is can wholly only be lived, experienced. If a fully valid and adequate methodical definition must always fall short, the moments that have been brought out are nevertheless important enough to pick out a few more things about the question.

The preparation of a possible sense of judgment, which I would like to call the creative moment of the question, indicates that the question in its inherent essence is rooted in subjectivity. The relationship of content and act in the question is accordingly exactly the reverse of that in the judgment. In the latter, the content as
validating is primary; to it, as such, can—but need not necessarily—correspond an act of decision on the part of the subject. Conversely, in the question, the act is primary; from it, the content is conditioned in its persistence and structure. The question as act cannot be interpreted from its content; on the contrary, the content can only be understood from the sense of the act. The question is, as it were, a reflexive construction instigated by the subjectivity. As preparation of a possible sense of judgment, the question must already also bestow upon its content a certain structure which in its form is oriented to the structure of the judgment.

But there is a still broader sense in which the question is oriented toward and compared with the judgment. Questioning is not true or untrue, but rather correct or incorrect. The question “How many grams does a curve to the second degree weigh?” will have to be called incorrect on the basis of a comparison with validating judgments as they are: mathematical objects are non-sensory and not corporeal, and so cannot be weighed. (Important: not a thetic moment. Alternative: what one thinks of the question [correct or incorrect]. The ultimate questions.)

The moment of wishing in the sense of the act of the question brings with itself the character that the question is something inconclusive, a construction that refers beyond itself. It has within itself no stay and hold of its own, so that we say, not incorrectly, that a question is held “in suspense.” The question is a teleological construction.

The judicative acts of decision provide a certain completion to the subject, allow it to come to rest by living in the transcendent validating sense of the judgment, “raising” it up, as it were, into “safe keeping” [“heben” es auf].

In questioning, by contrast, the subject lives in a certain state of tension, it strives for the fulfillment of completion, toward rest in the answer.

What has been said above is extracted from a larger investigation of the question. What has been presented is a selection of only several viewpoints that perhaps have a certain interest in connection with the object. Some important problems have not even been mentioned, like the relationship of question and doubt, of question and probability, of question and evidence, the structural problems of the question (subject, predicate, copula), positivity and negativity in the question, the various forms of question: questions of decision and of generation or production. These will be treated in detail on another occasion.
7. The Concept of Time in the Science of History

As his last step towards achieving the certification (Habilitation) to teach at the University of Freiburg, Martin Heidegger delivered a trial lecture, “The Concept of Time in the Science of History” before the Philosophy Faculty on July 27, 1915. The lecture unfolds by way of a contrast: the concept of time in physics vs. the concept of time in the science of history. The goal of physics, he argues, is to reduce all phenomena to mathematical laws; and within that framework, time is understood as a homogenous series of quantitative points that functions as a flat scale for measuring motion. By contrast, the science of history focuses on past objectifications of human life in terms of their uniqueness and singularity and above all their impact and continuing effect on the present. Thus the selection of which past events will become “historical” depends on their relatedness to certain present values. Within the science of history time is not, as it is in physics, a homogenous, mathematically divisible quantum at the service of measuring motion. Rather, it has a qualitative structure and function which stand in the service of overcoming the gap that separates the historian from past events. The lecture reveals the young Heidegger’s debt to Dilthey and Rickert and his critical interest in the structure and philosophical history of modern science. But above all, while evidencing his early fascination with the concept of time, it also reveals the distance that separates him from the understanding of time and history that would first find expression a dozen years later in Being and Time.

* * *

The Concept of Time in the Science of History

Time is what changes and becomes multiple.
Eternity remains simple.
– Meister Eckhart

For some years now there has been awakening a “metaphysical urge” within scientific philosophy. Staying focused on mere epistemology will no longer do the job. The emphasis on epistemological problems is born of a legitimate and lively awareness of the need and value of critique, but it does not permit philosophy’s questions about ultimate issues and goals to achieve their intrinsic significance. This explains the sometimes hidden, sometimes manifest tendency towards metaphysics. We should interpret this trend as evidence of a deeper understanding of philosophy and its problems, and we should see in it philosophy’s will to power, although certainly not in the sense of the intellectual violence of the “worldview of the natural sciences.”

So strong and vital is the awareness of critique in modern science and philosophy that it even tries to dominate our culture with ungrounded or poorly founded claims to power—so strong that, even though it recognizes the indispensable need to lay an ultimate metaphysical foundation (Plato’s ὑπόθεσις), it still devotes so much of its energy to grappling with epistemological (in the broadest sense, logical) problems. There is no question that, despite fruitful research in the theory of science in the last decades, numerous problems in this area still await resolution. The natural sciences, like the cultural sciences, have been problematized with regard to their logical structure. In fact one of the main outcomes of this research has been the sharp distinction between the two kinds of science, along with the logical grounding of their respective autonomies. Nonetheless, a multitude of specific problems must first be resolved [416] before we can undertake the comprehensive future task of a general theory of science. In what follows we shall take one of those specific problems as the focus of our investigation.

In order to keep the goal and specific character of such an investigation present to mind, we first offer some general observations about science and the theory of science.

Every science is a coherent interconnection of theoretical cognitions organized and grounded on principles. Cognitions are expressed in judgments; these judgments are true, i.e., valid. What is valid in the strict sense of the word is not the act of judgment that an individual researcher performs in acquiring knowledge. Instead, the sense of the judgment—its content—is what is valid. Each science, when we consider science in terms of the notion of its completion, is seen to be a self-subsisting matrix of valid sense. But the particular concrete sciences, as temporally conditioned cultural facts, are never complete. They are always in the process of discovering truth.
The way the particular sciences discover knowledge—i.e., the method guiding their research—is determined by the object of the science in question and by the viewpoint from which it is examined. The research methods of the various sciences operate with certain basic concepts, and the job of the theory of science is to reflect \textit{sich besinnen} on the logical structure of those concepts. Raising this question within the theory of science leads us from the specific sciences into the realm of the basic and ultimate elements of logic, the categories. Such investigations in the theory of science might easily give researchers in the particular sciences the impression of being obvious and thus pointless. But this so only when one expects such investigations to provide new subject matter for one's own particular science. Clearly they cannot do that: they operate in an entirely different dimension. These investigations begin to make sense to researchers in a particular [417] science only when they forget about doing such research—and start to do philosophy.

Articulating the logical bases of the research methods of the particular sciences is the business of logic \textit{qua} theory of science. In what follows we cannot develop that subject in its entirety. Instead, we shall single out and clarify a specific individual category (or basic logical element): the concept of time. In the end we shall show how this central concept becomes a problem, the solution to which invariably sheds light on the logical structure of the particular sciences employing the concept. Our question now is: What path will most surely lead to understanding the logical structure of the concept of time in the science of history? In saying that this concept of time has a particular logical structure, we mean that its content is determined in a particular way by very specific and basic categorical elements. What we need to articulate is this determination of the concept of “time in general” as the concept of “historical time.” We shall see that the science of history applies the concept of time in a way that corresponds to its own tasks. Consequently the structure of the time-concept within the science of history can be described from its function within that science; in turn, its particular function can be understood from the goal of that science. Therefore, the path we follow in solving this problem about the logical character of the time-concept in the history of science moves from the goal of this science, through the consequent function of the concept of time, to the structure of the concept of time. The problem may be briefly formulated as follows: \textit{Within the science of history what structure must the concept of time have in order to function in that science in a way that corresponds to the goal of that science?} In this manner we neither presuppose a particular philosophical theory of scientific history, nor inquire into which structure of [418] the concept of time fits that science. Rather, we begin with the science of history as a fact; then we study the factual function of the concept of time within that science; and from there we determine its logical structure. If we solve the problem as posed and come to understand the concept of time as one of the central concepts within historical science,
we should be able to establish some general principles about the logical structure of history as a science.

The peculiar structure of the concept of time in the science of history will no doubt stand out more clearly if we contrast it with a very different articulation of the structure of time. To do so, we shall briefly characterize the concept of time in the natural sciences—specifically physics—before going on to deal with our own proper task. We shall pose the question about the time-concept in physics in the same way we do for the time-concept in history: Within physics, what structure must the concept of time have in order to function as a concept of time that corresponds to the goal of physics?

1

We must first get clear on the goal of physics as a science. The best way to do that is to lay out the basic orientation of physics, which has become ever more clear in the course of its history from Galileo to the present.

Ancient and medieval philosophy of nature sought [419] to investigate the metaphysical essence and hidden causes of phenomena as these latter obtrude in immediate reality. In contrast to such metaphysical speculation about nature, Galileo’s science yields something fundamentally new with regard to method. It seeks to master the multiplicity of phenomena by means of laws; and its unique new accomplishment consists in how it arrives at those laws. The new method for discerning laws most clearly reveals the basic orientation of physics; and we shall explain this method by way of the classical example of Galileo’s discovery of the law of gravity. The old way of investigating nature would have approached the problem of gravity by first observing individual cases of gravitational phenomena, then trying to abstract what was common to all such phenomena, in order finally to infer what the essence of gravity might be. Galileo, however, begins not by observing individual examples of gravitational phenomena, but with a general assumption (hypothesis) which declares that, when deprived of support, bodies fall in such a way that their velocity increases in proportion to time \((v = g \times t)\); that is to say, bodies fall with uniformly accelerating motion. The initial velocity is 0; the final velocity is \(v = g \times t\). If we take the average velocity as \(g/2 \times t\), then we have uniform motion. The basic definitional formula is: \(s = c \times t\). Distance equals the product of velocity and time. In our case, \(c = g/2 \times t\). Inserting this value into the final equation yields \(s = g/2 \times t^2\). Galileo tested this equation against

1. Medieval thought was not as foreign to empirical concerns as people usually think. It was certainly aware of the value of experiential work, or at least of recording the facts. It had an awareness (albeit theoretically unclarified) of the value of mathematics for investigating nature, and knew of experiment. But despite all that, the proper way of posing the problems of natural science was still lacking.
concrete cases, and they confirmed it. Therefore the initial assumption is valid, and from it one derives, by pure deduction, the law that is subsequently corroborated by experimentation. We have intentionally presented the whole thought-process in some detail in order to show that nowhere in the entire deliberation is it ever a question of this or that specific body or period of time or line of fall. The postulate $v = g \times t$, which subsequently becomes a law by way of inference from the verifying experiment, is a universal hypothesis about bodies in general.

Two things are peculiar to this new method: 1) It sets out a hypothesis that allows us to understand all the phenomena of a particular region—in this case, phenomena of motion. 2) Rather than positing some hidden quality as the cause that explains the phenomena, the hypothesis consists of mathematically understandable (i.e., measurable) relations between idealized moments of the phenomenon. This way of formulating problems, which Galileo was the first to consciously employ, has, over the course of time, come to dominate the various fields of physics (mechanics, acoustics, thermodynamics, optics, electromagnetism). In each of these fields physics strives for equations that lay out the universal law-governed relations that regulate processes within the respective field.

But modern physics does not stop with that. It has now discovered fundamental laws that allow, on the one hand, for parts of acoustics and thermodynamics to be included within mechanics, and on the other hand, for parts of optics, magnetism, and thermodynamics to be included in electrical theory. Thus the multiplicity of particular fields within physics has nowadays been reduced to two: mechanics and electrodynamics, or (as it is sometimes put) the physics of matter and the physics of the ether. As hotly as the battle has raged between the mechanical and the electrodynamic “worldviews” (!), the two regions, as Planck says, “cannot in the long run be sharply distinguished from one another.”

“Laying a foundation for mechanics requires, in principle, only the concepts of space, time, and ‘the mobile’ whether considered as a substance or a state. These same concepts are also indispensable for electrodynamics. Thus a sufficiently generalized mechanics could easily take in electrodynamics as well; and in fact there are many indications that these two fields, which already partially overlap, will ultimately be unified into a single field: general dynamics.”

This should suffice to indicate the goal of physics as a science. That goal is the unity of the physical theory of the world, the reduction of all phenomena to the mathematically established basic laws of general dynamics—laws of motion that apply to any mass that needs to be determined. Now that we understand the

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3. Ibid., 9 [ET p. 9].
goal of physics, we may ask our second question: *What is the function of the concept of time within this science?*

Concisely put, the object of physics is law-governed motion. Motions run their course in time—but what does that mean? The “in” of “in time” has a spatial meaning; but obviously time is not spatial; in fact we constantly contrast space and time. But it is equally clear that space and time do go together somehow. In a passage from his *Discorsi*, Galileo speaks straightforwardly of a “relation between the concepts of time and motion.”

“For just as the uniformity of motion is defined and understood by way of equalities of times and spaces . . . , so too by way of similar equalities of *segments* of time we can understand uniform increases in velocity [i.e., acceleration].” Clearly the relation of motion and time has to do with *measuring* motion by means of [422] time. Measuring as a way of determining quantity is the business of mathematics. The foundation of experimental physics is formed by theoretical (i.e., mathematical) physics. If we hope to get precise concepts of motion and time, we have to study them in their mathematical form.

The position of a material point in space is determined by the spatial point with which it coincides. Imagine that space is empty, except for the material point whose position has to be determined. But space is infinite: each spatial point is equal to every other, just as each direction is equal to every other direction. Determining the position of the material point in question is impossible without another point, with relation to which the position of the first point can be determined. Such a reference point must always be presupposed. All determinations of position have their validity in relation to that point; hence they are never absolute. We determine a position by taking three straight lines, perpendicular to each other, that intersect the reference point: the axes $x$, $y$, and $z$. The position of point $p$ is determined by the distances (= coordinates $x$, $y$, and $z$) measured along those coordinate axes. Assume that point $p$ lies on a spatial curve. We now consider it in terms of its motion, that is, we study its positions as they succeed one another in time. At each second on the clock, we can take three measurements—i.e., we can fix the specific

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values of $x$, $y$, and $z$—which determine the place of point $p$ at time $t$. Thus $x$, $y$, and $z$ are dependent for their values on the respective value $t$—that is, they are functions of time: $x = x(t); y = y(t); z = z(t)$. If the value of time $t$ changes even infinitesimally, the values of the coordinates also change. Now if we assign the entire sequence of possible values for $t$, then the coordinates, as constant functions of $t$, will express the integral totality of all temporally sequential positions of point $p$. The integral totality of all these positions is what we call motion. [423]

“If we want to describe the motion of a material point,” Einstein writes, “we give the values of its coordinates as functions of time.”6

All further basic concepts of the theory of motion, such as velocity, uniform motion, acceleration, and non-uniform motion, are defined by definite relationships between magnitudes of space and time. The sensibly perceivable qualities of the defined phenomenon are eliminated and entirely absorbed into mathematical qualities.

This is how motion as an object of physics is measured by means of time. The function of time is to make measurement possible. Since physics views motion in terms of its measurability, motion’s relation to time is never just occasional, such that there might be physical cognitions from which time as such is excluded. On the contrary, as the previous equations have indicated, time is a necessary moment in the definition of motion. Motion is understandable within mathematical physics first and foremost because of this necessary linkage with time. Now that we know that time is a condition of possibility for mathematically determining the object of physics (i.e., motion), we can directly answer our last question, What is the structure of this concept of time? In the equations of motion—$x = x(t), y = y(t)$, and $z = z(t)$—time is presupposed as an independent variable that changes consistently, i.e., flows uniformly from one point to another without any leaps. Time is like a simple linear series in which each point of time is differentiated by its current position as measured from its initial position. Since any given point in time differs from the preceding one only by being the succeeding one, it is possible [424] to measure time and therefore motion. As soon as time is measured (and time has a meaningful function in physics only as measurable and measuring), we can determine a quantitative “how much.” This declaration of “how much” gathers the already elapsed points of time into a unit. We make a cut, as it were, in the time-scale, thereby destroying the proper flow of time and letting time congeal. The flow freezes, becomes a segment; and only as a segment can it be measured. Time has become a homogeneous ordering of points, a scale, a parameter.

Before concluding our treatment of the concept of time in natural science, we must consider one more objection. Someone might suggest that what we have said so far does not take into consideration the most recent theory in physics, the theory of relativity. The conception of time resulting from that theory “surpasses in boldness everything previously achieved in the speculative investigation of nature and even in philosophical theories of knowledge.”

But one usually overlooks the fact that relativity theory, as a *theory of physics*, is concerned with the problem of the *measurement* of time and not with time in itself. The concept of time is untouched by the theory of relativity; in fact, relativity theory corroborates to the highest degree what we spelled out earlier about the character of the concept of time in natural science, namely, its homogeneous, quantitatively determinable character. Nothing could more clearly express the mathematical character of the concept of time within physics than the fact that time is posited as the fourth dimension alongside three-dimensional space and, together with it, is treated in a non-Euclidean geometry, one with more than three dimensions.

As we make a transition to presenting the structure of the time-concept in the science of history, it might seem highly doubtful at first that [425] we can pose a new problem here at all. For even within scientific history time is not unlike an ordering of points, whereby events get their determinate place in time and are thus fixed *historically*. Frischeisen-Köhler recently wrote “that in certain circumstances, fixing something in time is enough . . . to change a concept formed according to natural scientific principles into a historical concept.” Thus the concept “the famine in Fulda in the year 750” indicates a very specific individual event [*Ereignis*] and accordingly is a historical concept.

Here we face a choice. Either the aforementioned concept is not a historical concept—since it is hardly clear why a mere determination of time should turn universal concepts into historical ones (even occurrences of motion in physics are determined temporally); or we do indeed have a historical concept here. The latter is in fact the case—but then the determination of time within this concept is a very distinctive one that can be understood only from the essence of the science of history.

At least this much has become clear: There is a problem about the concept of time in the science of history. And therefore it is reasonable and legitimate to ask about the structure of the time-concept in history. The only way to discern this structure is from its function in the science of history; and this function in turn can be understood only from the goal and the object of scientific history.

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7. Planck, ibid., 117. [ET, 120.]
9. Heidegger’s marginal note: “In what sense does ‘individual’ = ‘historical’?”
THE CONCEPT OF TIME IN THE SCIENCE OF HISTORY

II

When it comes to the science of history, the path we are following—from the goal of the science, to the function of the concept of time within that science, and from there to the structure of the concept of time—may seem like a detour. In this science we might more readily reach our goal by recalling that its methodology includes a special auxiliary discipline concerned explicitly with determining time within that science: historical chronology. And in this discipline the distinctiveness of the concept of historical time would immediately become clear. Our reason for not taking this path will become evident only at the conclusion, at which point we will also understand the single aspect of chronology that functions as an essential moment in the concept of historical time. For now, continuing with the path we laid out earlier, we shall first try to establish something about the goal of the science of history.

We immediately run up against a difficulty: historians have failed to reach complete agreement about the goal and object of the science of history. Hence whatever we decide about this problem can make no claim to finality and completeness. Nonetheless, that does not jeopardize our issue so long as we focus only on those moments of the concept in the science of history that allow us to understand the function of the concept of time within that science.

The object of the science of history is human beings, not as biological objects but insofar as their intellectual and material achievements are that whereby the idea of culture unfolds. In all its fullness and variety this creation of culture runs its course within time: it undergoes development, it experiences the most varied forms of inversion and reversion, it takes up past events in order to further rework or contest them. This creation of culture by human beings in and through the associations and organizations they have forged (the state) is at bottom the objectification of human spirit. Historians are interested in the objectification of spirit as enacted within the flow of time, although not in its entirety at each particular moment as if history recorded absolutely everything that occurs in time. Instead, as someone has put it, historians are interested only in what is “historically efficacious.” Eduard Meyer, who came up with this formulation, correctly develops and explains it when he says: “The selection depends on the historical interest that the present has in this or that effect, this or that outcome of the development…”

An interest, however, must always be determined by a point of view and guided by a norm. Consequently, the selection of the historical from out of the abundance of available data depends on a relation to certain values. Consequently the goal of scientific history is this: to present the ensemble of the effec-

11. Kleine Schriften (Halle: Niemeyer, 1910), 42.
tivity and development of objectifications of human life in all their singularity and uniqueness as they are understandable in their relation to cultural values.

But we have not yet touched on a fundamental and essential mark of any historical object. The historical object, as historical, is always past: in the strict sense it no longer exists. A temporal divide separates the historian from the past. The past has its meaning always and only when seen from the present. When viewed from our standpoint, the past not only  

is  

no longer; it also  

was  

something other than us and our present-day context of life. This much has already become clear: time has a completely original meaning in history. Only when this qualitative otherness between past times and the present moment breaks into consciousness does the historical sense awaken. Insofar as the historical past is always a realm of “other” objectifications of human life, and insofar as we ourselves forge and live within these objectifications, there does exist the a priori possibility of understanding the past, for it cannot be a totally incomparable “other.” Nonetheless, there still remains the temporal divide between historians and their object; and when they seek to represent it, they must somehow already have this object in front of them. They have to overcome time and live across the temporal divide, from the present into the past. [428] Overcoming time and representing a past (which the goal and object of scientific history requires) is possible only if, along with that, time itself assumes its function within scientific history. As early as 1607, Johannes Bodinus’s  

Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem  

had already devoted a chapter specifically to time. There we find the sentence: “qui sine ratione temporum [the plural is significant] historias intelligere se posse putant, perinde falluntur, ut si labyrinthi errores evadere sine duce velint.”  

In studying the function of time within the overcoming of time required for scientific history, the most reliable way is to focus on the  

methodology  

of the science, through which it gains access to and historically represents the past. It would take us too far afield to pursue all the details of how time functions in historical method and to lay out the relations between its basic concepts and the guiding concept. Instead we shall characterize only some of the more salient concepts and procedures of the scientific method of history that illustrate the function of the concept of time in this science. This will yield a moment that is at least  

adequate  

for analyzing the structure of the concept of time.

The first and fundamental task of scientific history is simply to guarantee the factuality  

[Tatsächlichkeit]  

of the occurrences it has to represent. As Droysen puts it: “Perhaps the greatest service of the critical school within our science—at least

12. Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem, 1607, chap. VII “de temporis universi ratione” [“On calculating universal time”], 431. [“Thinking that one can understand histories without calculating time-periods {Heidegger’s note: “the plural is significant”} is as misguided as trying to escape the twists and turns of a labyrinth without a guide.”]
the most significant as regards methodology—has been to come up with the insight that the foundation of our research consists in testing the ‘sources’ we draw on. With this, history’s relation to the past enters its scientifically normative stage.”

Thus the “source” makes possible scientific access to historical reality. In fact the historical reality is constructed from that source in the first place. But this is possible only if the source is guaranteed as regards its value as a source, i.e., only if its authenticity is proven. This is what criticism does. Suppose, for example, that we have to prove the authenticity of a document. This can be done by deciding whether it fits a certain bureaucratic style. “Documentary records issuing from an orderly functioning government office will have particular characteristics at particular times. The ensemble of all those characteristics at a particular time constitutes the bureaucratic style of that office.” So here the concept of time is embedded in the concept of bureaucratic style.

Proof via bureaucratic style—the so-called diplomatic critique—must, however, be supplemented by a legal-historical and general historical critique; that is, the document must be compared with the legal and the general cultural circumstances of the time-period to which it allegedly belongs. For example, the Decretals of Pseudo-Isidore were proven to be forgeries once the individual papal letters were shown to be anachronisms. We know that Pope Gregory the Great was the first to begin his letters with the phrase “servus servorum Dei” [“servant of the servants of God”]. But in the letters from the Isidoran collection, earlier popes are already calling themselves “the servant of the servants of God.” We also know that up until the end of the fourth century the popes did not date their letters according to which Roman consuls were in office at the time; however, in the Isidoran letters they do. The Decretals, which are supposed to come from the earliest centuries, presuppose circumstances of Church law that arose only later. Criticism

13. Heidegger’s marginal note: “This is not [the same as] ‘establishing facts.”


16. Editor’s note: The Decretals of Pseudo-Isidore (also known as “The False Decretals”) is a collection of some 200 texts, about half of which are expert forgeries produced 846 to 852 CE, probably in Mainz, in an effort to diminish the power of the state over the church generally and of archbishops over bishops specifically. The collection purported to contain papal letters from 88 to 314 CE (all of which are forgeries) and from 314 to 731 CE (40 of which are forgeries), as well as various papal decretes (written replies on questions of Church discipline) and conciliar decrees, most of which are genuine, an exception being the “Donation of Constantine.” The title of the collection derives from their false ascription to either St. Isidore of Seville (ca. 560–636 CE) or a fictitious “Isidore Mercator” (“Isidore the Merchant”).
thus shows that, in both form and content, the letters have absolutely none of the characteristics of the time [430] in which they allegedly were written but only those of a later time. For a source to be employed scientifically, the time of its origin must be established, for its value as a witness depends on how close in time it lies to the historical fact to which it bears witness. “The most common means is a comparative investigation of the era to which the source in question most closely corresponds in form, style, and content—in short, in its whole character . . . because each period manifests in the ensemble of its creations and expressions a characteristic that distinguishes it from another, and we are certainly able to discern what that characteristic is.”17 With written sources it is mainly the writing style and the language—“those most flexible expressions of the Zeitgeist”—that allow us to make determinations about the time-period.

The concept of time plays an equally essential role in the second major task of historical method: spelling out the context of the already established individual facts. First of all it is a matter of correctly understanding the individual facts in their significance for the context, i.e., of correctly interpreting the relevant content of the sources.

An interesting example of the comprehensive function of the concept of time in history has been offered of late by Troeltsch’s examination of Augustine. Troeltsch shows that Augustine “truly was the conclusion and culmination of Christian antiquity, its last and greatest thinker, intellectual activist, and tribune of the people. This is the standpoint from which he must be understood.”18 On the other hand Troeltsch uses Augustine as the standpoint for definitively characterizing Christian antiquity. This characterization permits him to delimit the second period [Periode] in the history of Christianity from the first. Troeltsch holds that the distinctions between these two periods [431] “have to be drawn according to how the world of the Christian church fits with the general cultural circumstances at the time.”19

These examples suffice to briefly note the essential element of the concept of time in history: Time-periods [Zeiten] in history are distinguished qualitatively. What Ranke calls “the guiding tendencies” of an age [Zeitalter] set the norms for distinguishing one age from another.

Consequently the concept of time in the science of history has none of the homogeneity characterizing the concept of time in the natural sciences. That is also why historical time cannot be expressed mathematically by way of a series, for

19. Ibid., 172.
there is no law determining how the time-periods succeed one another. The temporal moments of physical time are distinguished from each other only by their positions in a series. Historical periods likewise follow one another (otherwise they would not be time-periods); but each one is20 distinct as regards its structural content. The qualitative factor of the historical concept of time is nothing but the congealing—the crystallization—of an objectification of life within history. Thus the science of history does not work with quantities. And yet, what are historical dates if not quantities? In the concept “the famine in Fulda in 750” historians can do nothing with the mere number “750.” They have no interest in that number as a quantum, as an element with its own determinate position within the numerical series from 1 to infinity, or as a number divisible by 50, or the like. The number 750, or any other historical number, has meaning and value within the science of history only as regards its historically significant content. The Trecento and Quattrocento [the 1300s and 1400s in Italian history] are anything but quantitative concepts. The question of “when” has two very different meanings in physics and in history. In physics I ask when the weight on the [432] Atwood gravity machine will reach a specific position on the scale, where “when” means “after how many ticks of the second-hand.” But when I ask about the “when” of a historical event [Ereignis], I am asking not about its quantity but about its place21 in a qualitative historical context. But on occasion even historians ask questions about “how much.” A future history of the war will certainly be interested in how long it took Mackensen’s army to drive its offensive from the Carpathians to the Russian-Polish quadrant.22 However, the quantitative determination (namely, about twelve weeks) has no intrinsic value and significance for historians, except insofar as it allows them to understand the extraordinary force of our allied troops and the unwavering focus of the entire operation, as well as to judge the strength of the Russian army’s resistance on the other side. Historical dates are convenient tokens for counting, but in themselves they have no meaning because every number could just as easily be substituted with another one simply by changing the point from which we start the count. However, a glance at the starting-points of time-reckoning systems shows that they always begin with a historically significant event [Ereignis] (the founding of the city of Rome, the birth of Christ, the Hegira).

20. Heidegger’s marginal note: “What does ‘is’ mean here? It is not a question of objective qualities.”
21. Heidegger’s marginal note: “What does ‘place’ mean here?”
22. Editor’s note: Heidegger is referring to the successful campaign that General August von Mackensen (1849–1945), commander of the combined German-Austrian 11th Army, conducted in western Galicia (today, southern Poland) from April to June 1915. After achieving a major breakthrough in the Gorlice-Tarnów area, Mackensen was promoted to Field Marshal on June 20, 1915, five weeks before Heidegger delivered this lecture.
Historical chronology, as an auxiliary discipline in the science of history, does have significance for a theory of the concept of time in history with regard to the beginning of time-reckoning. For example, we read that the establishment of January 1 as the first day of the year was initially upsetting to Christians “because it had absolutely no relation to the Christian religion.” The Church, therefore, moved the Feast of the Circumcision to January 1 in order to give that date an ecclesiastical significance, since the beginning of the year had always been set on important feast days—Easter or Christmas. This shows that, as regards time in the science of history, anything that concerns numbers and counting is qualitatively determined by how one decides the starting point of the count. We may say, then, that the starting-point of time-reckoning manifests the principle that controls all concept-formation in history: relatedness to a value.

Recognizing the fundamental significance of the concept of time in history, as well as its complete difference from the concept of time in physics, will enable the theory of science to penetrate more deeply into the proper character of the science of history and to ground it theoretically as an original intellectual position, irreducible to any other science.

8. Supplements to *The Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus*

Of the two texts presented below, namely, Heidegger’s “Author’s Notice” (1917) on the publication in 1916 of his habilitation dissertation, *The Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus* (1915) and the “Conclusion” that was “written as a supplement” (FS, 133/GA 1, 191) to the dissertation and included in its publication, the first provides an overview of the dissertation and thus a convenient introduction to the difficult future problems Heidegger raises by way of conclusion in the second. In the “Conclusion,” Heidegger situates the results of the dissertation within a programmatic sketch of the essential structures of the problem of categories and the tasks required for its solution. This programmatic sketch is significant above all in its introduction of the concept of “living spirit” (*lebendiger Geist*) as the necessary standpoint for solving the problem of categories, which not only appears to foreshadow the concept of *Dasein* in *Being and Time*, but also (as I will briefly explain) appears to echo the idealist/romantic reception of the Kantian problematic and, in particular, Fichte’s related conception of the self-positing *Ich*.

As the “Author’s Notice” summarizes, Part One of the dissertation is dedicated to the first basic requirement for any treatment of the problem of categories, that of demarcating the different domains of the field of objects in general, or, in Husserl’s language: “regional ontology.” Part Two of the dissertation elaborates specifically on the domain of ideal entities determined by the “categories of meaning,” as well as the...
subjective acts of meaning and knowing that are connected with them. Although this second part touches on the acts of the subject in their relation to the constitution of meaningful objects and thus alludes to what in the “Conclusion” Heidegger will call the “second basic requirement” for any solution to the problem of categories, “the entire structure of the present investigation” nonetheless remains oriented to the “first basic requirement,” the objective task of regional ontology, and thus remains “strictly conceptual” and “one-sided” in its presentation.

The “Conclusion” should correct for this one-sidedly conceptual presentation of the dissertation by supplementing this first basic task with two others that have yet to be attempted, but are necessary for any final solution to the problem of categories. According to Heidegger, the second basic requirement is that of “situating the problem of categories within the problem of judgment and the subject.”

Mentioning Aristotle and Kant, Heidegger explains that if categories are to be the most general determinations of objects, and if objectivity as such makes sense only for a subject that conceives its objects by acts of judgment, then a full treatment of the problem of categories requires situating the category with respect to the subject and its acts of judgment. This is not equivalent, Heidegger warns, to treating the categories as mere “forms of thinking.” On the contrary, Heidegger sketches an apparently realist position according to which the categories are grounded in the objects themselves. On this view, objects articulate themselves into various domains that call for different forms of judgment, and the categories are then finally “read off” from these forms of judgment, so that the object determines the category via the judgment, rather than vice versa as Kant is typically read.

In addition to situating the problem of categories with respect to judgment, the second basic requirement also involves situating this problem with respect to the judging subject. As Heidegger emphasizes, however, this subject is not to be understood merely logically, as Kant’s transcendental apperception is sometimes understood, but metaphysically. As Heidegger claims: “We cannot view logic and its problems in their true light at all if we do not interpret them from a translogical perspective. Philosophy cannot dispense for long with its own optics, metaphysics. For a theory of truth, this means that we must give a final, metaphysical-teleological interpretation of consciousness.”

This translogical consciousness is a “living deed that is itself meaningful and actualizes meaning,” and among whose “wealth of formative directions . . . the theoretical attitude is only one.” It is precisely this one-sidedness of the theoretical attitude with respect to the wealth of possibilities of “living spirit” that requires that we set the categories in relation to their living source, which seems to accomplish that enigmatic “fundamental liquidification” (prinzipielle Flüssigmachung) that Heidegger mentions, and avoids the “lethal vacuity” of a “meager, schematic table of categories.”

Heidegger vaguely attributes this concept of “living spirit and its ‘eternal affirmations’” to Friedrich Schlegel, without citing any specific text. Although Hei-
degger’s immediate interlocutors are neo-Kantian contemporaries, the position that he takes from them is especially informed by the idealist/romantic reception of transcendental idealism that plays out between Kant and Hegel. The fact that the “Conclusion” begins with a quotation from Novalis, attributes its central concept of living spirit to Friedrich Schlegel (both of whom were astute Fichte scholars), and ends dramatically with the name “Hegel,” suggests that this period and its conceptuality were very much present to Heidegger. Although a more thorough investigation is required than I can offer here, it is nonetheless worthwhile to consider very briefly the concept of “living spirit” as it appears in Schlegel’s writings, and also as it relates to Fichte’s philosophy. It was Fichte, and not Schlegel, who first attempted to situate the problem of categories with respect to the meaning-constitutive acts of “living spirit,” and to relativize the “theoretical attitude” with respect to spirit’s more profound practical possibilities.

Although the exact term “living spirit” first appears in Schlegel’s Dialogue on Poesie at the beginning of the first discourse, “Epochs of Poetry,” it is already the subject of Schlegel’s introductory remarks to the Dialogue. There Schlegel describes a hidden, universal creative power, a “formless and unconscious poesie that stirs in the plant, that shines in the light, that smiles in the child, that glimmers in the blossoms of youth, that glows in the loving breast of women” (285). This fluid, formless, but formative power, Schlegel continues, “is the first, original [poesie], without which there would certainly be no poesie of the word” (285). Not only the poet’s activity in the narrow sense, but all human creativity is an expression of this universal poesie, and we are capable of appreciating the beauty of nature or a work of art only because the “spark of [that] creative spirit lives in [each of] us” (285).

When the term “living spirit” surfaces in the discourse on the “Epochs of Poetry,” it names the human instantiation of this universal creative power (290). When this power appears in human beings, however, it undergoes a significant change: it becomes reflected, and thereby potentially conscious. As Schlegel says in an Athenäum fragment: “Sense that sees itself becomes spirit” (225). The universal poesie is a formative, and thus sense-constituting power. But this “sense” (if we can speak of such a thing in abstraction from a reflected subjectivity), this articulated structure, as it exists blindly in nature, cannot appear as such until it is reflected in “living spirit.” It is first in the reflection of spirit that the articulated world of sense is disclosed to a being for whom it can become an object. As such, “spirit” is the origin of the disclosure of a meaningful world of objects, as well as the conscious production of meaningful works.

Although this creative spirit is responsible for all genuine human creativity,
some works express this spirit more adequately than others, and that goes for philosophical works as well. At the end of the 1790s, Schlegel viewed Fichte’s *Wissenschaftslehre*, along with the young Schelling’s commentaries and complementary philosophy of nature, as the most adequate philosophical expression of this creative spirit. In one *Athenäum* fragment, Schlegel considers which philosophy would be most appropriate for the poet. After dismissing eudaimonism, fatalism, idealism, skepticism, materialism and empiricism, he describes an appropriate philosophy that is unmistakably Fichte’s: “And which philosophy is left for the poet? The creating one that begins with freedom and the faith in freedom, and then shows how the human spirit imposes its law on everything, and how the world is its work of art” (191–92). Schlegel was certainly critical of Fichte. For Schlegel, spirit’s capacity for reflection is infinite and could not be exhausted by the closed system of theoretical and practical categories that Fichte had hoped to derive from it. Moreover, Schlegel thought that Fichte’s system was one-sidedly subjective and conceptual, and must be supplemented by a mythological philosophy of nature that Schelling was to have written (see, e.g., the “Discourse on Mythology” in Schlegel’s *Dialogue on Poetry*, where Schelling is mentioned by name). Nonetheless, Schlegel viewed the essential kernel of Fichte’s philosophy, its foundation in the free productivity and reflection of the self, the self-positing *Ich*, as the corresponding philosophical expression of the universal *poesie*, a philosophy of the “living spirit.”

Fichte is relevant here not only because the world-disclosive reflection of his self-positing *Ich* is the philosophical expression of Schlegel’s “living spirit,” but also because Fichte, unlike Schlegel, is explicitly concerned with the problem of categories, and, like Heidegger, his conception of subjectivity is the key to its solution. The free reflection of the self-positing *Ich* truly is, to use Heidegger’s words, “a living deed”—Fichte’s *Tathandlung*—“that is itself meaningful and actualizes meaning.” Its self-positing is nothing less than the *production* of objectivity as such (the self posits itself as the first object), and thus opens a space for meaning that makes the categories possible and allows a world of empirical objects to show up for us. At the same time, this subjectivity subordinates the theoretical categories to a practical interest (which, of course, is understood as a moral interest, and not as mere technical practicality or the *Zuhandensein* of *B eing* and *T im e*). To be sure, I am far from claiming that Heidegger has adopted a romantic or Fichtean conception of subjectivity, but only that Heidegger’s confrontation with his neo-Kantian contemporaries has a significant historical parallel in the early idealistic and romantic reception of Kant, and that Heidegger himself was acutely aware of this parallel by way of neo-Kantians like Emil Lask, and at this early stage of his career oriented himself by it.

With an eye to this historical parallel, Heidegger’s third and final basic requirement for any treatment of the problem of categories appears in a new light. The “deed” of living spirit must now be conceived *historically*. As Heidegger claims: “Spirit can be comprehended only when the whole abundance of its ac-
complishments, i.e., *its history*, is taken up within it." And further: "History and its cultural, philosophical-teleological interpretation must become a sense-determining element for the problem of categories," if we want to "get beyond a meager, schematic table of categories." As Heidegger dramatically and enigmatically concludes, such an historical interpretation of living spirit and the problem of categories requires in some way a confrontation (*Auseinandersetzung*) with Hegel. Now that we have situated the concept of "living spirit" with respect to Fichte and Schlegel, Heidegger’s intended confrontation with Hegel can appear as a repetition of Hegel’s critique of Fichte and Schlegel’s insufficiently historical conceptions of subjectivity. Heidegger’s confrontation with Hegel, then, will be less a dispute in which the concept of "living spirit" is defended against Hegel, than a critical appropriation of Hegel’s exemplary historical consciousness, which for the young Heidegger will be mediated “hermeneutically” by way of philosophers like Wilhelm Dilthey and Emil Lask.

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P.S. A word must be said about the pervasive presence of Emil Lask in the “Conclusion: The Problem of Categories” as well as in the body of the of the Scotus dissertation itself. The principle of the material determination of form and so the meaning-differentiating function of matter come from Lask. He is also the author of the distinction between constitutive categories, which demarcate the field of objects into domains and regions, and the more general reflexive categories, which draw their meaning-differentiation from the subject-object duality rather than the form-matter relation. Its primary category is the “anything whatsoever” (*Etwas überhaupt*), the logically naked object which, defined in relation to subjectivity, is a “standing over against.” Its basic reference to anything there is (*es gibt*) then generates the further reflexive categories of identity, difference, unity, multiplicity, plurality. Even the young Heidegger’s ultimate translogical metaphysical solution to make history into “a meaning-determining element for the problem of categories” remains a Laskian solution, since history is still understood along Fichtean lines as a value-laden history of human culture aiming teleologically toward the asymptotic ideals of the true, good, and the beautiful. According to Heidegger, Lask came close to realizing this return to concrete historical life before his life was cut short at the front lines in 1915. See Theodore Kisiel, “Why Students of Heidegger Will Have to Read Emil Lask,” in his *Heidegger’s Way of Thought: Critical and Interpretative Signposts*, ed. Alfred Denker and Marion Heinz (London: Continuum, 2002), 101–36.

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This investigation of the history of a problem ultimately has a systematic goal: the problem is the doctrine of categories and the goal is its fundamental grounding and organic completion, which has today become one of the clearly recognized tasks of philosophy. As an investigation into the history of a problem, it takes the philosophy of the scholastic Duns Scotus as its focus. For by examining one of the most intellectually complete and richest models of medieval scholastic thought from the point of view of the general problem of categories and of logic as such, one might gain a deeper understanding of this thought itself in ways that would counter the current evaluation of medieval scholasticism and its logic. Accordingly, the major emphasis in Part I (the doctrine of categories) was given to the basic requirement for any treatment of the problem of categories, that of demarcating the different domains of the field of objects in general. First, the most general determinations of objects as such and the particular domains (logical, mathematical, physical, psychical, and metaphysical reality) had to be subjected to an interpretive framework of distinguishing characteristics. Part II (the doctrine of meaning) provided the opportunity to present in more detail a particular sphere of objects, that of meanings, and thereby to elaborate in their interrelation the principal theses about acts—and the sense of acts—of meaning and knowledge, as well as the basic forms of meaning in general (the “categories of meaning”). The concluding chapter attempts to give some preliminary indications of the structure of the problem of categories and the potential path to its solution.

**Conclusion: The Problem of Categories**

We seek everywhere for the unconditioned [Unbedingte] and always only find contingent things [Dinge].

The proper goal of this investigation, as one oriented toward the history of a problem, requires that we provide with systematic necessity, by way of conclusion, a preview of the systematic structure of the problem of categories, as well as a summary review and overview that treats and evaluates the main points that have already been made. Nevertheless, with such a task we cannot provide much more than an exposition of the essential potencies of the problem and its contexts, the fundamental activation of which we have been unable to fulfill in our previous elaboration of the problem. This is also the reason why previous attempts to develop systems of categories have not been able to avoid the impression of a certain lethal vacuity.

2. Novalis, Fragmenta, vol. II (Minor), 111.
In the present work, where the primary task was to present a historical expression of the problem of the categories while elevating it to a systematic level, it was not practicable to pose principled theses with specific content at the beginning; for their further connection to a special configuration of problems certainly would have remained questionable without prior acquaintance with this configuration. Moreover, the often wide-ranging problematic that is necessarily connected with taking a fundamental position would have heavily burdened my attempt to present a simple, systematic understanding, and would have unpleasantly disturbed that presentation by constantly interjecting open questions. In contrast, this is now the appropriate place to express [342] the intellectual unrest, until now suppressed, that the philosopher must experience anytime he studies the historical developments of his world of problems.

However, we may carry out an exposition of the essential potencies of the problem of the categories only by isolating and analyzing these potencies one after another. Thus, it is all the more pressing to emphasize from the outset that these potencies condition one another reciprocally and that what is apparently immediate and unmediated is always mediated. Moreover, what is established individually in what follows receives its full sense only in the totality.

If we conceive of the categories as elements and means of exposing the sense of the experienceable—of what is objective [Gegenständlichen] in general, then one basic requirement for a theory of categories results, namely, the characterizing demarcation of the various domains of objects into sectors that are categorically irreducible to one another. The entire layout [Anlage] of the foregoing investigation has already been oriented toward the fulfillment of this task. At the same time, this has forced us to the point where we had to destroy the hitherto indigent and unproblematic appearance of logic in medieval scholasticism. This occurred by way of exhibiting the characterizing definitional elements that lay the groundwork for the individual domains of objects. The fact that these definitional elements extended into the ultimate categorial sphere of what is objective (the transcendentals) provided the fundamental, unifying integration of the [otherwise] mutually exclusive regions. This task demanded a strictly conceptual and, in a certain sense, one-sided [343] presentation, with a conscious exclusion of deeper-reaching metaphysical constellations of problems.

We may understand these [previously excluded metaphysical questions] as be-

3. Even Oswald Külpe emphasizes “the manifold of domains of validity of the categories.” See “Zur Kategorienlehre,” Sitzungsberichte der Königlichen Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, philos.-historische Klasse (1915), 46 ff. This last, valuable work by Külpe first appeared after the present investigation was completed. The importance of Külpe’s treatise and of his philosophical position generally that this scholar, who died too young, was able to achieve calls for some comment, but only insofar as it becomes relevant to the present investigation. It should especially be noted that in no case do these comments infringe in the least upon our respect for the author.
ing ultimately decisive for the problem of categories only if we recognize a second
fundamental task for any theory of categories: situating the problem of categories
within the problem of judgment and the subject. Even this side of the problem of the
categories was at least touched upon in scholastic logic. Admittedly, the presenta-
tion of Duns Scotus’s theory of judgment also took another direction: it was in-
tended to characterize the domain of what is logical, and in this the essential
relation of the judgment to the category in general remained in the dark. On the
other hand, Scotus’s theory of signification did permit some access to subjectivity
(by which we do not mean individuality but the subject in itself). The task of Duns
Scotus, the analysis of a certain layer of acts, the modi significandi, forced him to en-
ter the sphere of acts in general and to establish certain fundamental things about
the individual layers of acts (modus significandi, intelligendi, essendi [the modes of
signifying, understanding, and being]) and their relationship to one another.

Precisely the existence of a theory of signification within medieval scholastic-
cism reveals a fine disposition for accurately giving ear to the immediate life of
subjectivity and the nexus of meaning immanent to it, without having acquired a
refined concept of the subject. We might be tempted to “explain” the existence of
such “grammars” by mentioning the operation of medieval schools and its traditions.
Such an “explanation,” which is generally preferred in the historical sciences,
but is highly dubious for problems in the humanities, is in fact justified to a certain
degree even in our case. However, where we are concerned with a living under-
standing of a “period,” and with the achievements of the spirit at work in that
“time,” our interpretation of its meaning must be guided by our final intentions
and goals [letzten Zielgedanken]. Such a plan is usually rejected with an air of su-
periority, typically with the cheap label “construction,” as unhistorical and there-
fore worthless.[344] But such a rejection does not notice—as a result of a
fundamental ignorance of the nature of historical knowledge and historical con-
cept formation—how much we are led away from the vital life of the historical
past when we merely jumble and shove together as much “factual material” as pos-
sible, and how much such a procedure comes remarkably close to being a leveling
construction that dismisses any unifying and goal-giving sense.

Because of its recourse to a fundamental sphere of problems regarding subjectiv-
ity (the act-layers), the theory of signification—in spite of its immediate, schematic
character—is especially significant for a philosophical exposition of medieval
scholasticism in connection with the problem of the categories. The investigation
of the connection between the modus essendi [mode of being] and the “subjective”
modi significandi et intelligendi [modes of signifying and understanding] leads to
the principle of the material determination of every form, which for its part con-
tains in itself the fundamental correlation of object and subject.4 This essential

4. I hope to be able to show on another occasion how Eckhart’s mysticism first re-
connection between the object of knowledge and knowledge of the object receives its most precise expression in the concept *verum* as one of the *transcendental*, the determinations of the object *as such*. Nevertheless, two things are lacking here that are intrinsically connected with our comprehension of the problem of knowledge: first, consciously working the problem of judgment into the subject-object relationship and, second, placing the category in relation to that judgment.

Because even today, in those places where realism is espoused, the interconnections of these problems have still not been subjected to a basic examination, this fundamental task of a doctrine of categories, along with the task of demarcating the domains of objects, must here be more thoroughly discussed. In this context, we shall also have the opportunity to indicate, at least in very general outlines, the necessity of bringing the problem of knowledge to a *metaphysical* conclusion.

The category is the most general determination of an object. Object and objectivity [*Gegenständlichkeit*] have sense as such only *for* a subject. Objectivity [*Objektivität*] is constructed in this subject by means of the judgment. Consequently, if we want to conceive of the category decisively as the determinateness of an *object*, then we must establish its essential connection to those formations that construct objectivity [*Gegenständlichkeit*]. It is thus also no “accident,” but rather lies grounded in the innermost core of the problem of categories, that this problem arises in Kant, as well as in Aristotle, in some sort of connection with predication, i.e., with the judgment. This can mean that the categories would have to be reduced to mere *functions of thinking*, but such a move does not seem possible at all for a philosophy that acknowledges *problems of sense* [*Sinnprobleme*]. And it is precisely transcendental idealism, which in its present form may not simply be identified with Kantian epistemology and its formulation, that emphasizes from the outset that all thinking and knowing is always thinking and knowing of *an object*. It is according to this reference to an object, then, that we should also ascertain what is involved in treating the categories as mere “forms of thinking.”

5. The lack of attention paid to the fundamental importance of the problem of judgment for the *grounding of objectivity* is also the reason why Külpe succeeds just as little in his previously mentioned treatise “Zur Kategorienlehre” as well as in his book *Realisierung* (1912) in repudiating transcendental idealism—indeed, why he could not succeed. Right at the crucial point where Külpe rejects the characterization “representation theory” [*Abbildtheorie*] as unsuitable for critical realism and emphasizes that “the objects of the real world that are to be represented and determined [*!] in knowledge are not already available constituents of perception, are not simply given in consciousness, but are to be grasped only through a process of knowing, in particular through scientific research” (“Zur Kategorienlehre,” 42; author’s emphasis), at this point he bases his claim on an argument that transcendental idealism has consciously moved into the center of the problem. If critical realism can be brought to the point where it relies fundamentally on the judgment for working out
[346] Even those most general determinations of objects, the reflexive categories, which in view of their [utterly general] content may be regarded as highly diluted [verblässt, literally “faded,” “turned pale”], cannot be completely understood without some relation to the judgment that constitutes objectivity [Objektivität]. This means that a merely “objective” universal theory of objects that does not incorporate the “subjective side” remains necessarily incomplete. Consequently, every difference is certainly a difference of what is objective, but once again only as a cognized, judged difference. The reason for a manifold of domains of validity within the totality of categories lies primarily, though not exclusively, with the manifold of regions of objects, which in each case condition a corresponding structured form of judgment-formation, from which the full content of the categories can be “read off” for the first time.

Even the problem of the “immanent and transeunt (lying ‘outside of thinking’) validity” of the categories is to be solved, then, by way of the judgment. It does not even make sense to speak of immanent and transeunt validity without taking into consideration a “subjective logic.” Immanence and transcendence are relational concepts that acquire their secure meaning only if we establish that in relation to which something must be immanently or transcendentally thought. It is indisputable “that all transeunt validity stands and falls with the recognizing of objects.”6 But the problem is precisely what sort [347] of objectivity [Gegenständlichkeit] this can be, when one considers that objectivity makes sense only for a judging subject. Without this subject, we could never succeed in bringing out the full sense of what we call “validity” [Geltung]. We need not decide here whether Geltung refers to a special “being” [Sein] or to an ought [Sollen], or to neither of these, but can only be comprehended by means of more profound constellations of problems that are contained in the concept of living spirit and are unquestionably closely connected with the problem of value.

The close connection between the problem of the categories and the problem of knowledge and, on the other hand, if transcendental idealism is successful in organically working the principle of the material determination of form into its basic position, then we shall necessarily succeed in raising both of these epistemological directions, which are the most significant and fruitful at present, to a higher unity.

6. See Külpe, “Zur Kategorienlehre,” 52. Heinrich Rickert, in his Gegenstand der Erkenntnis, has made us especially aware today of the necessity of including the logical, judging subject. We shall have to refrain from taking any final position on the problem of “judging consciousness in general,” as well as of the “unquestionable yes” (318 ff. and 334 ff.), until the necessary foundations have been laid by a fully conceived and developed axiology. Similar qualifications hold for Husserl’s valuable determinations about “pure consciousness” (Ideas I, 141 ff. [Hua III, 174 ff.]), which provide a crucial look into the riches of “consciousness” and which wholly destroy the oft-expressed view that consciousness is empty.
lem of judgment, then, also allows us to problematize once again the form-matter relationship and the meaning-differentiating [bedeutungsdifferenzierende] function of matter. Today the form-matter duality is such a crucial means for elaborating problems in epistemology that a fundamental investigation into its value and limits has become inevitable.

Of course, if we remain within the logical sphere of sense and the structure of sense, we shall never be able to fully illuminate this question. One ends at best in the [quasi-mathematical] phenomenon of exponential growth (Lask's theory of levels of levels of forms [Stockwerklehre der Formen]), which undeniably leads to the significant achievement of illuminating the structural manifold of the logical itself, but nevertheless complicates the problem of the meaning-differentiating function of matter even more and moves it into a new sphere, without adequately accounting for the fundamental difference between sensory and non-sensory matter.

We cannot view logic and its problems in their true light at all if we do not interpret them from a translogical perspective. [348] Philosophy cannot for long dispense with its true and proper optics, metaphysics. For a theory of truth, this means that we must ultimately provide a metaphysical and teleological interpretation of consciousness. Value originates primordially in consciousness, insofar as consciousness is a vital doing [lebendige Tat] that is full of meaning and itself actualizes meaning [sinnverwirklichende]. This living deed of consciousness is not understood in even the remotest way if it is neutralized into the concept of a blind biological factuality [Tatsächlichkeit] and dismissed as a mere matter of fact.

Among the wealth of formative directions of the living spirit, the theoretical attitude is but one of them. For this reason it is a fundamental and disastrous error for philosophy as worldview if it satisfies itself with a spelling out of reality and does not go beyond an ever preliminary synopsis that gathers up the totality of what is knowable and aim instead at a breakthrough to true reality and real truth, which is its most proper vocation. An epistemological logic will be guarded from limiting itself exclusively to a study of structures, and will problematize logical sense even in its ontic meaning only by taking its orientation from the concept of living spirit and its "eternal affirmations" (Friedrich Schlegel). Only then will a satisfactory answer be possible as to how "unreal" "transcendent" sense guarantees us true reality and objectivity [Gegenständlichkeit].

As radically as Lask exhibited the structural problems in the theories of judgment and of categories, just as irresistibly was he himself driven from his context of problems to metaphysical problems, without his perhaps being fully aware of these metaphysical problems. Moreover, precisely in his concept of an object, which is characterized by the feature of supra-oppositionality [Übergegensätzlichkeit], there is a fruitful element by which widely divergent epistemologies can now be merged. In doing so, however, we should not overlook the difficulties con-
nnected with the problems of opposition and value, i.e., the problem of the [349] ontic interpretation and logical apprehension of the “object” [Gegenstand].

If we understand the concept of an object in such a transcendental-ontic fashion, then the problem of the “application” of the categories no longer makes sense. This is all the more certain, the more vigorously we take seriously the fundamental meaning of the principle of immanence, which is not in any way to be understood “individualistically.” As I see it, the necessary final grounding of this principle, which can only be carried out metaphysically, can be accomplished only on the basis of the concept of living spirit to which we have alluded. Insofar as one admits it as a possible problem at all, it is—if anywhere—precisely with the problem of the application of the categories that the merely objective [objektive] and logical way of treating the problem of the categories must be recognized as one-sided.

The epistemological subject does not explain the metaphysically most significant sense of spirit, to say nothing of its full content. And the problem of categories receives its proper depth dimension and enrichment only if it is situated within this full content. The living spirit is as such essentially historical spirit in the broadest sense of the term. The true [350] worldview is far removed from the mere moment-to-moment existence of a theory detached from life. Spirit can be comprehended only when the full abundance of its achievements, i.e., its history, is taken up within it [in ihm aufgehoben wird]. In its philosophical conceptuality, this ever-growing abundance provides a continually increasing means for a living conception of the absolute spirit of God. History and its teleological interpretation within a philosophy of culture must become a meaning-determining element for the problem of categories, if we want to think differently about elaborating the cosmos of the categories such that we can get beyond a meager schematic table of categories. Along with demarcating the domains of objects and incorporating the problem of judgment, this is the third fundamental requirement for a promising solution to the problem of categories. Conversely, only from a theory of categories

7. The author hopes shortly to be able to contribute some firm answers to this problem in a more thorough investigation of being, value, and negation.

8. Unfortunately, Külpe also does not respond to this problem as is clear from his constant preference for “objective logic” any more than to Lask’s *Lehre vom Urteil* [Theory of Judgment] (1912), an investigation to which I attribute even farther-reaching significance than I do to the *Logik der Philosophie* [Logic of Philosophy]. This book on judgment is unusually rich in fruitful perspectives, for which reason it is all the more regrettable that Külpe, in his exemplary, distinguished manner of disputation, may no longer present to the experts his own position on Lask regarding what, in my opinion, is the absolutely crucial problem of judgment. Indeed, the same thing holds today of Külpe himself that he wrote of Lask in his last work: “Surely this highly talented researcher would not have withheld this result of his deeply-penetrating thinking (on the problem of differentiating forms [Heidegger’s interjection]) in the later course of its development, if he had not been torn from us all too early by a harsh fate” (“Zur Kategorienlehre,” 26 n. 2).
that is [historically] oriented in this broad way can we provide the conceptual tools and objectives required for a living conception of the individual epochs of the history of spirit. The problem of the “medieval worldview” that we touched upon in the Introduction, which is of special interest in connection with the present investigation, has, to the extent that it is at all more thoroughly elaborated, lacked even until now the proper conceptual foundation in philosophy of culture that can first give clarity, certainty, and unity to the whole. The peculiar will-to-live and the refined spiritual sobriety of such a period require, in conformity with them, the corresponding openness [Aufgeschlossenheit] of a sympathetic understanding and a broadly (i.e., philosophically) oriented appreciation [Werten]. For example, the concept of analogy that we discussed in this study with regard to the problem of metaphysical reality appears at first glance to be a highly diluted concept of schoolbooks that is no longer meaningful. However, as the dominant principle in the categorial sphere of sensory [351] and suprasensory reality, it contains the conceptual expression of the qualitatively imbued, value-laden, and transcendently related world of experience [Erlebniswelt] of medieval humanity. ‘Analogy’ is the conceptual expression of that specific form of inner existence [Dasein] that is anchored in the transcendent, primal relationship of the soul to God—an inner existence as it was alive in the Middle Ages with rare concentration. The manifold of vital relations [Lebensbezüge] between God and soul, between the Other-world and This-world, varies in accordance with the temporally particular [jeweilsigen] distance or proximity (in a qualitatively intensive sense) between them. The metaphysical joining [of these two realms] accomplished by transcendence is the source of a multiplicity of oppositions; it is thereby at once the source of the richest vitality for the immanently personal life of the individual.

This transcendence does not imply any sort of radical alienation and loss of self—rather, there is a vital relation based upon correlativity, which as such does not have a single rigid sense of direction, but should be compared with the back and forth flow of experience between congenial spiritual individuals. Of course, with this we have not taken into account the absolute inestimability of one of the members of the correlation. Thus, the setting of values does not gravitate exclusively toward the transcendent, but is, as it were, reflected back from the abundance and absoluteness of the transcendent and reposes in the individual.

There is thus a whole world of manifold differentiations of value in the complete medieval worldview, precisely because it is so radically conscious of its teleological orientation. The possibility and fullness of experience that results from this for subjectivity is thus conditioned by that dimension of the spiritual life that reaches out for the transcendent and not, like today, by its diffuse and transitory content. The possibilities of growing uncertainty and complete disorientation are far

9. Cf. above, FS, 197 ff./GA 1, 255 ff.
greater and even limitless for this way-of-life of a fleeting surface existence, whereas the basic shaping of the form of life of medieval humanity from beginning to end does not in any way lose itself in the broad content of sensory reality and anchor itself there, but rather subordinates sensory reality itself, [352] as something in need of anchoring, to a transcendent and necessary goal.

In the concept of living spirit and its relation to the metaphysical “origin” we open up a view of its basic metaphysical structure, in which the singularity, or individuality, of its acts is integrated into a living unity with the universal validity, the self-subsistence, of sense. Viewed objectively [objektiv], this is the problem of the relation between time and eternity, change and absolute validity, world and God, a problem that is reflected for the theory of the sciences in history (the formation of value) and philosophy (the validation of value).10

If we meditate [sich besinnen] on the deeper essence of philosophy in its conjunction with worldview, the conception of Christian philosophy in the Middle Ages as a scholasticism that stands in opposition to the contemporaneous mysticism must be exposed as fundamentally false. For the medieval worldview, scholasticism and mysticism belong essentially together. Both pairs of “opposites”: rationalism-irrationalism and scholasticism-mysticism, do not coincide with one another. Any attempt to equate them rests on an extreme rationalization of philosophy. Philosophy as a rationalistic structure, detached from life, is powerless; mysticism as irrational experience is purposeless.

The philosophy of living spirit, of deedful love, of reverent intimacy with God, whose most general aims [353] we can only allude to, especially a theory of categories that is governed by its basic tendencies, faces the major task of a fundamental confrontation [Auseinandersetzung] with that system of an historical worldview that commands the greatest wealth of experience and concept-formation, as abundant as it is profound, a system that took up into itself [in sich aufgehoben hat] all of the fundamental motives previously operative in philosophical problems—that is, a confrontation with Hegel.

10. It is from this standpoint that we may also for the very first time analyze and establish the concept of philosophia perennis in terms of a theory of the sciences, which to the present day has not happened even in a roughly adequate fashion.—Just as little today has the problem of an examination of Catholic theology in terms of a theory of the sciences, which is closely connected with what has been said, been recognized as a problem, to say nothing then of a solution having been ventured; in part, this has its basis in the all-too-traditional way of treating logic, which has been blind to the problems. Geyser undertook the first self-consciously new orientation in this area; we have already mentioned his Grundlagen der Logik und Erkenntnislehre (1909). (See my review, “Neuere Forschungen über Logik” in the Literarische Rundschau für das katholische Deutschland 38, no. 11 [1912], cols. 522 ff.; reprinted in GA 1, 35 ff. [See chap. 4 above for a translation]).

The occasion is clearly documented by Heinrich Ochsner, whom Heidegger called “my oldest student,” in a pair of letters to a friend in early August 1917. As

This is an English paraphrase and supplementation by Theodore Kisiel of a note entitled “Zu Schleiermachers zweiter Rede ‘Über das Wesen der Religion,’” published in Heidegger’s GA 60, Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1995), 319–22. The published transcription has been checked, and corrected, against the handwritten original found in the Heidegger Archive at the Deutsches Literaturarchiv in Marbach under DLA access no. 75, 7045/A2. This German sketch of the talk consists largely of Heidegger’s typically terse phenomenological comments interspersing a series of sometimes unnoted citations, often indicated only by one or two key phrases of the passage to be cited, drawn primarily from the fourth edition (1831) of Friedrich Schleiermacher, Über die Religion. Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern, as published in Friedrich Schleiermacher’s sämtliche Werke, I. Abteilung: “Zur Theologie,” I. Band (Berlin: Reimer, 1843); “Zweite Rede,” 172–283. This English paraphrase identifies and fills out the content of these citations with supplements from the Second Speech in more precision and detail than the German editors have done, as is necessary to better comprehend Heidegger’s sparse commentary and strategy of selective interpretation. Although citations from Schleiermacher have been translated into English especially for this occasion, pagination of the extant English translation of the third edition by John Oman (1893) is provided: Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers (New York: Harper, 1958), “Second Speech,” 26–118. The pagination of this translation follows the pagination of the 1843 German edition noted above in brackets.

The introduction precisely locates the context and chronology of this occasional text within a cluster of notes on the “Phenomenology of Religious Consciousness/Life” composed during the period of Heidegger’s “religious-philosophical conversion” in the years 1917 to 1919. GA 60, 301 falsely identifies the same group of handwritten notes, published there with unnoted editorial abridgments and errors of transcription, as well as unannounced deletions of several of the notes on file, as “Elaborations and Outlines for a Lecture Course that Was Never Held, 1918–19.” See the asterisked entries between 1916 and 1919 in section C (the chronological bibliography) of the “Chronological Overview” earlier in this volume for a more accurate chronology of the 26 notes involved. A more complete account of these notes toward a “Phenomenology of Religious Life” is to be found in Kisiel, Genesis, esp. chap. 2, “Theo-logical Beginnings: Toward a Phenomenology of Christianity.”
an old family friend and the best man at their recent wedding, Ochsner had made an impromptu visit to the newly married Heideggers only to be disappointed in having missed Frau Heidegger’s birthday celebration. To offset Ochsner’s disappointment, Heidegger offered instead, “in order to elevate the mood [of the evening] and as an expression of thanks for their friendship, an account of the problem of the religious in Schleiermacher.” The religiously minded Ochsner was so moved by the impromptu talk that he mentioned it again a few days later to his friend . . . and for the rest of his life: “It’s too bad that you did not hear it. . . . But perhaps we can read the second of Schleiermacher’s ‘Speeches on Religion’ together sometime. It contains the essentials of Heidegger’s account.”

The handwritten series of excerpts out of Schleiermacher’s text upon which this impromptu talk was based comes to us as one of a cluster of notes that the young Heidegger filed under the heading “Phenomenology of Religious Consciousness/Life.” The overall project of this file is already announced in the 1915 Introduction to the Scotus dissertation. In the context of establishing that scholastic psychology already operates with a non-psychologistic sense of “intentionality,” Heidegger proposes the task of a “phenomenological elaboration of the mystical, moral-theological, and ascetic literature of medieval scholasticism” (FS, 147) and concludes by singling out “Eckhartian mysticism” (344 n.) as a particularly fruitful vein to explore to this end. “By following such paths we shall enter into the vital life of medieval scholasticism in the way in which it decisively founded, enlivened, and invigorated a cultural age” (147–48, 352). But by 1917, Schleiermacher and other Lutheran spirits are added to the list for religious revival by way of the phenomenological approach, such that the Catholic Middle Ages must now share its spotlight with the spirit of the early Christian communities that evangelical Protestantism takes as its first models. In an “enlightened age” in which the German philosophers following Kant opted for a universalistic ethical Christianity, Schleiermacher held out for the uniquely historical orientation of “positive” Christianity, with all the paradoxes of faith that this historical uniqueness entails. The Second Speech, in its attempt to single out the “essence” of the purely religious life, in contradistinction to its admixtures with the ethical and the metaphysical, thus

1. Curd Ochwadt and Erwin Tecklenborg (eds.), Das Mass des Verborgenen. Heinrich Ochsner (1891–1970) zum Gedächtnis [The Measure of the Hidden: H. O. in Memoriam] (Hannover: Charis-Verlag, 1981), 92. Ochsner was otherwise deeply involved in all the religious trends that engaged the young Heidegger during the war years, accompanying Heidegger in his frequent visits to the Benedictine monastery at Beuron. Ochsner seems to have been a perennial university student, having as his teachers not only Heidegger in 1915–1930, but also Rickert and Husserl in Freiburg, Natorp and Otto in Marburg, and Scheler in Cologne. His later years were spent in Catholic charities, where he was director of Caritas in Freiburg for a time. See Husserl’s letter to Rudolf Otto on March 5, 1919, in appendix II.
provides a particularly powerful illustration of the spontaneous practice of a proto-
phenomenology in Schleiermacher’s somewhat ornate rhetoric designed to reach
the Enlightenment’s “cultured despisers” of religion.

The litany of selective quotations is only occasionally interspersed with Hei-
degger’s Husserlian remarks on the need for phenomenological bracketing and
eidetic intuition, and on the noetic versus the noematic “moments” of the inten-
tional structure of immediate experience, which Schleiermacher describes holis-
tically as the immediate experience of the finite in the experiential fullness of the
whole, or the infinite, as well as in its middle-voiced structure of receptive activ-
ity or felt intuition. Schleiermacher bids us to listen to ourselves “in advance of
our consciousness” through a return to the original experience of fullness in the
“first incipience of consciousness.” Schleiermacher is only one of a number of
thinkers who for Heidegger at this time seek to put us in touch with a “know-
ledge” built into experience that precedes overt knowledge, an experientially im-
manent knowledge (Reinach), “naked intuition of the first truth” (Eckhart),
categorial intuition (Husserl), dedicative submission to the things themselves
(Lask), the Lutheran truth as trust, the scholastic intellectus principiorum (un-
derstanding of first principles), which for Heidegger all point to the protoprac-
tical “know how” of being that is Seinsverständnis (understanding of being).2

† † †

On Schleiermacher’s Second Speech, “On the Essence of Religion”

In order to arrive at what religion is in its unalloyed essence, it is necessary in
our times to assume a phenomenological attitude toward the religious experience.

The “cultured” have come to “despise” religion because the complications of
culture itself have transformed religion into something which it in essence is not.
The difference between our ever more cultivated age of cosmopolitan enlighten-
ment and a simpler age is that no one is ever one thing any longer, nothing is whol-
ly itself, but everyone and everything is all things. “And just as cultured peoples
have inaugurated such a many-sided interchange with one another that the native
sense and peculiar character of each people no longer appears unalloyed in the in-
dividual moments of life, so is it also in the human temperament [Gemüth], where
the sociability among the faculties has instilled itself so extensively and complete-
ly” [173/27] that no performance takes its course and develops in isolation. “Each
faculty is in any performance moved and pervaded by the ready love and support
of the other faculties” so that it is very difficult “to sort out the productive force
that predominates in this union” [174/27], which would be the essential sense of
the performance [Leistungssinn] in its pure essence. “Accordingly, each of us can un-

derstand each and every activity of the spirit only insofar as we can find it in ourselves and thereby intuit it” [174/27].

The prevailing view: Religion is at times

1) a way of thinking, a belief, a unique way of contemplating the world which culminates in a metaphysics; a theoretical structure.

2) “a way of acting, a unique desire and love, a special kind of self-com- portment and internal self-motivation” [174/27] which develops into a morality; a practical phenomenon.

Religion “belongs to both sides” [174/27], the theoretical and the practical, and in fact constitutes their underlying unity. (Even now, the utterances of religion, its scriptures and testaments, are held in high esteem for the most part for the treasures they have yielded for morality and metaphysics. It is now necessary to start from the other end and demonstrate instead “the sharp opposition” [183/34] of faith to morality and metaphysics, of “our piety” to “your ethics.”)

Religion therefore renounces all alien pretensions “and gives back what it may have borrowed from them or whatever they may have forced upon it” in order thereby “to take possession of its own original domain and exhibit its peculiar character in sharp definition” [183/35]. (Suspending or “bracketing” certain inherently self-grounding positions which sustain an autonomous teleology in themselves; within phenomenology, such an ἐποχή is applied in order to be able to cleanly exclude the individual teleologies operating purely for themselves.)

What then does your science of being, your natural science, in which all the reality discovered by your theoretical philosophy must be united, seek and aim at? It strives to know things in their characteristic essence, as they are, I think; to show the particular relations by which each is what it is; to determine for each its place in the whole and to distinguish it rightly from all else; to present everything actual in its mutually conditioned necessity and exhibit the oneness of all phenomena in their eternal laws. [183/35]

The essence of religion is perceived “without any association with this kind of knowledge” [184/35], even when it leads us to God as Supreme Ordainer of the laws of being. “For the measure of knowledge is not the measure of piety” [184/35], where measure is the criterion of value for two distinct teleologies. God placed at the apex of science and taken as the ground of knowing and the known is not the same as the way the pious have God and know of Him.

Essential to religion is contemplation, not impervious stupidity. Under contemplation we understand “any movement of the spirit withheld from outward efficacy” [266/103 = note to p. 189/39]. “True religion is a sense and taste for the infinite” [188/39, 266/103], which is one and the same as the “immediate life in us of the finite as it is in the infinite” [266/103]. “Through religion, the universal being of everything finite in the infinite lives immediately in us” [266/103, 189/39].

Infinite being—here it is “impossible not to implicate God” [266/103]. This particular meaning and its corresponding expression were avoided “because otherwise a certain kind of representation [causality] would have easily taken over and stood out in that idea and thus a decision would have been made, or at least a critique would have been exercised, regarding the different ways to think God and the world as together and apart from one another, which would not have been at all pertinent here” [267/103–4]. An alien teleology and in fact the theoretical one, the most dangerous of confusions, is thus bracketed and put out of play.

In order to truly comprehend the unity as well as unique difference of religion in relationship to metaphysics and morals, it is first necessary to descend into the innermost sanctuary [Heiligthum] of life, where we possibly find ourselves in true community. There alone do you find the original relationship of feeling and intuition from which alone their unity and separation are to be understood. But I must direct you to your own selves, to the grasp of a living moment there, in its very movement. You must learn how to listen to yourselves in advance of your own consciousness, so to speak, or at least to reproduce this state for yourselves from that vital movement. What you are to notice is the very becoming of your consciousness, rather than merely to reflect on a consciousness that has already become. [191/41]

It is a matter of revealing an original domain of life and of the performance of consciousness (or feeling) in which religion alone actualizes itself as a definite form of vital experience [191–96/41–46].4 There the elements of religion are to be read

4. Heidegger’s reference here is to the highly rhapsodic pages that incorporate the “love scene” passage of the Second Speech famous in the literature of Romanticism, on the “first beginnings of consciousness” which in its immediacy is “raised above all error and misunderstanding,” and yet “it is fleeting and transparent as the vapor which the dew breathes on blossom and fruit, it is bashful and tender as a maiden’s kiss, it is holy and fruitful as a bridal embrace. . . . It is the holy wedlock of the universe with reason become flesh for a creative productive embrace. You lie immediately on the bosom of the infinite world” (On Religion, 193/43). “Thus comes to pass the initial reception of every living and original moment in your life, which . . . is also the source of every religious emotion. But it is not even a moment. The incoming of existence [Dasein] in this immediate union dissolves as soon as it becomes consciousness: Either the intuition becomes clearer and more vivid, like the figure of the vanishing maiden to the eyes of her lover; or the feeling rises from your heart and overspreads your entire being, as the blush of shame and love over the face of the
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off [ibid.], where religion is found not to belong to and to be determined by alien teleological and correspondingly alien noetic contexts. “Religion itself is to be strictly distinguished from what merely belongs to it” [268/105 = note to p. 196/46].

The universe (fullness of actuality) in the uninterrupted flowing and actualizing of everything individual as part of the whole: the specifically religious intuitional and affective relation of each experiential content to an infinite whole as its fundamental sense—that is, religion.

Religious experience in its wholeness consists of the two interconnected motions of receptivity and activity:

1) **Dedicative submission** [Hingabe = devotional surrender], allowing oneself to be moved by the originally uninhibited influx of fullness: “that man surrender himself, give himself over to the universe and allow himself to be moved by the side turned toward him” [212/58] and

2a) **[integration]**, returning this particular experience of being-moved [affection of feeling] to the full inner unity of his life and being. “Religious life is nothing other than the constant renewal of this process” [ibid.].

2b) **Action** is then the “reactive effect of this feeling” [212/59], springing of itself from the integration of the inner life. “Only the integrated action [gesammtes Handeln] would be a reactive effect of the integrity [Gesamtheit] of feeling” [ibid.], not every individual act [Akt] would be so determined. “Only when each action is in its own context and proper place does it exhibit the total inner unity of the spirit in a free and proper way” [ibid].

“A mysterious moment [geheimnisvoller Augenblick] of undivided unity of intuition and feeling, where the one is nothing without the other, intuition is

5. Reading **intuitionale** instead of **intentionale** on GA 60, 321, last line.

6. To express the receptive moment of immediate experience, Schleiermacher prefers **Empfängnis over Hingabe**, which accordingly appears rarely in On Religion. Thus, “eternal fate” alternately invites one “now to impotent defiance and now to childlike submission [Hingebung]” (On Religion, 240/81). As opposed to **Hinsehen, Hingeben** is Lask’s non-ocular way of expressing our receptive relationship to immediate experience.
nothing without feeling." The noetic moment [Moment] is itself co-constitutive for the noematic integral content of living experience. In the immediacy of this supercharged moment-of-insight, every thetic character, every assertion of being is lacking. Since all positing is absent, since nothing is decided about anything whatsoever, the experiential fullness stands in a certain neutrality, no object has priority over any other. The specific infinity of religiously vital experience is thereby given.

History in its most proper sense is the highest object of religion; “religion begins with history and ends with history” [238/80]. Humanity should be viewed as a living community of individuals in which any isolated existence would be lost.

Do everything with religion, not from religion. Religion should, “like a sacred music” [213/59], accompany every deed of life.

7. The phrase geheimnisvoller Augenblick and the cited sentence occur only in the first edition (1799, p. 73) of Über die Religion. Clearly, then, Heidegger consulted this first edition and/or Dilthey’s biography, which paraphrases the first edition Speech by Speech and makes much of this rhapsodic passage, along with the “love scene” passage (n. 5 above). Cf. Wilhelm Dilthey, Leben Schleiermachers (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2nd ed., 1922), 430–31.

8. Reading ’mitkonstitutiv’ at GA 60, 322, line 10.

9. Heidegger cites the more ambiguous, thoroughly pronominal passage from the first edition of the Second Speech, “mit ihr hebt sie [die Religion? die Geschichte?] an und endigt mit ihr,” suggesting that the relation is reciprocal and can be read in both directions, not only “religion begins and ends with history” but also “history begins and ends with religion.” Thus we read, shortly after this passage, that “all true history everywhere has at first had a religious goal, and has proceeded from religious ideas” (On Religion, 238/80). In turn, history “is the greatest and most universal revelation of the innermost and the holiest” (ibid.). History is always religious, and religion historical. The same middle-voiced structure of immediate experience that Schleiermacher takes as the heart of religious emotion and intuition will soon be understood by Heidegger as “experienced experience,” the streaming return of life back upon itself, which is precisely the immanent historicity of life, a certain familiarity or implicit “understanding” that life already has of itself and that hermeneutics, religious or philosophical, needs only to explicitly “repeat.” See Kisiel, Genesis, 55.
Part II

Early Freiburg Period, 1919–1923
10. Letter to Engelbert Krebs on his Philosophical Conversion

On the day before Christmas Eve in 1918, the very pregnant Frau Elfride Heidegger made an unexpected visit to Father Engelbert Krebs, the Catholic priest who in 1917 had presided over the wedding ceremony of the Heideggers. She informed him that she and her husband could no longer fulfill the promise made at their Catholic wedding to have their children baptized and raised in the Catholic faith. Father Krebs carefully records the words of Frau Heidegger in his dairy: “My husband has lost his faith in the Church and I have failed to find mine . . . . As a result, we both now think in a Protestant way but with no fixed dogmatic ties, believing in a personal God, praying to him in the spirit of Christ, but outside any Protestant or Catholic orthodoxy. Under the circumstances, we would consider it dishonest to have our child baptized as a Catholic. But I felt it my duty to tell you this in advance” (Ott, Heidegger, 108/109). Accordingly, Heidegger’s letter to Krebs some two weeks later was itself not unexpected. Speaking as one colleague to another, Heidegger justifies his personal conversion to a “free Christianity” on purely philosophical grounds and as a direct consequence of thinking these grounds through to the end. An epistemology of history (hermeneutics!), a metaphysics “in a new sense,” and perhaps most central, his “professional” thought and extensive readings in the direction of a phenomenology of the religious life and its various historical lifeworlds, all serve to shape a personal “inner call to philosophy.” The personal conversion and the philosophical conversion are one.

This philosophically telling letter found among the papers of Engelbert Krebs at the University of Freiburg library was first published in Bernhard Casper, “Martin Heidegger und die Theologische Fakultät Freiburg 1909–1923,” Freiburger Diözesan-Archiv 100 (1980), 534–41, esp. 541. A slightly corrected version, and an English translation, were published by Thomas Sheehan in Charles Guignon (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 70; and yet another translation by Allan Blunden, was published in Ott, Heidegger, 106–7/106–7, both of which also discuss the personal context in which the letter was written. The following English translation by Thomas Sheehan is here edited and introduced by Theodore Kisiel.
Letter to Engelbert Krebs on his Philosophical Conversion

Freiburg
January 9, 1919

Dear Professor,

Over the last two years I have set aside all scientific work of a specialized nature and have struggled instead for a basic clarification of my philosophical position. This has led me to results that I could not be free to hold and teach if I were tied to positions that come from outside of philosophy.

Epistemological insights that extend to the theory of historical knowledge have made the system of Catholicism problematic and unacceptable to me—but not Christianity and metaphysics, which, however, [I now understand] in a new sense.

I believe that I—perhaps more than those who work on the subject officially—have perceived the values that the Catholic Middle Ages holds within itself, values that we are still far from truly exploiting. My research into the phenomenology of religion, which will draw heavily on the Middle Ages, should prove beyond dispute that, even though I have transformed my basic standpoint, I have not let myself be dragged into abandoning my objective high opinion and regard for the Catholic lifeworld in favor of the empty polemics of an embittered apostate.

Therefore, it is especially important to me—and I want to thank you most cordially for this—that I not forfeit the enjoyment of your invaluable friendship. I and my wife (who first told you about this) would like to keep the very special confidence we share with you. It is hard to live as a philosopher—inner truthfulness toward oneself and toward those one is supposed to teach demands sacrifice, renunciation, and struggles that remain forever foreign to the academic “tradesman.”

I believe that I have an inner call to philosophy and, by fulfilling it in research and teaching, a call to the eternal vocation of the inner man—and for that alone do I feel called to achieve what is in my powers and thus to justify, before God, my very existence [Dasein] and work.

Yours with deep gratitude,
Martin Heidegger

P.S. My wife sends her warmest greetings.
Karl Löwith\(^1\) interrupted his philosophical studies with Moritz Geiger, Alexander Pfändner, and Max Weber at the University of Munich during the postwar revolutionary turmoil in that city to come to study with Edmund Husserl in Freiburg in SS 1919, only to be captivated by the destructive brilliance of his hitherto unknown phenomenological assistant, Privatdocent Martin Heidegger. Heidegger in turn was likewise impressed by this urbane cosmopolitan and war veteran

This letter was translated by Gary Steiner and edited by Theodore Kisiel. The English translation of it was first published in Karl Löwith, *Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism*, ed. Richard Wolin, trans. Gary Steiner (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 235–39, 291–92. Permission from Columbia University Press to republish it here is gratefully acknowledged. The original German text, edited by Hartmut Tietjen, was first published in Dietrich Papenfuss and Orto Pöggeler (eds.), *Zur philosophischen Aktualität Heideggers 2: Im Gespräch der Zeit* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1990), 27–30. A more accurate transcript of the letter from Dr. Klaus Stichweh, curator of the Löwith papers, enabled me to correct two significant errors in the published German text, which are noted in brackets in the translated text.

whose gasping voice still betrayed his severe lung wound. His letters soon reflected an increasing familiarity and remarkable openness with his very first habilitation student in their exchanges of books, ideas, opinions, and academic gossip, against a running record of the stages of development of Heidegger’s early thought. On March 23, 1920, he writes to Löwith: “The more I read Jaspers’s book [Psychology of Worldviews], the more flaccid it becomes. The positively new in it is more in the order, in the ‘catalogue,’ which is basically unphilosophical. . . . For we do philosophy not in order to hoard information and propositions, but in order to structure life. And this does not aim to be a worldview-philosophy!” On September 1, 1920: “I am now destroying myself, which is taking a great deal of effort.” On September 13, on his decision to do a seminar on Descartes in conjunction with a course on the phenomenology of religion in WS 1920–1921: “In regarding the ‘Cogito,’ I must take the whole of Christian philosophy into consideration, since I want to regard it backwards, in reverse order. . . . Even Kierkegaard can only be theologically unhinged (as I understand theology and will develop in the winter semester). . . . What is of importance in Kierkegaard must be appropriated anew, but in a strict critique that grows out of our own situation. Blind appropriation is the greatest seduction . . . Not everyone who talks of ‘existence’ has to be a Kierkegaardian. My approaches have already been misinterpreted in this way. But I at least want something else, which is not much, namely, what I vitally experience as ‘necessary’ in today’s factic situation of upheaval, without regard to whether this will lead to a ‘crisis’ or an acceleration of the decline [of the West].—Since I myself want to learn something in my seminars, by way of objections and difficulties, which are posed with the necessary acuity only when the participants are equal to the matter at hand, I have for now decided to forego a seminar on the phenomenology of religion. For, to be frank, all that would come of it is the kind of babble in the philosophy of religion that I want to eliminate from philosophy, this talk about the religious that is familiar to us from reference works.” Heidegger’s reluctance even to prepare a lecture course on the phenomenology of religion is underscored by a remark made by the “old man” (der Alte: Husserl!) that Heidegger relays to Löwith on October 20: “I myself am no longer even regarded as a ‘philosopher’ at all, I am ‘still really a theologian.’”

The letter of August 19, 1921 translated in full below thus proceeds from a series of frank discussions between a young instructor and an intimate circle of favored students who had formed a “phenomenology club” that met on occasion in mid-semester, some of whom were on the verge of completing one phase of their academic studies, Löwith his first doctorate (in early 1923) and Oskar Becker’s second doctorate, or habilitation (1922). Heidegger’s contrast be-

tween Löwith, the existentially inclined philosopher, and Becker, the scientifically oriented philosopher, is made in conjunction with this early attempt to explain the intent and comprehensive objectivity (Gegenständlichkeit) of his own situation-oriented, and thus formally indicative hermeneutics of facticity. For the phenomenological matter (Sache) and so its “relevant situationality” (Sachlichkeit, “what matters most”), here already based on the hermeneutically distributive principle “To each their own facticity, their own ‘I am,’” is radically different from the vaunted neutral objectivity (Objektivität) of the modern sciences. The immediate background of the discussion is the postwar restructuring of the German university in a milieu charged by the doomsday sentiment of the impending “decline of the West” (Oswald Spengler).

-letter to karl löwith on his philosophical identity
August 19, 1921
Dear Mr. Löwith,

Your letter addresses two issues: 1) a justification of yourself, and 2) the “correct” interpretation of “my philosophy.” A year ago I told you from Messkirch what it is I am looking for; and I said the same to Becker (I have never spoken about this matter to any other human being) for only one reason: you have embarked on the path of earning a “doctorate” at the university. It makes no difference to me what people think of the title, how others attain it, etc. I take the matter just as seriously as I would take it for myself.

I am not in a position to judge the extent to which this chosen path, as a possibility of existence, is related to your attitude (completely independent of me) about “scientific philosophy” (more about this below). I must take you as you present...

ent yourself to me—which does not mean that I have always seen you primarily and properly as my “doctoral candidate.” In connection with scientific work, I have (because I have a greater concern for you than for others) a certain obligation to offer guidance. And even the “scientific relationship to life” [in philosophy] is different than it is in the “sciences.” I am concerned not with a primary and isolated definition of philosophy—but rather only with the kind of definition that is related to the existentiell interpretation of facticity.

A discussion of the concept of philosophy in the detached sense is without purpose—and likewise a discussion of “what is scientific.”

I must now bring the discussion to myself [in response to your remarks on the “correct” interpretation of “my philosophy”].

The discussion hinges first of all on the fundamental mistake that you and Becker make in measuring me (hypothetically or not) against standards like Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Scheler, and various other creative and deep philosophers. You are free to do so—but then I have to say that I am not a philosopher. I do not presume to be doing anything even comparable. That is not at all my intention.

I simply do what I must and what I regard as necessary, and do it as I can. I do not slant my philosophical work toward cultural tasks for the sake of a “universal today.” I also do not have Kierkegaard’s inclination and direction.

I work concretely and factically out of my “I am”—out of my spiritual and thoroughly factic heritage, my milieu, my life contexts, and whatever is available to me from these, as the vital experience in which I live. This facticity, as existentiell, is no mere “blind existence”—this Dasein is one with existence, which means that I live it, this “I must” of which no one speaks. The act of existing seethes with this facticity of Being-thus, it surges with the historical just as it is—which means that I live the inner obligations of my facticity, and do so as radically as I understand them. This facticity of mine includes—briefly put—the fact that I am a “Christian theologian.” This implies a certain radical self-concern, a certain radical scientificity, a rigorous objectivity [Gegenständlichkeit] in this facticity; it includes the historical consciousness, the consciousness of the “history of spirit.” And I am all this in the life context of the university.

“Philosophizing” is for me [mir, not nur] factically and existentiell connected with the university. By this, I am not claiming that there could be philosophy only there, but that philosophizing precisely in its existentiell fundamental sense has its facticity of actualization, and so its boundaries and limits, at the university.

This does not exclude the possibility that a “great philosopher,” a creative philosopher, may come from the universities, nor that philosophizing at the university may be nothing but pseudo-science, i.e., neither philosophy nor science. What university philosophy is can then be demonstrated only by way of one’s own life.

There is therefore no way to determine which of the two of you understands me correctly, or on whose side I belong. What I mean by this is not intended to be
a facile reconciliation. On the contrary, you and Becker stand equally distant from me—only in different directions. It has always been clear to me that neither you nor Becker would accept the Christian side of me, and I have never understood you to be seeking agreement in this connection. I have sought to influence you as little as I have Becker. You each take something different to be what is essential in me, which I do not separate, nor do I hold them together in a kind of balanced equilibrium, namely, the scientific, researching, conceptually theorizing life and my own life. The essential way in which my facticity is existentially articulated is scientific research—in the way that I conduct it. Thus, for me the motive and goal of philosophizing is never to augment the stock of objective truths, because the objectivity of philosophy, as I understand it and factically pursue it, is something of my own, something that belongs to me. But this does not exclude—on the contrary, for me it is implicit in the sense of my existing—the strictest objectivity of explication. Objective [gegenständliche] rigor here does not refer to a thing, but instead to historical facticity.

I can emphasize research, but it is concerned with a direction that is fundamentally different from Becker’s. I take the person to be decisively important; but I do so within the possibilities of actualization that I alone honestly have at my disposal, without any intention to be creative. I am thus subject to the danger of threshing empty straw, in comparison with the great philosophers, if I really only thresh from out of myself. Unfortunately, I know all too well that even this often fails.

I do believe that you cannot “theoretically” bring together the how of my philosophizing with the direction of my concern. This “together” is not a theme for theoretical unraveling. I cannot make my “I am” into something different, but can only take hold of it and be it in this or that way.

Even in the destruction I neither want nor envision an objectivity of the in-itself [An-sich-Objektivität], for this serves to take our own facticity and “twist it around,” if you like, putting a false construction upon it. It is simply a matter of whether a fictitious non-personality which understands everything accomplishes more than does going after things in such a way that taking hold of them depends on our being there ourselves, present and involved. Objectively speaking we are then one-sidedly dogmatic; but philosophically speaking we are in fact “absolutely” objectively rigorous [in keeping with the matters themselves].

Jaspers wrote to me and said that I have done injustice to him in several ways.

3. Karl Jaspers had received a typescript copy of Heidegger’s critical review of his Psychologie der Weltanschauungen [Psychology of Worldviews] at the end of June. In a letter dated August 1, 1921, Jaspers looks forward to a future conversation to discuss Heidegger’s critique: “Of all the reviews that I have read, yours goes deepest into the roots of the ideas. It has accordingly truly moved me to the very core. But I still miss the positive method, even in your discussions of the ‘I am’ and the ‘historical.’ As I read it, I sensed the pull of forward movement, but was then disappointed when I found that I also had already come as far as
My reply: Husserl and others have also said this—though for me this is simply a sign that I have at least attempted to engage his work and come to terms with it, rather than fancifully listing the “results” of the book in an imaginary body of knowledge.

It is simply a matter of each doing what he can. Ultimately he is there in the doing—unreflectively—even if he has a wholly reflective “philosophy.”

Perhaps I am much less objective than you. You are, to the extent that such expressions say something, an objective relativist; I, on the other hand, am a dogmatic subjective relativist, i.e., I push my “position” through—and am “unjust” toward others in the knowledge that I myself am “relative.” But this interpretation is of no interest to me at all; I do not want to initiate a new direction in the history of philosophy.

What I want in my teaching at the university is for human beings to take action and become engaged. The old university cannot be overcome by making the “intellectualism” of fossilized lecturers laughable and by turning to those individuals whom one considers to be richer, more lively, and deeper. Instead, it can be overcome only by returning to the origins of actualization in what has survived in today’s facticity and by deciding for oneself what one can do. What will happen? Will we still have universities in 50 years? Who knows? Certainly no institution lasts forever. But there is one thing that is within our power: Will we continue to fret in our moods and brood over possible new cultures [Neukulturen, not Urkulturen], or will we sacrifice ourselves and find our way back to our existentiell limitation and facticity, rather than reflecting our way off into programs and universal problems? Things are going much too well for most young people today, especially intellectually. All avenues are open to them, and from early on—travel, literature, art, etc. I would not wish my student days on anyone, and yet I would also never part with them.

You have not misunderstood me, but there is something that you do not understand, as you yourself explained so well. To this I can only answer: I cannot do otherwise without rejecting myself and denying who I am. For you, I think, this will suffice.

Becker has misunderstood me because he, in a somewhat isolated manner, understood the same thing all too well. Both misunderstandings are inconsequential. Only one thing is decisive: that we understand each other well enough so that each of us is radically devoted to the last to what and how each understands the unum you. . . . Some of the judgments I found to be unjust.” In his reply of August 5, Heidegger observes: “Husserl also remarked that I do you injustice in several ways. For me that only proves that I have at least tried to engage you and come to terms with your book. Its goal is fulfilled if you draw some kind of impulse from it, perhaps even one that I did not intend.” Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers, Briefwechsel 1920–1963, ed. Walter Biemel and Hans Saner (Frankfurt: Klostermann/Munich: Piper, 1990), 23–24.
necessarium [“one thing necessary” (namely, our respective facticity)]. We may be far apart in “system,” “doctrine,” and “position”—but we are together in the one way in which humans are able to be genuinely together: in existence.

It is all to the good that you have become angry and vented it in your letter. I have but one objection: that, in relation to the distinctness with which you interpret me and measure me, you still take me to be all too important.

But you must decide for yourself to what extent I “harm” or help you.

I cannot deal with people. And “guidance” always becomes awkward. I also have nothing at all to say to you; my remark to Becker about you is something that you have heard from me once, when its direct effect was not your spontaneous resistance.

Do you want to come with Becker on Sunday evening?

Warm Regards
Your
Martin Heidegger
The more personal tone taken by the vita that Heidegger prepares for Georg Misch and his nominating committee, in response to an invitation from Misch to apply for the junior position at the University of Göttingen once held by Husserl, makes it stand out from the other, more formal vitae gathered in this volume from other stages in Heidegger’s career. The accompanying letter continues and supplements the task of the vita, making the two documents the most detailed curricular self-assessment that we have from Heidegger at such an early stage in his career.

In the vita and letter Heidegger emphasizes his connections as a student to scholars and trends in Göttingen, especially to those of the “Dilthey School” to which Misch himself belongs, and his own development of this trend in “life philosophy” in his already celebrated, albeit brief, teaching career. Heidegger had published nothing since his Scotus book of 1916, so he also projects the impending publication of his treatise on Aristotle and submits the unpublished manuscript of

Translated by Theodore Kisiel. Acknowledgment of a debt of gratitude are due to the Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek (Lower Saxony State and University Library) in Göttingen for the expeditious dispatch of a copy of this handwritten vita and letter from Heidegger to Georg Misch, shortly after the Misch Archive was first opened to the public in June 1995. The vita without the letter has been published in GA 16, 41–45.

1. Georg Misch (1878–1965), Wilhelm Dilthey’s student in Berlin who then became his son-in-law and an editor of Dilthey’s Collected Writings, was professor of philosophy at Göttingen (1920–1935; 1946–1948). Some of his significant works include the longish “Vorbericht des Herausgebers” to Dilthey’s Gesammelte Schriften 5 (1924), to which the early Heidegger repeatedly refers; Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie. Eine Auseinandersetzung der Diltheyschen Richtung mit Heidegger and Husserl (1930; 2nd ed., 1931), one of the earliest treatises to acknowledge the brilliance of Being and Time, shortly after it appeared, while subjecting it to a fundamental critique. Heidegger’s extant correspondence found in the Misch Archive in Göttingen begins with the above letter accompanying the vita of June 1922 and ends with a letter of February 1931 which expresses the hope that they find occasion for a thoroughgoing conversation to discuss the Auseinandersetzung detailed in the 1930 book.
the “treatise” that had begun as a review of Jaspers’s book (chapter 13). Misch
would also receive a typescript copy of the “report” to Natorp entitled “Indication
of the Hermeneutic Situation” in October of 1922 (chapter 14).

Heidegger did not get the position. For Misch’s evaluation of Heidegger based
in part on this vita and letter as well as a letter from Husserl on May 31, 1922 (in
appendix II), see appendix I.

VITA AND LETTER TO GEORG MISCH

Freiburg in Breisgau, June 30, 1922
Lerchenstrasse 8

Most respected Professor!

The vita that I am taking the liberty of enclosing at your request is designed to
go beyond a mere recording of dates in order to give you sufficient information on
my course of study and on the directions that my research and teaching are cur-
rently taking. But this has dictated my talking about myself in more personal detail
than is usual.

In addition to the “Duns Scotus” book, the following article has appeared:
philosophische Kritik, 1916. Unfortunately, I myself no longer have any copies of it.

Permit me also to enclose a treatise on Jaspers’s Psychology of Worldviews.
Originally intended for the journal, Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen [Göttingen Scholar-
ly Notices], it could not be published there, even though I cut out the book review,
for I was allowed only 6 pages. The brunt of its contents was presented as a lecture
in the circle of philosophy instructors here in 1920. Jaspers, who heard about it
through common students, requested a copy for his second edition, which is about
to appear.

Husserl, who also has a copy, wanted to publish the treatise already in last
year’s Jahrbuch. I have nevertheless withheld it since it is comprehensible only in
the context of [my ongoing] investigations of the basic phenomena of the com-
prehensive object [Gegenständlichkeit] called “life” and the sense of be-ing (Exis-
tenz) of this “object,” the comprehensible context in which its results would
become scientifically applicable.

The treatise at the same time wishes to bring out the positive tendencies of
“life philosophy” and, in unison with this, to move together toward a principled
meditation-on-meaning [Besinnung] within phenomenological research and its
directions.

Life is approached as the basic comprehensive object of philosophical re-
search. The self-illuminating comporting of factic life to itself is, on the cognitive level, interpretive exposition \([\text{Auslegung}]\); the principled scientific development of this exposition is phenomenological interpretation \([\text{Interpretation}]\); the genuine logic of philosophy is accordingly a principled phenomenological \textit{hermeneutics}.

As a comprehensive object of concern that can be met essentially in its What and That in the course of interpretive exposition, factic life is in its basic sense historical. It holds within itself and as such is, in \[and through\] this intimate familiarity with itself, \textit{tradition} [\text{Tradition}].

Philosophical research is “historical” knowing. The “historicism” in Dilthey is no accident or a systematic incapacity. What is meant by it cannot be measured by way of the opposition of “timeless and temporal,” which springs from a Platonism that has never drawn its ground categories from a ground experience of the specifically historical consciousness.

I have completed concrete analyses of the comprehensive object of “life” that are readily available. They need only a final redaction. Some parts are ready in a “relatively” clear handwritten copy.

Research into the history of logic by way of the history of its problems does not take logic as a discipline of philosophy and in the order outlined by its textbooks, but as the research into categories, in which the fundamental structures of [first] addressing and considering objects by life are raised to the conceptual level.

It is therefore a matter of taking the basis for interpretation from a philosophical context of research in the way that such a context first becomes accessible in Aristotle’s treatises.

Aristotle’s treatises cannot merely serve as sources from which one excerpts certain school concepts, but are to be interpreted according to their initiating problem, the intuition that first provides its context of objects, the direction in which the specific conceptual articulation proceeds, and the temporally particular stand attained by that problem. Only in this way do we arrive at a basic understanding of the unique vital movement of Greek philosophical research, and are thereby given the possibility of understanding the logic thus developed in its genesis-of-sense.

A first part of the investigations of this “Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle” on \textit{Metaphysics} I.1–2 and \textit{Physics} I, II, III.1–3 is complete, and will be dictated into the machine when vacation begins. Printing begins in September for the \textit{Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung}. A second part on \textit{Metaphysics} VII–IX, along with II and X, as well as \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} VI, is undergoing its final elaboration in the special four-hour lecture course now taking place.² It is upon this foundation that the interpretation of the treatises of the \textit{Organon} will be structured.

². The course of SS 1922, Heidegger’s very first four-hour course, was, like Heidegger’s other academic exercises at this time which were all related to the preparation of a never-pub-
For the Winter I have announced “Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Sextus Empiricus, Hypotyposeon.”

From Husserl’s repeatedly proven experience, which he impressed upon me at an earlier occasion, I will not raise premature hopes over the prospects that you indicated to me in your kind letter. The possibilities that Göttingen has to offer, its scientific context of life and the very roots of the finest [of the groups in the] Free German Youth Movement, are almost too superabundant.

In any case, please keep the manuscript on the critique of Jaspers. If you do not have your own copy of the “Duns Scotus” and are interested, I will gladly send you one of the available copies.

With sincere regards,
Yours respectfully,
Martin Heidegger

Vita and one Ms. follow as registered mail with the same post.

lished treatise on Aristotle bearing the same title, announced under the title “Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles” and bore the abbreviated subtitle “Ontologie und Logik.” The Gesamtausgabe edition (GA 62) is entitled Phänomenologische Interpretation ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zu Ontologie und Logik.

3. A course with this subtitle announced for WS 1922–1923 under the title, “Skepticism in Ancient Philosophy,” was cancelled, presumably to free time to write the book entitled “Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle.” Instead, Heidegger held an advanced seminar on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics VI, De anima, Metaphysics VII) and a beginners’ seminar on Husserl’s Ideas I. Misch also received a carbon copy of the manuscript written at the behest of Paul Natorp in Marburg, “Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle: Indication of the Hermeneutic Situation,” as indicated in Heidegger’s cover letter to Misch dated October 8, 1922. It was Misch’s copy that was recently found in the archives of one of his students at Göttingen, Josef König, leading to the first publication of the text in 1989. A translation of it is included in this collection (chapter 14).

4. The reference here is to the very first Wandervogel (“birds of passage”) group consisting of university students, Deutsche Akademische Freischar (German Academic Volunteer Corps), founded at Göttingen in 1907 by Knud Ahlborn, who would become a prominent figure in the then burgeoning German Youth Movement. The university at Marburg soon followed (1912). All the groups in Germany from all ranks of life then joined together at nearby Hoher Meissner (a mountain near Kassel) in 1913 to form the Freideutsche Jugendbewegung, which Heidegger mentions with qualified enthusiasm in his course of SS 1919 (GA 56/57, 208). Heidegger’s very first academic act in his course in WS 1924–1925, virtually on the 11th anniversary of this historic meeting, was his eulogy of Paul Natorp, a rare “friend of the Youth Movement” among the German professors, praising him for his singular understanding and support of the German youth who on that occasion “pledged to shape their lives out of an inner veracity and self-responsibility. Many of the best of them have fallen in the war” (GA 19, 5).
I was born on September 26, 1889, in Messkirch (province of Baden, region of Constance) as son of the cooper Friedrich Heidegger and his wife Johanna, née Kempf, of the Catholic confession. I attended the gymnasium first in Constance and then in Freiburg, where I graduated in the summer of 1909.

Beginning in the winter semester of 1909–1910, I studied Catholic theology at the University of Freiburg in Breisgau as an alumnus of the theological seminary. Here I applied myself primarily to philosophy, from the start always fundamentally, from the sources (Aristotle, Augustine, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas). In order to get beyond schoolbook philosophy and to arrive at an understanding of the problems, I studied Lotze and Husserl under the guidance of the Freiburg dogmaticist Braig. Theological work was concentrated on New Testament exegesis and patristics. My efforts to look beyond what was being offered led me to the critical investigations of Franz Overbeck and made me familiar generally with the research of Protestant historians of dogma. Crucial for the development of my perspective were the modern investigations of the history of religion by Gunkel, Bousset, Wendland, and Reitzenstein, and the critical works of Albert Schweitz-

5. Carl Braig (1853–1923), Catholic professor of dogmatic theology at Freiburg (1897–1919) and avid defender of the anti-modernist oath. Especially important for the young Heidegger's development was Braig's *Vom Sein. Abriss der Ontologie* [On Being: An Outline of Ontology], first published in 1896. Significantly, it includes extensive citations from the “sources” and delves into the Greek etymology of the traditional ontological concepts.

6. The works of Franz Overbeck (1837–1905), a Protestant theologian infected by a radical skepticism toward his craft and its object that developed from his long friendship with Nietzsche beginning with their time together at the University of Basel, underwent a revival in 1919 with the posthumous publication of his *Christentum und Kultur*. There is strong evidence that Heidegger also carefully studied Overbeck's first major work, *Über die Christlichkeit unserer heutigen Theologie* (1873; 2nd ed., 1903), but not until 1920.

7. Hermann Gunkel (1862–1932), theologian of the Old Testament who graduated from Göttingen in 1888, was a chief representative of the theological school of the history of religion. He was editor of the second edition of the five-volume lexicon, *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (1927–1931), in which the very first encyclopedia article on “Heidegger” would appear, thanks to Rudolf Bultmann (in chapter 22 of this volume).


(Johann Theodor) Paul Wendland (1864–1915), ancient philologist who taught at Göttingen from 1908 to 1915; Heidegger will later refer to his essay, “Entwicklung und Motive der platonischen Staatslehre” [On the Development and Motives of the Platonic
In the course of these first semesters, my theological and philosophical study had taken such a turn that, early in 1911, I left the seminary and gave up my theological studies, since I could not take the “modernist oath” that was then explicitly required. I was thus without means, but determined to make the effort to dedicate myself to scientific research. The plan to go to Husserl in Göttingen came to naught after I received a scholarship at my own university, which I held until my habilitation.

I attended the lecture courses and seminars held by Rickert and the courses of Reitzenstein and Schwartz (Gospel of John), which hitherto had been forbidden to me. In addition, I was introduced to both early and late scholasticism in the courses and seminars of Schneider. Problems of logic made me see the need to work on the basic concepts and elements of mathematics. I was introduced to the concrete tasks and methods of historical research by Finke’s courses and seminars on the history of the middle ages and the renaissance. In this way I became ac-

Theory of the State], *Preussische Jahrbücher* 136 (1909), in a letter to Elisabeth Blochmann on September 18, 1932.

Richard Reitzenstein (1861–1931), professor of classical philology at Freiburg (1911–1914) during Heidegger’s student years and Misch’s older colleague at Göttingen (1914–1931), is best known for his *Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1910), a trailblazing work in the then burgeoning school of the history of religion to which the young Heidegger occasionally refers.

8. Albert Schweitzer (1875–1965) wrote his early theological works, against the background of 19th-century scientific research into the life of Jesus, from 1900 to 1913, before embarking on his career as physician, African missionary, and philosopher of the “reverence for life” (*Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben*). Heidegger in his early Freiburg courses refers to Schweitzer’s *Geschichte der Leben-Jesu Forschung* [History of Research into the Life of Jesus] (1913) as well as to his running critique of eschatological Christianity.

9. Heinrich Rickert (1863–1936), along with Wilhelm Windelband, chief representative of the Southwest German School of Neo-Kantianism and its pursuit of a transcendental philosophy of value. Holder of the regular chair of philosophy at Freiburg from 1894 to 1916, he directed Heidegger’s habilitation (second dissertation to qualify for university teaching), which applies the methods of modern philosophical logic to a Scotian transcendental logic and speculative grammar.


12. Heinrich Finke (1855–1938), Catholic historian specializing in medieval history, professor at Freiburg from 1899, president of the Görres-Gesellschaft from 1924. He played a central role in promoting, and then stifling, the young Heidegger’s budding career within the relatively large branch of Freiburg’s Philosophical Faculty that officially represented the “Catholic worldview.”
quainted with Dilthey’s works on the history of [the human] spirit [Geistesgeschichte].

In the summer of 1913, I graduated summa cum laude with the work entitled The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism.

My relationship to phenomenological research was at that time still tenuous. In my fundamental scientific orientation, I regarded scientific research to be compatible with a more freely conceived Catholicism in the form of a purely historical preoccupation with the history of the spirit of the Middle Ages. I then underestimated the full consequences that thinking through the fundamental questions must necessarily have for a problem-history of philosophy.

After graduation, my initial intention inclined toward an investigation of late scholasticism, above all Occam, in order to obtain, by way of this illumination of late scholastic logic, a concrete and broad infrastructure for the scientific understanding of the history of the genesis of Protestant theology and thereby of the central contexts of problems of German idealism. My preoccupation with Occam made a return to Duns Scotus urgent for me. This return took the route of bringing out and exhibiting what there was in Duns Scotus regarding a universal theory of objects by way of the interpretive means of the context of problems acquired in modern philosophical research.

Meanwhile, the war broke out. I enlisted as a volunteer in the local infantry regiment, but after four weeks was released because of heart trouble. After my recovery, I resumed my work on Duns Scotus.

In July 1915, with the manuscript of “The Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus,” I received my habilitation in the Department of Philosophy within our Philosophical Faculty. Shortly thereafter, I was once again drafted, provisionally restricted to garrison duty, which left only a limited time for me to hold lecture courses.

By the beginning of my academic teaching, it became clear to me that genuine scientific research free from all reservations and covert commitments is not possible along with active adherence to the Catholic faith and its standpoint. This standpoint became untenable for me through my unceasing preoccupation with early Christianity as it is developed by the modern school of the history of religion. My lecture course was forbidden to the theologians.

In the interim, Husserl came to Freiburg, and I now found the opportunity that I had wanted ever since my first semesters, of working my way systematically into phenomenological research. I discontinued my lecture courses as the demands of military service (training for field duty) became more intense. Regular weekly evenings with Husserl provided crucial progress for me until I was sent into the field.

With war’s end, I resumed my phenomenological study and regularly attended Husserl’s seminars from early 1919 to summer semester 1922. Since summer se-
mester 1919 I myself held phenomenological seminars, first only for beginners, then a two-hour seminar for beginners and advanced students. Since the end of the war, I receive a stipend, which was raised to an assistant’s salary upon Husserl’s recommendation. Since the fall of 1920, I officially do the phenomenological exercises of seminars in common with Husserl. Since the end of the war, I have held the following lecture courses.\textsuperscript{13}

Interim Semester 1919: Basic Questions of Phenomenology, 2 hours.
SS 1919: Transcendental Philosophy of Value and Phenomenology, 2 hours.
WS 1919–1920: Introduction to Phenomenology, 2 hours.
SS 1920: Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression: The Problem of Philosophical Concept Formation, 2 hours.
WS 1920–1921: Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion (phenomenological analyses of basic Pauline concepts in their connection with Hellenism), 2 hours.
SS 1921: Plotinus and Augustine (the science-shaping influence of Greek ontology and logic on theological concept formation; the corresponding context of influence on the Reformation and German idealism), 2 hours.
WS 1921–1922: Phenomenological Interpretation of Selected Treatises of Aristotle on Ontology and Logic: Phenomenological and Systematic Introduction and Hermeneutics, 2 hours.
SS 1922: Phenomenological Interpretation with Respect to Aristotle (continuation), 4 hours.


The investigations upon which the fully elaborated lecture courses are based have as their goal a systematic, phenomenological, and ontological interpretation of the basic phenomena of factic life, which in its sense of be-ing is understood as “historical” and is to be brought to categorial definition in keeping with the essence of its basic comportment of getting around \textit{(Umgehen)} in and with a world (environing world, communal world, self-world).

A condensed overview of these investigations in the principal thrust of their problems is given in the essay on Jaspers’s \textit{Psychology of Worldviews}.

The basic idea of philosophy as phenomenological research is that it [first] has to take its stand in the narrow working context which originally belongs to the historical human sciences. As a doctrine, philosophy must elaborate itself less

\textsuperscript{13} Even from the remove of one to three years, Heidegger’s recall of the exact titles of his lecture courses is somewhat faulty, or free. For a more accurate historical account, see the bilingual record of Heidegger’s academic career in the Chronological Overview above.
in the explicit mediation of worldviews and cultural or educational overviews as in the explicitly rigorous and always concretely actualized bearing and development of the scientific consciousness. Such a consciousness does not get activated by speeches and pamphlets on the crisis of the sciences, which in the new [generation of] youth only breeds fatigue and exhaustion, but by bringing today’s academic youth back from the excesses of reflection and discussion to concrete and solid work on the matters themselves, on the objective contexts that are given by scientific philosophy.

Since March of 1917, I have been married to Elfride Petri, daughter of Reserve Colonel Richard Petri from Alfeld on the Leim. We have two boys, who are three and two years old.

Freiburg i. Br., June 30, 1922
Martin Heidegger
13. Critical Comments on Karl Jaspers’s

*Psychology of Worldviews*

**Introductory Overview**

Heidegger dates the composition of this ostensibly “critical review” of Jaspers’s groundbreaking book—which first appeared in early 1919 and was destined to inaugurate German *Existenzphilosophie*—as “1919–1921.” But various bits of internal evidence in the review essay, like the distinction between objective and actualizing history and the methodological move of “adjudication,” indicate that the first draft was written in the weeks after Heidegger’s course of SS 1920 on philosophical concept formation, and completed in September 1920. A third and only slightly revised final draft was distributed in typescript form in June of 1921 to Jaspers.

Heidegger’s review essay, “Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers ‘Psychologie der Weltanschauungen’” was first published in Hans Saner (ed.), *Karl Jaspers in der Diskussion* (Munich: Piper, 1973), 70–100, and was later included in the *Gesamtausgabe (GA)* 9 expanded edition as the first of *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976), 1–44. Accordingly, an English translation by John van Buren first appeared in Martin Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1–38; a later improved translation appears in Martin Heidegger, *Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond*, ed. John van Buren (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 2002), 71–102. It is upon this latter translation that the following abbreviated annotated paraphrase is based, which includes a few corrections of errors that crept into the extant translation, here made without comment. A paraphrase is dictated by the difficult language and refractory style of this early essay by Heidegger, which is carried over into the extant English translation. Accordingly, a more readable English paraphrase of this essay has been prepared especially for this volume by Theodore Kisiel. While omitting numerous unnecessarily complicated passages and tangential remarks as well as the editorial appendix to this “critical review” of Karl Jaspers’s 1919 book, the paraphrase seeks to capture the essence and flow of the whole of this highly methodological essay in a form and language that is more readily accessible to the reader of this volume, but without undue sacrifice of accuracy. In the furtherance of readability and comprehension of the flow of the whole, the paraphrase has been outlined into eight titled subsections and reinforced with some explanatory notes provided by the editor. Needless to say, this abbreviated paraphrase is meant as a supplement rather than as a substitute of the more complete version, especially for the more specialized reader.
Husserl, and Rickert. In sending a copy to Georg Misch in June of 1922 in support of his candidacy for a position at the University of Göttingen (see chapter 12), Heidegger identifies it as a “treatise” that was too long to be published as a book review in the *Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen* (Göttingen Scholarly Notices), its original venue, and notes that it belongs in the “context of my ongoing investigations of the basic phenomena of the comprehensive object called ‘life’ and the sense of being (*Existenz*) of this objectness.” To be more precise, it is factic life, or the factic experience of life, or still more simply (albeit abstractly), facticity, that is the object, or better, the (subject) matter of philosophical research. *Existenz* then adds the all-important existential qualifier of its being my/our very own facticity.

The review turned into a treatise thus becomes the early Heidegger’s “Dis- course on Method” and so on philosophical concept formation, in the making since KNS 1919, utilizing Jaspers’s book as an occasion to exercise that method, and as an example of how the lack of a considered method squanders the positive and radical direction indicated in the book. The “argument” is intricate and elaborate as well as verbose and obtuse, and thus begs to be outlined in its structure and movement and loosened of its heavy language, which we have attempted to do in the following abbreviated annotated paraphrase. As a further guide to the flow of this treatise, we begin with an introductory summary of each of the eight sections superimposed upon the threads and seams of this essay.

§ 1. Phenomenological Critique and Historical Destruction

From the start, Heidegger identifies what he is doing as a “critique that reveals the positive” in this remarkable book. This positive understanding of the work in a deeper sense than the author himself perhaps suspects serves to extract fruitful possibilities for further philosophical research, here the tendency in Jaspers’s book toward the radical phenomenon of existence. The positive critique is in this way a radical critique, a philosophical critique. In its radical exegesis and explication of the historical phenomena coming into radical question, it is a hermeneutical critique. In its pursuit-of-the-sense (*Besinnung*) of these phenomena, e.g., life related back to its sense-of-being in the existence of the historical I, it is a phenomenological critique. Since even the vaunted phenomenological “intuition” can take place only in the pregiven context of a preconception, and “observation” (Jaspers’s methodological term) is possible only in a historical context of understanding, phenomenology is always hermeneutical phenomenology.

Positive critique of systematic structures is to be distinguished from and at once closely related to the historical destruction of a tradition, which in its dismantling is itself ultimately positive, since its ultimate task is to explicate the original motive-giving situations from which the basic experiences of philosophy originate. Thus, the then current “philosophies of life” will be “destroyed” in order
to uncover the “basic philosophical motive” that is operative in their very focus on life. For this motive tends by and large to be present in a degenerate and covert form, such that it comes to expression in them in an inchoate form by way of indigent concepts. Destruction thus continues the work of critique by way of the detour through history and the understanding that actualizes this history. What is being dismantled in de(con)struction is not merely the hardened tradition of an intellectual-spiritual history (Geistesgeschichte). At its roots, de(con)struction is the “articulated contestation [Auseinandersetzung] that lays open the history that we ourselves are.”

§ 2. Limit Situations in Existence, Formally Indicated

It is in its view from life’s limits, in limit situations like death and struggle, that Jaspers’s book manifests its radical tendency toward the phenomenon of existence, which Heidegger accordingly tentatively “formally indicates” as the very sense-of-being of existence expressed in the simple but experientially charged formula, “I am!?” thereby focusing on the life of the self. In this early section, Heidegger is content to identify existence in Jaspers’s terms as the “how” of psychic (human) life as such when this life is regarded as a whole and in its roots in experiences that lead to the formulation of “worldviews” and “philosophies of life,” statements about how life is supposed to be lived. It is Jaspers’s own aim of a holistic psychology of worldviews, which will be classified in great detail by him, that has him overlooking the full implications of existence and the potential of a radical “philosophy of existence” at this early stage. That life has limits which influence the human psyche thus becomes only a part of the preconception of human life that Jaspers carries over largely unthinkingly from his immediate tradition (Kant, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche) into his psychological work. Heidegger here introduces his own chief task in this “review,” that of sorting through the mix of assumptions entering in Jaspers’s preconception in order to demonstrate that Jaspers’s own application of his preconception to his work, notably in his “method” of pure observation of the whole of life, runs counter to the deepest tendency contained in this preconception, the tendency toward existence.

§ 3. Philosophies of Life

The loose and indigent conceptuality of the then-current “philosophies of life” criticized by Rickert prompts the phenomenologist Heidegger not only to go to the matter itself of life itself, in a lengthy parenthetical remark. Along the way, he singles out the concept of life in unique historical context in Dilthey’s Lebensphilosophie as indicative of the same radical trend in philosophizing that is manifest in phenomenology toward the structures of “factic life experience” and in Jaspers toward existence (the life of the self), whose exposition constitutes the “moving
force and positive aim of this critique.” In short, the main goal of the essay itself is the conflation of these three radical trends in contemporary philosophy: *Existenzphilosophie, Lebensphilosophie*, and phenomenology.

The long parenthesis distinguishes two trends toward giving precision to the initially vague concept of life further muddled by competing vital philosophical interests. Both trends seek to orient individual existence to the immediate actuality of life, so that the I (or we) can “be there” (*da sein!* in and as this immediately experienced life. One trend is the active extrovertive life of creative acting and achievement, say, in the formation of a culture, and the other, the receptive introvertive life of living and undergoing experience intensely, as in learning, feeling, and other forms of “taking in,” and so “being there” in such experiencing. Needless to say, both aspects of the middle voice of the verb “to live” belong together in the proto-phenomenon of life.

For Jaspers, life (of the psyche, mind, spirit) is at once an encompassing whole (thus a region) and a flowing stream, an infinite whole and an infinite process. Taking life as a holistic region prompts Jaspers to assume an objectifying theoretical stance of “pure observation” toward it in order to further articulate the phenomena occurring within it. But taking life as a flowing stream raises the problem of how to gain access to it and “grasp” it in prehensile concepts without “stilling the stream,” thereby destroying its very essence as an ongoing process.

§ 4. Life as Whole and Split, Mystical and Objective

The problems of objectifying and conceptualizing life prompt Heidegger to take a closer textual look at Jaspers’s own preconception of life in its what and how, topic and method, i.e., in its “functional sense,” the way in which he concretely develops his preconception into a psychological method to access and express its topic. The life of the spirit is normally experienced as a broken whole within the subject-object split, but it can also be experienced in its ever underlying reality as an infinitely flowing and undivided whole in a mystical union which, while experienced, remains inexpressible. In contrast to this amorphous underlying actuality of life, Heidegger at this point introduces the phenomenologically formal “underlying reality” that gives full sense to any phenomenon, namely, the prestructuration of individual existence into an intentional relation, the intentional content held within this relation, and the intentional actualization that fulfills this relation and brings it to its fully temporalized sense. This triple-sensed intentional prestruction is phenomenology’s preconception of the context of actualization of the always temporally particular factual life in its concrete horizon of expectations and concern. It is capable of clarifying—which Jaspers does not do—the concrete limit situations in terms of their meaningful motivations and tendencies and thus provide a vectorial analysis of their full sense in any concrete instance. Any preconception is the fundamental context from which both phenom-
ena and concepts, topics and their articulation, arise. Jaspers’s articulation of life in terms of limits, antinomies, the subject-object split, the absolute, indeed taking the whole of life as a guiding Idea, betrays the contingent historical origin of his preconception in Kant (Kierkegaard and Luther are also named). The attitude of pure beholding can perhaps be traced back to a more ancient provenance. The fundamentally aesthetic experience that underlies pure observation finds its climax in the mystical absorption in the supra-oppositional harmony of the undivided dynamic whole of life.

§ 5. Another Formal Indication of Existence

Functioning in an objectifying and theoretical way, assuming a basically aesthetic bearing, Jaspers’s preconception has taken a direction which is bound to miss the phenomena of the “I am,” the phenomena of self-existence. A deepening “formal indication” (a methodological level of phenomenological explicating that Heidegger declines to elaborate in detail here) of existence suggests that I have myself in pretheoretical, precognitive, and preobjective ways that defy classification into regions and other objective realms, even though I have myself at different levels of coping with life and its import. In its purest, most genuine, and radical way, I have myself anxiously in a limit situation which is not generic but factically individual, and therefore uniquely historical. I first have myself in my unique historical situation rather than in a generic objective region.

§ 6. The Historical I: Actualizing its Full Facticity

The proper experience of having-myself extends historically into the past of the I which is met in a horizon of expectations coming from the self’s future. It is also in a fundamentally historical context that the “I am” first meets and understands the “he, she, it is” and the “we, you, they are.” Factic life experience, the life experienced here and now in its unique historical situation, is not a phenomenon of objective history (my life viewed as taking place in the present), but rather of actualization history, “which always experiences itself in that [unique temporal] actualization.” The phenomenon of existence discloses itself only in the radically historical manner of actualizing experience, which is never actualized once and for all but must be re-viewed and renewed time and again, motivated by a historically driven concern anxious about a self that is concretely one’s own. Such a history is not a matter of detached curiosity and academic knowledge but a matter of the engaged conscience and unique self-responsibility. Its concepts are not objective but hermeneutical, capable of reading the full uniqueness of its historical context. For “we ourselves are the historical that we ourselves bear as a responsibility,” as a factic burden and as a task.
§ 7. Present Tasks of Phenomenology

Phenomenology, which was first directed toward the phenomena of theoretical experience and its theoretical logos, if it wishes to be radical, must now direct itself toward the historically existing self in its fundamental actualization on the level of factic life experience, where experiencing in the fullest sense is to be found. Its method at this level is the interpretive, historically actualizing explications of the concrete fundamental experiences in which I/we have myself/ourselves factically in anxious concern. But to what extent is phenomenology in its philosophical sense nowadays oriented to this radical origin of sense such that anxious concern pervades all of its problems? To what extent is it understood that this radical origin of sense is thoroughly historical, such that the classical problem of the relationship of the systematic and the historical in philosophy is dismissed as a pseudo-problem?

§ 8. Summary Remarks: Jaspers’s Deficiencies in Method

A summary review of Jaspers’s various deficiencies in method by way of conclusion serves to bring out a few hitherto half-expressed nuances of contrast between his preconception, approach, etc., and the analogous aspects of hermeneutic phenomenology, like the mood of aesthetic harmony versus that of anxious concern, detachment versus involvement in the subject-matter of life, detached curiosity versus the engaged conscience, declarative versus interrogatively indicative modes of address, the differing concepts of the individual exposed in the ineffability objection (based on the aesthetic and external observation of the whole person) as opposed to the fragmented factic self being driven by anxious concern into interrogatively becoming what he or she is to be. Emphasis on the thoroughly historical character of both the what and how of research now infects even pure observation, which always takes place within a particular historical context of understanding (say, in Jaspers’s preconception) and is therefore unavoidably interpretation. Once Jaspers acknowledges that he is pursuing philosophy and not a particular science called psychology, then his “pure observation must evolve into an ‘infinite process’ of radical questioning that always implicates itself in the questioning, and always remains ‘there,’” in one’s unique historical situation.

(Note: A somewhat different and earlier summary exegesis of the “Jaspers Review” is to be found in Kisiel, Genesis, 137–48.)

Critical Comments on Karl Jaspers’s Psychology of Worldviews

(Abbreviated Annotated Paraphrase)

To begin with, it should be conceded that the present stand of scientific and philosophical knowledge does not provide a “suitable” direction for a critique of this work by Jaspers that would expose its positive features. This admission itself
already indicates the unique quality and significant originality of Jaspers's work. Instead of starting with idle counsel on possible methods, we shall begin with a preliminary deliberation-of-sense [Besinnung] that first identifies the subject matter [Gegenstand] of these critical comments. The following deliberation on the scope and thrust of our positive critique thus will first follow the immanent intentions of the work under critique; our very first task is accordingly to spell out in some detail just what its subject matter is.

This work grew out of efforts toward “psychology as a whole,” which seeks to provide a vision of “what the human being is” (5/5).¹ The psychology of worldviews, which is a part of this whole, assumes the function of demarcating the “limits of psychic life” in order to provide a clear comprehensive horizon [Gesamthorizont] for that life. This demarcation of limits is moreover a thoroughgoing orderly apprehension of the ultimate positions [i.e., worldviews] of human mental and spiritual being regarded in its totality. But the psychology of worldviews is only one way of obtaining the means for the comprehension of the psychic whole. The other is “general psychology”² (theory of principles and categories, methodology of psy-

¹ The young Heidegger frequently provides the pagination of the first edition in his critical remarks and, in order to make this paraphrase serve as a guide to further study, e.g., of Jaspers’s germinal idea of limit situations and their “types,” we are adding the pagination of the more readily available, and oft reprinted in paperback, sixth edition. Karl Jaspers, Psychologie der Weltanschauungen (Berlin: Springer, 1919; 6th ed., 1971; paperback, Munich: Piper, 1985). Some corrections of Heidegger’s citations have also been made in the present paraphrase, usually without comment.

² The most prominent example of “general psychology” for Heidegger at that time would most likely have been the book by the neo-Kantian Paul Natorp, Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode (Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 1912). Heidegger held a seminar on this book in WS 1919–1920 and in his lecture courses at the time returned again and again to Natorp’s two objections therein against the very possibility of phenomenology: see Kisiel, Genesis, 47–50, 56. The objection of the purported “ineffability” of immediate experience will be raised more than once by Heidegger himself in the course of this review.

Natorp’s genial objections are in fact twofold, rendering immediate experience not only inexpressible but first intuitively inaccessible. For “reflection” exercises an analytically dissective effect on the immediate stream of living experience, acting as a theoretical intrusion that interrupts the stream and stills it, as we now look at the objectified dissection rather than live the streaming experience. Phenomenology’s claim to simply describe what it sees is likewise subverted since, for Natorp, description is circumscription into general concepts. The concrete immediacy of experience is thus “subsumed” under objectifying abstractions (see GA 56/57, 100–1, 111, for Heidegger’s first statement of these objections). Heidegger responds to these objections by developing a hermeneutic phenomenology of factic life experience utilizing a formally indicating language whose grammatology would include exclamatory impersonals, the distributive universals of indexicals, middle-voiced verbals, reflexive pronouns, double genitives, etc., some of which are exemplified in this critical review.
chological knowledge). Its overview provides an understanding of the basic forces and directions of psychic and spiritual life as a whole. This in itself, in view of the way general psychology is carried out, has already been instrumental in furthering knowledge in psychiatry as well as in the human sciences, by enriching our natural psychological understanding, thereby making it more attentive and flexible, more sensitive to the dimensions and levels of distinctions in our psychic being.

In view of its concern for the whole of psychology, for arriving at its fundamental horizon and principal region, the concrete direction of a psychology of worldviews can already claim to be “philosophical.” It does not seek to develop and promote any positive worldview, but rather to provide “clarifications and possibilities as means for self-deliberation” on the sense of various worldviews by understanding and ordering the psychic positions [= worldviews] in accord with the processes and stages of psychic life. With this ordered understanding of psychic life, the initial direction of tasks (arriving at the whole of psychology) has found its final goal. The manner of carrying out the first set of tasks is at once the path toward fulfilling the second set of tasks, the properly philosophical set (a basic understanding of psychic life sufficient to guide classifying worldviews into types). In return, the direction toward the goal of a particular kind of philosophizing gives basic guidance to the resolution of the comprehensive problem of psychology.

[1. Phenomenological Critique and Historical Destruction] The critique aims to get at what is fundamental: it is accordingly a radical critique. It is therefore not concerned with details of content or the particular elements of the ordering schemes of typological classification in order to modify them and replace them with others or, say, to add hitherto unnoticed types of worldviews. What matters is to define the how of such a philosophical critique in its basic bearing and intended problematic. Such a definition at once sets limits upon the scope of its claims.

The critique brings out the proper direction of Jaspers’s work in its basic bearing and attitude. It seeks thereby to bring into sharper focus the dominant direction of the problematic and its basic motives and to determine in what way the approach to the task, the choice of methodological means, and how they are employed in carrying out the task, are in keeping with these very directions, and whether these motives and tendencies are taken radically enough for the fundamental probing that constitutes the direction of philosophizing. In such a radicalizing approach, any particular critique oriented toward established criteria is put out of play. Jaspers’s deliberations will therefore not be compared with a finished and securely grounded philosophy nor measured against any completed system of the sphere of philosophical problems, nor judged by any fixed ideal of scientific method or philosophical rigor, nor condemned by epistemological ideals. Such measures are put out of play because our critical comments are oriented toward sharpening the con-
science to the need for radical questioning that returns to the place of origin where meaning is first generated in the “history of spirit/mind” [Geistesgeschichte] in its proper sense, which is a return to the original motives or motives of origin that are operative in first establishing such philosophical ideals of knowledge. This radical vantage then questions whether these ideals satisfy the original sense of philosophizing, or whether they instead lead a shadowy existence that has hardened into a long, degenerate, and deviant tradition which has not been originally appropriated for quite some time. We are convinced that the cultivation of an acute conscience cannot be achieved or even initiated in a genuine way by the fabrication of “new” philosophical programs. Rather, it has to be actualized quite concretely by way of a destruction [Destruktion] aimed directly at what has been handed down to us in the tradition of Geistesgeschichte. The task of destruction is equivalent to the explanation of the original motive-giving situations from which the basic experiences of philosophy have sprung. These experiences have then undergone a long theoretical development that have yielded the aforesaid established ideals. Nevertheless, the very sense of “theory” is here still being shaped by this pretheoretical origin (see Plato and Aristotle). The significance and range of this task of destruction can hardly be overstated. If we simply restrict ourselves to this task of destruction and deliberately give up on traditional, still historically conditioned, ambitions to do “creative” philosophizing, we will quickly come to see “what needs to be done” concretely.

The firm intent to leave aside all measures oriented toward fixed and developed standards that have not been subjected to a radical appropriation [i.e., “destruction”] is however matched by an equally strong suspicion of all the lavish “philosophies of life” that make pretentious claims to an untrammeled freedom and a pseudo-originality. “Philosophy of life” will itself be called into question, and analyzed to determine the basic philosophical motive that comes to expression in it, albeit in a degenerate form, which remains invisible and incomprehensible to itself due to its indigent stock of concepts.

Abstaining from any critique oriented toward fixed standards is by no means a succumbing to an uncritical endorsement of a syncretism blind to all differences and amenable to all manners of mediation. The basic direction that will be followed in this review also has its fixed orientation, whose essential characteristic is manifest precisely in a certain way or “how” of persevering. This how of critical direction involves an appropriation that repeatedly renews itself by way of destruction. The critique is a phenomenological critique in its most proper sense. It is “without presuppositions” not in the bad sense where whatever lies right “before one’s hand” in one’s objective situation in Geistesgeschichte is made into the in-itself of the “matters themselves.” One thereby fails to appreciate the peculiar character of any intuition, namely, that an intuition is always actualized in a particular [hermeneutic!] context that is oriented by a preconception [Vorgriff] that anticipates its region of experience. An intuiting that is concerned with immediacy only in its simplistic
“objective” sense, and is thereby diligent in avoiding all constructivistic viewpoints foreign to its subject matter, can easily become oblivious of its own ultimately unoriginal motivational basis. The sense of originality is not an extra-historical or supra-historical idea, it can attain its sense of freedom from presuppositions [here, those of constructivism and objectivism] only in a factically and historically oriented self-critique. The unceasing concern and effort to attain freedom from presuppositions is precisely what constitutes that freedom. The path “to the [original] matters themselves” in philosophy is long and hard, so that the excessive liberality with eidetic insights recently manifest among some phenomenologists is grossly out of tune with their professed “openness” and “devotion” [Hingabe] to these matters. It may well be that even the routes of access to the matters of philosophy lie hidden and require a radical deconstruction [Abbauen] and reconstruction to be carried out. In short, what is required in philosophizing is a properly articulated contestation [Au-seinandersetzung] of history that dismantles and therefore lays open the history that we ourselves “are.” In the end, the way to the matters themselves is this detour through history and the understanding that is actualized in that detour.

At this point, the following “destructive” questions regarding the endeavor of philosophizing phenomenologically within the current circumstantial state [Germany in 1920] of philosophy need to be raised: In the wake of making basic philosophical declarations of who and how “I am” and “we are” [e.g., “We ourselves are history!”], is not now the time to determine for once the extent to which we have actually dealt with what we ourselves presumably “have” and “are”? Instead of securing a firm and rigorous grasp of such basic questions of philosophy, are we not rather developing a gigantic enterprise engaged in a half-hearted concern to “save [Western] culture”? Are we not absorbing ourselves in side issues which at one time were labeled as basic problems by an earlier intellectual industry that ventured too far afield in its search for all of the objects of philosophy? In the spirit of a phenomenology without presuppositions, what we have called a bearing [Haltung] and its direction (introduced neither as a sport nor as a prophetic show of saving the world) is meant to guide a “destructive” critique that would ultimately lay out the intuitive context of experience [Erfahrung, understood phenomenologically as a contextualized “learning encounter”] which constitutes the ground and basis for initiating any problem and any conceptual explication. This ground-laying “intuition” will in turn be critically interrogated as to its originality, motive, tendency, and the thoroughness [Echtheit] of its fulfillment.

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3. “We ourselves are history!” is the famed mantra that Count Yorck von Wartenburg is reputed to have constantly reiterated in his philosophical conversations with Wilhelm Dilthey. Heidegger himself will have occasion to do the same later in this essay and in his lectures and writings of the next several years (see chap. 16–18). How we become the history that we already are is then dealt with in great detail in § 74 of Being and Time on proper historicality.
This basic critical bearing is being put into practice here to clear up the object of our investigation (Jaspers’s book), to sketch out its immanent structures, and to further confirm the intrinsic sense actually manifest in these elaborated structures. The “positive” character of the critique consists simply in introducing problems and in providing a “more exacting” grasp of what is intended in Jaspers’s work. And it may well turn out that “more precise” means something other than a mere conceptual re-presentation that becomes ever clearer and sharper. The difficulty as well as perhaps the tortuous complications of the radically destructive, but ever fundamentally oriented “preliminary work” that the critique must perform is much too great to allow us to hastily push toward the presentation of any finished results. We will be satisfied if, in the indicative process of calling something to your attention, we succeed in bringing into consideration one or another decisive motivational experience which may contribute to the explication of the phenomena that are coming into question.

[II. Limit Situations in Existenz, Formally Indicated] Jaspers’s book in fact provides a whole spectrum of “decisive motivational experiences” that not only motivate philosophy, but also art and religion [as Jaspers will observe in later works]. In its most powerful as well as most concrete section (202–47/229–80), in what must be regarded as the consolidating core of the whole work, Jaspers elaborates the limit situations of human existence. It is a basic characteristic of human life—and so at least a tacit preconception—that this life has limits, that it encounters “limit situations” to which certain “reactions” are possible, and that these reactions to the structural antinomies of limit situations “play out and run their course” in the “vital process” of psychic life, which is the medium for the limit situations (247/280). These are the crisis situations that are “inextricably tied to being human as such and are inevitably given with finite existence [Dasein]” (202/229), to which humans respond—Jaspers’s word is “react”—in various ways in an endeavor to cope with these situations by securing a firm and supported stand [Hal] toward them. Jaspers identifies “struggle, death, chance, guilt” as “instances” of this “generality” of limit situations and adds “suffering” as a common element inextricably involved in all of these instances (204/232). [Heidegger will add the limit situation of already finding oneself situated willy-nilly in existence and couple it with death in his existential ontology in order to define the finite whole of a lifetime that each unique Dasein is called upon to take over and make its own.] We thus arrive at the “original motive-giving situations from which the basic experiences of philosophy have sprung” which is the goal of the destructive retrieve of a phenomenology of factic life experience.

But, as implied in the above account, the terms and context in which Jaspers presents these motive-giving situations leaves something to be desired. The proper goal of Jaspers’s book, as articulated in the foreword to the first edition, is only to
“provide clarifications and possibilities as means for the self-examination-of-sense [Selbstbesinnung]” of whatever worldviews or philosophies of life one might want to consider and perhaps to choose to live. *Psychology of Worldviews* accordingly does not seek to develop and impose any particular worldview or doctrine of life. The work of clarification is nevertheless the clarification of life regarded in some way. The approach and technique of clarification, along with the scope and nature of its goal, inevitably forces life itself into a certain pre-view for those who adopt such clarifications on their way to their particular worldview. The possibilities that are revealed are possibilities in and for a specially articulated aspect of life and psychic existence (*Dasein*). What is thereby preconceived is an essential sense of the way [*Wie = how*] of life as such. As much as one might try to carry out everything in the non-prejudicial stance of pure observation, already the attempt to understand what has been presented in that observation, in applying it to a self-examination, demands in its very sense that we first enter into and go along with the specific basic applications to what is therein intended for life and the self that is to live that life. If genuine psychology is supposed to allow us to see “what the human being is” (5/5), then the initial way in which it actually poses the proper task of psychology implies certain [ontological] preconceptions of the sense of being of this whole of psychic and spiritual *Dasein*, as well as preconceptions of the potential way [*Wie*] in which life, once clarified, is supposed to be lived, i.e., preconceptions of the basic sense of how “possibilities” as such are to be implemented and brought forth out of life.

We must therefore accept that preconceptions are at work everywhere, in life, in the sciences, in philosophy. It is then a matter of experiencing preconceptions in their effective operation, e.g., in their function of guiding fundamental knowing, and indeed in the same self-clarification that they themselves demand. We should develop these often tacit preconceptions even more precisely, pursue the motive, sense, and scope of the direction that they assume, consider the sense of the perhaps unexpressed demands tacitly understood to accompany these preconceptions, and so in the end assess the philosophical relevance and originality of their immanent intentions. In their function as guides, prompting us to proceed in certain preferred directions and to avoid others, preconceptions imply a sense of “method” understood in the broad sense of “way,” a way of proceeding according to the directives of the preconception. The above exposition of the problem of the particular preconception operative in Jaspers’s work would now seek to show that his approach to the assumed tasks is in need of a more radical discernment of his sense [*Besinnung*] of method. This must be done not only to permit the unique direction of the work to come to its true potential. It is especially necessary because the object of this preconception is what it is only by virtue of an originative “method” operating constitutively from within to make it what it is. But Jaspers, in the context of expressing admiration for the way Hegel proceeded in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, professes to a more modest way of proceeding in his *Psychology of World-
views. “We have no dominant method, but now this one, now that,” all of which takes place within the basic attitude of “pure beholding, sheer observation” (11/12). [Thus, still in the spirit of Hegel, Jaspers assumes the stance of a pure spectator, or more scientifically, a detached observer of the whole of life.]¹

In contrast, our way of proceeding (“method”? Or more ontologically put, our way-to-be) toward the same phenomena is that of formal indication, which is to be left unexplicated here.⁵ The proper object put under interrogative focus by way of formal indication can here be identified as existence [Existenz], which in its thus indicated meaning points intentionally to the phenomenon of the “I am,” to the sense of be-ing of this [self that] “I am.” This sense of be-ing provides the starting point and approach to a context of basic phenomena and its problematic [especially the phenomena of limit situations]. Formal indication is to be regarded as

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¹ In the running critique of Jaspers’s theoretically oriented preconception that will shortly follow, Heidegger will in this essay only haltingly indicate what the more pre-theoretical preconception of his own approach to existence [Existenz] is, for one thing because he had in 1920 not fully developed the triadic presuppositional structure (of prepossession, preview, and preconception) of the proper hermeneutic situation in which Dasein, existence, finds itself. But in WS 1921–1922, he observes that since philosophy radically understood always starts from the pre-theoretical realm of the facticity of original experience, it does not in fact “pose” or “posit” its presup-positions. For it has already been positioned within its most basic “presup-position,” the very facticity of factic life. In Heidegger’s early language, its basic Voraus-setzung is in fact Voraus-dasein, “pre-existence” in its being-t/here (GA 61, 159–61/120–22). Rather than a positing, it is more a matter of a radical return to the original facticity of the “motive-giving situation” in which we already find ourselves positioned, interpretively appropriating it and developing it into one’s own unique hermeneutic situation in which and out of which philosophy is to do its work of expository interrogation. Presuppositions of this sort are to be lived, seized as such in order to plunge wholeheartedly into the factically historical dimension of existence and to accept the demands being exacted upon existence by that situation.

⁵ But a first step of explication is immediately taken here when the formally indicated “I am” is inextricably linked to the limit situations of Existenz, making it a situated “I am,” a ’Here I am!? situated at the ex-tremities of ex-sistence. Another step is taken in Heidegger’s very next foray into formal indication where the actualizing of the “I am” deepens sufficiently to encounter myself as a self in “reflexive” intensifications like “I myself.” “I have myself” in various ways, as in “having myself anxiously,” or in the ultimate facticity, “I find myself existing willy-nilly.” Here we are approaching the proper function of formal indication, its eigen-function, the demand (call, challenge) inherent in Existenz calling for or soliciting the response of owning up to my own situation of existence and making it my own. It might be called the demand-response “logic” of the individualized human situation. Heidegger will later describe the “indicative” side of a formally indicative concept as an intimated call to transform ourselves into the Dasein within ourselves, which in each of its instantiations is mine (yours, ours). Its “formal” side is in pointing to a concretion of the individual Dasein in man without bringing the content of this concretion with it. For the concretion is precisely what the unique Dasein must explicate for itself out of its own historically particular situation.
the basic methodological sense of all philosophical concepts and their contexts [by way of the limit situations serving as the motivating origin of philosophy]. In its formality, it first functions as a precaution against uncritical lapses into any particular [and especially objectifying] conceptions of existence, like those of Kierkegaard or Nietzsche, in order to gain the possibility of pursuing a more genuine sense of the phenomenon of existence and of explicating the pursuit itself. In a summary of Kierkegaard, Jaspers writes: “The consciousness of existence arises precisely by way of the consciousness of the antinomic situation” (217/245). Limit situations illuminate the living Dasein. “The limit situations raise the consciousness to its highest intensity, which is as such the consciousness of something absolute” (245/277). “Limit situations are something ultimate and final for living human beings” (274/308). With the critical analysis of the limit situations (202–47/229–80) we come to the consolidating core of the whole of Jaspers’s work. With the intensification of existence by way of limit situations, it should now be possible to develop the already noted problems of preconception and method a bit further.

Peculiar to Jaspers is the treatment of limit situations as antinomic situations. When human beings seek certainty about the totality of the world and life, they find themselves confronted with ultimate incompatibilities. “We ourselves and the world are split into antinomies” (203/230). “The structural antinomy of Dasein itself (namely, the subject-object split, the subjective we ourselves and the objective world) is a limit to the objective world picture,” and the subjective counterpart to this limit is “the suffering inextricably linked to every life” (204/232). These antinomic situations provoke “reactions,” the particular ways in which the human being seeks to cope with these situations by securing a firm and supported stand toward them. “When human beings step forward from the finite situation in order to view it as a whole,” they see “oppositions” and “processes of destruction” everywhere. “Since everything objective can be rationally formulated, such oppositions can be thought as contradictions” (203–4/231). “Contradictions persist as antinomies at the limit of our knowledge of infinities. The concepts of infinity, limit, and antinomy accordingly belong together” (205/232). Antinomy gives rise to the will to unity as a power of life (213/241). “Unity is repeatedly experienced in life, and it is in fact the sharpest antinomists who in their paradoxical expressions like to teach us such a mystical and vital unity” (215/243). The life of unity and wholeness is the life of the spirit itself (213/241). Human beings “always find paths to the infinite or the whole” (204/231).

The preconception that comes with this adoption of Kantian terminology to describe the human being as situated in the whole of a life repeatedly broken by antinomic situations has yet to be determined. From this perspective, nevertheless, it is clear that humans see themselves essentially situated in this whole as an ultimate, experience their existence as “encompassed” by this unbroken “medium.” It is only from the vantage of life flowing as a whole that antinomies destroy and tear apart.
Experiencing and undergoing antinomies means to stand within a limit situation. From the perspective of the whole of life, antinomies are oppositions that bifurcate the whole. If the antinomies of limit situations can be formulated rationally, they would be regarded as contradictions: for example, death contradicts life, whereas chance contradicts necessity as well as meaning (203 ff./231 ff.). Experienced as limit situations, struggle, death, and chance are experienced as limits to our consciousness of that whole which somehow exceeds life. “Struggle [Kampf] is a fundamental form of all existence” (227/257). “All of existence is nothing whole” (229/259), which is why humans must struggle if they want to live. This struggle “never lets a single individual come to rest in any wholeness.”

With the introduction of the singular individual, Jaspers indulges in a line of thought that indeed takes him deeply into the phenomena of Existenz, but at the price of temporarily abandoning the perspective of infinite wholeness. Everything real is transitory, every experience and current state fades away, every human is forever changing (229/260). Experiences, individual human beings, a people, a culture, all succumb to death. “The relation that human beings have to their own deaths is different from their relations to all other forms of transitoriness; only the absolute non-being of the world as such is a comparable notion. . . . Only the perishing of one’s own [eigenen] being or of the world as such has a total character for human beings” (230/261). Such a “lived relation to death” is there in one’s life only “when death has appeared as a limit situation in one’s experience,” and when “consciousness of this limit and of infinity” (231/262) is not ignored or evaded.

But the lapse is only temporary and the prevailing perspective of the infinite whole of life gains the ascendancy time and again over the destructive power of fissioning antinomies. This will to unity, wholeness, totality is constitutive of the life of the spirit (213/241: Hegel!). Jaspers understands life as a flowing whole, thus as at once infinite whole and infinite process, at once an encompassing realm and a flowing stream in which all of life’s motions take place and run their course. It will be seen that such a preconception of life in fact serves to block access to the phenomena of Existenz and the phenomenological return to original experience.

[III. Philosophies of Life] How does such a preconception fit into the current plethora of philosophies of life, which have been the target of critique by a book just published by Heinrich Rickert?6 This critique of the notoriously vague and typically ambiguous concepts of life invokes a call for more rigor in the forma-

tion of concepts from the vantage point of a formally unimpeachable ideal of philosophical knowledge. But how are philosophical concepts formed and how are they invested with structure, and what is the basic intent of conceptual explication in philosophy? Rickert, who has done excellent work in reading off the structural characteristics of concepts formed in the particular sciences, says nothing about the how of concept-formation. In rightly emphasizing the importance of concept-formation, he still neglects the method and means of concept-formation offered by his prize student, Emil Lask, with regard to “differentiating the meaning of forms” from the “matter” [of life experience]. How is this material there for us, how do we already “have” it [in a pre-having!], and what does gaining access to it involve? How is the conceptualization of the material, which is motivated by this having of the material and access to it, conditioned by the very material to which it owes its orientation and in which it remains involved?

It is in this context of concept formation that the positive tendencies of a philosophy of life must be investigated, especially at its summit in Dilthey’s Lebensphilosophie, to which all that follow are indebted for all that is decisive, even while these lesser offshoots misunderstood his proper intuitions, which also to him were often barely perceptible. [In brief summary, Dilthey advocated a return from thought to the facticity of life itself, which already understands itself as a whole and so, in the course of living, already spontaneously “interprets,” i.e., articulates and contextures itself, repeatedly unfolding into the manifold of vitally concrete and meaningful relations which constitute the fabric of human concerns that we call our historical world; ergo a “hermeneutics of facticity.”] We must therefore ask whether a radical trend in philosophizing is not in fact initiated here, though this may have been hidden even to itself and is expressed in a language borrowed from the tradition rather than in creative original terms. The exposition of this radical trend in philosophizing is in fact the moving force and positive aim of this entire critique. Accordingly, it is important to see that the philosophy of life, which in fact developed out of a proper orientation to our Geistesgeschichte, tends (expressly or tacitly) in the direction of the phenomenon of existence.

This direction already indicates the positive character of philosophy of life,

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7. Lask’s “principle of the material determination of form,” which Heidegger makes central in his Scotus dissertation (chapter 8), is thus a quasi-scholastic hylomorphic formulation of the call to return to original life experience, which for the neo-Kantian Lask first articulates itself into the domains of thinking, willing, and feeling, or the scientific, ethical, and aesthetic life governed by the transcendentals of the true, good, and beautiful. For Heidegger’s application of Lask’s material “logic of philosophy” to his own work, see chap. 4, 6, and 8 of this collection and Kisiel, Genesis, chap. 1. The problem of philosophical concept formation has already been raised in connection with the “method” of formal indication, where Heidegger already makes the bold claim that all philosophical concepts are formally indicative concepts.
which can be developed further by defining the initially “vague” concept of life, further muddled by competing philosophical interests, in two of its main albeit still ambiguous directions of sense. In fact, the word “life” should be left ambiguous, so that it can indicate the different phenomena intended by it. We can therefore sort out two directions of sense of the term “life” that have by and large shaped its meaning and served to express its tendency toward the phenomenon of existence:

1. Life as objectifying in the broadest sense, as an act of creative formation and achievement, as an act of going out of itself and thus unclearly intended as something like our “being there” ["Da sein"] in this life and as this life.

2. Life as living experience [Erleben], as undergoing an experience [Erleben], apprehending, learning, appropriating, and thus obscurely linked with something like our “being there” in such experiencing.

The first direction is in fact associated with the current neo-Kantian philosophy of culture and culminates in the problem of absolute validation, i.e., the problem of the a priori. The second direction comes from philosophy of life proper and culminates in the problem of the purported irrationality and ineffability of living experience. The two directions appear to be operative in Jaspers’s preconception of life as at once the infinite whole of life and infinite process of life, encompassing realm and flowing stream. But Jaspers’s basic attitude of “sheer observation” suggests a theoretical apprehension in which the whole of life is regarded as an objective thing and the process of life an objective medium in which objective events take place and run their course. Even the limit situations are regarded within the context of a subject standing over against an object, hardly a promising starting point to approach the phenomenon of existence in situation.

[IV. Life as Whole and Split, Mystical and Objective] Jaspers’s preconception of life first regards life as an undivided in-finite whole from which all finite form breaks forth and apart into the primal split of a subject standing over against an object. While the undivided whole remains as the underlying reality, all of life now plays itself out within the subject-object split. The splitting asunder now becomes the common experience of life and the “primal psychic phenomenon.” But on oc-

8. Supplements, 82; translation modified. The distinction of these two senses of life in the course of SS 1920 is quite similar except for the concluding “being there” being replaced by “being and existing and intensifying it [i.e., such living]” (GA 59, 18/13). (Heidegger’s “method” for intensifying life will come through urging human beings to face up to life’s limit situations, which are inherently charged with anxious concern). Furthermore in SS 1920, the first direction is associated with the then current neo-Kantian philosophy of culture and culminating in the problem of absolute validation, i.e., the problem of the a priori, and the second direction with philosophy of life proper and culminating in the problem of the irrational, i.e., the ineffability of living experience.
occasion, there are experiences where the subject-object split either has not yet appeared or has been lifted (392/444). “Where an object no longer stands over against us, where all content is lacking and there is nothing that can be spoken about and it is unsayable, and yet something is still experienced, here we speak of the mystical in the broadest possible sense” (19/21). This unified unbroken whole, this ultimate supra-oppositional harmony muting all interruption and overcoming destruction, which encompasses all of life, is Jaspers’s guiding idea of life itself. What motivates his preconception is the basic experience that keeps the whole of life in view as an idea (perhaps even as an Idea in the Kantian sense). It can be regarded as a “basic aesthetic experience.” This means that the proper relational sense of the primary experience in which the object “life” is pregiven involves “looking at” [Anschauen] something and be-holding [Be-trachten] it, contemplating it. If it is taken to be theoretical apprehension, then it is the theorein of the theatre. Even more, the fundamentally aesthetic experience that comes with pure be-holding finds its climax in the mystical absorption in the supra-oppositional harmony of the undivided dynamic whole of life.

But a more mundane theoretical observational attitude rules on the level of the finite parts that issue from this ineffable whole of infinite process. Of particular interest here is the subject side of the split, where life itself is individualized in a multiplicity of phenomenal directions and the subject is characterized as the soul or psyche, the psychophysical individual, the ego, living experience, personality, etc. The whole of life on both subjective and objective sides is divided into objective regions which sustain Jaspers’s penchant for the classification, say, of mental types and worldviews.

Enough has been said to attempt a first adjudication [Dijudikation]9 of Jaspers’s preconception of life, to “adjudge” to what degree it provides the motivational fundamentals that can approach the originary experience of be-ing formally

9. The methodological issue of a phenomenological Dijudikation of the preconception is interjected into the context of the interlinked “methods” of “critical destruction” and “formal indication” only in the course of SS 1920 entitled “Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression: Theory of Philosophical Concept-Formation.” “Phenomenological adjudication” of the presuppositions regarding original experience is applied in SS 1920 to the preconceptions of Natorp, Dilthey, and Jaspers in order to “adjudge” whether their preconceptions were ursprungsnah oder ursprungsfern, i.e., how closely (or remotely) their philosophical starting points approach the originary experience of be-ing, “life in and for itself in the eidos, in its understanding evidence and evident understanding” (GA 56/57, 126/107), which constitutes the “phenomenological criterion” for the adjudication, for the “de-cision regarding the genealogical position of the meaningful context being judged when viewed from the origin” (GA 59, 74/57, emphasis added; see also 75/57, 79/60, 84/64, 190/146). Phenomenological adjudication is thus situated at the juncture between the interlinked “methods” of critical deconstruction down to the originary experience of be-ing and the reconstruction of its “prestruction” by way of a formally indicative hermeneutics.
indicated in the phenomenon of existence as the sense of be-ing of the “I am.” The full sense of any phenomenon encompasses the interrelated intentional characters of relation, content, and actualization. These three characters of the sense of any phenomenon only get their sense directly from a tightly unified and integrated structural nexus of interrelations that varies in each case [jeweils] according to its various levels and directions of experience. This structural context and the shifts in sense that occur in it are to be understood as the proper dimension that manifests itself in the phenomenological articulation of these interrelated characters of sense. This proper dimension is itself in turn to be understood precisely as the prestruction of one's own existence, which is actualized in self-appropriation in the self's temporally individuated [jeweiligen] facticity of life. The prestruction of one's own existence in turn discloses and holds open the historically concrete horizon of expectations fraught with anxious concern [Bekümmerung] that each particular context of actualization as such develops.

The existing self caught up in a temporal context fraught with anxious concern is the most obvious indication of how far removed Jaspers's preconception is from the originary experience of the “I am!” Its ultimate experience is instead the aesthetic attitude of contemplating the whole as a harmonious unity of life. The viewpoint at the remotion of infinity of the detached spectator contrasts sharply with the temporally particular self-appropriating herself in her very own temporally individualized context of sense. Other contrasts will develop as we explore the formal indication of existence more deeply.

[Excursus: What Is the “Underlying Reality” of Life?] For Jaspers, the life of the spirit is normally experienced as a broken whole within the subject-object split, but it can at times be experienced in its ever underlying reality as an infinitely flowing and undivided whole in a mystical union which, as experienced, remains inexpressible. In contrast to this amorphous underlying whole of life, Heidegger has here just introduced the phenomenologically formal “underlying reality” that gives full sense to any phenomenon, namely, the prestructuration of individual existence into an intentional relation, the intentional content held within this relation, and the intentional actualization that fulfills this relation and brings it to its own fully temporalized sense. This triple-sensed intentional prestruction is phenomenology's preconception of the context of actualization of the always temporally individuated factic life in its historically concrete horizon of expectations and concern. It is capable of clarifying—which Jaspers does not do—the concrete limit situations in terms of their meaningful motivations and tendencies and thus provide a vectorial analysis of their full sense of actualization in each temporally particular instantiation. What stands out here is the vast difference between the intentional prestructuration that phenomenology takes to be the “underlying reality” of factic life and the infinitely flowing and undivided whole of life that Jaspers takes it to be.
Taking life to be basically a flowing stream inevitably raises the problem of how to conceptualize it, how to “grasp” it in prehensile concepts [Be-griffe] without “stilling the stream” and destroying its very essence as an ongoing process [compare Na-torp’s objections to phenomenology in note 2]. Then there is the classical saying that *individuum est ineffabile* (the individual is inexpressible). Both lines of argumentation take their starting point from an external observation of the “life-stream” or the “individual,” a sense of theoretical apprehension that is starkly objective and inescapably reifying, and a Bergsonian sense of language as spatializing and oriented toward technical domination, and so apt to misconstrue and distort the vital impetus of life. What needs to be done is not so much to “capture” or “catch” these actualities but rather to enter into these actualities as they actualize their proper sense and articulate themselves, from which the appropriate language of articulation follows. One comes to the sense of the be-ing of the “I am” not by theoretically intending it, but by actualizing the “am” in its unique context on its way to be-ing its “I.” This is what the phenomenological framework of a triple-sensed intentionality that actualizes a phenomenon to its full temporalization is intended to do. The “con-cepts” [Heidegger here prefers to speak of Vor-griffe und Rück-griffe] follow from this actualization and the “individual” is no longer ineffable but articulated in its unique context. Formal indication in this way proves to be a “method” of philosophical concept formation.

[V. Another Formal Indication of Existence] The objectifying approach to the realm of life and the basic bearing of Jaspers’s preconception (the aesthetic attitude toward this realm) are proving to be approaches that bypass or simply miss the phenomenon of existence. One would expect the same results from the objective approach that starts from the fact that existence is a determination of being and then proceeds to sort out the different senses of “is” in order to divide them into regions of being and establish an objective system of classification therein. As in the above adjudication, the contrast of such a misguided “regional” approach to being from that of the formal indication of existence as the sense of being of the “I am” is quite telling. For a regional determination of the “I” simply suppresses the sense of the “am” and turns the “I” into an object that can be fixed and classified by putting it into a region.

This “am” is truly had not in a theoretical intention, but in the very actualizing of the “am,” in the way of be-ing that properly belongs to the “I.” The very be-ing of this self signifies existence in a formally indicative way. It indicates the source out of which the sense of existence, as the particular how of the self or the I, must be drawn. What is decisive here is the fact that I *have myself* [in a fore-having!], which is the basic experience in which I encounter myself as a self, so that I, *living in this experience and responding to its temporally individuated sense, can ask* about the sense of my own “I am.” “Having-myself” is ambiguous in many ways, and this multiplicity of sense
must be made comprehensible not by way of systematically regionalized contexts of
generic classification, but rather in specifically historical contexts. In the archontic
sense of the properly actualized basic experience of the “I am,” an experience that prop-
erly concerns just me myself purely and radically, we find that this experience does not
experience the “I” as standing in a region, as an individuation of a “universal,” as an in-
stance of a genus. Rather, this experience experiences the “I” in its proper sense as a
self [as I myself; you yourself; we ourselves, je nach dem]. The sheer persistence of the ac-
tualizing that brings this experience to complete fulfillment experientially demonstr-
ates how foreign any region or objective realm is to the I. 10

We must therefore remove ourselves from this realm of objective experiences
oriented toward the acquisition of theoretical and scientific knowledge and back-
track to a more original sense of be-ing. This backtrack passes through an inter-
mediate realm of non-theoretical “objectivity” of things and matters of importance
[Bedeutsames] to us in our experience of the environing world, the with-world,
and even the self-world. In factic life, I simply cope with what is important in my
world in one way or another, and this “coping with” [Umgehen mit = “getting by
with”] as a whole is correlated with its own sense of [practical] objectivity that can
be apprehended phenomenologically. But the sense of Existenz must be traced
back to a deeper origin and more genuine basic experience (of limit situations)
than the realm of practically coping with matters of importance and the realm of
objectifying experience specifically for the sake of knowledge. Instead, the sense of
existence is to be drawn from the basic experience [motivated by limit situations]
of “having oneself anxiously.” Such a having is actualized before any knowledge
about it, which comes later by way of objectifying its “is,” which knowledge is in
fact irrelevant to the actualization of the “I am!?” Pre-cognitive, pre-theoretical, at
times even pre-worldly, poised at the extremities of existence [Heidegger will soon
put it at the level of the proto-practical, where it is actualized by the proto-action
of letting be].

[VI. The Historical I: Actualizing its Full Facticity] “The I here is to be under-
stood as the full, concrete, historically factic self that is accessible in its historically
concrete experience of itself.” 11 And the full concretion of the historical self that I
have properly extends back into the past of the “I” which is experienced historically
within a horizon of expectations running ahead of itself, where the “I” has itself
in both a “selfly” and a historical way. The phenomenological explication of how
this actualization of experience accords with its fundamentally historical sense is
the most crucial task in the entire complex of problems pertaining to the phe-
nomena of existence. In order to meet this task, we must first come to regard ex-

10. Supplements, 92, translation modified.
11. Supplements, 93.
lication as the actualizing of an interpretation and the explicata of our task as essentially hermeneutical concepts, which become accessible only in a constant renewal of interpretation that time and again begins anew [in the historical change of generations in a community of language]. For this actualization of our historical self does not take place just once or “once and for all” in a momentary and isolated way, but rather again and again in a constant renewal of concern that is necessarily motivated by the historically driven concern for the self as such.

“According to the how of its own actualization, factic life experience is an essentially historical phenomenon.”12 It is however not primarily a phenomenon of objective history. Factic life experience is rather a phenomenon of actualization history that always experiences itself as historical in that actualization. This experiential context which, in accord with its sense of relation, is historically directed to its self, also has a historical character in accord with its sense of actualization. The “historical” is thus both the irreplaceable content and the how of the self’s anxious concern for itself. The phenomenon of Existence thereby discloses itself only in a radically historical and essentially concerned manner of actualizing experience. “Because we are actually unable to see the phenomena of existence today, we no longer experience the meaning of conscience and sense of responsibility that reside in the historical itself. For the historical is not merely something of which we have knowledge and about which we write books, objective history.”13 Rather, we ourselves ARE the historical that we ourselves bear as a responsibility.

[VII. Present Tasks of Phenomenology] With Husserl’s Logical Investigations, the movement of phenomenology was launched with the particular aim of appropriating the phenomena of theoretical experience and knowledge anew and originally within the larger research goal of securing an undistorted seeing of the sense of the objects experienced in such theoretical experiences as well as a sense of how these objects get experienced. But a radical understanding of the philosophical sense of phenomenology’s innermost tendency is not to be found by proceeding analogously from the theoretical to other domains of lived experience [Erlebnis]. We must rather see that experiencing [Erfahren] at its fullest takes place in its properly factic context of actualization in the historically existing self. And this self is somehow the ultimate issue of philosophy. The concrete self is to be taken into our approach to the problems of existence and brought to “givenness,” or better, actualized, at the properly fundamental level of phenomenological interpretation, at the level of the factic life experience as such. It should be evident that the proper phenomenon of existence calls for the actualization of access to its self in a way that is peculiar to itself. The phenomenon of existence is had only within a par-

ticular how of experiencing itself; and this how has to be attained in a particular way. “It is precisely this how of appropriation and indeed the how of our approach to the actualizing of such a self-appropriation that proves to be [‘methodologically’] decisive.”

“That our factic, i.e., historically actualizing life is already at work within how we factically approach the problem of how the self, in being anxiously concerned about itself, appropriates itself—this is something that belongs originally to the very sense of the factic ‘I am.’”

The question of how we should actualize our approach and access to ourselves will without reprieve be party to our approach to the central task of explicating existence. And the question of the how is the question of method, to be sure not the theoretical methods of objectifying, ordering, classifying and regionalizing much discussed above. “Method,” as the how of actualizing one’s self-appropriation in a way that precedes any theorizing, is rather the interpretive, historically actualizing explication of the concrete modes of fundamental experience in which I have myself factically in anxious concern, i.e., of the limit situations of existence.

Two major tasks of self-clarification of its philosophical sense confront phenomenology today:

1) To what extent does the basic phenomenological attitude preserve the most radical origin of sense arising from its problem of existence? To what extent does it overtly preserve the decisive orientation of anxious concern that essentially pervades all of its questions?

2) To what extent does “history” get appropriated here such that it is understood as more than a mere discipline of philosophy? To what extent is it understood that the historical in its very sense is originally already there intrinsically within the philosophical problematic? From such an understanding, it follows that the problems that have currently arisen from the sometimes sharp distinction between the historical and systematic approaches to philosophy are at their roots pseudo-problems.

[VIII. Summary Remarks: Jaspers’s Deficiencies in Method] Jaspers’s preconception has proven to be inappropriate in its approach to the phenomenon of existence, inasmuch as existence, when it is regarded as concrete life, is placed under observation and life is assumed to be a whole with essentially regional characteristics. One then ultimately looks at this whole aesthetically, as a harmonious unity of life, all the while remaining unconcerned about one’s own existence being lived in its anxiety-ridden self-world. This basic aesthetic attitude does not allow the self’s anxious concern for itself to assert its predominant role in guiding and defining all the problems of existence in their objectivity and their explication. Thus, in

the end, Jaspers’s preconception actually runs counter to the tendency toward existence that is nevertheless still operative within it. Its orientation toward regions simply cuts us off from the phenomenon of existence, which in its very sense cannot be conceived and classified as a region.

Jaspers characterizes his methodological bearing as pure observation. And its object? “The object of all observation is simply that which is there for us so far in human experience. All observation has the tendency to take this as the whole” (329/372). But how do we attain what is there for us so far, up until now? That which is there for us so far in available and knowable life is always “there” [“da”] in various ways of understanding and conceptual apprehension that have in fact brought about this “being there” [“Dasein”]. After taking up what is given in this kind of interpretive understanding of life, and adopting it as that which is really there for us, Jaspers then proceeds to organize and classify it within the particular context of understanding in which he operates. If the observation of the phenomena of life merely looks around at “what is there,” is it at all capable of taking a single step forward without taking what is there in one or another historical context of understanding? For the observation of the phenomena of life is inescapably historical, and consequently must be interpretation out of particular historical contexts. It is “historical” not merely in the superficial sense of being relevant only for a particular age but also, in accord with the unique way in which the “observation” is actualized, because its object is essentially historical. The sense of this interpretation has to be clarified before “observation” can regard itself as a method and recommend itself as such.

The fact that we today live from, in, and with history in a very unique way is itself at the very least also something that “is there” for us, if not a main issue of our times. It is precisely this fact of our times that needs to gain currency in the type of “observation” that aims to get at the phenomena of existence, so that it comes to regard this fact as something that it simply must understand. It may well be that phenomena of life (or existence) can themselves become accessible to us only in a “historical” way. We must therefore question whether the objectifying kind of understanding in the discipline of history is at all the most proper and radical way of developing our historical experience in theoretical form. In view of the indivisible continuity of historical phenomena with the problematic of existence, we are instead faced with the problem of finding an alternative method that would interpret our existence in terms of its more original history of actualization.

Jaspers deceives himself if he thinks that pure unadulterated observation provides minimum interference and so the maximum of freedom to his individual readers in making up their minds in the self-examination-of-sense [Selbstbesinnung] of their own existential situation. By depicting his own investigations as sheer observation he only appears to avoid forcing any particular worldviews upon his readers, namely, the ones that he has classified. “But then he repeatedly sug-
gests that his own implicit preconception (life as a whole) and the essential kinds of articulation connected with it are self-evident and non-committal. But it is precisely in the sense of these concepts and how they are articulated and interpreted that everything is in fact decided. Sheer observation does not give us what it wants to give, namely, the possibility of radical reexamination, deciding on our own and, what is synonymous with these, a rigorous consciousness of the methodical necessity of questioning. We can liberate genuine self-examination meaningfully only if it is there to be liberated, and it is there only when it has been rigorously awakened. Moreover, it can be genuinely awakened only if the other is somehow relentlessly driven into reflection [Reflexion], and thereby sees that the appropriation of the objects of philosophy is inseparably bound up with a certain rigor of methodological actualization. All sciences fall short of this kind of rigor, inasmuch as their one demand is the simple demand for objectivity, whereas philosophy’s drive to get to the matters themselves must follow a more involved route, since implicated in its drive and in these matters is the philosophizing individual and (his) notorious misery. He can therefore call something to our attention and compel us to reflect upon it only by taking the lead himself for a stretch of the way, and so ‘be there’ for us.”

Which is also why philosophy cannot remain with the method of pure observation and take the stance of the detached spectator. “In order to have a real impact upon contemporary philosophy, pure observation must evolve into an ‘infinite process’ of radical questioning that always implicates itself in the questioning, and so ‘is there’ in the [angst-driven] question itself.”

16. Supplements, 102, translation modified.
14. Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle:
Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation

This is the most famous version of the Introduction (Einleitung) to a book on Aristotle that Heidegger was planning to write under the title, “Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles,” ever since he taught his course of WS 1921–1922 under that title (the course itself therefore being the first version of the Einleitung, evident from its major themes like “What is Philosophy?” and “The Basic Categories of Life”: see the table of contents of GA 61). The circumstances of its genesis are tied directly to the academic context of Heidegger’s candidacy for a university position at Marburg, which he eventually obtained on the strength of this

The typescript of this introduction (by way of the above subtitle) to a projected book on interpreting Aristotle (with the above title) was first discovered in 1989 in its entirety, i.e., with both the introduction and the supplementary overview of the book, in the Göttingen archive of Josef König by Hans-Ulrich Lessing, who edited it for publication in the very same year: Martin Heidegger, “Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation),” *Dilthey-Jahrbuch* 6 (1989), 235–69, with an editor’s postscript, 270–74. The first English translation followed shortly thereafter: Martin Heidegger, “Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle: Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation,” *Man and World* 25 (1992), 358–93, with a translator’s preface by Michael Baur, 355–57. The editors wish to thank Frithjof Rodi, editor of the *Dilthey-Jahrbuch*, for initial permission to proceed with this project, Kluwer Academic Publishers for permission to republish a portion of the translation in *Man and World* in this volume, and the translator Michael Baur for his cooperation in the early stages of this project. His translation of the “Aristotle-Introduction” (358–76) has been edited especially for this volume by Theodore Kisiel, who has also provided a distilled summary of the overview (377–93) of the projected book. The published translation has been modified by the editor in an attempt to make its tortuous prose more readable, and divided into subsections to make its latent structure more apparent. Unique to this more readable rendition of the “Aristotle-Introduction” is the addition of Heidegger’s 1923 marginal comments to his copy of the 1922 typescript, which serve to supplement the three footnotes that first appeared with the text sent to Paul Natorp in Marburg and Georg Misch in Göttingen in support of Heidegger’s candidacy for positions at these universities.
personal “research report” that merely promises a future publication. In first recommending Heidegger to Natorp at Marburg, Husserl observes that this “highly original personality” is still “struggling, searching for himself and laboriously shaping his own unique style,” and therefore “does not want to publish yet” (letter of February 1, 1922: see appendix II.1 below). Lack of publications became an even more acute issue with Misch’s expression of interest in Heidegger for a position at Göttingen in May 1922, so that plans were initiated for Heidegger to publish his Aristotle Interpretations in the forthcoming issue of Husserl’s *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*. Even so, when Natorp wrote Husserl again in late September for at least a “publishable manuscript” from his prime candidate, Heidegger was still struggling with the problem of how to introduce his “phenomenological interpretations.” For the next three weeks, into mid-October, Heidegger labored over the manuscripts of his two Aristotle courses to extract and distill from them an Introduction serving to found and develop the “hermeneutical situation” in which Aristotle’s works were to be interpreted. The upshot is a closer fusion of two still disparate strands in Heidegger’s phenomenological approach: the “systematic” approach to the structures of the field of factic life experience and the “historical” approach to the conceptual resources available in the philosophical tradition for such a phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity. In the context of Heidegger’s overall development, this concentrated methodological statement of the hermeneutics of the research situation roughly outlines for the very first time the double-pronged program familiar to us in *Being and Time* as 1) a fundamental ontology and 2) a destruction of the history of ontology. On the systematic side, the text first clearly establishes the comprehensive polar space of tension defining the concept formation of the structures of factic life, and takes some significant steps in fleshing out these poles of opposition between the *common* averageness of the “everyone” and the *proper*, unique, one-time-only “having” of my own death (as well as my own life) that particularizes original temporality. On the historical side, the problem of an original retrieve of Western philosophy’s Greek conceptuality begins to get rooted in basic words like ἀλήθεια, λόγος, and φύσις. Of course, the history of philosophy that Heidegger presents in this essay is the history of the Greek-Christian interpretation of life, which will within the next two years be replaced by the metaphysics of constant presence, hints of which are already to be found in the present essay in Heidegger’s remarkably original interpretations of Aristotle’s Greek texts.

To assist the reader in traversing a somewhat daunting text written in the notoriously “refractory” style of this period of Heidegger’s development, the “Aristotle Introduction” has been structured, following the opening tripartite outline of any hermeneutic situation, into the following subdivisions:
1. The Primal Stand of Facticity: What Is Philosophical Research?
   1a. Elements of the Facticity of Life
   1b. The Facticity of Philosophy
2. The Historically Indicated Direction of View
   2a. The Greek-Christian Interpretation of Life
   2b. Specifying the Destructive Direction of View
3. The Range of Vision
4. Interpreting Aristotle Accordingly

Through Being and Time and other texts that postdate this particular “indication of the hermeneutical situation,” one has become accustomed to a tripartite structuration of the interpretive situation in terms of its pre-possession, pre-view, and pre-conception (fore-having, fore-seeing, fore-conceiving). While especially the first and the third of these play a major role in this present account, the striking difference of this analogous structuration of the presuppositional situation of interpretation is the prominence given to the visual dimension of interpretation, perhaps to accommodate itself to Aristotelian texts that are strongly oriented to the Greek “metaphysics of light and sight,” which is carried over into medieval metaphors like the “natural light” of the intellect. But the very first of these dimensions, the “initial stand from which we view,” which is quickly and repeatedly equated with the temporally particular and immediate context of the facticity of one’s own time and generation, at once hints at the situational metaphors of time and place that will eventually offset the visual metaphors by way of a deconstructive regress to situated origins. The hermeneutic principle of temporally and historically distributed contexts whose presuppositions then govern and direct any and every interpretation, the principle of je-weiligkeit (“to each Dasein its particular while”), is invoked early and often throughout this Introduction to interpreting Aristotle here and now, in and for our present situation. It is incumbent on each “time” and generation of philosophers to appropriate its own past (i.e., the history of philosophy) through radical interrogation out of the hermeneutical situation of its own living present by first making its temporally particularized presuppositional structure as transparent as possible. Given the temporal individuation of such inherited structures, accordingly, each time must perform this hermeneutic task on its own and for itself, and cannot simply borrow the interpretations of another time, nor can it take away from other times the burden and effort of performing their own radically interrogative exegeses of their particular context. This temporal differentiation of hermeneutical situations each according to its time however does not prevent a present time from understanding, appropriating, and in fact “repeating” what a past philosophical inquiry took to be its basic concern and central question in its situation and for its time. But this is not a rote repetition, a simple borrowing of its principles and basic concepts, but
rather an original repetition of these questions and answers which are now understood in our own present situation and for that situation, such that these questions (and not just resolutions) of the past are themselves the subject of a radical critique or “destruction.” For a philosophical past has a future not in its results but in the originality of its interrogative thrust, which can later serve as a model for evoking further and ever more original questions and thus “becomes a present in ever new forms.”

It gradually becomes clear that philosophy’s explication of its temporally particular hermeneutical situation is not merely a preliminary, say, to interpreting Aristotle as a historical fount of philosophy, but is itself philosophy at its most radical, which Heidegger finally identifies as the “phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity [i.e., of factic life].” One’s own temporally particular hermeneutical situation, intercalated as it is with historically inherited tendencies and motivations, is the sole object of philosophical research. The resolute cultivation of this situation in its full propriety “brings the object of philosophy within our sight and grasp,” which is factic life itself, the radically simple matter most worthy of thought. More hermeneutically complexified, it is factic life in the how of its being and speech, in how it has already been addressed and interpreted at any given time in its various intentionally articulated and temporally ripened movements of living and human caring (in Gadamer’s famous one-line synopsis of Dilthey’s central insight, “Life itself interprets itself, lays itself out/Das Leben selbst legt sich aus”). Philosophical research only makes explicit and accentuates the interpretive movement that is already operative in the temporal and historical development of life itself. Heidegger identifies two interrelated counter-movements within life itself whose polar tension defines the temporal range of the proto-practice of factic life. The dominant tendency to fall into the routine of the rote habit of everyday living within the familiar habitat of the common world is countered by a movement toward the limits and ends of a finite lifetime that is uniquely and properly mine (or ours) to live in its full propriety and the urgency of its temporal particularity. Within this polar space of factic life between the common and the proper, Heidegger in this introduction naturally highlights especially the phenomena that become central to Aristotle’s philosophy of (human) life, like the genesis of the theoretical vision from the practical arts, which have their own kind of sight, and the practical wisdom (phronesis) of human decision-making in those extraordinary critical situations that threaten human “well-being.” The polar tension in like fashion distinguishes two distinct attitudes toward the tradition of philosophy: the common attitude of unthinking acceptance of the terms of the tradition as “self-evident” commonplaces, which influences vital hermeneutical matters like the choice of problems and the direction taken by philosophical questioning; and the proper attitude of tracing the inherited conceptuality back to its original sense and provenance in certain basic experiences that have become paradigmatic.
Thus, the deconstructive regress back to uniquely original experiences is designed to loosen the currently accepted prevalent tradition in order to uncover the underlying hidden motives and implicit tendencies that govern the authentic concept formation of that particular tradition.

Out of his hermeneutic situation at that time, Heidegger singles out the Greek-Christian interpretation of life for retrospective historical backtracking back to its roots in the philosophical anthropology of Aristotle, with the suggestion that its onto-logic, its sense of being, is already diverted in its factic historical thrust of radicality by the Parmenidean sense of being as permanent presence. The recognition that Aristotle takes human life as only one being in a more comprehensive field of being and makes it subject to this more comprehensive “archontic” sense of being only reinforces the need to reinterpret the texts of Aristotelian philosophy wherever these betray a latent tendency toward the philosophical problematic of facticity and its more “radical phenomenological anthropology.” For even Aristotle’s archontic sense of being as constant presence proves to be drawn from human practice. Being for Aristotle is not a theoretical object found in an eternal world but basically being as having-been-produced, realized in finished products that are now available for use. Aristotle’s basic word for being, ωσία, is at once the Greek word for household goods and real estate, belongings and possessions, whatever one has [die Habe]. Such a reinterpretation of Aristotle by way of the problem of facticity so central to Heidegger’s hermeneutical situation should eventually identify precisely where and how the Aristotelian conceptuality is incapable of grasping the full temporal and historical contingency of the “motions” of the human situation that a full-fledged phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity wishes to explicate and schematize.

Having introduced his treatise on Aristotle, Heidegger concludes with a detailed “overview” of the planned phenomenological interpretations of select Aristotelian texts deemed to be particularly amenable to his guiding problematic of the radical facticity of the human situation. A distilled summary of this overview of “Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle” follows the translation of the introduction by way of an “Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation.” For further assistance in understanding both these texts of introduction and overview, the reader may wish to consult Kisiel, Genesis, 248–71.
Life will find a way to escape even this critique by a flight into clichés and catchphrases.¹

The following investigations contribute to a history of ontology and logic. As interpretations,² they stand under particular conditions of expository interpreting and understanding. The subject matter that forms the content of any interpretation, that is, the thematic object in the how of its being-interpreted, is capable of speaking appropriately for itself only when its temporally particular [jeweilige] hermeneutical situation (to which every interpretation is relative) is made available with sufficient clarity in its basic outlines. Every interpretation, each according to its particular field of subject matter and cognitive claim, has the following hermeneutical outlines:

1) An initial stand from which to view [Blickstand],³ a concrete site which is more or less expressly appropriated and secured;

2) A direction of view [Blickrichtung] which is motivated by the initial stand and within which the “as-what” and the “toward-which” [das “worauf-
of the interpretation are determined. The object of the interpretation is thereby grasped in advance in the “as-what”, and is explicated in accord with the “toward-which”;

3) A range of vision \( \text{Sichtweite} \) which is demarcated by the initial stand and direction of view, and within which the interpretation’s claim to objectivity operates and applies.

The potential actualization \( \text{Vollzug} \) of interpretation and understanding, as well as the appropriation of the object that grows out of this actualization, are transparent to the degree that the situation (in which and for which an interpretation temporally develops, i.e., temporalizes itself \( \text{sich zeitigt} \)), is illuminated in its outlines according to the three senses mentioned above. The hermeneutics unique to each situation has to develop the transparency of its current situation and bring this hermeneutical transparency into its starting point and approach to interpretation.4

The situation of expository interpretation, of the understanding appropriation of the past, is always the situation of a living present. History itself, the past which is appropriated in understanding, grows in its comprehensibility according to the originality of the decisive choice and outlining of the hermeneutical situation. The past opens itself only in accord with the measure of resoluteness and the capacity of disclosure that a present has available to it. The originality of a philosophical interpretation is determined by the specific surety in which philosophical research adheres to itself and keeps to its tasks. The idea that this research has of itself and of the concreteness of its problematic also already decides its basic bearing toward the history of philosophy. What constitutes the proper objective field of inquiry for the philosophical problematic is determined by the direction of view into which the past cannot but be placed. This directed reading-into the past is not only not contrary to the sense of historical knowing, but is simply the basic condition for getting the past to speak to us at all. All expository interpretations in the field of the history of philosophy, as well as in those other fields which insist (over against the “constructions” of the history of problems) that nothing is being read into their texts, inevitably open themselves to being caught in the act of just such a reading. They only do so without conscious orientation and with conceptual means from the most disparate and uncontrollable sources. This lack of concern

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4. The cultivation of the hermeneutical situation is the \textit{seizing} of the factic “conditions” and “presuppositions” of philosophical research. Authentic presuppositions are not “regrettably” there, so that one is “compelled to concede” them as phenomena of imperfection. Rather, they are to \textit{be lived}, which does not mean to let them go and steer clear of them, but to \textit{seize} them as such, i.e., to plunge into the \textit{historical}. 
over what one “actually does” and lack of awareness of the means thereby employed is misconstrued as a suspension of subjectivity.\textsuperscript{5}

The clarification of the hermeneutical situation for the following interpretations, and thus for the demarcation of their thematic field, grows from the following basic conviction: Philosophical research, in accord with its character of being, is something that a “time”—insofar as it is not concerned with philosophy merely as a matter of cultural formation and education—can never borrow from another time. But philosophical research is also something that will never want to claim to be allowed to, and be able to, take away from future times the burden and trouble [\textit{Bekümmerung} = anxiousness] of radical questioning. Yet this is how philosophical research has understood itself and its sense of what is possible to attain in human existence [\textit{Dasein}]. The possibility that past philosophical research will have an effect upon its future can never be attributed to its results as such, but rather is grounded in the originality of the questioning which in each instance has been achieved and concretely cultivated, through which past research—as a model for evoking problems—can become a present in ever new forms.

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[1. \textit{The Primal Stand of Facticity: What Is Philosophical Research?}] The comprehensive object of philosophical research is human Dasein insofar as it is interrogated in its character of being. This basic direction of philosophical questioning is not externally added and attached to the interrogated object, factic life. It should rather be understood as the explicit grasping of a basic movement of factic life. Factic life is in such a way that in the concrete temporalizing and maturation [\textit{Zeitigung}] of its being it is concerned about its being, even when it goes out of its way to avoid itself. A characteristic of the being of factic life is that it finds itself hard to bear. The most unmistakable manifestation of this is factic life’s tendency to make things easy for itself. In finding itself hard to bear, life is difficult in accord with the basic sense of its being and not merely as an accidental quality. If factic life properly is what it is in being-hard and being-difficult, then the genuinely appropriate way of accessing it and truly preserving it can only be by intentionally making it hard. Philosophical research must fulfill this duty if it does not want to completely miss its object. Every form of making things easy,\textsuperscript{6} any seductive catering to immediate needs, all metaphysical reassurances based on what is primarily just book-learning—all of this leads already in its basic intent to a failure to bring the comprehensive object of philosophy within sight and within grasp, let alone to keep it there.

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5. The insensitivity and carelessness toward one’s own hermeneutical situation, which is therefore often regarded as a confused and haphazardly formed situation, is itself interpreted as a lack of prejudice.

6. Not just \textit{gaping at} ideas that others have thought.
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Philosophy’s own history is thus objectively there in a relevant sense for philosophical research if and only if it provides, not a diversity of curiosities, but rather radically simple matters worthy of thought; i.e., if the history of philosophy does not divert present understanding into merely seeking an expansion of knowledge, but rather forces the present back upon itself in order to magnify its questionability. Especially for a present whose very being is constituted by historical consciousness, anxiety over history and its appropriation calls for a radical understanding of what a particular instance of past philosophical research put forward as its basic anxiety in its situation and for its time. To understand means not simply to recognize established knowledge, but rather to repeat in an original way what was once understood in terms of its own situation and for that situation. Such a radical understanding happens least of all in the borrowing of theorems, propositions, basic concepts, and principles in order to revive and update them in one or another “new” form. When in its concern to understand itself it takes its models from the past, such an understanding will subject these models to the sharpest radical critique and will cultivate them into a potentially fruitful opposition. Factic Dasein always is what it is only as its own Dasein and never as the general Dasein of some universal humanity, whose cultivation would only be an exercise in futility. Critique of history is always only critique of the present. Critique cannot be of the naive opinion that it can calculate for history how it would have taken place, if only . . . Rather, it must focus on the present and see to it that it asks questions in a manner which is in accord with the originality within its own reach. History is negated not because it is “false,” but because it still remains effective in the present and nevertheless can never become a properly appropriated present.

The fixing of the basic historical bearing of interpretation grows out of the explication of the sense of philosophical research. Its comprehensive object was defined in indicative fashion as factic human Dasein as such. The concrete outline of the philosophical problematic is to be drawn from this, its object. In preparation for this end, the specific character of the object, factic life, must be brought out into the

7. “Tradition” is precisely the unhistorical. In it, the past is not there as that which it is, namely, as the other and as the recoil to the present; it is there rather as the present, undecided as to whether this is an average indifferent, ever-same “for the time being” [gleich-gültiges “Zunächst”]. In tradition, there is no appropriated past (neither the hermeneutical situation nor the content of what the past is).

8. One “pursues” history instead of “be-ing” history! One is history not because it is “beautiful,” “spiritually powerful,” “respect for the past,” piety, or testimony of a superior farsightedness that does not naively absolutize itself! Where one “pursues” history, the historical has disappeared!

9. That the past recoils back into existence and ought to show Dasein as such to us at all does not mean that it must be intuited as existence [Existenz]; rather, it must be endured! It is something that forces itself into our Dasein, and our Dasein into decadence [Verfall].
open. This is necessary not only because it is the object of philosophical research, but also because philosophical research itself constitutes a particular how of factic life itself. As such, philosophical research in its very actualization co-temporalizes and thus brings to fruition the temporally particular concrete being of life in itself, and not first by way of some subsequent “application.” The possibility of such a co-temporalizing is grounded in the fact that philosophical research is itself the explicit actualization of a basic movement of factic life and constantly maintains itself within that life.

[1a. Elements of the Facticity of Life] In this indication of the hermeneutical situation, the structures of the comprehensive object, “factic life,” will not be outlined in their full concretion and will not be grasped in their constitutive interrelations. Rather, what is meant by the term “factic life” will be brought into view by enumerating only the most important constitutive elements of facticity. Thus, what is meant by the term “factic life” will be brought into view and made available as the pre-possession \[Vorhabe\] for such concrete investigations.

The confusing plurivocity of the word “life” and its usages should not become grounds for simply getting rid of the word. For then one renounces the possibility of pursuing the various directions of meaning which happen to belong to that word and which alone make it possible to reach the objectivity that is meant in each of its instances. In conjunction with this, one must basically keep in mind that the term ζωή, vita, signifies a basic phenomenon, in which the Greek, the Old Testament, the New Testament-Christian, and the Greek-Christian interpretations of human Dasein are all centered. The plurivocity of the term thus has its roots in the meant object itself. For philosophy, this uncertainty of meaning can only be either an occasion for eliminating the uncertainty, or, if it turns out that the uncertainty is a necessary one grounded in the object, for making it into an expressly appropriated and transparent uncertainty. This focus on plurivocity (πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον: what is said in many ways) is not an empty poking about among isolated word meanings, but rather is the expression of the radical tendency to make the meant objectivity itself accessible and to make available the motive source of its different ways of meaning.

The basic [relational] sense of the movement of factic life is caring \[Sorgen\] (curare).\(^{10}\) Life’s “being-out-toward-something” \[“Aussein auf etwas”\], in which it is directed toward something for which it cares, is such that the “toward-which” \[das Worauf\] of life’s care, the historically particular world at the time, is also there for it. The movement of caring has the character of coping \[Umgang\] with the world with which factic life is interacting. The toward-which of care is the with-

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\(^{10}\) rekuratio [restoration]: the historical! Therein lies the highest safeguarding and preservation of being, placing being into the custody of truth \[Verwahrung\].
which of interactive coping.\textsuperscript{11} The sense of the world’s being-actual and being-there is grounded in and defined by the world’s character as the with-which of care’s coping. The world is there as always already somehow taken into care’s custody. The world is articulated according to the possible directions of care as the world-around [\textit{Umwelt}], world-with [\textit{Mitwelt}], and self-world [\textit{Selbstwelt}]. Correspondingly, caring is the care of livelihood, of profession, of enjoyment, of not being disturbed, of not dying, of being familiar with things and persons, of knowing about them, of securing life in its final goals.

The movement of concern [\textit{Besorgen}] manifests manifold ways of actualization and of being-related to the with-which of interactive coping; tinkering with, preparing for, producing of, guaranteeing by, making use of, utilizing for, taking possession of, safekeeping of, and forfeiting of. The with-which that corresponds to each of these different ways of actualization of routine coping stands in each case within a particular acquaintance and familiarity. Care’s coping has its with-which always within a particular sight. A certain circumspection [\textit{Umsicht}] is always active in coping, serving to guide and develop it temporally. Caring takes the form of looking around, and as circumspect it is at the same time concerned with the cultivation of circumspection, with safeguarding and increasing its familiarity with the objects of coping. In circumspection, the with-which of interactive coping is anticipatorily grasped as . . . , oriented toward . . . , interpreted as . . . . The objects are there as signified in this or that way, so that the world is encountered in the character of significance. The coping that is characterized by caring not only has the possibility of giving up this care of ordering things in the world. In point of fact, on the basis of an original tendency of movement within factic life, it has an inclination to do so. This obstruction of the tendency toward concerned coping turns it into a mere circumspecting that looks around without looking forward to the routine tasks of directing and orienting things in the world. Circumspecting thus becomes inspecting, merely looking at [\textit{Hinschen}]. In the care of inspecting, of curiosity (\textit{cura}, \textit{curiositas}), the world is there not as the with-which of the routinely directed coping, but solely with regard to how it looks, its appearance. Inspecting finds its completion in a defining inspection, and can now organize itself as a science. Science is thus a way of concerned coping with the world by way of inspecting it, a way which itself is temporally developed by factic life. As such a movement of coping, science is itself a way of being of factic life, playing its role in shaping the Dasein of factic life. The particular constellation of ways of looking at the world, i.e., points of view (the determination of the objective contexts of the world with regard to their outward appearance) achieved at any given time coalesces with circumspection and is deeply

\textsuperscript{11} The with-which loses and never assumes the bare schematic character of a stage setting [\textit{Kulisse}] when the character of the being of coping (i.e., coping as factic) is understood (not however as a lived experience).
rooted in it. 12 This circumspecting is actualized in the mode of addressing [Ansprechen] and discussing [Besprechen] the objectivity involved in coping with the world. The world is always encountered in having been addressed in certain ways, in an address (λόγος) that has made a certain claim [Anspruch] on and about it. In releasing itself from its routine tendencies, coping holds up, takes a break, even takes up residence [nimmt einen Aufenthalt]. Inspection itself becomes an autonomous form of coping, and as such it is a kind of dwelling among [Sichauhalten bei] objects in order to define them, as it holds itself back [Sichenthalten] from practical work. The objects are there as significant, and it is only in definitively directed and layered theorizing that what is objective (in the sense of what is simply object-like and thing-like) arises from the world’s factic character of encounter (i.e., from what is already significant). 13

Factic life always moves within a particular interpretedness that has been handed down, or revised, or reworked anew. Circumspection gives to life its world as interpreted according to those respects in which the world is encountered and expected as the comprehensive object of concern, in which the world is put to tasks and made into a refuge. These respects, which are for the most part available in an implicit form, and into which factic life has simply slipped by way of habit [of a habitat!] more than it has expressly appropriated them, prefigure the paths for the movement of caring upon which this movement can actualize itself. The interpretedness of the world is factically also the interpretedness within which life itself stands. Also prefigured in the interpretedness of the world is the direction in which life takes itself into its care. That includes, however, the prefiguration of a definite sense of the Dasein of life (its “as-what” and “how”), within which human beings maintain themselves in their prepossession.

The movement of caring is not a process of life which runs its course on its own over and against the world that is there for it. The world is there in life and for life. 14 But it is not there in the sense of merely being thought and observed. How the world is there, its Dasein, is temporally developed only when factic life pauses,
holds up and takes a break in its movement of concerned coping. This Dasein of the world is what it is only as having grown from a particular pause that was made there. This being-there of the world—as actuality and reality, or even in the objectivity of nature (which is impoverished of all significance)—must for the most part provide the point of departure of the epistemological and ontological problematic. This pause to inspect is, as such, in and for the basic movement of concerned coping.

But the concern is for its own part related to its world not just in general and in its original intentionality. The movement of concern is not an indifferent actualization such that with it in general something only happens in life and life itself were a mere process. There is alive in the movement of caring an inclination of caring toward the world as the propensity [Hang] toward absorption in the world, toward letting oneself be swept along by the world. This propensity of concern is the expression of a basic factic tendency of life, a tendency toward falling away from one’s own self [Abfallen von sich selbst] and thereby toward falling into the world [Verfallen an die Welt], and thus toward the falling apart of oneself [Zerfall seiner selbst]. Let the basic character of this movement of caring be terminologically fixed as factic life’s inclination toward falling or lapsing [Verfallensgeneigtheit], (or, in brief, the falling-into- [das Verfallen an-]).¹⁵ And with this, the sense of direction and the intentional toward-which of the tendency of caring is also indicated. This falling is to be understood, not as an objective event nor as something that simply “happens” in life, but rather as an intentional how. This propensity [Hang] is the innermost fate [Verhängnis] which life factically endures. The how of this endurance in itself (as the way in which this fate “is”) must be approached, along with fate itself, as a constitutive element of facticity.

This character of life’s movement is not an evil quality that surfaces from time to time, a quality which through cultivation could be eliminated in the more progressive and happier times of human culture. This is so little the case that even the projections of human Dasein toward a reachable perfection and natural paradise are themselves only extensions of this very inclination toward lapsing into the world. In closing our eyes to life’s most characteristic movement, we come to see life simply in a worldly way, as world-laden [welthaft], as an object of commerce which through coping can be produced in an ideal form, in short, as the toward-which of plain and simple concern.

The very fact that factic life, in its tendency to lapse, arrives at such a worldly interpretation of itself gives expression to a basic peculiarity of this movement: This movement is tempting¹⁶ for life itself, insofar as it spreads certain possibilities

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¹⁵. The expressly organized degeneration [Verfall] found in “philosophical” exposition as “hardening”: world – culture – “justice.”

¹⁶. The lapsing character-of-being of the anticipatory knowledge that races ahead in haste, by which life allows itself to be drawn!
issuing from the world across life’s way, whereby life idealizes its way to “take it easy” and so to miss itself. As tempting, the tendency to lapse is at the same time tranquilizing, i.e., it detains factic life in the states of its fallenness, such that life considers and carefully cultivates these states as quasi-situations of untroubled security and the most ideal possibilities of action. (In contrast to state [Lage], the situation [Situation] of factic life denotes the stand [Stand] taken by life itself. The seizure of this stand makes its fallen state transparent and, in the concrete troubles and woes of any given time, the possibility of being seized by a movement that counteracts the lapsing of care.) As tranquilizing, the tendency to lapse (which cultivates temptation) is alienating. This means that factic life becomes more and more alien to itself by being absorbed in the world in which it is concerned. And the movement of caring (which is left to itself and appears to itself as life) increasingly takes away from factic life the factic possibility of seeing itself in the counter-state of anxiousness, and thus takes away the possibility of taking itself as the goal of an appropriating return. In its three characters of movement—tempting, tranquilizing, and alienating—the tendency to lapse is the basic movement not only of the orienting productive coping, but also of circumspection itself and of its potential autonomy, of simply inspecting things in an addressing and interpreting which define them cognitively. Factic life takes itself and takes care of itself not only as a significant occurrence which stands before it in the guise of the importance of the world, but also speaks the language of the world whenever it speaks with itself.

Inherent in the inclination toward falling or lapsing is the fact that factic life, which in each instance [je] is properly the factic life of the individual, is mostly not lived as factic life. Factic life moves instead within a particular averageness of caring, of coping, of circumspection, and of apprehending the world. It is the averageness of the general public at any given time, of the social ambience and its prevalent trends of the “just like everyone else,” the crowd. It is this “everyone” that factically lives the individual life. Everyone is concerned about it, everyone sees, judges, enjoys it, everyone does it, asks about it. Factic life gets lived by the “no one,” for which

17. The habit of the ordinary that the tendency to lapse cultivates in itself and for itself as a form of protection and defense.

18. [Handwritten footnote to p. 10, bottom, of the 1922 typescript:] Anxious or troubled concern [Bekümmernung: also distress, trouble, anxiousness, worry] does not mean a mood with a troubled mien, but rather factically being decided to the point of seizing existence (see p. 13 below) itself as the matter of concern. If “caring” is taken as a vox med[slip] (middle voice) (which in itself, as a category of [grammatical] meaning, has its origin in the addressing of facticity), then anxious concern is the care of existence (genitive objective). [Editor’s note: The German sich kümmern perhaps best brings out the middle-voiced character of anxious concern. It means both the active “to trouble oneself” and the passive “to be troubled.”]
all life gives its concern. Life seems always to be somehow stuck in inauthentic tradition and the inertia of habit and custom. Out of these habitualities, there arise needs, and, in these, the ways of fulfilling these needs are pursued in concern. Within the world in which it is absorbed and within the averageness in which it goes about its being, life hides from itself. The tendency to lapse is life’s evasion of itself. Factic life itself provides the most acute testimony of this basic movement in the way in which it comports itself toward death.

Just as factic life in its character of being is not a process, so too death is not a cessation in the sense of a termination of this process someday. Death is something that is imminent for factic life, standing before it as something inevitable. Life is in such a way that its death is always somehow there for it. Its death stands in view there for it, and this is so even if “the thought of death” is shut out and suppressed. Death presents itself as the object of care precisely in the fact that it is encountered in the obstinacy of its imminence as a how of life. The forced lack of anxiety about death in caring about life gets actualized in the flight into world-laden concerns. Looking-away from death, however, is so little a seizing of life in itself that it becomes precisely life’s own evasion of life and an evasion of life’s proper character of being. The having of death as imminent, both in the manner of the concern that takes flight as well as in the manner of the anxiousness that takes hold of death, is constitutive of facticity’s character of being. In the having of certain death (a having that takes hold of it), life becomes visible in itself. Death in this way of being gives to life a kind of sight, and continually brings life before its ownmost present and past, a past that is growing within life itself and comes toward it from behind it.

The attempt is repeatedly made to define the character of the comprehensive object, factic life, and of its being, without including the fundamental character of death and the “having of death” for the start in one’s approach to the problem of life. The initial omission of this guiding element to the entire problematic cannot be corrected by the mere addition of further supplements along the way. The purely constitutive ontological problematic of the character of the being of death which is described here has nothing to do with a metaphysics of immortality and a metaphysics of the “What next?” or “What comes after death?” As a constitutive moment of facticity, the impending death which one has imminently before oneself at the same time makes the present and past of one’s life uniquely visible, so that it is likewise the phenomenon out of which the specific “temporality” of human Dasein can be explicatively highlighted. The basic sense of the historical is defined in terms

19. “Generality” – “universal validity”: that is the logic of the dominion of the “everyone” transposed into philosophy! We get the Platonism of the historical by the same route. “Universal obtrusiveness” makes everyone [jeden] an interpreted Dasein exposed and explicated for everyone!
of this temporality,” and never by a formal analysis of concept-formation within any particular historiography.

The constitutive characters of facticity that have been indicated—caring, the tendency to lapse, the how of the having of death—appear to run counter to what has been emphasized as the basic characteristic of factic life, namely, that it is a being to which, in the manner of its temporalizing, what ultimately matters is its own being. But that only appears to be the case. In all of its “going out of its way,” to avoid itself, life is factically there for its own self. It is precisely in this “away from itself” that life presents itself and pursues its absorption in world-laden concern. Like every movement of factic temporality, “absorption-in” has in itself a more or less explicit and unacknowledged view-back toward the thing from which it flees. The from-which of its fleeing, however, is life itself as the factic possibility of being expressly seized as an object of troubled anxiousness. All coping has its own circumspection. This circumspection brings the with-which of coping (a with-which within the authenticity that is attainable at any given time) into the guiding preview [Vorblick]. The being of life in itself, which is accessible within facticity itself, is of such a kind that it becomes visible and attainable only by way of the detour through the countermovement against lapsing care. This countermovement, as life’s anxiousness about not getting lost, is the way in which the possible and seized being proper to life comes to fruition and temporalizes itself. Let this being, which is accessible in factic life and to factic life as the be-ing of factic life itself, be called “existence” [Existenz]. When it is anxious about its existence, factic life is on a detour. The possibility of seizing and being seized by the being of life in anxiousness is at the same time the possibility of failing existence. Because existence in itself is

20. Temporality—death, the decisive singularity [Einmaligkeit] of the “one-time-only”? This “only once” is the radical “all” of life. Temporality is not equivalent to any sort of quantities or other such successions of “one after the other.” It is rather a matter of existentiell factic leaps. The continuity of the “and so forth” is in each instance [je] at once a leap (προαίρεσις) [decision], at once the how of expecting!

21. Propensity and negation as a basic existential must be put more sharply and truly as a detour across that retains its provenance, i.e., life is, in each of its modes of being, historical; what it “goes through” [passiert], “what it in each case [je] is” moves and is moved in a propensity [Hang], “remains suspended” [bleibt hängen] in it; it is “caught” by, to, and in this “hang” of propensity.

In this now familiar intentionality we only encounter an immediate “first of all” [Zumächst]. In a lapsing looking-at there is a “going along with” “lived experiences,” (inner perception). The primal phenomenon, out of which “intentionality” is a derivative offshoot [Ausladung], [is] still concealed; accessible only in the radical expository interpreting of the full facticity: the basic existential: the “No” = the un-closure [Ent-schluss]; factic = in movement = historical.

22. The seized possibility, existentiell questioning (Am “I”?); is a placing itself of life onto itself “into the void”; “am”—what is the pre-possession of this being?—whence? how
something that life can fail, the possible existence of factic life is basically question-
able. The possibility of existence is always the possibility of concrete facticity as a how of the temporal fruition of this facticity in its temporality. It is impossible to ask in a direct and universal manner what existence may show. Insight into existence itself can be gained only by making facticity questionable, that is, by the concrete destruction of facticity with respect to the motives of its movement, its directions, and its volitional availabilities.\textsuperscript{23}

The countermovement against the tendency to lapse should not be construed as a flight from the world. It is typical of all flight from the world that it does not intend life in its existentiell character. That is, it does not seize life in the question-
ableness that lies at its roots, but rather imaginatively displaces life into a new and tranquilizing world. Anxiousness about existence changes nothing in the factic state of life at the particular time. What is changed is the how of the movement of life, which as such can never become a matter for the general public or for the “everyone.” The concern involved in this coping is a concern that is anxious about its self. For its own part, factic life’s anxiety over its existence is not a brooding over oneself in egocentric reflection. It is what it is only as the countermovement against life’s tendency to lapse, so that it takes place precisely in the concrete movement of coping and of concern. Thus the countering “against” (as the “nor”) attests to an original achievement which is constitutive of being. In view of its constitutive sense, negation has an original primacy over any position. And this is because the character of being of the human being is factically defined by its falling, by its worldly propensity. The sense of this proto-fact itself and the sense of this factuality \([\text{Tatsächlichkeit}]\) as such can only be interpreted—if it can be interpreted at all—in and relative to facticity \([\text{Faktizität}]\) in the excitement of being truly seized by \textit{it}. The actualizing of the insight and of the insightful addressing of life with respect to its existentiell possibility has the character of an anxious interpretation of life in its sense of being. \textit{Facticity and existence do not mean the same thing}. And the factic character of the being of life is not defined by existence. \textit{Existence is only one possibility} which temporally comes to fruition \textit{within the} being of the life which is characterized as \textit{factic}. But this means that it is in facticity that the potentially radical problematic of the being of life is centered.

\textsuperscript{23} Destruction of their interpretedness according to their factitious (existentiell) pre-possession and pre-conception (the what in the how of these).
1b. The Facticity of Philosophy] 1) If philosophy is not a contrived preoccupation that merely accompanies life, busying itself with any “generalities” whatsoever and with arbitrarily concocted principles; if instead philosophy is a questioning knowledge, i.e., research, which is simply the genuine and explicit actualization of the tendency to interpret and explicate that belongs to life’s own basic movements (movements in which life is concerned about [geht um] itself and its own being);

2) and secondly, if philosophy is bent upon viewing and grasping factic life in the decisive possibilities of its being; i.e., if philosophy has decided radically and clearly on its own (without the distractions of any busywork with worldviews) to make factic life speak for itself on the basis of its very own factic possibilities; i.e., if philosophy is fundamentally atheistic and understands this about itself;

—then it has decisively chosen factic life in its facticity and has made this facticity into its very own comprehensive object and subject matter. The how of philosophy’s research is the interpretation of this sense of being in terms of its basic categorial structures, i.e., the ways in which factic life temporalizes itself and speaks with itself in such a temporalizing development (κατηγορεῖν). Philosophical research does not need the finery of worldviews or the overzealous concern over not coming onto the scene too late for the entanglements of the present in which one still seeks to keep current. This is so, as long as philosophy has understood, on the basis of the object that has seized it, that what this object has entrusted to it as its topic of inquiry constitutes the original ontological conditions of the possibility of any worldview, which can be made evident only in the rigor of its research. These conditions are not “logical forms”; categorically understood, they are already the possibilities of the factic temporalizing of existence which are now grasped in their true availability.

The problematic of philosophy has to do with the being of factic life. In this

24. [Footnote to the original 1922 typescript:] “Atheistic” not in the sense of a theory like materialism and similar “isms.” Any philosophy that understands itself in what it is, as the factic How of the expository interpretation of life itself, must know, precisely while it thereby still has a “presentiment” of God, that the wrenching return of life back to itself that it forces through is, in religious terms, to raise one’s hand against God. But only then does philosophy assume an honest stand before God, in accord with the possibility that is as such available to it. “Atheistic” here means staying clear of the seductive activity concerned solely with arguing glibly about religiosity. In this context, is not the very idea of a philosophy of religion sheer nonsense, particularly if it does not take the facticity of the human being into account?

25. The sense of how being itself temporally develops [Seinszeitigung] these categories of “speaking”: Speaking is an ἀληθεύειν, giving the world, i.e., guiding caring, temporalizing concern, i.e., the be-ing of [human] life; speaking as an implicit (unaccentuated) speaking with itself of the world’s life in particular ways of discussing the world; all that is called “fundamental” [Prinzipielle] in this field; questions of order, of priority, of rank, of the universal and general.
regard, philosophy is fundamental ontology [prinzipielle Ontologie], such that the particular specialized regional ontologies of the world receive the ground and sense of their own problems from the ontology of facticity. The problematic of philosophy has to do with the being of factic life in the how of its being-addressed and being-interpreted at any given time. This means that philosophy, as the ontology of facticity, is at the same time the categorial interpretation of the addressing and explicating [of being]; that is, it is logic.

Ontology and logic are to be returned to their unity of origin in the problematic of facticity and are to be understood as the derivatives of principled research; this principled research can be described as the phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity.

Philosophical research has to render the ever concrete interpretive expositions of factic life (i.e., the interpretations of the circumspection of caring and of the insights of anxious travail) categorially transparent in their factic unity in the temporalizing development of life: It has to render these interpretations transparent with regard to their pre-possession (basic sense of being into which life has placed itself) and in relation to their pre-conception (ways of addressing and discussing in which factic life speaks to itself and with itself.) The hermeneutics is phenomenological; this means that its object-field, factic life with respect to the how of its being and its speaking, is seen thematically and methodologically as a phenomenon. The structure of the object, a structure which characterizes something as a phenomenon, i.e., full intentionality (being-related-to, the toward-which of the relating as such, the actualization of the relating-itself-to, the temporalizing development of the actualization, the truthful safekeeping [Verwahrung] of the temporalizing) is none other than the structure of an object having the character of the being of factic life. Intentionality, taken simply as being-related-to, is the first phenomenal character of the basic movement of life (i.e., of caring) that can be brought into relief immediately. Phenomenology is itself radical philosophical research, just as it

26. [Ontology and logic as] factic and historical derivatives [Ausladungen] and not a genuinely radical expression [Ausformung] of the originally posed central problem.—Detached, fallen, and traditionally transmitted modes of approach and questioning; detached ways, especially logic, with its “seemingly” radical questioning.

27. Purely indicative! Without direction from the problematic of facticity.

28. “Intentionality”: the specifically formalized character of the being of coping is to be taken out of the “psychological” or “consciousness”-theoretical, “experience”-theoretical prepossession! Already in Logical Investigations, Fifth Investigation; later, certainly still genuine, but a degenerate formal field of objects in blind explication.

[Editor’s note: it should be noted that intentionality in 1922 is still explicitly formalized in terms of at least four interrelated and thus integrated “senses”: the relational, held content (“the toward-which of the relating”), actualizing, and temporalizing sense. Unique to this 1922 essay is the addition of perhaps a fifth conservative sense, that of taking custody of the truth attained in order to maintain and preserve it in the habitual act of “truthful
was in its first breakthrough in Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*. One has not grasped phenomenology in its most central motives if one sees in it (as is sometimes the case within phenomenological research itself) only a philosophical pre-science for the purpose of preparing clear concepts with whose help alone some *authentic* philosophy is then supposed to be set in motion—as if one could descriptively clarify basic philosophical concepts without the central and always newly appropriated basic orientation towards the comprehensive object of the philosophical problematic itself.

[2. *The Historically Indicated Direction of View*] With this account of facticity we have indicated the initial stand from which we view that the following interpretations, as phenomenological and as investigations into the history of ontology and logic, will assume. The idea of the phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity includes within it the tasks of: formal and material logic and a theory of their objects; the theory of science; the “logic of philosophy”; the “logic of the heart,” the logic of “pretheoretical and practical” thought; and it includes these within itself, not as some unifying collective concept, but rather according to its own operative force as the principled approach of the philosophical problematic.

But we have still not come to understand what historical investigations are supposed to do for such a hermeneutics, and just why *Aristotle* is to be the focus of the investigation, and just why the investigation is to be carried out. The motivations for the particular directions of view emerge from the concrete setting of the initial stand from which we view. The very idea of facticity implies that only *authentic and proper* [eigentliche] facticity—understood in the literal sense of the word: one’s own [eigene] facticity—that is, the facticity of one’s own time and generation, is the genuine object of research. Because of its tendency to lapse, factic life lives for the most part in what is inauthentic, i.e., improper, in what has been handed down to it, in what has been reported to it, in what it appropriates in averageness. Even that which has been developed originally as an authentic possession lapses into averageness and publicness. It loses the specific sense of its provenance out of its original situation and “free floats” its way into the ordinariness of the “everyone.” This lapse of decadence affects all of factic life’s coping and circumspection, and not least of all its own actualizing of interpretation according to its pre-possession and pre-conception. Philosophy, in the way it asks questions and finds answers, also stands within this movement of facticity, since philosophy itself is simply the explicit exposition and interpretation of factic life.

safekeeping” (*Verwahrung*). But note its close connection to the fourth sense of temporalization (*Zeitigung*), a term closely associated with a vintner’s careful and patient cultivation of plants from young seedling through to its ripening into the full fruition of the mature grape, and further: “We shall have no wine before its time.”]
Accordingly, the philosophical hermeneutics of facticity necessarily makes its own beginning within its factic situation, and it does so within an already given interpretedness of factic life which first sustains the philosophical hermeneutics itself and which can never be completely eradicated. According to what has been said about the tendency toward falling which affects every interpretation, it follows that precisely “what is self-evident” about this interpretedness (what is not discussed in it, what is assumed not to require any further clarification) will be that which in-authentically (i.e., without explicit appropriation on the basis of its origins) exercises the dominating power to influence such hermeneutical matters as the choice of the problems and the direction of the questioning.

The addressing and interpreting of itself that is actualized by factic life itself receive their ways of seeing and speaking from the already given objects of the world. Where human life, Dasein, the human being, is the comprehensive object of an interpretive questioning, this objectivity stands within our pre-possession as a worldly occurrence, as “nature” \(^{29}\) (the psychical is understood as nature, as is spirit and life by way of an analogous categorial articulation). Our intellectual history still motivates us today to speak of the “nature” of the human being, of the soul, and in general of the “nature of the thing,” and also to discuss this kind of objectivity categorically, i.e., in categories which derive from a particular kind of explication, from a particular way of looking at “nature.” Even when the objects are, in principle, no longer approached as “substances” in a crude sense (an approach, by the way, from which Aristotle was further removed than is commonly taught) and when the objects are not investigated for their occult qualities, the interpretation of life nevertheless moves within basic concepts, interrogative approaches, and tendencies of explication which have arisen from experiences of objects, experiences which we today no longer have—and for quite some time have not had—available to us.

For the most part today, philosophy operates inauthentically within the Greek conceptuality, which itself has been pervaded by a chain of diverse interpretations. The basic concepts have lost their original functions of expression, functions which were specially tailored to fit regions of objects experienced in a particular way. But for all the analogizing and formalizing which these basic concepts have undergone, some mark of their provenance still remains. These basic concepts still bear within themselves a part of the genuine tradition of their original sense, such that their direction of meaning can be traced back to their objective source. By beginning with the idea of the human being, the ideals of life, and representation of the being of human life, philosophy today moves within ramifications of basic experiences which have been temporally developed in Greek ethics and above all in the Christian idea of the human being and of human Dasein. Even anti-Greek and anti-Christian tendencies remain fundamentally within the same directions of viewing

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29. But not yet in the modern \textit{theoretical} giving-of-sense \([\text{Sinngebung}]\).
and ways of interpreting. Thus the phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity sees itself called upon to loosen up today's prevalent traditional interpretation in its hidden motives, its unexpressed tendencies and ways of interpreting and, by way of a deconstructive regress [abbauender Rückgang], to press toward the original motive sources of the explication. The phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity thus sees itself summoned to such a radical exposition in order to assist the contemporary situation along the path toward a radical possibility of appropriation (and this by way of calling its attention to the concrete categories that are being provided to this end). Hermeneutics carries out its task only on the path of destruction. So long as it has understood the kind of objectivity and being which belongs to its thematic toward-which (the facticity of life), philosophical research is “historical” knowing in the radical sense of that term. For philosophical research, the destructive contestation [Auseinandersetzung] of philosophy's history is not merely a supplement for the purposes of illustrating how things were earlier, an occasional overview of what others “did” earlier, or an opportunity for outlining entertaining perspectives in world history. The destruction is rather the authentic path upon which the present must encounter itself in its own basic movements, and it must encounter itself in such a way that what springs forth for the present from its history is the continual question: to what extent is it (the present) itself truly worried about appropriating radical possibilities from basic experiences and their interpretations? The tendencies towards a radical logic of origins and the approaches to ontologies thereby get a principal critical elucidation. Here the critique which already arises simply by way of the concrete actualization of the destruction is thereby focused not on the bare fact that we stand within a tradition, but applies rather to the how of our standing there. What we do not interpret and express originally is also what we do not have in proper safekeeping. It is factic life itself (and that means at the same time the possibility of existence that lies in factic life) which is to be brought into a temporalizing safekeeping. If this life renounces the originality of interpretation, it relinquishes the possibility of coming into possession of itself at its roots, i.e., the possibility to be itself in radicality.

[2a. The Greek-Christian Interpretation of Life] The complexity of the decisive constitutive forces operative in the character of the being of today's situation will, in view of the problem of facticity, be characterized briefly as the Greek-Christian interpretation of life. The anti-Greek and anti-Christian tendencies of interpretation (which are determined by and so relative to the Greek-Christian interpretation of life) are also included in this characterization. The idea of the human being and of human Dasein which is set within such an interpretation defines the philosophical anthropology of Kant as well as that of German Idealism. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel come from theology and receive from it the basic impulses of their speculation. This theology is rooted in Reformation theology,
which succeeded to only a very small extent in achieving a genuine explication of Luther’s new basic religious position and its immanent possibilities. For its own part, this basic position itself grew out of Luther’s interpretations of Paul and of Augustine, whom Luther adopted in an original manner, and from his concurrent confrontation of the theology of late Scholasticism (Duns Scotus, Ockham, Gabriel Biel, Gregory of Rimini).

The doctrines of late Scholasticism concerning God, the Trinity, the original state \[\text{Urstand}\] of humanity before the Fall, sin, and grace all operate with the conceptual means that Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure provided for theology. But that means that the idea of the human being and of the Dasein of life, which is set in advance for all of the above domains of theological problems, is based upon an Aristotelian “physics,” “psychology,” “ethics,” and “ontology,” in which Aristotle’s basic teachings are treated in a particularly selective way and restrictive interpretation. At the same time, Augustine is also crucially influential and, through him, Neoplatonism. And through Neoplatonism, Aristotle is once again influential, and this to a greater extent than is usually assumed. These connections are more or less familiar to all in the rough textual filiations of literary history. What is completely lacking is a proper interpretation founded centrally in the basic philosophical problematic of facticity outlined above. Research of the Middle Ages in its leading points of view is presently constrained within the schematism of a neo-Scholastic theology and within the framework of an Aristotelianism outlined by this neo-Scholasticism. It is first of all necessary to understand the scientific structure of medieval theology, its exegeses and commentaries, as highly mediated interpretations of life. Theological anthropology must be traced back to its basic philosophical experiences and motives. Only by reference to these can we make sense of the forces of influence and modes of transformation which originated from the basic religious and dogmatic attitude of the time. 30 The hermeneutical structure of commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard (which sustains the authentic development of theology up until Luther) is not only not laid bare as such; the very possibility of questioning and approaching it is lacking. Even those things which entered into Lombard’s Sentences in the form and choice of selections from Augustine, Jerome, and John Damascene are already significant for the development of medieval anthropology. In order to have any standard for these reformulations at all, there is a need for an interpretation of Augustinian anthropology which does not simply excerpt propositions on psychology from his works, in the manner of

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30. [Final footnote to the original 1922 typescript:] The hymnology and music of the Middle Ages, along with its architecture and sculpture, are accessible to intellectual history only on the basis of an original phenomenological interpretation of the philosophical and theological anthropology of this period, which in the medieval social world and its environment is communicated in its sermons and its schools. As long as this anthropology has not been explicitly appropriated, “Gothic man” remains but a cliché for our times.
some textbook on psychology or manual of moral theology. The center of such an interpretation of Augustine with respect to the basic ontological and logical constructions of his life’s teaching should be situated in his writings on the Pelagian controversy and in his teachings on the Church. The idea of the human being and of Dasein which is operative here points back to Greek philosophy, to patristic theology (which is founded upon Greek thinking), to Pauline anthropology, and to the anthropology of John’s Gospel.

[2b. Specifying the Destructive Direction of View] In the context of the task of phenomenological destruction, the important thing is not merely a graphic depiction of the different currents and their relations of dependency. It is rather a matter of bringing out the central ontological and logical structures within each of the decisive turning points of the history of Western anthropology by way of an original return to the sources. This task can be achieved only if a concrete interpretation of Aristotelian philosophy which takes its orientation from the problem of facticity, i.e., from a radical phenomenological anthropology, is made available.

In light of the problem of facticity which constitutes our starting point, Aristotle is only the completion and the concrete refinement of the philosophy that preceded him. At the same time, however, Aristotle in his Physics arrives at a new basic approach to principles from which his ontology and logic grew, which in turn permeated the history of philosophical anthropology that has just been schematically and retrospectively described. The central phenomenon, whose explication is the theme of the Physics, becomes beings in the how of their being-moved.

At the same time, the literary form in which Aristotelian research has been transmitted (treatises in the style of thematic exposition and investigation) offers the only fundament which is suitable for the particular methodical intentions of the following interpretations. It is only by a regress from Aristotle that Parmenides’ doctrine of being can be defined and understood as the crucial step that decided the sense and destiny of Western ontology and logic.

The investigations that aim at carrying out the task of the phenomenological destruction focus especially on late Scholasticism and Luther’s early theological period. Thus this framework also encompasses tasks whose difficulty is not easily overestimated. It is the initial stand from which we view (i.e., the starting point and the exposition of the problem of facticity) that determines our basic comportment [Haltung] toward history and fixes the direction of our view toward Aristotle.

[3. The Range of Vision] Every interpretation must, according to both the initial stand and direction of its view, over-illuminate its thematic object. The thematic object can be suitably defined only when one succeeds in seeing the object, not arbitrarily, but rather in seeing it too precisely, in its sharpest outlines, by way of accessing its definitive content. One thereby succeeds, by way of a retraction of this excess of illumination, in coming back to a precise demarcation which is as suit-
able as possible for the object, a “perfect fit,” so to speak. An object which is always
seen only in semidarkness can be grasped only by passing through an over-illumi-
nation of the object precisely as it is given in semidarkness. As over-illuminating,
however, the interpretation should not question too widely and claim for itself a
fantastic objectivity in historical knowledge as such, as if the interpretation had ar-
rived at an “in-itself.” Simply to ask about the “in-itself” at all is to misjudge the ob-
jectivity of the historical completely. To arrive at relativism and skeptical historicism
because an “in-itself” cannot be found is only the reverse side of this same mis-
judgment. The translation of the interpreted texts, and above all the translation of
their crucial basic concepts, have developed from the concrete interpretation and
contains it, so to speak, “in a nutshell” (in nuce). The coining of terms derives not
from a desire for innovation, but rather from the content of the translated texts.

[4. Interpreting Aristotle Accordingly] The starting-point of the Aristotle-inter-
pretation, which is determined by the initial stand from which we take our view,
must now be made understandable, and the first part of the investigations must be
sketched in summary fashion.

The guiding question of the interpretation must be: As what kind of object
and character of being is human being, [who finds] “be-ing in living,” experienced and
explicatively interpreted? What is the sense of Dasein within which this interpre-
tation of life approaches the comprehensive object, human being, in advance? In
brief, within what pre-possession of being does this objectivity stand? Further: how
is this being of the human being conceptually explicated, what is the phenomenal
ground [Boden, soil] of the explication, and which categories of being grow out of
what is thus seen as its explicata?

Is the sense of being that in the end characterizes the being of human life
drawn genuinely from a pure basic experience of just this object and its being, or
is human life taken as only one being within a more comprehensive field of being,
that is to say, is it subject to a sense of being which is applied archontically to it?
What does being as such mean for Aristotle, how is it accessible, conceivable, and
definable? The field of objects that provides the original sense of being is the field
of things that are produced and in common use. Thus the toward-which that the
original experience of being aims at is not the field-of-being of things as a theoret-
ically and thingly apprehended kind of object. The toward-which is instead the
world that is encountered in our coping with it by producing, doing, using, etc.
The finished product resulting from the coping movement of production
(ποίησις), that which has become a being-on-hand [Vorhandensein] ready for use,
is actually what is. Being means being-produced and, as something produced, being
available as well as significant relative to our tendency to cope with the world. In-
sofar as it is the object of circumspecting or else the object of an independent ap-
prehension by way of inspecting, a being is addressed with regard to how it looks,
its appearance (εἶδος). The inspective kind of apprehension is explicated in addressing and discussing (λέγειν). The “what” of the object, i.e., the “what” which is addressed (λόγος), and the object’s appearance (εἶδος) are in a sense the same. But this means that what is addressed in the λόγος is, as such, the proper and authentic being. With the objects that it addresses (and so claims), λέγειν brings beings in the beingness (οὐσία) of their appearance into the custody of truth’s safekeeping [Verwahrung]. In Aristotle as well as later, οὐσία still retains the meaning of household goods, belongings, property, that which is available for use in one’s surroundings. Οὐσία means possessions, what one has [die Habe]. That about the being which, as the being’s being, comes into the custody of safekeeping in the course of coping, i.e., that which characterizes the being as a possession, is the being’s being-produced. In production, the object of coping comes to its appearance and acquires its “look.”

The field of being of the objects of coping (ποιούμενον [product], πράγμα [deed], ἔργον [work], κινήσεως [thing moved]) and the way of addressing that belongs to coping (a particular kind of logos, or, more exactly, the object of coping, in the how of its being-addressed) indicate the prepossession from which the basic ontological structures (and thus the ways of addressing and defining the object “human life”) are to be drawn.

How do the ontological structures develop? As the explicata of an addressing, inspecting, defining, determining, i.e., on the path of a kind of research that takes the field of being (a field of being which is brought into its particular prepossession by way of a basic experience of it, according to particular regards, and articulates it in these regards). Therefore the researches (researches whose object is experienced and thought in the character of being-moved, researches within whose What something like movement is already given) must mediate the possible access to the proper motivational source of Aristotelian ontology. Such research is present in the Physics of Aristotle. In our method of interpretation, this research is itself to be taken as a full phenomenon and interpreted, first, with respect to its object in the how of its investigative coping with the object; then, with respect to the basic experience within which the object is pregiven as the starting point for the research; with respect to the constitutive movements that actualize this research; and with respect to the concrete ways in which the object is intended and conceptually articulated. What becomes visible in this way are the beings being moved with an eye to their character of being, the movement itself with regard to its categorical structure, and thus the ontological constitution of the archontic sense of being.

But for the phenomenological interpretation of this research itself, we must also come to an understanding of the sense in which Aristotle generally understood research and the actualization of research. Research is a way of coping that looks directly [hinsehen] at something, inspecting it (ἔπιστήμη) [science, knowl-
edge]. Research has its particular genesis in the practical coping of daily concern. And it is only on the basis of this genesis that we can come to understand how research “copes”—i.e., the manner of its questioning something with respect to that thing’s “in what way” (ἐτίτον [cause]) and its “from whence” (ἀρχή [source, origin]). Insight into the genesis of research is provided by our preliminary interpretation of the *Metaphysics*, Book I, chapters 1 and 2.

But the understanding which inspects and defines (ἐπιστήμη) is only one way in which beings come into the safekeeping of “truth” [Verwahrung]: these are the beings that are what they are necessarily and for the most part. Another kind of coping, where we are practically concerned in keeping things in good working order and deliberate to that end, exists with regard to the beings which can also be other than what they are at any given moment, the beings that have to be manipulated, treated, or produced, to begin with, in the course of coping with them. This way of safekeeping the truth of being is τέχνη, art. Aristotle interprets the ways in which coping is illuminated (circumspection, insight, inspection [Umsicht, Einsicht, Hinsicht])—ways that differ according to the different regions of being—as ways of actualizing pure and simple apprehension [reines Vernehmen], which provides vision in the first place. He interprets these within an original context of problems with regard to their basic achievement of appropriating being and safeguarding its truth (*Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VI). Through the interpretation of this text, we shall from the start attain the phenomenal horizon within which research and theoretical knowing are to be ordered as ways οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχή [in which the soul “trues”] (VI.3.1139b15). The first part of our investigations will thus include the interpretations of the following texts:

*Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VI;
*Metaphysics*, Book I, chapters 1–2; and
*Physics*, Books I and II; and Book III, chapters 1–3.

[Overview of the Planned Treatise: A Distilled Summary]

[Heidegger’s stated intention of this overview, and so of the planned treatise, is to single out, from the myriad texts that offer a philosophy of substance and constant presence, the Aristotelian texts that approximate the guiding problematic of the radical facticity of the human situation and subject these selections to a phenomenological interpretation. The key to human facticity in Aristotle is his ontological distinction between beings that always and necessarily are and “beings that can also be otherwise,” usually translated as “changeable beings.” The outstanding new interpretation in this survey of Aristotelian texts is Heidegger’s very first full account of factic (finite) truth understood as a process of un-concealment (a translation of ἀ-λήθεια already repeatedly questioned by Georg Misch in the margins of his copy of this “Introduction”), with the emphasis here on the conserving stasis of
the habits of truth. In view of its increasing importance in the ensuing years, the
first section on truth will be summarized in some detail, and the remaining sections
in a more schematic distillation.]

**Nichomachean Ethics VI**

The key to this treatment of the “dianoetic virtues,” the four “habits” of
truth that actualize νοῦς (simple apprehension as such, pure be-holding), is that,
as habits, each in its own way serves to maintain, preserve and conserve be-ing in
its truth, taking being into custody and safeguarding its truth (*Seinsverwahrung*).
With νοῦς [mind, thought], there are thus five ways in which the human soul
“trues,” ἀληθεύει, or “brings and takes beings as unveiled [unverhüllt] into the
safekeeping of truth.” This means that the beings that first become accessible
through appropriation and safekeeping can then be defined and demarcated in
the how of their apprehension and thus with respect to their genuine character
of be-ing. Since there are two distinct regions of be-ing, that which always is
[eternal being] and that which can also be otherwise [changeable being], the
concrete actualizing of the genuine safekeeping of be-ing as unconcealed there-
fore occurs in four ways (in Aristotle’s order of listing: 1139b15–18):

τέχνη [art] – procedures of producing, organizing, managing, and directing
ἐπιστήμη [science] – defining by inspecting, discussing, and demonstrating
φρόνησις [prudence] – solicitous circumspection in the care of human well-
being
σοφία [wisdom] – proper understanding that sees properly through a direct
view

The latter two, circumspection and the sight of understanding, first provide access
to the beings which are then defined and demarcated according to the first two
habits of excellence. Since all four, each in its own way, are concrete ways of actual-
izing and fulfilling the “ground vitality” of apprehension as such, νοûς, their phe-
nomenal differentiation and interconnection and the variation in their respective
achievement and truthful preservation of being depends on the correct interpreta-
tion of the sense of ἀληθές–ἀλήθεια and a phenomenological apprehension of νοûς.

The usual appeal to Aristotle for the traditional doctrine of truth as some-
thing “occurring in the judgment” and constituting an “agreement” of thought
with the object cannot be justified in his texts. There is no trace in Aristotle of
truth as agreement, ὀφθάλμος as valid judgment, of a representational theory of cog-
nition, or of the epistemological monstrosity of “critical realism.” The sense of
ἀληθές, being-there [da-sein] as unconcealed [unverborgen], or being-intended in
itself, is in no way drawn explicatively from the judgment and is not originally
domiciled there and related to it. Ἀληθεύειν does not mean to “take possession of
the truth” in usurpation, but to take it in trust for conservation, to take the intended being into the safekeeping of habitual truth as unveiled.

Αἴσθησις, apprehending in the sensory mode, is not “also” called true by way of transference of the “concept of truth” from the λόγος [misunderstood as judgment]. Rather, its proper intentional character is such that it gives that which in itself is originally its intentional toward-which “in an originary way” [Husserl]. “Giving an object as an unveiled object” is its very sense. “Sense perception of the objects proper to each sense is always true” (De anima III.3.427b12). “True” in this phenomenal context of directness does not really tell us anything. By contrast, there is “falsehood” only when there is “synthesis” (III.6.430b). Falsehood presupposes, as its condition of possibility, a different intentional structure in intending an object, of going-toward the being with “regard” to another being-intended. Where the being is intended not simply in itself but as such and such, in an “as” character, the apprehending takes place in the mode of taking-together and taking-with. Since apprehending as sensory takes place in the form of addressing its object as this or that and discussing it as this or that (in λέγειν), it is possible that the object can give itself out as something that it is not. The tendency to intend the object in its “as” is absolutely fundamental for the possibility of ψεῦδος, falsity. As Aristotle puts it, thinking falsely occurs only when there is discourse along with sense perception. “Only the apprehended being addressed with respect to an ‘as’ can give itself to such an addressing as ‘deceptively like it’” (427b13). In its very sense, the “being true” of the λόγος of addressing is constituted only by way of a detour through ψεῦδος. The λόγος itself must be taken in its own intentional character: it is ἀπόφανσις, an intending arising from the object and drawing upon (ἀπό) it in this addressing and discussing. Accordingly, ἀποφαίνεσθαι is a matter of letting the object “appear” for itself from out of itself (middle voice) as itself. This becomes important for the interpretation of φαντασία, imagination.

The λέγειν gives the being in itself, which now means that it gives the being in its unveiled “as what,” to the extent that a what is put forward that is not deceptive, merely passing itself off as the what in question. Ψεῦδος as self-veiling [Sichverhüllen] has sense only on the basis of a meaning of ἀληθές that is originally not related to λόγος. Remaining concealed, being veiled, is expressly specified as that which defines the sense of ψεῦδος and therefore the sense of truth. Aristotle regards being concealed as in itself positive. It is not by chance that the sense of “truth” for the Greeks is in its sense, and not just grammatically, defined privatively. The entity in the how of its possible “as-what determinations” is not simply there, it is a “task.” And the entity in the how of its being unveiled, ὅν ὡς ἀληθές, is that which must be taken into custody for safeguarding against possible loss. That is the sense of the habits, ἕξεις, in which the soul possesses truth. The highest authentic habits are σοφία and φρόνησις, which hold the ἄρχαι in trust and safeguard their truth, each within its own field of being. The ὅν ὡς ἀληθές is no proper being or field of
being of true judgments, but rather the entity itself in the how (ὡς) of its unveiled being-intended. It is ἐν διανοίᾳ as νοητόν: “in the ‘intellect’ as the toward-which of its apprehending.” This interpretation of ἀληθές and ἀληθεύειν, which circumvents a series of artificial difficulties that have arisen in the exposition of their sense, will be concretely documented by an in-depth phenomenological analysis of *Metaph.* VI, 4 (being as truth), *De anima* III.5–6 (productive and passional mind), *De interpretatione*, *Metaph.* V.29 (“false”) and, above all, *Metaph.* IX.10 (being as truth).

The λόγος, λέγειν is the way in which νοεῖν (simple apprehension) is actualized and, as such a διανοεῖσθαι, an apprehension that takes its intention apart and analyzes it; it is a division as well as a synthesis (*De anima* III.6.430b3). Addressing and discussing in its synthetic determining can also be regarded as a taking-apart and explicating.

Νοεῖν has the basic character of apprehending. Νοῦς is apprehension pure and simple, which means that it enables to begin with, and first gives, a toward-which for any and every directed coping whatsoever. “It pro-duces all things, it is the capacity to make things available, in a habit that is akin to light, in making the potential (e.g., color) actual” (III.5.430a15). Νοῦς as such gives sight, gives a something, gives a “there.” As “what is proper to the human being,” ἴδιον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, νοῦς exists in its concrete actualization, as ἐνεργεῖα, as at work, its own work, which is that of giving sight, always such in the mode of concrete coping with, in orienting, producing, treating, defining. Insofar as it gives coping its sight, it can also be described as the illumination of coping, which however has the sense of taking being into trust and conserving its unconcealment. The genuinely objective for νοῦς is that which it apprehends ἄνευ λόγου, “without discursivity,” without the mode of addressing something in terms of its “as-what-determinations” (430b28). The genuinely objective is the ἀδιαίρετα, the indivisible, that which in itself cannot be taken apart and explicicated any further. Νοῦς as such presents the objective as such purely in its unveiled what. Νοῦς as such is “simply true.” “Apprehension of the simple and indivisible is found in those cases where falsehood is impossible” (430b26). The “simply” here means “simply not yet” in the possibility of being-false, and not anything like “no longer” in this possibility. Νοῦς gives to any concrete discussion its potential about-which, which itself cannot become accessible simply in the discussion as such, but only in the ἐπαγωγή (“induction”). But this word must be understood purely in its literal sense and not in the empirical sense of gathering things together, but rather a simple and direct leading-to . . . , and letting it be seen. Νοῦς is αἴσθησις τις, an apprehending which in each case pre-gives the “look” [Aussehen, outward appearance, form, eidos] of objects simply: ὁ νοῦς εἶδος εἰδῶς καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις εἶδος αἰσθητῶν (432a2); “simple apprehension is the look of looks, the form of forms, while perception is the look or form of the perceived.” Just as the hand is the tool of tools and just as a tool [Werkzeug] taken in the hand comes to its proper being in generating work [Werk-zeugen], so too the look/form is in sight only
through and in the νοῦς, as its toward-which. It is in sight, it “looks out” at us, it appears and takes shape by way of νοῦς. Insofar as a field of objects must become explicitly accessible as such (and that not simply in the task of theoretical determination), the “whence” (ἀρχή) of the λέγειν must already be available as unveiled. With an eye to the ἀρχή, the λέγειν takes its point of departure from it such that it keeps this point of departure “within eyesight” as its constant orientation of ground. These ἀρχαί as unveiled are expressly taken into custody for safekeeping in the ἐπαγωγή by what is nowadays called the “induction of first principles” (Nic. Ethics VI.3.1139b31). The highest and proper achievement of νοῦς is the apprehension of the ἀρχαί which correspond to each region of being and the placement of them under the safeguards of truth.

The concrete ways of actualization of this authentic safekeeping of being are σοφία and φρόνησις. Purely inspective [contemplative] understanding brings into safekeeping those beings whose “whence” (ἀρχή) is, as they themselves are, such that it necessarily and always is what it is. By contrast, the circumspective solicitude of human well-being, under discussion, brings into truthful safekeeping those beings which, along with their “whence,” can in themselves also be otherwise. Both modes of guardianship develop and ripen temporally μετὰ λόγου in speech, actualizing themselves in discussion and explication. This form of discursivity is constitutive of them, insofar as they place the ἀρχαί in their sights not as isolated things which exist for themselves, but as they in fact are in their most proper sense, as ἀρχαί for. The what-for also comes into the purview of conserving safekeeping as the what-for of these whences, which is still in need of definition. The λόγος here is an ὀρθὸς λόγος, seeking to define just the right path between excess and deficiency. Discussing here establishes an original direction and seeks to maintain its originality. It has in each case its established “end,” corresponding to the sense of the temporally particular mode of safekeeping, and it is this end which is of central concern for the illuminative explication of this guarded preserve of safekeeping. Φρόνησις brings into the custody of safekeeping the toward-which of the coping of human life with itself as well as the how of this coping in its very own being. This coping is πρᾶξις: how one handles oneself in non-productive coping, in how one simply acts. Φρόνησις is the illumination of coping which at once brings life to fruition in its temporal being.

The concrete interpretation shows how this entity called the καιρός (the timely moment) temporalizes itself and matures in and through φρόνησις. The practical action of the solicitous conduct of human affairs is always concrete in the mode of concerned coping with the world. Φρόνησις makes the circumstantial state (Lage) of the actor accessible by adhering to the σῶ ἐνεκά, the why (for-the-sake-of-which), by providing a precisely defined what-for, by seizing the “now” and prefiguring the how; it heads toward the ἔσκατον, the ultimate extremity, the limits, in which the concrete situation of action regarded to be definitive finds its culmina-
tion. The [political] discussions and solicitous deliberations of \( \phi \rho \omicron \nu \nu \sigma \varsigma \) are possible only because it is primarily an \( \alpha \iota \sigma \theta \gamma \nu \sigma \varsigma \), in the end a simple overview of the moment of decision, insight, and opportunity. The \( \pi \rho \alpha \kappa \tau \tau \nu \) (human action), the unveiled entity made available in the \( \alpha \lambda \iota \theta \epsilon \upsilon \varepsilon \iota \varsigma \nu \) of the \( \phi \rho \omicron \nu \nu \sigma \varsigma \), is a being-not-yet such and such. As “not yet such and such,” as the toward-which of concern, it is at the same time already such and such, as the toward-which of a concrete readiness to take action, to cope. The constitutive illumination of this state of readiness is precisely what \( \phi \rho \omicron \nu \nu \sigma \varsigma \) as circum-spection, as over-view, is all about. The “not yet” and the “already” are to be understood in their “unity,” from a primordial givenness [a whence] for which these two temporal relations are particular explicata. Their particularity refers to determinate aspects of movement to which the concept of \( \sigma \tau \epsilon \gamma \nu \sigma \varsigma \) (privation), a category of motion, applies. It is in this category that Hegelian dialectic finds its roots in intellectual history [Nic. Ethics VI, esp. chap. 2, 4, and 8].

\( \alpha \lambda \iota \theta \epsilon \upsilon \varepsilon \iota \varsigma \nu \pi \rho \alpha \kappa \tau \tau \nu \) thus finds its focus in the full, unveiled, temporally particular pivotal moment of factic life in the how of its decisive readiness to cope with itself, all this within a factic relation of concern for the encountered world. \( \phi \rho \omicron \nu \nu \sigma \varsigma \) is epitactic [prescriptive, prefiguring]: it presents the entity as something to be concerned with, it interjects into this concern each aspect of the pivotal moment and maintains them in this concern (the temporally particular how, what-for, how-far, and why at this time). As epitactic illumination, it brings coping into the basic bearing of readiness for . . . , breaking free toward . . . . The toward-which intended here, the entity of the pivotal moment, stands under the purview of significance for . . . , of being within the capacity of concern, of what simply must be done now. \( \phi \rho \omicron \nu \nu \sigma \varsigma \) looks to “what is conducive to the end” (Nic. Ethics VI.9.1142b32). Since its basic concern is to safeguard the full moment and assume custody of it, circumspection in its proper sense maintains the why of the action, its \( \alpha \rho \chi \alpha \iota \iota \), in the custody of truly genuine safekeeping. The \( \alpha \rho \chi \alpha \iota \iota \) always is what it is only in concrete relation to the moment, being there in and for the moment in being seen and being seized.

The interpretation at once provides a concrete characterization of the method by which Aristotle explicates the phenomenon of \( \phi \rho \omicron \nu \nu \sigma \varsigma \): descriptive comparison and contrast according to the various phenomenal aspects of relatedness-to: the toward-which of the relational sense, the how of the actualization sense. The description always takes place within the simultaneous comparison and contrast of the different \( \varepsilon \xi \varepsilon \varsigma \). Especially instructive in this regard is the analysis of \( \epsilon \upsilon \beta \omicron \omega \upsilon \lambda \alpha \iota \alpha \) (deliberating well = Besinnung), the concrete way of actualizing the \( \lambda \acute {e} \gamma \varepsilon \nu \iota \upsilon \nu \) immanent to \( \phi \rho \omicron \nu \nu \sigma \varsigma \). Working out of the moment itself, it brings into circumspective purview the most fitting and proper way to go to work in order to arrive at the desired goal.

But it is not only the entity and its character of being brought to safekeeping
by φρόνησις which are highlighted by the interpretation. The interpretation at once comes to an initial understanding of the character of being which φρόνησις in and of itself has. For φρόνησις is a ἕξις, a how of enabling the conserving safeguarding of being. As ἕξις it is a γενόμενον τῆς ψυχῆς, the soul’s state of already having-become, which temporizes itself in life by cultivating its own possibility to full fruition and thus bringing life to a particular state, the stasis of an achieved stand. Thus what is indicated in φρόνησις is a doubling of the aspects into which the human being and the being of life are placed, which becomes fatefully decisive for our intellectual history in the categorial explication of the sense-of-being of facticity. In circumspection, life is there in the concrete how of a with-which of coping. But the being of this with-which—and this is the decisive point—is not characterized ontologically out of its own being in a positive manner. Instead, it is characterized simply in a formal manner as that which can also be otherwise, as that which is not necessarily and always what it is. This ontological characterization is therefore carried out by way of a negating contrast with another kind of being which is regarded as authentic being. In accord with its basic character, this authentic being is for its part not obtained by way of an explication of human life as such. Its categorial structure derives instead from an ontological radicalization of the idea of beings that are moved, which is carried out in a particular way. It is the motion of production that in Aristotle’s pre-possession is made paradigmatic for beings that are moved, in order thereby to bring out their structural sense. Authentic being is being-finished, complete, per-fected (“made through and through”), in which the movement has come to its end. The being of life is seen as the movement that has run its course within itself, in this life. It is in this very same movement that human life has come to its own end when it fulfills its ownmost possibility of movement, that of pure apprehension. This movement is in the ἕξις of σοφία. According to its intentional character, pure understanding does not bring human life in the how of its factic being into safekeeping. For σοφία does not even have human life, which is actually a being that can in each case be otherwise, as its intentional toward-which. In view of the authentic movement that σοφία can attain, the being of life itself has to be regarded solely in terms of such a movement of pure temporalization. As pure apprehension, νοῦς is 1) in its genuine movement when it has given up every kind of concern for practical orientation and apprehends simply. 2) As simple apprehension, it is a movement which not only does not cease, but also is movement for the first time, precisely as movement which has come to its end, since it has that which can be purely apprehended in its sight.

As an underway toward . . . , every movement is, in its very sense, a movement which has not yet reached its toward-which. As a going-toward, it is, for example, learning, going, house-building. “Go-ing” is in its character of be-ing fundamentally different from having gone. “The moving is different from the moved” (Metaph. IX.6.1048b32). By contrast, having-seen is simultaneous with and ac-
companies the seeing. He has seen—he has it in sight—only insofar as he is seeing right now, he has apprehended precisely in the apprehending: νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν (ibid.). Such a movement is be-ing in the conserving temporalization as temporalizing conservation of truth’s be-ing, where conserving is at the same time temporalization: ἅμα τὸ αὐτό ("simultaneously the same": 1048b33). The supreme idea of pure movement is satisfied only by νέσης as θεωρεῖν. The authentic be-ing of human being comes to temporal maturation and fruition only in the pure actualization of σοφία as the unconcerned whiling [Vorweilen] that has time to spare (σχολή, leisure) for pure apprehension in spending time (whiling) with the ἀρχαί of the beings that always are. The character of the being of ἕξις and therefore of ἀρετή [virtue, habit of excellence], which is the ontological structure of being-human, becomes comprehensible on the basis of an ontology of beings in the how of a particular movement and the ontological radicalization of the idea of this movement.

Metaphysics I.1–2

By way of these two famous chapters of the Aristotelian opus, Heidegger now proposes to bring this supreme and “perfect” movement of the human be-ing of leisurely “whiling with the ἀρχαί of the beings that always are”—the superlative life of philosophical contemplation that Aristotle put forward as the very best human life—back to its roots in factic life experience. For these two chapters tell a secular story of the emergence of human culture—the arts, sciences, and ultimately philosophy—out of the common experience of humanity. Already in his course of SS 1922, then entitled “Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Ontologie und Logik” (GA 62 bears a slightly longer subtitle for this clear continuation of the Introduction and Overview of a planned Aristotle book begun in WS 1921–1922 [GA 61]), Heidegger translates these chapters into one possible account of the phenomenological problem of the genesis of the theoretical from the practical.

Heidegger first notes that Aristotle’s account of human learning progresses by way of the comparatives of “seeing more,” “knowing more,” and “wiser,” until one arrives at the apex of wisdom in knowing or “seeing” and so “understanding” the ultimate “aspects” of the “look” of things, which turn out to be their first “whences,” the ἀρχαί. The equation of knowing and seeing is very Greek, where εἰδέναι (to know; the natural human “desire” noted in the opening line of the Metaphysics) stems from the pre-Homeric εἴδω (I see) by way of a grammatical “logic” according to which “to have seen” means “to know,” in a “truthful safekeeping” of insights. Thus, the decisive break from the practical to the theoretical occurs with the leisurely pause that takes a break from coping (dealing) with the world of practical concern through circum-specation in order to simply inspect it. This is regarded as a liberation from mundane tasks toward a life of simple apprehension of the determining sources of being that assumes the aura of the divine life, of the νοῦς in its
pure “circular” movement of a thinking that thinks itself in sublime detachment. But it is this aloof self-movement of the divine, imported into the conception of the Christian God as Pure Act and into the inner life of the Trinity (in movements like “begetting” and “proceeding”), that indicate how alien the Greek categories are to the Christian factic life experience, in which the encounter with the Divine is temporal and historical through and through. The sharp break between the “theater” of the theoretical and the chiaroscuro action engaged in the fully temporal world of the practical is thus ultimately to be regarded as a mistaken step, a major faux pas in the history of Western philosophy/theology that Heidegger in 1922 wants to “destroy.” Heidegger suggests that more promising insights into the “being of life in the Christian life-world” might be found in the way Aristotle’s “ontology of the psychic life” treats the movement of temporal ripening and maturation in terms of the “crucial phenomenon of intentionality” that he contributed to bringing to the forefront of contemporary phenomenology.

*Physics* I, II, III.1–3

Aristotle’s basic book of nature’s motion and its “whences” (ἀρχαί) likewise gets a dress rehearsal in Heidegger’s lecture course of SS 1922, clearly in preparation for his planned treatise on Aristotle (see Kisiel, *Genesis*, 238–48, for a summary account of this lecture course). The critique of the Eleatic thesis that Being is One finds its counterpoise in the repeated insistence that “being is said in many ways.” The problem of motion in this context comes down to the varying expressions of the problem of the One and the Many. Aristotle assumes from the outset that beings are on the move and assesses his precursors, the “ancient nature philosophers,” in terms of how far and how well they allowed the phenomenon of movement to speak for itself. And if the whences or ἀρχαί of motion are many, how many are necessary to account for the movements of Nature? By way of examples like the “coming-to-be of the statue from bronze,” drawn from the human movement of pro-duction, Aristotle will derive his theory of the four causes to account for any natural motion. But the question arises as to whether this account is sufficient for every human movement, like the movement of research guided and determined by a background structure of pre-possession and pre-conception which is clearly ahi-storical in origin. In fascination and laudation, Heidegger highlights two concepts of motion that emerge in the middle of *Physics* II, τύχη (chance) and αὐτόματον (spontaneity), both of which probe deeply into the “happening” of history and thus come closest to characterizing the thoroughly historical movement of factic human life in the midst of beings which “also can be otherwise.”

Heidegger concludes by indicating a wide range of other Aristotelian texts that further magnify the tension between the ever unfinished human movement of intentionality, of being-rooted-in as well as being-out-for and toward λόγος (mean-
ing, possibility) in a variety of practical as well as theoretical endeavors, and the movement of production that terminates in finished products that persist in their closed entelechy. The contrast allows us to measure “the degree to which a particular ontology of a particular field of beings and the logic of a particular way of addressing beings became the definitive ontology and logic which has decisively dominated not only its own history but also the history of the Mind and Spirit itself, i.e., the history of *Existenz.*"
Part III

Marburg Period, 1923–1928
15. The Problem of Sin in Luther

*Being and Time* mentions Luther only twice (*BT*, 10, 190 n.), and both occurrences seem at most peripheral to its project of a fundamental ontology and analytic of Dasein. And yet, in this lecture on the problem of sin in Luther, the attentive reader will readily find, in Heidegger’s close reading of Luther’s text, ample opportunity to wonder about the impact of Luther on Heidegger’s entire project. The record of evidence of this influence is now abundantly clear. Heidegger began to read Luther closely as early as 1918, sometimes with like-minded colleagues like Julius Ebbinghaus. A small grant through Husserl allowed Heidegger, “who is as poor as a church mouse” (Husserl to Winthrop Bell on September 18, 1921: *Briefwechsel* 3, 21), to obtain the complete Erlangen edition of Luther, from which he had already been citing in his lecture courses and seminars in “Catholic Freiburg.” The move to “Protestant Marburg” thus gave Heidegger an immediate and uninhibited opportunity to demonstrate his long familiarity with the Lutheran opus precisely in the context of a semester-long participation in Bultmann’s seminar on “Paul’s ethics.” The record of the seminar shows that Heidegger made his first significant contribution in a discussion of the Lutheran thesis of the justification of faith through God’s act of judgment, and therefore the relationship between faith and ethical action (session of January 10, 1924). Heidegger’s exegesis of Romans 6 on “living in faith” spilled over, in the following weeks, into the questions of the fulfillment of ethical commands and the special demands imposed on Christians. A discussion of the demands of conscience, guilt, decision (κρίσις), and freedom sets the stage for Heidegger’s two-part commentary that concludes the semester.

At issue in his seminar presentation is Luther’s conception of the radicality of
sin and the consequences of this radicality for a theological understanding both of
the being of the human and of the human’s proper relation to God. The conclusion
to this issue reached by Heidegger with Luther is that, “faith can be understood
only when sin is understood, and sin is understood only by way of a correct under-
standing of the very being of the human being.” Heidegger thereby attempts to
lead the theological questions of sin, faith, and man’s relation to God back to more
properly philosophical territory.

A closer look at Heidegger’s exegesis reveals that its guiding thread of inter-
pretation, and so its criterion for the selection of texts, is the ontological concept of
*affectus*, understood explicitly in a non-psychological way as the “how of being
positioned” (*Wie des Gestellteins*) toward things, in the world, before God. To
bring out this affective element, *Gestellsein* has accordingly been translated as “be-
ing-disposed.” This translation is confirmed by the repeated recurrence of the Ger-
man term in the Aristotle course of SS 1924 as Heidegger’s formula for affective
habit, usually in close proximity with another Aristotelian category denoting the at
first non-psychological state of always already finding oneself disposed in the world
(*Befindlichkeit*). The theological dynamics of sin and faith subjected to the con-
trary forces of attraction and repulsion (traditionally, the “concupiscible” versus
the “irascible” appetites) thus plays itself out in a situational habitat of being-in-the-
world which begins with the drama of man’s turning away from God in sin and
seeks to end in being turned toward God in faith. The full register of the affects of
sin is therefore rehearsed: aversion, rejection, revolt, impenitence, hatred, con-
tempt. The horror and loathsomeness of the revolting things of the world provide
occasions for the repentant return to God. The affective habit of faith, the atten-
tive listening to the call of grace in the Word of God, is thus understood by way of
the affects of sin. The lecture concludes by invoking Paul’s and Kierkegaard’s affect
of a faith that stands before God in fear and trembling, in mortal anxiety of the
spiritual trial and tribulation that it must suffer in passage.

As is well known, Heidegger often arrived at similar ontological insights for
his thought through an examination of very different thinkers. And in this lecture
one wonders about the apparent parallel between the characterization of the move-
ment of sin and Heidegger’s movement of *Verfallenheit*, the state of lapse; the re-
spective emphases on *affectus* and disposition as primary modes of disclosing man’s
being; the issue of entanglement in the world and its relation to the possibility of
authenticity; the horror of clinging to things in the world preceding the possibili-
ty of coming to God, Heidegger’s analysis of anxiety and the possibility it opens of
living mortally in authenticity; and the concept of the debit of “guilt” (*Schuld*) and
its possible relation to the religious notion of sin.

But despite these apparent correspondences, there exists between these two
thinkers a radical incommensurability. For in Heidegger, in opposition to Luther,
there is no room to talk about the “original righteousness” of the human being.
And in fact it is precisely from this perspective that one would have to reconsider the aforementioned parallels between the two on the issues surrounding the determination of the being of the human. What in Luther’s thought on the being of the human is a loss [defectus] vis-à-vis a prior mode of being becomes in Heidegger the finitude that determines Dasein as such. This finitude is of course not to be understood in terms of a defective mode of being that Dasein has fallen into from a higher mode and thus might try to overcome. That is, finitude for Heidegger does not name a condition to be alleviated through salvation or any other means. In that sense alone Heidegger’s relation to Luther will always be a strained relation, where the latter assumes the future possibility of reacquiring a perfection beyond the human’s current defective condition, whereas for Heidegger finitude is in its own sense perfect precisely in its essential incompletion.

Brian Hansford Bowles

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**The Problem of Sin in Luther**

Professor Heidegger made the following comments [February 14, 1924]:

The problem of sin will here be treated not as an object of religious contemplation but as a theological problem. Luther’s theology will then be elucidated from the perspective of this question.

The object of theology is God, and its theme is the human being in regard to how he is placed before God. But to be human is at the same time also to be in the world, and so that human beings also have before them the entire problematic of the world. Luther’s theological questioning assumed a particular basic direction in starting from the problem of sin. Our question now reads: What does “sin” mean when humanity’s relation to God is discussed as a theological problem? This problem is closely tied to the question of the original state [Ursrand] of humanity in iustitia originalis [original righteousness]. For we are asking about human being at the moment of its emergence from the hand of God.

The human being must, on the one hand, be regarded as the sumnum bonum [highest good] of creation, and, on the other hand, be so created that the Fall and the being of sin become possible but are not blamed on God. Furthermore, the idea of redemption also depends upon the way in which original sin and the Fall are considered. The sense and essence of any particular theology can be read

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1. [Editor’s note: Wie des Gestellseins, “how of being-pos[ition]ed or placed.” Since this is Heidegger’s formula at this time for an affective habit, it will usually be translated in what follows as the “how of being disposed” or some variant thereof. In SS 1924, Heidegger will relate the same formula to Aristotle’s dia-thesis (dis-position), which he translates as Befindlichkeit, “finding oneself disposed” or the disposition of moods.]
off from its view of man’s iustitia originalis [original righteousness]. For the more the radicality of sin is underrated, then the more redemption is disparaged and the more God becoming human in the Incarnation loses its necessity. We thus find in Luther’s thought the fundamental tendency that the corruptio of man’s being can never be grasped radically enough. And Luther asserted this particularly in opposition to Scholasticism, which always spoke of corruptio with qualification and in extenuation.

It is now a matter of showing: I) that the tendency toward this problematic is already operative in Luther’s early period, and II) that the later Luther likewise displays this same tendency.

I

1. “Quaestio de viribus [et voluntate hominis sine gratia]” [The Question of Man’s Capacity and Will without Grace] from 1516.2

Luther does not see sin as a growing accumulation of errors. He instead directs our view to affectus [affect], that is, to the way in which the human being is disposed [Gestellsein] toward things, its being-displaced and horrified [Entsetztsein] by things, which comes from its clinging to them. The human being is stricken by a horror that is based in quaerere iustitiam suam [seeking its righteousness]. The desperatio spiritualis [spiritual despair] that arises from this is a despair before God that comes not from a multitude of sins but from the affectus horrens peccatum [affect of being horrified by sin]. And sin is defined by a very specific state of being disposed toward the world. The basic requirement of every theology is, consequently, to interpret man’s being in the world in such a way that the human can depart from this state of being and come to God. This state of being should therefore not be presented as something good, for in it humans do not learn to love God. Instead, human beings must be brought to the point where they grasp their being as persisting in a world that offers not the delight of glories but the loathsomeness of revolting things. God in His mercy has profoundly shaken man’s quaerere iustitiam suam so that he now knows, “I have nothing to expect from the world.” Luther thus lays the emphasis on the affectus subtilissime carnalis [simplest affect of the flesh] and arrives, in complete opposition to Scholasticism, at the proposition that corruptio amplificanda est [corruption is something to be amplified].

2. M. Luther, “Quaestio de viribus et voluntate hominis sine gratia disputata” (1516) in D. Martin Luthers Werke 1 (Weimar: Hermann Böhlau, 1883) [= WA 1 = Weimarer Ausgabe (i.e., Weimar edition), vol. 1], 142–51. These notes to the published German text of the seminar protocol, including the bracketed in-text references to the German of Luther’s works, have been added by the German editor, Bernd Jaspert.
2. “Disputatio contra scholasticam theologiam” [Disputation against Scholastic Theology] of 1517.³

   a) Thesis 17: Man of himself is not able to want God to be God. It is much more the case that man wants to be God. But this is precisely the essence of sin: *velle se esse deum et deum non esse deum* [to want himself to be God and God not to be God; *WA* 1, 225.1–2/10].

   b) Thesis 25: Hope comes not from works, but from suffering [*WA* 1, 225.15–16/10].

   c) Thesis 30: On man's part, nothing but the revolt against grace can preempt grace itself. The possibility of its existence does not reside in the human being [*WA* 1, 225.29–30/11].

   d) Thesis 37: All of human action is presumptuous and sinful. These statements separate Luther from Aristotle and all of Greek ontology such that in thesis 50 Luther can say: *Totus Aristoteles ad theologiam est tenebrae ad lucem* [All of Aristotle is to theology as darkness is to light; *WA* 1, 226.26/12].

3. The Heidelberg Disputation of 1518.⁴

   Luther here quite clearly characterizes theology's task by contrasting two theological perspectives. The first of these is *theologia gloriae, quae invisibilia Dei ex operibus intellecta conspicit* (Thesis 22 [*WA* 1, 362.35]) and *dicti malum bonum et bonum malum* (Thesis 21 [*WA* 1, 362.21]) [the theology of glory which sees the invisible things of God in works as perceived by man and calls evil good and good evil]. In opposition to this stands the *theologia crucis* [theology of the cross], which starts from the actual state of affairs (*dicit id quod res est* [tells us how things really are; *WA* 1, 362.22/53]).

   The Scholastic takes cognizance of Christ only after he has defined the being of God and the world. This Greek way of thinking adopted by the Scholastic magnifies human pride. But he must first go to the cross before he can say *id quod res est* [how things really are; *WA* 1, 362.22/53].

   We thus find in the Heidelberg Disputation of 1518 the most pointed state-

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³ M. Luther, “Disputatio contra scholasticam theologiam” (1517) in *WA* 1, 221–28. [“Disputation against Scholastic Theology,” trans. Harold J. Grimm in *Luther’s Works*, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann, vol. 31: *Career of the Reformer* (Philadelphia: Concordia, 1957), 9–16. Henceforth cited as *WA* 1 with page and line numbers separated by a period and followed the English page reference, which is separated from the German reference by slash—e.g., “*WA* 1, 225.1–2/10” = *WA* 1, p. 225, lines 1–2; English translation, p. 10.]

⁴ M. Luther, “Disputatio Heidelbergae habita” (1518), in *WA* 1, 350–74. [“Heidelberg Disputation,” trans. Harold J. Grimm in *Career of the Reformer*, 39–70. Heidegger had already cited these “Heidelberg theses” of the young Luther in his course on Augustine in SS 1921: see *GA* 60, 281–82.]
ment of Luther’s position on sin in his early period. Our next hour will demonstrate that the same tendency persists even into the later period of Luther’s theology.

Continuation of Professor Heidegger’s talk [February 21, 1924]:

II

1. Before we critique the relation between the problems of sin and *iustitia originalis* in Luther, it will be useful to consider the same problematic in Scholasticism. Scholasticism’s response to the question of *iustitia originalis* is here related to its basic conception that the church is the authority in matters of faith. But this is something that the church can be only insofar as it is a divine institution, which must be demonstrated *rationaliter* [rationally]. For this it is necessary to prove 1) the existence [*Dasein*] of God, and 2) the possibility of a historical Revelation attested to in inspired Scripture and carried on in the Church that is grounded in it. In order to be able to bring about these demonstrations, it is presupposed that the human being by nature overtly possesses the possibility of knowledge of God. This can be presupposed only if the *natura hominis* [human nature] is *integra* [uncorrupted and whole] even after the Fall.

If this is the natural condition of man, then humans before the Fall must have possessed another and higher knowledge of God due to a *donum superadditum* [surplus gift]. As is well-known, this gift consists in the three theological virtues. 5 Humans lose this surplus through sin, but do not lose—and this is the decisive point—their natural state of being disposed before God.

Luther rebels against this and instead appeals to *experientia* [experience]. The *natura hominis* is *corrupta*. The being of man as such is itself sin. Sin is nothing but the opposite of faith, where faith means standing (being placed and disposed) before God. Sin is thus not something tacked onto the moral condition of humans but is rather their essential core. With Luther, sin becomes a concept encompassing existence, which his emphasis on *affectus* already indicates.

Along with this basic determination of sin, Luther directs his attention to the movement that sin, as a mode of the being of humans, carries within itself: one sin begets another and pulls man down ever lower. The true sin is *incredulitas*, that is, disbelief, *aversio dei* [turning away from God]. Inasmuch as man, in this movement of being averted or turned away from God, is being put into the world [and so put upon by it], true sin is accompanied by *pavor* [fear and trembling]. This basic affect is soon followed by others: *fuga* [flight], *odium* [hatred], *desperatio* [despair], *impenitentia* [impenitence].

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5. Faith, hope, and love (see 1 Cor. 13:13).
2. The above account can be elucidated by Luther’s lecture course on Genesis in 1544 (Erlanger Ausgabe [Erlangen edition], app. exeg. lat. tom. I).6

a) The difference of opinions is clearly expressed on page 208: Scholastici disputant, quod justitia originalis non fuerit connaturalis, sed cec ornatus quidam additus homini tanquam donum . . . [The Scholastics argue that original righteousness was not a connatural state but, like some ornament, was added to humans as a gift . . .]. Against this Luther says: . . . justitiam . . . fuisse vere naturalem, ita ut natura Adae esset diligere Deum, credere Deo, agnoscere Deum. . . . [righteousness . . . was truly part of human nature, so that it was Adam’s nature to love God, to believe God, to know God . . . ; EA 1, 209/164–65].

The consequence that follows from the Scholastic determination of man’s justitia originalis would be that if this did not belong to the true essence of man, then neither would sin belong to him. However: fugiamus deliria ista . . . et sequamur potius experientiam [let us shun those ravings . . . and instead follow experience; EA 1, 210/166]. Experientia . . . docet nos de his calamitatibus . . . [experience teaches us about these calamities; EA 1, 178/141–42], namely, defectus [the loss] that resulted from sin. But we recognize the enormity of this loss only when from a correlative consideration we see God as God. For only then do we understand what aversio Dei means.

b) The Fall through sin . . . inveniemus summam et acerrimam omnium tentationum hanc fuisse, quia serpens invadit ipsam voluntatem Dei bonam, et nittiur probare, Dei voluntatem erga hominem non esse bonam. Ipsam igitur imaginem Dei . . . petit [. . . we shall find that this was the greatest and severest of all temptations; for the serpent assails God’s good will and dares to prove that God’s will toward man is not good. It thus launches its attack against the very image of God. . . . ; EA 1, 184/147]. Adam and Eve are therefore not tempted by a single specific sin, but are instead incited against God himself and his Word. Their sin consists simply in lending an ear to a word that is not God’s Word, in allowing themselves to become involved at all in such a disputatio [argument]. They thus lose their original being before God.

c) The movement of sin: Primum enim cadit homo ex fide in incredulitatem et inobedientiam: incredulitatem autem sequitur pavor, odium et fuga Dei, quae desperationem et impoendentiam secum adducunt. [Humans first fall from faith into disbelief and disobedience. Then come fear, hatred, and flight from God, and these

bring on despair and impenitence; *EA* 1, 217/171] God is unbearable to humans. They are frightened by God even in the slightest rustling of leaves, because they are shaken and disturbed in their very being. They flee from God and thereby betray their *intellectum depravatum* [depraved intellect]. *An non enim extrema stultitia est... Deum fugere, quem non possunt fugere?* [Or is it not the height of folly... to flee from God, from whom they are unable to flee? *EA* 1, 217–18/172] They flee because they do not see that *sin* itself means the *vera discessio a Deo,* *nec oportuit majorem fugam addere* [total separation from God, so that there is no need to add any further flight; *EA* 1, 218/172–73].

*Et tamen haec (stultitia and pavor) sunt quasi praeludia* [And yet these (folly and fear) are, so to speak, mere preludes; *EA* 1, 218/172]. The true meaning of *sin* is that once someone flees, his flight is such that he continually wishes to distance himself even further, and *fugit in aeternum* [flees forever; *EA* 1, 218/173]. And Adam flees *excusando mendaciter peccatum, peccatum peccato addit... Sic peccatum pondere suo semper secum trahit alium peccatum, et facta aeternam ruinam* [by excusing his sin with lies, heaping sin upon sin....Thus sin by its own weight always draws with it other sins and brings on eternal ruin; *EA* 1, 221/175].

Adam goes so far as to make an *excusatio* [excuse], and then *perstat in excusatione* [to persist in his excuse; *EA* 1, 223/177]. He is presumptuous enough to make an *accusatio et culpam a se in Creatorem transfert* [accusation and to transfer his guilt from himself to the Creator; *EA* 1, 221/175]. *Non enim possunt (peccatores) aliter, quam Deum accusare et se excusare* [They (sinners) cannot do otherwise than to accuse God and to excuse themselves; *EA* 1, 225/178]. That is the real despair.

It gets even worse: In her excuse, Eve directs her accusation at God as the *creator* of the serpent and thereby depicts God as *auctor peccati* [the author of sin]. *Ita ex peccato humano ficit peccatum plane diabolicum, et incredulitas vertitur in blasphemia, inobedientia in contemptum Creatoris* [A human sin thereby leads to a clearly demonic sin; disbelief turns into blasphemy, disobedience into contempt for the Creator; *EA* 1, 226/179]. *Hic ultimus gradus peccati est* [This is the ultimate degradation of sin; *EA* 1, 227/179].

d) And yet, the situation of the human being who alienates himself from God is still a relation to God. This relation is still manifest when the alienated human being looks back and repudiates God as *auctor peccati* [the author of sin] and says that “God is not God.”

This human situation is in fact brought on by God, who after the Fall does not keep silent but still *loquitur* [speaks], and quite loquaciously; which is the *summa gratia* [highest grace; *EA* 1, 229/181]. It should also be noted how the being of God is always taken to be *verbum* [word], and how the basic human relation to God is regarded as *audire* [listening, hearing].

e) In summary, all of these comments show how [1] Luther’s orientation in regard to sin is completely different from that of Scholasticism and how [2] he un-
derstands sin as a fundamental antithesis to faith. In theological terms this means: [3] “Faith can be understood only when sin is understood, and sin is understood only by way of a correct understanding of the very being of the human being.”

Protestant theology today generally does not demonstrate the understanding of sin we have just outlined and the understanding of the relation of God and man that this entails. And when, in the latest theological movement, it is once again made clear, it is discounted and resisted out of fear of the import of such an understanding. In this way, the Protestant Principle is once again betrayed.

f) What this means can be illustrated by a remark about Catholicism and Protestantism found in Kierkegaard’s journal of 1852 (II, p. 284 ff.),7 the gist of which is briefly the following:

Just as Luther is Luther only on the spiritual ground of Catholicism, so is Protestantism only a corrective to Catholicism and unable to stand alone as normative. When Catholicism degenerates, then the “sham sanctity” of sanctimonious hypocrisy arises. But when Protestantism degenerates, then “worldliness without spirit” arises. What would appear as a result is a refinement in Protestantism that cannot emerge in Catholicism. For in Catholicism, when a representative of its principle degenerates into worldliness, he brings upon himself the odium [disgrace] of worldliness. But when a representative of Protestantism degenerates into worldliness, he is praised for his piety and honesty. And this is so because Catholicism is based on the general presupposition “that we human beings are all really scoundrels.” “The Principle of Protestantism has a special presupposition: a human being who sits there in mortal anxiety—in fear and trembling and great spiritual trial.”

16. The Concept of Time

The lecture entitled “The Concept of Time” (*Der Begriff der Zeit*) was delivered under the auspices of the Theological Faculty at the University of Marburg on Friday, July 25, 1924. A few weeks before, Rudolf Bultmann of the theological faculty at Marburg had written to his theological colleague in nearby Göttingen, Karl Barth, that Heidegger would be delivering a lecture on “History and Time”
toward the end of the month. Resonances of this initial direction for the talk are to be found in remarks near its conclusion on history, historical research, historicality (the “common interest” driving the correspondence of Dilthey and Count Yorck), and the conclusion itself, which “samples” some of Heidegger’s own historical approach to philosophizing. But in mid-1924, the intellectual world was also abuzz with the public confrontation over the concept of time that had taken place earlier in the year in Paris between the philosopher Henri Bergson and the mathematical physicist Albert Einstein. Heidegger thus oriented his talk not only toward the theologians, but also toward the historians, mathematicians, and physicists on the faculty. This accounts for, among other things, the curious introductory remark on the “parade of the sciences” being in need of a modest “police escort” by a pre-philosophical pre-science (i.e., phenomenology) that would serve to examine what philosophy, the sciences, and ordinary language in the end really mean, to what matters they really refer, when they speak about the world and about themselves.

Though the metaphor is a bit mixed, it is a sign of Heidegger’s major effort precisely at this time to improve his writing/speaking style and strategy, long criticized, for example, by his friend, Karl Jaspers, for being lackluster in imagery and wooden (“refractory”) in its rigidity and turgidity. Concurrent with the lecture, Heidegger was just concluding a course on philosophical concept formation in Aristotle, in which his text on the *Rhetoric* played a major role, and Heidegger was obviously taking some of the suggestions of this ancient “practical” manual and applying them to his own philosophical rhetoric. The result is a rhetorical tour de force on the dif-

This lecture of July 1924 has recently been republished in *GA*64, Der Begriff der Zeit (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2004), along with a longer article on “The Concept of Time” that Heidegger sent to a journal for publication in November 1924. For further on the genesis of this latter article, see Theodore Kisiel, “Why the First Draft of *Being and Time* Was Never Published,” *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 20 (1989), 3–22; also Kisiel, *Genesis*, 315–21 (July 1924) and 321–57 (November 1924). The following English paraphrase of the July lecture by Theodore Kisiel constitutes a “text” that interweaves all of these sources and seeks to reconstruct the rhetorical power of a talk which apparently caused quite a stir at the time in German philosophical and theological circles.

1. The letter was dated July 4, 1924. Barth did not come. See Karl Barth and Rudolf Bultmann, *Briefwechsel 1922–1966*, ed. Bernd Jaspert (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1971), 16. A few days earlier, Heidegger had notified the sponsors of his forthcoming Kassel lectures (April 1925) that his provisional title would be “Historical Da-sein and Historiographic Knowledge (Introduction to Wilhelm Dilthey’s Research).” Heidegger at this time was also in the process of writing a review of the just published correspondence between Dilthey and Count Yorck von Wartenburg, whose central theme was historicity; this review was first incorporated into the article-length version of “The Concept of Time” of November 1924. It is in this immediate context “at the time” that the choice of the title “History and Time” becomes more comprehensible. For a more complete comprehension of these works in progress “at the time,” see Kisiel, *Genesis*, chap. 7.
difficult subject matter of time, developed with a certain “existentialist” flair (this without ever mentioning *Existenz*)! on the extreme possibility of each of us being a “goner,” concluding with a dramatic litany of basic questions: “What is time?” has turned into “Who is time?” Accordingly, “Are we ourselves time? Am I time? Am I my time?” If time is indeed the how of be-ing, it is in the end an interrogative how. With this lecture, in its rhetorical breakthrough, Heidegger had found the powerful philosophical voice that would keep him in the public spotlight for the rest of his multifarious career. It is therefore surprising that the lecture was given but once, so far as available records show. From this first public airing of some of the most central themes of *Being and Time* itself, Heidegger went on immediately to other pressing academic deadlines, all of which became steps in the drafting of that famous book on time, which first appeared in April 1927.

But even before this major publication event, the 1924 lecture itself had already become a minor sensation, and the virtually verbatim transcript of it was being passed from hand to hand, reread and recopied by students, faculty, and interested intellectuals alike. One continues to be surprised by the number of private archives in which a carefully preserved copy of this unpublished lecture has survived and resurfaced over the decades, despite the ravages and universal devastation of world war, precipitous flight, and exile. Oskar Becker, philosophy instructor at Freiburg and one of Heidegger’s more mature students at the time, cites from his more deviant version in a long treatise entitled “Mathematical Existence” that accompanied *Being and Time* into print, in which he regards his lecture-transcript on “The Concept of Time” as a surrogate version of the just published *Being and Time* that he had not yet been able to study. In particular, Becker cites the passages on being-at-an-end understood uniquely in this lecture as a “forerunning of Da-sein toward its being gone” which defines the quality, the “how” of the “particular while” that is had by each Da-sein. In this way, Becker seizes the nub and guiding thread of development of the entire lecture, from the formal indication of Da-sein in the eachness of its particular “while” (*Je-weiligkeit*) to the identification of this “while” with time “itself”; in short, from the formal indication of “to each its while” to the ontological conclusion that each Da-sein is its time, its while, the quality of which is determined by how it is taken up and carried forward, whether it be past, present, future, and in particular the way in which they are invested with unity. In raising the problem of the different sort of individuation involved in historical time versus natural time as one between the individuation of the proper and unique, on the one hand, and that of the common and equal, on the other, and in resolving it in the difference between the future that always “comes toward” us and

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the past that always “comes again,” Becker struggles in his own way with perhaps the most tantalizing linguistic problem of a hermeneutic phenomenology raised by Heidegger’s formal indication of Da-sein, namely, its being in each instantiation its own particular while, or in each case mine. It is the classical problem of the difference between the distributive universal of the proper and unique “each,” ever subject to varying interpretation in order to accord with its individuating indexical context, and the generic universal of the common “all,” which (as Aristotle already noted) be-ing never is.

Heidegger himself refers to his unpublished lecture on two occasions, citing its first paragraph several months later in a note that introduces the theses of the third section on “Da-sein and Temporality” of an article-length treatise, intended for a journal, that likewise was to bear the overall title “The Concept of Time.” The article was never published. Instead it grew into the book-length treatise with the title Being and Time. In the middle of its Second Division entitled “Da-sein and Temporality,” Heidegger inserts a note stating that “the foregoing and the following considerations [i.e., those of the entire Second Division] were communicated in the form of theses on the occasion of a public lecture on the concept of time delivered in Marburg in July 1924” (BT, 268 n.). In short, the themes of forerunning my own death, being responsive to the demands of one’s own situation that are elicited in the call of conscience, proper versus improper temporality, the common time of the everyday versus the proper time of a lifetime (my while), and the repetition of one’s fate involved in enacting one’s historicality (“I am my past”): all of these “theses” of the Second Division were at least touched upon in seriatim fashion in the much more streamlined lecture of 1924. The beauty of the lecture is in its hard-core simplicity, like a well-cut jewel, magnified by its clipped brevity and deep reserve. It is not the “Urform” of Being and Time, as Gadamer has repeatedly maintained, if this means the “primal structure” of that project. That honorific title belongs to the more rigorously outlined longer treatise of the same title written several months after the lecture. But if “initial form” means the first public presentation of the core-idea that was destined to become Being and Time, then the lecture of July 1924 fits the billing with dramatic rhetorical flourish. Its craft lies in the simplicity and directness of this central idea, developed and reinforced by rhetorical repetition and allusion to one or another implicit context, but in its line of development ultimately reducible to an apparent tautology: the formal indication of Da-sein as “to each its while” ultimately leads to the conclusion that each Da-sein is its time, its while. “Am I my time?” then becomes on the one hand an existentiell demand to become my time (my past, my present, my future) and, on the other, an ontological task calling for a close “police” examination of this “is” and “am” in all of its aspects and contexts and their possible permutations: What does it mean to be my time, our time, one’s time?

On the way to Being and Time, the formal indication of Jeweiligkeit (to each...
its while-ness) is displaced by that of *Jemeinigkeit* (in each case mine-ness) and so recedes into the filigree of the text, nevertheless still doing its indicating by way of the proliferation of its more idiomatic variations (*je*, “in each case”; *jeweils*, “each time”; *jeweilig*, “at the time”) in the book, particles that unfortunately tend to get lost in translation. The reader of both the German and the English texts is left to ponder the most telling ways of making this difficult point of time, of saying the indexical, occasional, individuating nature of being here, now, I, in one’s own language, all the while drawing on its particular treasure trove of timely idioms of time.

The Concept of Time

The following deliberations deal with time. What is time?

If time finds its meaning in eternity, it then has to be understood by starting from eternity. The starting point and direction of this exploration are thereby mapped out in advance: from eternity to time. This way of raising the question is in order, provided that such a starting point is available to us, i.e., provided that we have an acquaintance and an adequate understanding of eternity at our disposal. If eternity were something more than an empty “being forever and always,” the *ἀεί*, if God were eternity, then this initially suggested way of considering time would necessarily present a quandary as long as one knows nothing of God and does not understand how to ask about Him. If the access to God is faith and if letting oneself become involved with eternity is nothing but faith, then philosophy will never have access to eternity. Accordingly, it can never make methodological usage of eternity as a possible way of discussing time. Philosophy can never escape this predicament. The theologian is accordingly the appropriate savant on time. And if memory serves me rightly, theology has to do with time in more ways that one.

Firstly, theology deals with human Da-sein as be-ing before God, with its tem-

3. *Da-sein als Sein*: Even though this first usage of Heidegger’s two most basic ontological terms are probably meant in their ordinary German sense—*Da-sein* as “existence” and *Sein* as “being”—we have translated them in Heidegger’s sense from the start, with the emphasis he wishes to give to them especially in this talk on time. Instead of the long-standing convention of capitalizing “Being” for the active infinitive used as a noun, *Sein*, which still conveys the misimpression of a hypostatized abstraction, we shall consistently translate it as “be-ing” to convey quite deliberately its “temporal be-ing” and its concretely experienced *dynamis*. Moreover, it also conveys, by way of the very dynamics of the relational hyphen, the ongoing multifarious action of relating entities to itself, to other entities in interrelating worlds, and eventually each of them properly to themselves. This orthography at once also serves to differentiate *Sein* ontologically from *Seiendes*, the plurality of “beings” in the entitative substantive sense, which in this essay will be translated as “entity, entities.”
poral be-ing in its relationship to eternity. God himself does not need theology, for His existence is not grounded by faith.

Secondly, Christian faith in itself is to have a relation to something that happened in time—at a time, we are told, of which it is said: 'In that time . . .', 'when time was fulfilled . . .'4

The philosopher does not believe. When the philosopher asks about time, he has resolved to understand time from out of time, or even from out of the ἀεί [ever, always], which looks like eternity but turns out to be a mere derivative of being temporal.

The following treatment is not theological. Theologically, this treatment of time can only mean making the question of eternity more difficult, preparing this question in the right way and posing it properly. The treatment is not even philosophical, since it does not pretend to provide a universally valid and systematic definition of time, and such a definition would then have to go back behind time and ask about its connection with other categories.

The following deliberations perhaps belong to a pre-science whose business it is to conduct investigations into what could ultimately be meant by what philosophy and science say and what the expository and interpretive speech of Da-sein says about itself and about the world. Clarifying what a clock is allows the kind of apprehension operative in physics to come alive, and with that also the way in which time has occasion to show itself. This pre-science within which this study moves is vitalized by the perhaps unusual presupposition that philosophy and science operate in concepts. The possibility of this pre-science resides in the presumption that all researchers must become clear on what they understand and do not understand. It lets us know when research is directly involved with its matter [Sache], or when it is simply feeding off a traditional and trite verbal knowledge of it. Such investigations are almost like the police force in service at the parade of the sciences, certainly a subordinate yet, in the opinion of some, a sometimes urgent business. The relationship of this pre-science to philosophy is only that of an escort, which at times must conduct a house search of the ancients in order to see how they did

In the opening hour of his course on ontology in SS 1923, one year before this lecture, Heidegger for the first time formally designates the term *Da-sein* in its *Da* (there, here) to indicate the unique and temporally particular human situation that we human beings in each of our instantiations (“each particular while”) are. See GA 63, 7. There is sufficient evidence within the text of the lecture—no doubt reinforced by Heidegger’s intonation in the delivery of the lecture—to indicate that Heidegger meant the term to be taken in its etymological, literal, and so hyphenated sense as *Da-sein*, being-(t)here. We have accordingly, following the convention initiated by the new English translation of *Being and Time*, consistently translated the German term “Dasein” into the “English” Da-sein.

4. Gal. 4:4; see Mark 1:15 and Eph. 1:9–10. These notes were provided by the German editor.
things. The following deliberation has only this much in common with philosophy, that it is not theology.

First a preliminary reference to the time that we encounter in everydayness, to the time of nature and of the world. Interest in what time is has been newly awakened in the present day by the development of research in physics and its reflection [Besinnung] on the basic principles of the kind of apprehending and defining that it performs: measuring nature within a system of space-time relations. The current state of this research is marked out by Einstein’s theory of relativity. Some of its propositions: “Space is nothing in itself; there is no absolute space. It exists only by way of the bodies and energies contained in it.” (An old proposition of Aristotle’s:)

“Time too is nothing. It persists only as a result of the events occurring in it. There is no absolute time, and also no absolute simultaneity.” The overtly destructive statement of this theory allows one to easily overlook its positive side, namely, its demonstration of the invariance of the equations that describe natural processes, over against arbitrary transformations.

“Time is that within which events take place and run their course.” This was already seen by Aristotle in conjunction with the basic kind of being that befits natural being: change [Veränderung], change of place, locomotion: ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐ κίνησις, ἀνέγγιξα τῆς κινήσεως τι εἶναι αὐτόν. “Since time is not itself motion, it must somehow have to do with motion.” Time is first encountered in changeable entities; change is in time. How is time found in this kind of encounter, namely, as the within-which of the changeable? Does it give itself here as itself in what it is? Can an explication of time that begins here guarantee that time will thereby yield, so to speak, the basic phenomena that define it in its very own be-ing? Or does the search for the grounds of the phenomena refer us to something else?

How do physicists encounter time? Their apprehension defining the time has the character of measuring. Measuring specifies the how-long and the when, the from-when-till-when. A clock shows the time. A clock is a physical system in which exactly the same temporal sequence is constantly repeated, as long as this physical system is not subject to change by any external influence. The repetition is cyclical. Each period has exactly the same temporal duration. The clock provides a constantly recurring equal duration, a duration to which one can always refer. The division of this constantly recurring stretch of duration is arbitrary. The clock measures time inasmuch as the stretch of the duration of an occurrence is com-

pared with equivalent sequences of the clock and from that is numerically determined in its “so much.”

What do we learn about time from the clock? Time is something in which a now-point can be arbitrarily fixed so that, in regard to two different points of time, one is always earlier and the other later. Thereby no now-point of time is privileged over any other. As a “now,” it is the possible earlier of a later, and as a “later,” it is the later of an earlier. This time is through and through uniform, homogeneous. Only in so far as it is constituted homogeneously is time measurable. Time is thus an unreeeling whose stages stand in a relation of earlier and later to one another. Each earlier and later is determinable from a now which, however, is itself arbitrary. If one goes to an event with a clock, then the clock makes the event explicit, but more with regard to its running its course in the now than with regard to the how-much of its duration. The primary determination achieved by the clock at any given time [jeweils] is not the declaration of how long or how much time transpired in the flowing present, but rather the fixing of the now at the time [jeweilig]. When I take out my watch, the first thing I say is: “It is now nine o’clock; thirty minutes since that happened. In three hours it will be twelve.”

This time now, as I look at my watch, what is this now? Now, as I do this; now, as the light goes out here, for example. What is the now? Is the now at my disposal? Am I the now? Is every other [person] the now? Time would indeed be I myself, and every other [person] would be time. And in our being with one another we would be time—everyone and no one. Am I the now, or only the one who is saying this? With or without an actual clock? Now, in the evening, in the morning, tonight, today: Here we come upon a “clock” that human Da-sein has from the beginning and all along assumed, the natural clock of the rhythmic change of day and night.

What relevance is there in the fact that human Da-sein has already provided itself with a clock before all pocket watches and sundials? Do I have the be-ing of time at my disposal, and do I in the now also mean myself? Am I myself the now and is my Da-sein time? Or is it in the end time itself that provides the clock in us

8. We begin by noting these first, incidental, idiomatic uses in the lecture of the family of German words that designate temporal individuation, and that Heidegger, in a formally indicative abstract coinage, Jeweiligkeit, will shortly make the central term guiding the formation of thought of this lecture. [In n. 3 above, the virtual synonymy of this abstraction with “Da-sein” was already underscored.] Some standard translations of this very flexible family of terms: jeweils, each time, at any given (particular) time; jeweilig, at the (that, its) time, for the time being; jedes, each; je, in each case (situation). For the latter, I prefer “in each instance (instantiation)” to suggest its connection with the later Heidegger’s Inständigkeit des Seins, Da-sein’s instantiation or “standing in” the context of be-ing. The contextual or hermeneutical thrust of such words, their indexical or occasional quality, is captured nicely by the extremely common colloquialism in conversational German, je nach dem, “it depends on the circumstances (situation), as the case may be, according to the context.”
for itself? Augustine, in the Eleventh Book of his *Confessions*, pursued the question to the point of asking whether spirit itself is time. And Augustine left the question at that. “In te, anime meus, tempora metior; noli mihi obstrepere: quod est; noli tibi obstrepere turbis affectionum tuarum. In te, inquam, tempora metior; affectionem quam res praeteruentes in te faciunt, et cum illae praetererint manet, ipsam metior praesentem, non eas quae praetererunt ut fieret: ipsam metior, cum tempora metior.” 9 To paraphrase: “In you, my spirit, I measure times; you I measure, thus I measure time. Do not cross me with the question: How is that? Do not mislead me into looking away from you through a false question. Do not obstruct your own path by confounding what may well concern you yourself. In you, I say again and again, I measure time; the things encountered transitorily bring you into a disposition [*Befindlichkeit*] that remains, while those things disappear. The disposition I measure in my present Da-sein, and not the things that pass by and pass over in order that this disposition may first arise. *My very finding myself disposed, I repeat, is what I measure when I measure time.*

The question of what time is has referred our deliberations in the direction of Da-sein, if by Da-sein we mean that entity familiar to us in its be-ing as human life; this entity in *each particular while*10 of its be-ing, the entity that each of us ourselves is, that each of us finds in the ground assertion “I am.” The assertion “I am” is the proper assertion of be-ing pertaining to the Da-sein of human being. This entity is in each particular while mine.

But was this complicated deliberation necessary in order to arrive at Da-sein? Is it not enough to point out that acts of consciousness, psychic processes, are in time—even when these acts are directed toward something that is not itself defined by time? This is a detour. But what matters in the question of time is to arrive at an answer from which the various ways of being temporal become comprehensible, as well as to let a possible connection of that which is in time with proper temporality to become evident from the start.


10. *Jeweiligkeit*, underscored by the German editor. If we ignore the abstract suffix for the time being, the word is a contraction of *jede Weile*, “each (particular) while,” our preferred translation. In abstraction, it combines the distributive note of “eachness” and the temporally particular note of “whileness,” each a possible translation of the abstract term. When translated abstractly, however, we will usually endeavor to convey both notes in the same sentence. “Each” is to be taken in the strong sense of a distributive universal that refers to its particulars as unique individuals that vary the universal notes to accord with their individual indexical occasional context. This hermeneutical, temporally properizing “each” is in no way to be conflated with the common generic universal “all,” which subdivides into equally common species. See n. 8 above.
Natural time as something long familiar and much discussed has hitherto provided the ground for the explication of time. If human be-ing is in time in an outstanding sense, so that we can read off from it what time is, then this Da-sein must be characterized in the basic determinations of its be-ing. Indeed, be-ing temporal, rightly understood, would have to be the fundamental assertion of Da-sein with regard to its be-ing. Yet even here a preliminary indication [Anzeige] of several basic structures of Da-sein itself is required.

1. Da-sein is that entity which is characterized as being-in-the-world. Human life is not some sort of a subject that needs to perform some sleight-of-hand in order to come into the world. Da-sein as being-in-the-world means: being in the world in such a way that this be-ing means: having to do with the world, sojourning within it in the routines of working, of managing and taking care of things, but also of examining, interrogating, and determining them by way of examination and comparison. Being-in-the-world is characterized as concern.

2. As this being-in-the-world, Da-sein is simultaneously being-with-one-another, being with others: having the same world there with others, meeting one another, being with one another in the manner of being-for-one-another. Yet this Da-sein is at the same time a being extant and on hand for others, just as a stone is there without having a world or a concern for it.

3. Being with one another in the world, having this world as being with one another, is defined by a distinctive determination of be-ing. The basic way of the Da-sein of the world, having it there with one another, is speaking. Fully seen, speaking is: oneself speaking out in speaking with another about something. It is predominantly in speaking that human being-in-the-world takes place and plays itself out [sich abspielt]. Aristotle already knew that. How Da-sein in its world speaks about its way of having to do with its world already includes a self-interpretation of Da-sein. It expresses how Da-sein understands itself in each instantiation for the time being [jeweilig], how it takes itself to be. In speaking with one another, in what one thus circulates in conversing, implicit in this colloquial round of conversation, lies the particular self-interpretation of the present in particular currency at any given time [jeweils].

4. Da-sein is an entity that defines itself as “I am.” Each particular while [Jeweiligkeit] of the “I am” is constitutive for each Da-sein. Just as primarily as it is being-in-the-world, Dasein is therefore also my Da-sein. It is in each instantiation its own and, as its own while, each its own time. If this entity is to be defined in its character of be-ing, then we must not abstract from each whileness [Jeweiligkeit] as in each instantiation mine. Mea res agitur. All basic characters must therefore converge in each particular while as in each instantiation mine [je meinigen].

11. "My life is at stake.” Translated non-idiomatically and verbatim: “My thing is being
5. Insofar as Da-sein is an entity that I am, and is at once defined as being-with-one-another, I for the most part and on average am not myself my Da-sein, rather I am the others; I am with the others, and the others are equally with the others. No one is himself in everydayness. What he is and how he is, is nobody: no one and yet everyone with one another. Everyone is not himself. This nobody by whom we ourselves are lived in everydayness is the “Everyone.” Everyone says so, everyone has heard that, everyone is for it, concerned about it. The obstinate persistence of the dominion of this everyone holds the possibilities of my Da-sein. Out of this leveling-down, the “I am” is possible. An entity that is the possibility of the “I am” is as such mostly an entity that everyone is.

6. The entity thus characterized is one to whom its be-ing matters in its everyday being-in-the-world in its particular while. Just as all speaking about the world implies Da-sein itself speaking out about itself, so all concernful having-to-do with things is a concern for the be-ing of Da-sein. I myself am to a certain extent that with which I have to do, that with which I occupy myself, that to which my profession chains me; it is in these that my Da-sein plays itself out and runs its course. The care for Da-sein has in each particular while [jeweils] placed be-ing into my care as it is familiar and understood in the prevalent interpretation of Da-sein.

7. The averageness of everyday Da-sein does not imply a reflection [Reflexion] upon the ego or the self, and nevertheless Da-sein has itself. It finds itself with itself, intimately disposed to itself. It comes across itself there in that with which it commonly has to do.

8. As an entity, Da-sein cannot be proven, nor can it can even be pointed out. The primary relation to Da-sein is not that of seeing but of “be-ing it.” Experiencing itself, like speaking about itself or self-interpretation, is only one particular outstanding way in which each Da-sein has itself at the time, for a while [jeweils]. On the average the interpretation of Da-sein is dominated by everydayness, by what one traditionally says about Da-sein and human life. It is dominated by the “Everyone,” by tradition.

The indication [Anzeige] of all of these characters of be-ing stands entirely under the presupposition that this entity is in itself accessible to an investigation that is to interpret it with regard to its be-ing. Is this presupposition correct, or can it be shaken? As a matter of fact it can, but not by appealing to the fact that a psychological consideration of Da-sein leads to obscurity. A far more serious difficulty than the fact that human knowledge is limited must be made evident, indeed such that, precisely in not evading our predicament, we bring ourselves into the possibility of grasping Da-sein in the propriety [Eigentlichkeit] of its be-ing.

enacted.” Note that Heidegger returns to this very same “thing,” res, central issue, matter of concern, the pressing matter of time, die Sache selbst, as an impersonal res beyond my control, in his concluding remarks that raise the question, “Am I my time?”
The propriety of Da-sein is what constitutes its most extreme possibility of be-ing. Da-sein is primarily defined by this outermost possibility of Da-sein. Propriety as the most extreme possibility of Da-sein’s be-ing is that determination of be-ing in which all of the above mentioned characters are what they are. The predicament of apprehending Da-sein is grounded not in the limitation, uncertainty, or imperfection of our cognitive faculty, but in the very entity to be known, in a ground possibility of its be-ing.

Among other characters, we identified the [distributive] definition: Each Da-sein is in its particular while [Je-weiligkeit]: insofar as it is what it can be, it is in each instantiation mine. This definition is thoroughgoing, total, constitutive for this be-ing. Those who would strike it out have lost what they are thematically talking about.

Yet how is this entity to be known in its be-ing before it has come to its end? After all, I am always still underway with my Da-sein. It is still always something that is not yet finished, at an end. In the end, if it has really gone that far, it is no more. Before this end, it never really, properly, is what it can be; and when it is that, then it is no more.

Can the Da-sein of others not take the place of Da-sein in the proper sense? News of the Da-sein of others who were with me and who have come to their end is very bad news. One day they are no more. The end of their Da-sein would indeed be the nothing. For this reason the Da-sein of others cannot take the place of Da-sein in its proper sense, if in any case its particular whileness as in each instance mine is to be maintained. I never have the Da-sein of the other in an original way, in the singular appropriate way of having Da-sein: I never am the other.

The less we are in a hurry to sneak away unnoticed from this predicament, the longer we endure it, the more clearly it becomes evident: Da-sein shows itself in its most extreme possibility precisely at the sticking point that creates this difficulty for Da-sein. The end of my Da-sein, my death, is not some point at which a course of events one day breaks off; it is rather a possibility that Da-sein [already] knows about in one way or another: the most extreme possibility of itself, which it can grasp and make its own as imminent, looming before it. Da-sein has in itself the possibility to join with its death as the outermost possibility of itself. This most extreme possibility of be-ing has in its imminence the character of certainty, and this certainty for its part is characterized by a total indefiniteness. The self-exposition of Da-sein which in certainty and propriety surpasses every other statement is the exposition of its death in terms of its death: the indefinite certainty of its ownmost possibility of being-at-an-end [Zu-Ende-sein].

What does this have to do with our question, “What is time?,” and especially with the immediate question, “What is Da-sein in time?” Each Da-sein, ever in the particular whileness [Jeweiligkeit] of what is in each instantiation my [jem einigen] Da-sein, knows of its death and does so even when it wants to know nothing of it.
What does it mean to have, in each particular instance [je] of the “my,” my own death? It is Da-sein’s forerunning to its being gone [Vorbei], to a most extreme possibility of itself that stands before it, imminent, in certainty and absolute indefiniteness. Da-sein as human life is primarily being possible, the being of the possibility of its certain but indefinite being gone.\footnote{Das Vorbei, the “being gone;” the adverb vorbei temporally also connotes being over, past in the sense of passed by, gone by, bygone. The idiomatic “having passed away” also has possibilities. The Italian translation is il non-più, the no-more, and the French is le révolu, the accomplished, completed, finished, elapsed, ended. This adverbial noun for a “goner” and state of goneness will in Being and Time disappear in favor of “being-at-an-end;” a phrase already equated with it in this lecture, which in turn is itself quickly displaced by the more active “being towards the end” (BT, 234 n., 245–46).}

The being of possibility here is thereby always the possibility of knowing of death, for the most part in the sense of “Yes, I already know, but I don’t think about it.” Mostly, I know of death in a kind of knowing that shrinks back. As an expository interpretation of Da-sein, this knowing is ever ready to dissemble this possibility of its being. Da-sein itself has the possibility of evading its own death.

This being gone, as that to which I forerun, brings about a discovery in my thus forerunning to it: it is my being gone. As thus being gone, it uncovers my Da-sein as all at once no longer there; all of a sudden I am no longer there in the midst of such and such matters and affairs, intimate with such and such people, surrounded by these vanities, these subterfuges, this verbosity. This being gone dissipates all secrecies and busyness, it takes everything with it into the nothing. Being gone is not some occurrence, not some chance incident in my Da-sein. It is its own being gone, not some “what” about it, some event that by chance befalls Da-sein and alters it. This being gone is not a “what,” but a “how,” indeed the proper “how” of my Da[-sein].\footnote{The Buchner transcript varies from the Haecker transcript in speaking only of the Da at this point, the “there,” suggesting that Heidegger was at least intoning the high-frequency word Da-sein, perhaps throughout this portion of the talk, to convey its separable etymological sense.} This being gone, which I can forerun as my very own, is not some “what,” but the “how” of my Da-sein pure and simple.

Inasmuch as forerunning to this being gone holds this in the how of the particular while, each Da-sein itself becomes visible in its how. Running ahead to this being gone is at once Da-sein’s running up against its most extreme possibility; and insofar as this “running up against” is serious, Da-sein in this running is thrown back into itself as “still being here” [Nach-dasein]. This is Da-sein’s coming back to its everydayness that it still is, such that being gone as the proper how also uncovers everydayness in its how, takes it in its bustle and its busyness back into its how. Being gone thus brings every what, all care-taking and plan-making, back into the how.

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12. Das Vorbei, the “being gone;” the adverb vorbei temporally also connotes being over, past in the sense of passed by, gone by, bygone. The idiomatic “having passed away” also has possibilities. The Italian translation is il non-più, the no-more, and the French is le révolu, the accomplished, completed, finished, elapsed, ended. This adverbial noun for a “goner” and state of goneness will in Being and Time disappear in favor of “being-at-an-end;” a phrase already equated with it in this lecture, which in turn is itself quickly displaced by the more active “being towards the end” (BT, 234 n., 245–46).

13. The Buchner transcript varies from the Haecker transcript in speaking only of the Da at this point, the “there,” suggesting that Heidegger was at least intoning the high-frequency word Da-sein, perhaps throughout this portion of the talk, to convey its separable etymological sense.
This being-gone-from, as the how, brings Da-sein unrelentingly into its singular possibility of itself, allowing it to stand totally alone, all by itself. Being gone has the capacity to place Da-sein, in the midst of the glory of its everydayness, into uncanniness. Insofar as it holds before Da-sein its outermost possibility, the forerun itself is the fundamental actualization and fulfillment of the expository interpretation of Da-sein. The forerun lays hold of the fundamental regard in which Da-sein sets itself and at the same time shows that the ground category of this entity [“be-ing here”] is its how.

Perhaps it is not an accident that Kant defined the ground principle of his ethics such that we call it formal. Perhaps he knew from a familiarity with Da-sein that it itself is the how. It remained for present-day prophets to organize Da-sein in such a way that the how gets covered up.

Da-sein is properly close to itself, it is truly existent, whenever it holds itself in this forerunning. This forerunning is nothing but the proper and singular future of one’s own Da-sein. In forerunning, Da-sein is its future such that in this being futural it comes back to its past and present. Da-sein, conceived in its outermost possibility of be-ing, is time itself and not in time. Being futural characterized in this way, as the proper how of being temporal, is Da-sein’s way of be-ing, in which and out of which it gives itself its time. By holding myself close to my being gone in forerunning, I have time. All idle chatter and all of that in which such idle chatter sustains itself, namely, all restlessness, all busyness, all noise and all running around, now breaks down. To have no time means to project time into the cheap present of the everyday. Being futural gives time, cultivates the present and lets the past be repeated in the how of its being-lived.

Time viewed in this way thus means that the ground phenomenon of time is the future. In order to see this and not sell it as an interesting paradox, each Dasein in its own particular while must hold itself in its forerunning. In this forerunning it becomes clear that the original way of having to do with time is not a measuring. The coming back that occurs in forerunning is itself the how of that concern in which I am leisurely “whiling” [verweilen]. This coming back can never become what one calls “long-whiling” [langweilig], a boring time that is being spent, used up, wasted. Each whileness is distinctive in that, from forerunning into proper

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14. The bilingual English translation, going beyond the original German, here succumbs to temptation and hyphenates ver-weile while (!) translating it as “tarrying,” as it were, “whiling away the time,” in preparation for a discussion of the boring, langweilig in the German. In the Heideggerian thesaurus, verweilen, leisurely lingering, is synonymous with another favorite word of his for the central theme of quality “dwelling” or living, namely, sich aufhalten, staying awhile, “holding up” for a while (say, on earth), abiding. The English “sojourning” brings in the note of living daily (à la journée) as well as journeying in one place. Heidegger’s question is aimed primarily at the quality (the “how”) of this time and be-ing, living, dwelling, whiling.
time, the whiling has in each of its instantiations all the time for itself. Time never becomes long or boring because it originally has no length. Forerunning to . . . falls apart if it is understood as a question of the “when” of it and the “how much longer” to being gone, because inquiries about being gone in terms of “how much longer” and “when” are not at all internal to being gone as this possibility has been characterized. Such questions cling precisely to the “I’m not gone yet!” and busy themselves with what might possibly still remain for me. Such questioning does not grasp the indefiniteness of the certainty of being gone, but instead wishes to define indefinite time. This questioning wants to flee from what being gone in itself is, namely, indefinite, and as indefinite, certain. Such questioning is so little a forerunning toward being gone that it organizes straightaway the characteristically direct flight from ever being gone.

Forerunning takes up being gone as the proper possibility of every moment of decision [Augenblick], choosing it as what is now certain. Being futural, as a possibility of each Da-sein in its particular while, gives time, because it is time itself. Inasmuch as futurity is properly time, it at once becomes evident that the question of how much time, how long, and when, must remain inappropriate to such time. The only appropriate assertion would be to say, “Time proper really has no time to calculate time.”

Yet we first got to know Da-sein, which itself is to be time, in its reckoning with time and even measuring it with the clock. Da-sein is there with the clock even when it is only the immediate everyday clock of day and night. Da-sein reckons and asks about the “how much” of time, and thus appears unfamiliar with time in its proper being. Thus asking about the “when” and “how much,” Da-sein loses its time. What is it with this asking that loses time? Where does time go? The Da-sein that reckons with time and lives with a watch in its hand—it is precisely this time-reckoning Da-sein that continually says “I have no time.” Does it not thereby betray itself in what it makes of time, inasmuch as it is in fact time itself? Losing time and getting a clock to do it! Does not the uncanniness of Da-sein start here?

The question of the when of the indefinite being gone, and in general of the how-much of time, is the question of what is still left for me, of how much of a present I still have. To bring time into the how-much means to take time as the now of the present. Asking “How much time?” means to become absorbed in the concern for a present what. Da-sein flees from the how and attaches itself to the particular what present “at the time” [jeweilige]. Da-sein is what it is concerned with. Thus, Da-sein is its present. Everything encountered in the world is encountered by a Da-sein that is sojourning in the now. It thus encounters the time that Da-sein itself in each instance of Da-sein [je] is, but is as present.

Concern as absorption in the present is, as care, nevertheless familiar with a not-yet that is to be brought to a close only by taking care of it. Even in the present of its concern, Dasein is “full time,” the whole of time, so much so that it is
never done with the future. The future is now that which care hangs on to—not
the proper being-futural of being gone, but the future that the present itself culti-
vates for itself as its own, since being gone as the proper future can never become
present. If it could, it would be nothing, [i.e., gone]. The futurity that care hangs
on to is such thanks to the present. And Da-sein, absorbed as it is in the now of
the present world, wants so little to admit that it has slipped away from proper fu-
turity that it says it has grasped the future out of concern for the development of
humanity, culture, and the like.

Da-sein as the concernful present dwells in what concerns it. It grows weary
in the what, and sick and tired of filling up the days. For the Da-sein that is its pres-
ent and never has time, time suddenly becomes long. Time becomes empty be-
cause Da-sein, by asking the question of quantity, “how much,” has all along made
time long, while the constant comeback to forerunning toward being gone never
becomes monotonous, “long-whiling,” boring. In its own present, Da-sein contin-
ually wants to meet something new. In everydayness, current world events [the
“news”] are encountered in time, in the present. The everyday lives by the clock,
which means that concern unceasingly comes back to the now, talks without end
about the now: “in a moment now,” “from now until then,” “till the next now.”

Da-sein, defined as being-with-one-another, at the same time means being
guided by the prevailing interpretation that Da-sein gives of itself; being led by
what everyone says, by modes and fashions and trends, by whatever happens to be
“going on”: the trend that no one is, whatever is modish: nobody. In everydayness
Da-sein is not the be-ing that I am [in each proper instantiation], the everydayness
of Da-sein is rather that be-ing that everyone is [the generic common “all”]. Da-sein
is accordingly the time in which everyone is with one another, “everyone’s” time.
The clock that everyone has, each and every clock, shows the time of being-with-
one-another-in-the-world.

Connected with such phenomena are certain relevant but still totally ob-
scure phenomena that we encounter in historical research, such as the phenome-
na of generations and of generational continuity. The clock shows us the now,
but no clock ever [je] shows the future nor has ever [je] shown the past [particu-
larly indicated in such phenomena]. All measuring of time means bringing time
into the how-much. If by the clock I determine the future arrival of an event, I do
not really mean the future. Rather, what I determine is how long I now have to
wait until the now meant is now. The time made accessible by a clock is seen as
present time. If one tries to derive what time is from the time of nature, then the νῶ
[now] is the μέτρον [measure] of the past and future. Then time is already in-
terpreted as the present, the past is interpreted as the no-longer-present, the future
as the indefinite not-yet-present: the past is irretrievable, the future is indefinite.

Accordingly, everydayness speaks of itself as that within which nature is con-
stantly encountered. [Natural] occurrences are in time; but this does not mean
that they have time. Rather, in that they occur and are there, they are encountered as running right through a present. This time of the present is explicated as a sequence that continually rolls on through the now, a succession whose sense of direction is said to be unique and irreversible. All that occurs rolls out of an endless future into an irretrievable past.

This interpretation is characterized by two features: 1) irreversibility; 2) the homogenization of now-points.

Irreversibility incorporates what this explication can still retrieve from proper time. It is what is left over from futurity as the ground phenomenon of time as Da-sein. This way of looking at time looks away from the future into the present, from which it follows time flying into the past. The definition of time in its irreversibility finds its ground in time already having been reversed.

Homogenization is an assimilation of time to space, to Präsenz pure and simple; it is the tendency to force all time out of itself into a present. Time becomes fully mathematized and becomes the fourth coordinate t next to the spatial coordinates x, y, z. Time is irreversible. This irreversibility is the single vestige in which time still asserts itself as “time,” the only way in which it resists a definitive mathematization. Before and after are not necessarily earlier and later, are not modes of temporality. In the series of numbers, for example, the 3 is before the 4, the 8 after the 7. But this does make the 3 earlier than the 4 nor the 8 later than the 7. Numbers are not earlier or later, because they are not as such in time. Earlier and later is a very specific before and after. Once time is defined as clock time, it then becomes hopeless of ever (re)gaining its original meaning.

That time is first and foremost defined in this way nonetheless resides in Da-sein itself, for which each particular while [Je-weiligkeit] is constitutive. Da-sein is mine in its propriety only as possible Da-sein, being-there. Da-sein is mostly there in everydayness. But everydayness as the particular temporality which flees from futurity, itself can only be understood when it is confronted with the proper time of the futural being of being gone. What Da-sein says about time is expressed out of everydayness. Hanging on to its present Da-sein says: the past is the bygone, and in being gone it is irretrievable. This is the past of the present of the everyday that sojourns in the present of its busyness. Da-sein as a present defined in this way accordingly does not truly see what is past.

The study of history that thrives in the present only sees history as irrecoverable activity and busyness: what once went on. The examination of what once had gone on is inexhaustible. It gets lost in its material. Because this history and temporality of the present does not get at the past at all, it merely has another present. A past remains closed off from a present as long as such a present, Da-sein, is not itself historical. But Da-sein is in itself historical insofar as it is its possibility. In being futural Da-sein is its past, coming back to it in the how. The manner [how] of coming back to it is, among other ways, conscience. Only the how is repeatable. A
past—experienced as proper historicality—is anything but “dead and gone.” It is something to which I can return time and again.

The present generation thinks it is really into *sei bei* history, it even thinks it is supercharged with history. It bewails its historicism—*lucus a non lucendo*. Something is called history that is not history at all. Since everything gets merged into history, one must (so says the present) return to the supra-historical. It is not enough that Da-sein today has lost itself in the pseudo-history of the present, it must also use the last vestige of its temporality (i.e., of Da-sein) in order to slip out of time entirely, out of Da-sein. And it is upon this imaginary path to supra-historicality that one presumes to find “*the* worldview.” (This is the disquieting uncanniness that constitutes the present age.)

The common interpretation of Da-sein is threatened by the menace and danger of relativism. But the angst of relativism is the angst of Da-sein. A past as proper history is repeatable in the how. *The possibility of access to history is grounded in the possibility according to which a particular present each time [jeweils] understands how, in each instantiation, to be futural. This is the first principle of all hermeneutics.* It says something about the be-ing of Da-sein, which is historicality itself. Philosophy will never get to the bottom of what history is as long as it dissects history as an object of methodological examination. The mystery of history resides in what it means to *be* historical.

In summary, we can now say: time is Da-sein. Da-sein is my particular whileness, and this instantiation can be its whileness in being futural by forerunning its certain but indefinite being gone. Da-sein is always in one of its possible modes of being temporal. Da-sein is time, time is temporal. Da-sein is not time, but temporality. The ground assertion, *time is temporal*, is therefore the most proper definition. It is not a tautology because the be-ing of temporality signifies an unequal, differing actuality. Da-sein is its being gone, it is its possibility in forerunning this being gone. In this forerunning I am properly time, I have time. Insofar as time is in each instantiation mine, there are many times. *The* time is meaningless, time is temporal.

If time is thus understood as Da-sein, then for the first time the meaning of the traditional assertion about time becomes clear: time is the proper *principium individuationis*. This is mostly understood as irreversible succession, as the time of the present and the time of nature. But to what extent is time, as proper time, the principle of individuation, i.e., that out of which each Dasein is in its unique whileness? In the futural being of forerunning, each Da-sein, which [first and foremost] is in the average and common and ordinary, becomes itself. In forerunning it becomes visible as the unique this-time-here-and-now and once-and-for-all [*Diesmaligkeit*] of its unique fate in the possibility of its one-and-only being gone. What is peculiar about this individuation is that it does not allow for any individuation
that would involve the imaginary cultivation of exceptional existences. It disclaims any attempt to make exceptions. It individuates in a way that makes all equal. In our being together with death each is brought into the how that each can be in equal measure; into a possibility in relation to which no one is [exceptionally] distinguished; into the how in which every what is pulverized.

Let us conclude with a test sample of historicality and the possibility of repeating. Aristotle in his writings often tended to emphasize that the most important thing is the right παιδεία, the original security in a matter arising from a familiarity with the matter itself [die Sache selbst], the security of the appropriate way of coping with the matter. In order to be responsive to the character-of-being of the theme being handled here, we must talk temporally about time. We want to repeat the question “What is time?” temporally. Time is the how. When we inquire into what time is, we should not hastily latch onto an answer (time is such and such), which always implies a what.

Let us not regard the answer but instead repeat the question. What happened to the question? It has transformed itself. “What is time?” turned into the question “Who is time?” More precisely: Are we ourselves time? Still more precisely: Am I time? Or closer still: Am I my time? With this latter question I come closest to the matter at issue, and if I understand the question correctly, it is then taken in its total seriousness. Such questioning is therefore the most appropriate way of access to time and of coping with time as in each instantiation mine. Da-sein would then be [itself]: being questionable.

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15. Noch näher: bin ich die Zeit? This sentence is taken from the Buchner transcript. It is not in the Haecker transcript and is “passed over” in the published German edition.
17. Being-There and Being-True
According to Aristotle

The text in this chapter is a free but accurate English translation of Heidegger’s talk in December of 1924 as recorded in an auditor’s typescript that was discovered by Thomas Sheehan among the papers of Heidegger’s early student, Franz-Josef Brecht. This Cologne address of late 1924, whose announced title was “Dasein und Wahrsein nach Aristoteles (Interpretation von Buch VI der Nikomachischen Ethik),” is based to a large extent on an earlier manuscript drafted by Heidegger during his first Marburg semester in “1923/4” under the title “Wahrsein und Dasein (Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea Z),” which is slated for publication in GA 80. Heidegger divides his handwritten manuscript into three sections, and adds a fourth section title to suggest the fundamental direction that his concluding (but never written) remarks would be taking:

This English translation of a talk given by Heidegger to the Kant Society at the University of Cologne in December of 1924 is based on a transcript made by an unknown auditor of the speech, which was discovered by Thomas Sheehan in typescript from among the holdings of Heidegger’s early student, Franz Josef Brecht. The typescript of the Cologne address bears the title, “Dasein und Wahrsein nach Aristoteles (Interpretationen von Buch VI [der] Nikomachischen Ethik),” which virtually matches the announced title of a “lecture series” that Heidegger was scheduled to deliver to the local Kant Societies of six German cities in the Ruhr-Rhine region on December 1–8, 1924: see the program announcement in Kant-Studien 29 (1924), 626. Fragmentary evidence indicates that this “Ruhr-Rede” (Ruhr-Talk) was in fact delivered in only some of these cities and that the reported date of delivery of the “Cologne address” within this series ranges from December 2 (Tuesday) to 4, 1924, which may therefore have been the dates of Heidegger’s reported visit with Max Scheler in Cologne: see Kant-Studien 30 (1925), 611–12, 616 and Kisiel, Genesis, 539 n. 1.

A free English translation of the Cologne address, serving to overcome some of the deficiencies of the extant transcript, has been made especially for this volume by Brian Hansford Bowles, who also provides an in-depth introduction to its operative concepts and a series of explanatory notes. This is preceded by a preliminary editorial note by Theodore Kisiel, which outlines the archival evidence for this “Ruhr-Rede” and the extant textual basis that facilitated the interpretation of the Cologne address as well as providing the means for structuring, filling out, and supplementing the English translation of the rough German transcript.

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I. Urteil – Rede – Wahrsein [also “Rede und ‘Urteil’ (λόγος)].  
II. Wahrsein und Dasein.  
III. Die Weisen des Wahrseins und seine ausgezeichneten Möglichkeiten.  
IV. Wahrsein – Dasein – Sein und die Aufgabe einer Ontologie.

We have accordingly divided the text of the December address at the appropriate stages with similar section titles in English.

Appended to this English rendition of the Cologne address is a paraphrase of Heidegger’s initial summary of Aristotle’s Rhetoric that concludes section I of the “1923–1924” manuscript, which is somewhat richer in its phenomenological detail than the later sketchier version presented in the course of the talk. It is on the basis of his deliberations on the everyday language of rhetoric that Heidegger, for the very first time in these two related texts, proceeds to list the three modes of the concealment of being, which he will then repeat in ever refined versions in the courses of WS 1924–1925 and SS 1925 and finally in Being and Time itself (BT, 35–36). Unique to Heidegger’s manuscript of 1923–1924 is a list, immediately following this very first listing of a threefold concealment of being (see section II below), of the three corresponding un-concealments possible to Dasein. In view of the clarifying nature of this latter list, especially in overtly attributing both concealment and unconcealment to the duplicitous nature of speech (λόγος), it is also outlined in the appendix below.

Significantly, Heidegger’s handwritten manuscript on “Wahrsein und Dasein” (1923–1924) is, in the Heidegger archive in Marbach, filed in the same folder as the various versions of the pivotal lecture, “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,” first delivered in 1930. This archival fact suggests the kinship of these later lectures with the early “Ruhr-talk,” which, in its similar movement from judgment to Dasein to unconcealment, can be regarded as the precursor to all of these “truth talks.”

Max Scheler’s extant notebook from that day in Cologne not only records the basic flow of the concepts of the address in outline form but also indicates that the talk took place on Wednesday, December 3, 1924, in the context of the founding of the local group of the Kantgesellschaft, with Scheler named as its chair. I wish to thank Manfred Frings for access to this confirming evidence from the Max Scheler Archives (item B1/136). See also Kant-Studien 29 (1924), 626; 30 (1925), 616, 611–12; the 1924 issue announces a tour schedule with dates from December 1 to 8, 1924, of six cities in the Ruhr-Rhine valley in which the talk on “Dasein und Wahrsein” was to be delivered at the local Kant Societies; whence the acronym “Ruhr-Rede” (“Ruhr-Talk”).

A final remark on the English title of this chapter: Throughout this collection and thus also in this chapter, we have adhered to the convention of leaving untranslated Heidegger’s particular “ontological” usage of the term, Dasein (usually “existence”), in referring to the unique human situation of “finding ourselves here,
thrown into the world.” But we have also noted that, as early as the talk on time in July 1924 (chap. 16), Heidegger began to orally underscore the etymological roots of the term *Da-sein* as “Being-here, Being-there,” to convey his special ontological usage. The same orally alliterative intonation is thus meant to be conveyed by the English “Being-There and Being-True According to Aristotle.” Brian Bowles makes the further case (in n. 2 below, based on remarks by the later Heidegger) that, especially in an Aristotelian context, the more appropriate title would be “Being-Open and Being-True According to Aristotle.”

Theodore Kisiel

**Introduction to the Cologne Address**

In this address we find Heidegger raising the question of the proper locus of truth as such and thus concomitantly the question of where truth is most originally rooted in human existence. Concerning the first question, Heidegger begins by distancing himself from the tradition, which claims that judgment is the locus of truth, and maintains instead that truth (*ἀλήθεια, unhiddenness*) belongs foremost to entities (φαινόμενα) themselves as they are encountered. As phenomena, entities “show themselves” (φαίνεσθαι). But this in turn points to the second question insofar as such “self-showing” entails an entity (i.e., the human) with a mode of being that enables it to “see” the phenomena, that is, a mode of being that is essentially open to the appearing of the phenomena. Heidegger thus attempts to articulate the possibility of the conjunction of the self-showing of the phenomena and the being of the human as receptive of such showing. In other words, he asks how the openness (i.e., *Dasein*) of human being originally discloses entities in terms of their be-

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1. In addition to this address, see *Being and Time*, § 7A (p. 28) and § 44 (p. 219). See also Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* IX.10.

2. As support for equating “openness” with “Dasein,” we cite two statements by the later Heidegger:


   b) There is also a statement made by Heidegger in the fifties, which is found in his *Zollikoner Seminare*, ed. Medard Boss (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1987), 156–57: “Das Da-sein in *Sein und Zeit* nicht eine Ortsangabe für ein Seiendes, sondern soll die Offenheit nennen, in der für den Menschen Seiendes anwesend sein kann, auch er selbst für sich
ing. His response to this question unfolds by way of an interpretation of Aristotle. According to Heidegger, Aristotle saw that truth, while primarily belonging to the things themselves, is also a determination of the soul (ἀληθεύει, see Nicomachean Ethics VI.3.1149b15). But Aristotle’s insight has gotten covered over by the tradition, which has uprooted from its soil in the essence of man the truth proper to human existence and transplanted it into the foreign ground of judgment. What Heidegger sets out to demonstrate is that truth belongs to Dasein as such; that is, Dasein discloses (ἡ ψυχή ἀληθεύει). Consequently, we have the title of the address: Dasein and Wahrsein according to or thought in the manner of (nach) Aristotle.

Heidegger’s investigations here lead him to a consideration of the connection between “truth” and “being,” i.e., between the unhiddenness of entities (ἀλήθεια, Unverborgenheit) and the being of entities (οὐσία, Anwesenheit). Thematically paralleling Heidegger’s wish to proceed from concealment to an original unconcealing of the issue of truth are the two texts of Aristotle that come to the fore in the address: Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics VI. Since Aristotle’s Rhetoric deals not with philosophical statements but with the everyday mode of public discourse and its mode of concealing and unconcealing, Heidegger’s focus on it is only preliminary. Such everyday discourse does not attempt anything like a proper uncovering of entities in their being—it is not about ἀληθεύειν in its proper sense. Rather, “rhetoric” or everyday discourse deals with how to persuade and to shape particular, common opinions [δόξα, Ansichten] about the world such as to incite the listener to a particular action. Everyday discourse is, therefore, inherently empathic: the speaker strives to conduct the listener to a specific way of “seeing” the world and of acting in it. Consequently, everyday discourse has its τέλος or completion in the listener and not in showing something purely as it is in itself. This is the mode of λόγος in which everyday human life primarily and for the most part functions; and while the openness [Dasein] of human being entails that we essentially are “in truth,” the investigation into rhetoric or everyday discourse reveals that human beings essentially are also “in untruth,” i.e., fail to properly uncover entities. In everyday discourse, beings are for the most part hidden.

Following convention, I have left Heidegger’s term “Dasein” untranslated throughout this 1924 address, while noting the particular passages in this Aristotelian context that strongly suggest such an identification of Dasein (the human soul) with “being-true” (ἀληθεύειν), discoveredness, disclosedness, openness, either by way of an explanatory note or simply marked with an asterisk in brackets [*].

3. According to Kisiel, the first draft (1923–1924) of this address marks the first time that Heidegger equates οὐσία with presence, at least in the extant archival record. See Kisiel, Genesis, esp. 281 and 283.
But, says Aristotle, the possibility persists that a λόγος or statement will be disclosive or ἀποφαντικός in a broad sense. Considered broadly, then, ἀποφαίνεσθαι means taking things out of their hiddenness—the τέλος of such a λόγος consists in letting something be seen-as this or that. Ἁλέθεια as λόγος is the basic mode of comportment of Dasein as disclosive. What is essential about such a disclosive possibility of λόγος is not that it “gets it right” regarding the entity it takes out of hiddenness, but rather that it shows the entity at all.

After analyzing Aristotle’s rhetoric as the “logic” of everyday discourse, Heidegger turns to Nicomachean Ethics VI and asks about the kind of unconcealing that is enacted in the so-called “intellectual virtues” (perhaps rendered more accurately from the perspective of ἀληθεύειν as “the most unconcealing λόγος-modes”). Heidegger follows Aristotle in distinguishing these ἀρεταί—“virtues” qua modes of authentically disclosing—according to two viewpoints: 1) according to the kind of beings they uncover, namely, whether they are beings that always are the way they are, or whether they can be otherwise than they now are; and 2) according to how these “virtues” uncover the entities, that is, whether or not they fully uncover the entities in their being—or, in other words, in terms of their ἀρχή and τέλος.

For those entities that most fully are—those that are unchanging in their mode of being—the ἀρχή and τέλος are given at the same time. The ἀρχή is that which always already is present or available, i.e.,, unhidden. It is the underlying, the ὑποκείμενον. In terms of production, it is what precedes the product as already on hand and thus not needing to be produced. In terms of understanding, it is what allows the entity to be understood as it most properly is. The most fundamental and highest form of uncovering is the ἀληθεύειν that reveals and maintains an entity in its ἀρχή and τέλος. Thus, in the most proper sense uncovering an entity in its being means revealing it and understanding it as it always already is. And what is in the fullest sense is also what can be uncovered in the most proper sense.

From this it becomes apparent in the address that the Greeks understood “to be” as meaning “to be available,” “to be present to a possible understanding” (Anwesenheit). Accordingly, what is in the fullest and most proper sense is that which is most available to possible understanding. Aristotle chooses the word ὀντία— which also means “what is present” or “what is immediately available”—to name this most proper mode of being as being present or available for understanding. Through this turn to Aristotle, Heidegger’s analysis results in articulating the connection between truth and being by showing the relation of truth as unconcealedness to being as presence.

The address ends with a programmatic sketch of the task of contemporary philosophy and is followed by a discussion between Heidegger and Scheler. For a much fuller account of the conception of truth mined by Heidegger from Aristotle, see the two courses that coincide with the composition and delivery of the
address, namely, the course on Aristotle’s fundamental concepts (SS 1924) and
the course on Plato’s *Sophist* (WS 1924–1925).

Brian Hansford Bowles

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**Being-There and Being-True According to Aristotle**

*(Interpretations of *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VI)*

Today I will try to explain the concept of truth as it is found in Greek philos-
ophy or, if you will, in the Greeks’ natural, everyday understanding of life.4 Such a
clarification of the meaning of truth—or of “being-true”—in Greek philosophy is
not merely of antiquarian interest. Its aim is, rather, to bring us to a radical and fund-
damental reflection [*Gesinnung*] within the parameters of a fundamental question
of science and, more generally, of human existence. I shall present my treatment of
the concept of truth by way of an interpretation of *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VI.
The foundations of contemporary science as well as of philosophy are rooted in the
investigations carried out by Greek philosophers—ultimately and especially in
those of Aristotle. This is true to such an extent that in many areas of thinking we
no longer know about these origins and simply make our way among clichéd,
 worn-out meanings, or with words that have been torn from their roots. It is en-
tirely up to us whether we get a clearer sense of the historical foundations of how
we see, think and interpret, or whether we instead treat history as a mere collection
of antiquities. We must first understand that history does not lie behind us like
some object, but rather that we ourselves are history, and consequently that we bear
the responsibility for how we deal with it—only then will our engagement with the
historical past, that is, with ourselves, become a truly burning issue.

The aim of the present interpretation is to enable Aristotle to speak again,
not in order to bring about a renewal of Aristotelianism, but rather in order to pre-
pare the battleground for a radical engagement with Greek philosophy—the very
philosophy in which we still stand. If an examination of Aristotle’s text should
show that much of what we say here is not to be found there in the text, that would
not be an argument against our interpretation. An interpretation is a genuine in-
terpretation only when, in going through the whole text, it comes upon that which
common sense never finds there, but which, although unspoken, nonetheless
makes up the ground [*Boden*] and the genuine foundations of the kind of vision
from out of which the text itself came to be. We need not go further into the steps

4. Note the slight variations in the subtitle (“Interpretations of *Nicomachean Ethics*,
Book VI”) and the date of delivery of the address vis-à-vis the preliminary editorial note for
this chapter. Additionally, the address is dated “December 2, 1924, Cologne.” All notes oc-
ccurring in the text are those of the translator [BHB] or editor [TK].
taken in this kind of interpretation, which in its principles goes back to phenomenology’s investigations of the matters. That approach should become apparent of itself in the very way this interpretation looks at things and inquires into them.

We usually designate truth first of all as a characteristic of knowing. But let us ask: What does the word “true” mean? To what state of affairs [Tatbestand] can we attribute the predicate “is-true” [Wahrsein] in an original sense? To put it another way: Taken as a basic phenomenon of whatever we encounter, where is truth? Where is it properly rooted [bodenständig]? What is its native ground? We are asking about a specific state of affairs from which we can somehow read a relation of things [Sachverhalt] in an original way. Accordingly, we want to move step by step into the field of this issue where truth somehow jumps out at us in its pure, fundamental character. Thus, our treatment unfolds in three stages. First of all we will allow ourselves to be guided by the tradition: What does the traditional doctrine mean to say about truth in the broadest sense? Second, we will investigate whether this tradition is really still rooted in solid ground [Boden], or whether it has instead already been uprooted. What we shall find is that truth is not a characteristic of judgment but instead is a fundamental determination of the Dasein [openness]5 of human beings themselves. Third, with the help of Aristotle we shall examine what kind of possibility is available for human Dasein within its own being. We will accordingly follow these steps:

I. Truth understood as a basic characteristic of judgment according to the tradition.
II. Truth and Dasein.
III. The various possibilities and forms of the predicate being-true as Aristotle distinguishes them from one another.

I. Judgement – Speech – Λόγος

The tradition’s most immediate point of departure. The tradition says that what is true is the judgment, inasmuch as because to know in the proper sense is to judge. Furthermore, support for this statement is thought to be found in Aristotle, who is supposed to be the first to recognize that truth is a defining characteristic of the judgment. Second, it is said that Aristotle was the first to define truth as the correspondence of thought with an object in reality. Third, it is stressed that this definition of truth—namely, as correspondence of thinking with reality—is the interpretation of truth that most agrees with common sense. However, in the course of the history of philosophy we find that this definition of truth that supposedly originates with Aristotle gives rise to serious problems. For how is a correspondence of thought with reality supposed to be established if thought is something occurring

5. On the possible equation of “Dasein” with “openness,” see n. 2 above [BHB].
in the subject, in consciousness, or in the soul? How can I measure this psychic aspect, that is, this aspect of consciousness, against the external world if I have not first recognized this external world as the standard of measurement? But if I have recognized that, then what would constitute a correspondence? It is just this that leads Kant to declare that this definition of truth does not explain anything, but rather presupposes the very thing it is meant to clarify.\(^6\) Consequently, we first need to find a way out of this dilemma of truth.

We must first of all distance ourselves from the beliefs a) that knowing, in whatever form, is capable of emerging from or coming out of the subject in which it is somehow encapsulated, and b) that knowledge is true only insofar as it follows the laws of thinking as such. These two perspectives are commonly called realism and idealism. Both points of view, however, presuppose the same things: on the one hand, a subject with life experiences, and on the other, an object toward which we must make something like an excursion. The only difference is that idealism denies that we can jump outside of the chamber of consciousness, whereas realism believes it can prove that we can. Critical realism above all affirms this presupposition, and it is ironic that it uses this presupposition while also arguing against it. In recent years some have attempted to create a middle ground or mediating point out of this fundamental subject-object approach. They say that this relation between subject and object—which they allow to stand in its traditional form—is an ontological relation, and they seek to establish a position that would partake of the prerogatives of both idealism and realism. However, this attempt still makes use of the old, groundless [bodenlosen] starting point and thus—as concerns the real heart of the issue—it is fruitless. For this reason we cannot go down the same path. Rather, we have to take hold of what has survived as the last remnant of its claim to native ground [Bodenständigkeit], namely, that it allegedly goes back to Aristotle.

Leaving aside the modern discussion of the concept of truth, let us simply pursue the claim that Aristotle is supposed to have said something about this matter. When we check into this more closely and look at the actual passage\(^7\) that others appeal to, we immediately make the curious discovery that in this passage in Aristotle, there is no discussion at all about judgment. The term does not even occur there. The passage deals with λόγος. However, λόγος does not mean judgment, nor does it mean reason or concept. Rather, it means discursive speech [Rede].

Aristotle says that every instance of discursive speech has the characteristic of being understandable. An instance of discursive speech has within itself a ἑρμηνεία;
it makes something known. This does not mean that every mode of speaking (conveys or) mediates cognition as such. Rather, each instance of discursive speech has a specific intelligibility or understandability. Take, for example, εὐχή, a request or wish. When I express a wish, it is neither true nor false. As a result, there are modes of speaking that to begin with do not at all have the character of being-true or being-false. As Aristotle says, οὐ πᾶς λόγος (not every instance of discursive speech) is ἀποφαντικός. Not every mode of speaking is such that it shows, ἀποφαντικός. To a being itself there belongs φαίνεσθαι, the letting-be-seen-as of the being itself. Not every mode of discursive speech is a showing or a letting-be-seen-as; rather, our everyday, natural mode of discursive speech has an aim altogether different than that of a pure showing of the things themselves. It follows from this that judgments are not primarily at stake here, but rather discursive speech, and that furthermore being-true is not at all primarily rooted [bodenständig] in discourse as such, but instead that only one way of speaking discursively has the possibility of being true. The native ground [Bodenständigkeit] upon which truth is rooted is not that of the judgment. Rather, the judgment is precisely the ontological condition of there being falseness. However, we are not satisfied with this explanation, which already pulls the ground [Boden] away from the tradition’s appeal to Aristotle. We now ask what the particular mode of discursive speech looks like that is not yet demonstrative, that is, the discursive speech of everyday existence, of the speaking-with-one-another of human beings. The Greeks and above all Aristotle had a clear understanding of this basic phenomenon of everyday living, of the speaking-with-one-another being-with-one-another. For the Greeks, the nonsensical problem of how a subject comes to or arrives at another subject does not exist.

Aristotle’s investigation into these basic phenomena of discursive speech, seen as the fundamental ways of being-with-one-another, is found in his work entitled Rhetoric. It is characteristic that up to the present day one does not know what to do with this Rhetoric, and this is the case merely because, soon after Aristotle’s works had been collected, the Rhetoric was passed on in the tradition as a technical and pedagogical tool. In all the confusion, even the Academy edition placed the work at the end rather than at the beginning. The Rhetoric, however, is none other than the interpretation of the basic phenomenon of speaking-with-one-another. Three fundamental modes of distinctive occasions of speaking were distinguished—political speech, speech before the court, and festive (celebratory) speech. Moreover, these modes of speaking, as they are present in everyday living, are merely the forms of the various ways of living which primarily constitute our being-with-one-another. With the help of Aristotle and using these three ways of dis-

8. See Aristotle’s Peri Hermeneia, 17a3 [BHB].
9. See the “appendix” to this talk for a somewhat more detailed summary of Aristotle’s Rhetoric drawn from an earlier draft of this text by Heidegger [TK].
cursive speaking, we would like now to bring to mind what sense these modes of
discursive speech have when we say discursive speech is the speech of the speaker to
the one spoken to.

The τέλος, or that through which the speech of the speaker comes to an end,
is the listener. This is already to say that from the start these three forms of dis-
cursive speech cannot have the sense of letting things be seen as they themselves
are. Rather, the point is to bring the hearer to a certain mood from out of which
a specific conviction grows. Thus, the primary way of speaking is meaningful as a
talking-into (a convincing), but talking-into in a good sense. Political discursive
speech is first of all a persuading and dissuading, e.g., over a resolution regarding
war and peace. The speaker in a public meeting does not want to teach the listen-
ers anything about a certain matter, but rather wants to act upon the listeners such
that they will support his opinion. It is similar with legal discursive speech. Festive
discursive speech has the sense of celebrating a victor in the Olympic games, once
again in order to conduct the listeners to a certain manner of being engaged in the
particular situation. These three ways of discursive speech relate themselves to
events of everyday life and to things that human beings have to do with in their
everyday being-with-one-another. In this manner political discursive speech is oc-
cupied with something to come in the future; legal discursive speech is concerned
with a past deed; and festive discursive speech involves the present.

These three ways of speaking have the tendency of cultivating in the listener a
specific opinion about something; they do not show anything; they do not let the
matter itself be seen, but instead let a specific view of it be seen. For this reason the
person speaking must work with very specific means.

Aristotle distinguishes three πίστεις—that which speaks for a thing, a means,
a possibility that speaks for the matter spoken about. These three kinds of πίστεις
are, first, the mood of the listener. The person speaking must take into account the
mood of the listener in order to modify or reshape it. Second, the right speaker has
to take himself into account as the speaker; he must show himself as trustworthy
and knowledgeable. This is ἦθος in the Greek sense of the word. The third possi-
bility that speaks for the thing is the manner of showing in this mode of discursive
speech. This does not have the character of demonstration or proof; rather, ac-
cording to Aristotle, because the thinking of the masses is short-winded, the speak-
er can only argue with striking examples—a way of concluding that goes straight to
the heart. But the essential point for us here is that these three ways of discursive
speech concern themselves with the states of affairs of everyday living, and thus
precisely with the world closest to us. With their specific means of shaping com-
mon opinion, these modes of discursive speech cultivate human existence such that
the most immediate everyday Dasein moves about in the first place in certain com-
mon opinions about the world and itself. But these specific opinions can still man-
ifest a genuinely created kernel of truth from out of themselves.
II. Being-True and Dasein

The being-with-one-another of human beings—κοινωνία—constituted through these ways of discursive speech [Rede] is the being-with-one-another in common speech [Gerede]. One sees, one judges, one wishes, one has needs in the manner in which one talks, in the manner in which everyone speaks. Therefore, the Everyone [das Man]: a curious phenomenon of the most immediate Dasein of the human being, one that governs an entire way of being [in the world], the way and manner in which the world is seen, judgmentally criticized, and questioned. The important thing is that we keep in mind that everyday Dasein sees the world and itself within common opinion, and maintains a definite opinion about them. The Greeks, a people who liked to talk and to speak a great deal, had such a strong awareness of this that they went so far as to define the very being of humans from this basic phenomenon. The human being is ζῷον λόγον ἔχον, that living being that speaks. And not only according to the scientific definition Aristotle takes up, but in a natural, normal sense. The tradition completely disguised this basic phenomenon in translating λόγος as ‘reason’ and maintained that Aristotle, in the Greek definition, is referring to the human being as the rational being. For Aristotle, however, λόγος is not reason, nor is it concept; rather, it is discursive speech. The most immediate kind of speaking-with-one-another is dwelling in common speech, which neither has the time nor the need to speak in an originary way about the things themselves. Only by first seeing this does one understand what a revolution it was that Socrates and Plato for the first time took issue with the dominance of common speech. Today we can no longer even form an idea of this revolution, and since that time there has never occurred in Western history a revolution of this kind, one that pierces through common speech and goes to the things themselves. Even Plato was not successful in actually breaking through completely. So, for example, he did not succeed in seeing movement truly as movement, but instead still attempted to define it in terms of the λόγοι (the common ways of speaking about things—movement in this instance) available to him, thus in terms of being and non-being. He did this rather than showing, as Aristotle did, that I can see movement in the ἐπαγωγή, by being led to it, and thus articulate it. Discursivity [Rede] is therefore a fundamental determination of Dasein itself.

Within this discourse there is the distinct possibility that a λόγος will become true which has the character of letting-something-be-seen-as: ἀποφαίνεσθαι. And, says Aristotle, only this kind of λόγος is λόγος ἀποφαντικός, that is, the one that lets-something-be-seen-as. This is the kind of λόγος that is primarily operative in theoretical knowing. He says that a λόγος is ἀποφαντικός when it has the characteristic of being-true; and for the Greeks being-true is ἀληθεύειν. If a λόγος is to be of that type, it must be one that lets reality be seen purely as it is in itself. It must be the kind of λόγος that frees reality from its hiddenness [Verborgenheit] due to common
opinions. It must be the kind of \( \lambda \circ \) that takes entities out of hiddenness. This is the basic comportment of being-true that human Dasein is.

We have already met up with this hiddenness: it is hiddenness by way of those common opinions within which everyday life operates. It is the concealment [Verborgenheit] by way of the specific ways of seeing in which everyday living moves. But there are various possibilities for breaking through the world’s concealment, which in any case is always only a relative concealment. The concealment of the world, as well as the concealment of human Dasein can be a threefold one. Let me explicitly emphasize: here I am going somewhat beyond Aristotle even though I am making use of fundamental Aristotelian concepts.

First, the concealment through common opinions.

Second, straightforward concealment, corresponding to ignorance, to unfamiliarity with a region of being that for the first time gets revealed and is made visible—or, to use a good German expression, entdeckt [discovered, uncovered].

Third, something that was already originally discovered once, and at one time had been a proper possession of someone who had original knowledge of it, submerges once more and thus becomes something that “everyone” understands, “everyone” repeats and says to others until it becomes “valid.” What was brought forth once in an originary and creative manner now becomes uprooted. It loses its ground [Boden]. But it does so in such a manner as to retain its dominance as true knowledge. As we say, it is valid, universally binding. From this we see that the element of validity has nothing to do with truth. This is the most dangerous kind of concealment, because it presents itself as a self-evident truth that requires no further questioning. It is the most dangerous kind, dissembling the Dasein of the human being as well as the being of the world.

There are three basic ways in which Dasein can be true[\(^*\)], that is, can uncover the concealment of the world.\(^{10}\) It becomes clear already that being-true is thus a possible way that Dasein itself can be.[\(^*\)] To put it more precisely: being-true is not a possibility of \( \lambda \circ \) \( \lambda \circ \); rather, \( \alpha \lambda \theta \mu \sigma \varepsilon \nu \), the uncovering of the concealed, can be completed in \( \lambda \circ \). And when \( \alpha \lambda \gamma \) is of the kind that lets-something-be-seen-as, then we can see that it has two fundamental possibilities: \( \kappa \alpha \theta \phi \varphi \alpha \zeta \varsigma \) and \( \alpha \pi \phi \zeta \varsigma \). Every discourse that lets-something-be-seen-as either 1) is one that expresses something as something—\( \kappa \alpha \theta \phi \varphi \alpha \zeta \varsigma \)—or 2) denies or negates something of the thing: \( \alpha \pi \phi \zeta \varsigma \). [Heidegger gives an example of “the blackboard.”] Even negation is an act of letting-something-be-seen-as, and Aristotle was the first philosopher to have a real understanding of negation, something that Hegel later took over in a very determinate and technical sense. Our task now is to see more precisely where the being-true of Dasein finds its ground and what Aristotle had to say about it.

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10. See the appendix to this talk for a listing of the threefold unconcealment that corresponds to the above threefold concealment [TK].
Aristotle says that being-true, ἀληθεύειν, is a ἕξις τῆς ψυχής [habit of the soul]. ἕξις comes from ἕχειν, something that the soul has in itself, something it disposes over. Thus the soul disposes over specific possibilities of uncovering the world and uncovering human life itself. I want to take a closer look at these various possibilities. First, however, we have to agree on what “soul” means for Aristotle. I can merely suggest this in a few brief strokes. A proper understanding would require that I lay out the whole of Aristotle’s ontology for you.

[Clarification of what is meant by soul.] The soul is not a substance or an “energy,” an apparatus that functions in some way or other; ἐντελέχεια is not some hackneyed notion for Aristotle but the concept in which his entire philosophy dwells. There are five distinctive possibilities of ἀληθεύειν, that is, of “being-true” in the Greek sense of uncovering an entity. Let us put the question more precisely: how does Aristotle characterize these five distinct ways of being-true, that is, ἀληθεύειν? What is his “guiding thread” [Leitfaden, clue] for distinguishing them, and what criteria does he use to put them in a specific order of priority?

III. The Ways of Being-True and its Distinctive Possibilities

To begin with, let us enumerate these five different ways of uncovering.

1. ἐπιστήμη: knowledge
2. τέχνη: here I emphasize that τέχνη does not mean manipulating something. Rather, τέχνη is a form of ἀληθεύειν and it means know-how [sich Auskennen] when it comes to manipulating something
3. φρόνησις: insight, or, better, practical insight [umsichtige Einsicht]
4. σοφία: pure understanding
5. νοῦς: pure apprehension [Vernehmen]

Let us start by briefly characterizing this last one as the clue to the rest. Aristotle says that the pure apprehension or νοῦς is given to human beings only within specific limits. The νοῦς of the human being is διανοεῖν, and it has the character of διά because it is determined by the very way that human beings are, namely λόγος, the addressing of something as something. Speaking is never a pure apprehending but always the addressing of something as something.

To apprehend something simply and straightforwardly always requires first being brought into a specific disposition [Befindlichkeit]. Human being has its way of apprehending: αἴσθησις, perception. I remind you that historically these four kinds of ἀληθεύειν were bundled together in confusion until the time of Aristotle. Even Plato had not sorted them out because he did not have the right clue for tru-

11. Since νοῦς as such has been virtually excluded from human being, that leaves four, the so-called “dianoetic virtues” [BHB].
ly seeing and distinguishing them. But what is that clue? It is nothing other than what they refer to. Ἐπιστήμη and σοφία relate to entities that always are as they are; τέχνη and φρόνησις relate to entities that can be different from what they now are: ἕνθεκόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν. 12 But we can’t let ourselves be satisfied with these simple results or believe that it is something that is sufficiently thought through in the manner that modern philosophers think something through and then make a system of it. The Greeks had a much better sense of things, and they had a much better category for the most immediately given reality—what I am engaged with in my most immediate concern—than we do with our word “object.”

The Greeks do not designate things as subject and object, but, in keeping with one’s primary being-together with the world, they call them πράγματα. These are not things that have always been there. Rather, they are produced—from wood, let us say, the wood that grows in the forest. That which is always already there in advance they call ύποκείμενον. I must ask you not to take these things too primitively. Water and the sea—which make ship navigation possible—are entities that are always already there. So are stones. What is always already there has no need of being produced. From this it is worth noting how the Greeks saw the world, the earth, as a plate floating on water beneath the vault of the heavens. Consequently, they arrived at this distinction of ύποκείμενον and πράγματα from the world itself. Human existence as Dasein also belongs among these things that can pass away. Human Dasein begins, holds forth, and then passes away. Thus the entity that is human Dasein falls within the domain of what can be different from what it is. That is why φρόνησις is a kind of ἀληθεύειν that relates to entities that can be different.

Thus, we have this difference: σοφία and ἐπιστήμη relate to entities that always are the same, whereas τέχνη and φρόνησις relate to entities that can be other than what they now are. Τέχνη relates to entities of the world, to objects of the human environment [Umwelt], whereas φρόνησις relates to human Dasein itself. These kinds of ἀληθεύειν, related in each case to these specific domains of being, are possibilities that Dasein has of discovering entities.

Aristotle does not simply place these four ways of ἀληθεύειν alongside each other. Rather, he now investigates their structure more precisely, using as his clue a determinate criterion, one in fact that compels him to see that two of these four are βέλτιστα ἕξις [the best habits]. 13 As possibilities of discovering entities, τέχνη and ἐπιστήμη do let an entity be seen-as, but not completely as the entity that it is. So we have to understand why Aristotle can say that τέχνη, as know-how in manipulating something, does not fully and properly make its entities present or take them out of their concealment. Ἄληθεύειν refers to a mode of being that Dasein is such that

12. See Nicomachean Ethics VI.3.1139b21 [BHB].
13. See Nicomachean Ethics VI.1.1139a16 [BHB].
Dasein uncovers being itself and maintains it in this discoveredness. 14 Ἀλήθεύειν means being-disposed [Gestellsein] toward something and that entails ἐπίστασθαι, that is, being-placed with something in such a way that you see it.

For the Greeks, being means nothing other than being present. Οὐσία likewise means wealth, property—we might translate it as “assets” [Anwesen: real estate]—thus a homestead or the like: something I have immediately available, something present of and by itself. For the Greeks, to be means to be present; and what is or has being in the proper sense is that which is always present and never is not. Thus, the highest manner of being consists simply in the purest and simplest presence. However, this implies that the entity that is in this way never was not, but always already was and always already was the way it now is present, finished and complete. That is what τέλος means.

Τέλος [being completed] and ἀρχή [being already there] are given at the same time. For that reason, to discover entities and to actually be an act of discovering means to reveal entities in terms of, and to maintain them within, these two determinations. In the process of producing something—an ax out of iron, for example—the iron is what is already there. What is already available, what is already there beforehand, not in need of being produced, is called the ὑποκίμενον, that which, from the viewpoint of production, was always already present there. This already-lying-there has the character of ἀρχή. Aristotle now carries out a very remarkable analysis regarding τέχνη, in which he shows how τέχνη does not properly speaking make its object graspable. Take a simple example. The shoemaker wants to make a shoe. This production will be guided by the shoemaker’s know-how, and its starting point consists in what the finished shoe will look like. He gets an order, which means he has to envisage beforehand what the shoe is going to look like. From this prior envisioning he then determines what kind of leather he will use. Those previously envisioned “looks” likewise guide the handicraft whereby the ἐργα, the work, is brought to completion. This “look” of the thing—envisioned beforehand and adhered to throughout the process—is the εἶδος; this is the sense of the Platonic idea. Thus the idea is not something that has fallen from heaven. But here is what is remarkable: the shoemaker thus has the ἀρχή [the beginning of the production process]; but does he have the τέλος, does he have the end of the production? The τέλος is not the goal of the production, but rather the

14. In short, Dasein is discoveredness, disclosedness, Ἀλήθεια, Offenheit, the clearing of being. In first making this equation between Dasein and disclosedness in Being and Time (133 and the later marginal comments attached thereto), Heidegger relates it to the tradition of the “natural light” stemming from Aristotle, whereby “the human soul is in a way all that is” (BT, 14). It is the potentially revelatory relationship to being-itself, a staple in the tradition of light metaphysics, that Heidegger transposes from the “soul” to the historically situated Da-sein and thus begins to talk about the “openness of the there.” See n. 2 above for statements that support translating Da-sein as “openness” [TK].
end [completion] of it, and that is the shoe. However, Aristotle says that the shoe no longer belongs to the shoemaker as shoemaker. Rather, the meaning of the shoe is precisely as an object of use.

In contrast to this, φρόνησις has the distinctive feature of discovering and holding on to both the ἀρχή and the τέλος. The subject of φρόνησις is the πρακτόν. In acting—or more accurately in deciding—I anticipate the ἀρχή. I decide to delight my friend on his birthday or to help him with something, which might not be something practical but might be of an ethical nature. In the course of deliberation, the καιρός [the opportune moment] becomes clear. The circumstances of the action are discovered through practical insight guided by the ἀγαθόν for which I have decided. The conclusion of the deliberation on the decision is the action itself. But this action is not something different from the mode of being of φρόνησις; rather, it is the very being of the deliberator himself. That is why φρόνησις has both the τέλος and the ἀρχή within the reach of its power of discovery. The ἀγαθόν—the good does not show itself except to those seriously striving after it.

Knowledge, that is, ἐπιστήμη, relates to entities that always are, and only if it can do that does there exist the possibility of knowledge at all. The basic presupposition of Greek philosophy and for the fact that knowledge is possible, is that there are entities that always are. Accordingly, knowledge, understood as an absolute placement [Gestellsein] before an entity, is governed by the presupposition that the entity always must be as it is; and for the Greeks this entity is in the first instance recognized as the mathematical. Only under this presupposition is it possible for there to be something teachable and something learnable. The teachable is μάθημα, that is, that science which occupies itself with what is purely and simply teachable. But this science is such as to make use of axioms. These axioms are hidden from the scientist as mathematician, and this person—as a mathematician—does not possess the possibility of making the axioms apparent as axioms. It is an absurdity to believe that one can pursue axiomatics with mathematical methods.

Only that ἀλγθεύειν that Aristotle calls σοφία is the form of being-true that reveals entities in their being-what-they-always-are and in that which they always already priorly are. But this requires that pure understanding have a peculiar mode of performance in contrast to the previous ones. Specifically, we said that λόγος is an addressing-of-oneself-to, an addressing of something as something. But if an ἀρχή should now be discovered—something that, in its very being, does not go back to something lying further back and already existing; if it should discover something that I can no longer address in terms of something else—at that point that form of discovering that discloses itself to us in λόγος, in addressing something as something, would fail to be said. At that point, says Aristotle, philosophical research is in the area in which it really is research: a νοεῖν, an apprehending, a pure and simple apprehension of the matters ἄνευ λόγου, without speech. This pure ap-
prehension, as it is given in σοφία, is the fundamental and highest form of discovering possible for Dasein. This is astonishing and for Aristotle himself it is not self-evident. For first of all one would say that the kind of discovering that pertains to human beings is φρόνησις. No, says Aristotle, being-placed by and with entities, being-disposed [Gestelltsein] toward entities that always are, is θεωρεῖν proper. As to the etymology of θεωρεῖν: a θεωρός is a guest at a festival. He goes to the festival and is all eyes. I can show you this only in some very rough strokes, not with the finesse of a conceptual and categorial analysis. Aristotle speaks of βαδίζειν [to walk] and νοεῖν [to see], and in the present perfect form of the verb νενόηκα: I have made my way somewhere, and when I have finished taking my walk [because I have made my way to my destination], I stop walking. By contrast, only when I “have seen” do I see correctly.

You see that the correspondence of thinking and being is not at all under discussion, that the term does not even come up. How does this strange tradition come about such that truth is supposed to be the correspondence of thinking and

15. Gestelltsein is Heidegger’s word in 1924 for denoting affective habit, ἔξος (see chap. 15 above). Heidegger has already noted above that the Greek ἐπί-στασθαι, to know, etymologically means “to be securely pos[ition]ed” before beings that already are. In Being and Time (138), he will observe that even the purest theorizing still has its mood or disposition, namely, the total composure of leisurely calm. Gestelltsein has accordingly been translated above, according to its context, variously as being-pos[ition]ed, being-disposed, or being-composed. In the background lies Heidegger’s subtle attempt to displace theoretical composure with existential composure, Gelassenheit [TK].


17. To translate νενόηκα as “has seen” is very problematic insofar as in doing so we rely on tense to render aspect. But what is at issue here is the mode of completion of these activities (their aspect), and more precisely whether or not they have their respective τέλοι within themselves or not. An activity such as walking to a destination is inherently incomplete, that is, the activity itself lacks its τέλος. Insofar as I have not yet arrived at my goal, my activity is on the way to its fulfillment. The activity is “perfected,” i.e., completed, as soon as I reach my destination. And yet, that is the point at which I stop walking. Thus, this activity is essentially incomplete (a-telic) in that its completion signals the cessation of the activity. The activity and its completion are mutually exclusive because the τέλος is “external” to the activity. On the other hand, “seeing” does not cease as soon as I have sighted an object because the object seen is not the τέλος of sight. Rather, seeing is the τέλος of sight, and thus the activity is immediately and at all times in possession of its τέλος, i.e., seeing is its own completion. Another way of expressing this issue would be to note that I walk for the sake of getting to the grocery store, whereas I see for the sake of seeing [BHB].
being? If we have gained a proper understanding of what Aristotle says, then we also thereby get an understanding of the tradition. It is connected with the fact that in interpreting Aristotle the point of departure has always been “common speech” instead of human comportment and the being of humans as primarily being-in-the-world, discovering this world out of that being. Rather than proceeding, on the basis of such being, to the disclosure of the world, the tradition takes the spoken sentence as the point of departure. You start from what is spoken and repeated, from the “valid,” in the sense of what everyone knows and repeats. But if you take up a sentence the same way you pick up a piece of chalk (thereby uprooting it, wrenching it from its proper place); and if you say that the sentence consists of a subject and a predicate; and if you say (because you’re a philosopher) that there is a representation in the subject as well as in the predicate, and that representations are lived experiences and hence that they are subjective and are “in” the subject, whereas the object is outside—just how does the subject get to the object? You start by taking λόγος as a part of the world, as something that shows up in the world, something you take up from the outside and then simply talk about.

IV. The Task of an Ontology of Dasein

Dasein means being-in-the-world—this is our fundamental finding [Befund]. There is not first of all a subject, which is enclosed in and for itself as in a box, with an object outside. Rather the fundamental finding and first level of reference is: being-in-a-world. From that there comes the task of ontologically determining this Dasein qua being-in-the-world in as precise a way as the Greeks determined the being of the world. That is, one can show that all the basic concepts of Greek ontology are concepts taken from the being of the world. When this stock of concepts enters into Christian theology and is used to define the being of God, one can see (and a radical critique can show this clearly) that one is now speaking about one reality in categories and ways that are all taken from another reality and transferred to an entity that presumably has quite a different mode of existence than, say, the sun and the eternal cycles of the heavens. We are faced with the immense task of creating an ontology of Dasein in contrast to the ontology of the world; and we shouldn’t think because we stand within an entirely different tradition that the task will be any easier for us than it was for the Greeks. That is why a radical critique is needed and why, in the first place, we have to learn again what real philosophical research looks like, and in fact we have to learn this from the Greeks. The Greeks already carried out such research long before us. We do not need to “take over” the Greeks. Rather, the outcome of our work will perhaps be very different from theirs; what remains the same, however, is the basic way of doing philosophical research. And as regards this basic way of philosophical research, today we have such a possibility in phenom-
enology. But this is the case only and precisely when we take phenomenology not as an actuality, not as something completed and not even as a direction. Such research will come about only when we understand that phenomenology is a possibility and that possibility is a higher form of being than actuality, when it is a matter of human actuality that has understood itself and has fixed on the goal towards which it is moving.

Discussion between Heidegger and Max Scheler

Scheler: It would be interesting if someone familiar with Aristotle could say something about the method of the lecture, namely: to what extent it is possible to penetrate into the ultimate conceptual foundations of the Aristotelian system the way he [Heidegger] has done. I would like to pose a question that to me too, in my own studies of these matters, has always seemed important. I too have always been of the opinion that the medieval conception of truth, as the correspondence of thought and being, is utterly impossible, indeed that it stands in contradiction to the very first presuppositions of Aristotelian-Platonic thinking, which in fact proceeds from being. For Plato, *methexis*, that is, an entity’s *participation* in another entity, is that which makes up truth in the first place; in the first instance, in the ontological sense, that is, an individual thing’s partaking of and participating in the idea of that thing; and in the second instance the human mind’s participation in this idea, which expresses the ultimate being-thus-and-so of the specific thing. Here there is not the least intimation that the thing’s being-thus-and-so can be *in mente* insofar as the being of things is itself *extra mentem*. On this point I am thoroughly in agreement with my colleague Heidegger. An image-theory of knowledge, the notion that there is some content of a judgment that corresponds with the thing, is a doctrine completely foreign to Aristotle, and it was first dragged back into Aristotelian concepts by Scholasticism. It would indeed be possible to translate *adequatio* not as a “depiction” or “image” but simply as “likeness.” No one has yet been able to determine whether the Scholastics themselves meant it in this way. I am even inclined to assume the opposite. However, I cannot say that with certainty, since this question is too far removed from my own philosophical perspectives, which are systematically and not historically oriented, for me to be able to dedicate enough time to them in order to decide on this question. For this reason I would like to direct to my colleague Heidegger the question of whether, by the word *adequatio*, Thomas Aquinas meant something akin to depiction or rather a likeness. In my opinion this notion can first come about only at the point when, as in Descartes, the notion dawns that in the first instance it is not things that are given to us, but consciousness—and this state of affairs can obtain only when the modern concepts of epistemology are first in place, that is,
only when they are already presupposed. Being conscious is itself a mode of being—but I don’t mean *conscientia*, which is only a kind of knowing, as one can show from the very word itself: *con-scientia*, *con-scire*. In the first, primary act of knowledge I grasp, for example, an animal, but not my knowing of the animal. Rather, [I grasp] the knowing of the animal only in a reflective act. In yet a third act, there is the confirming act, by which I know something; and then in a fourth act [I grasp] the ego. First a grasp of being, then of knowing; then a grasp of the knowing of knowing, which is consciousness; and only then a knowledge of the ego—this was the way the Greeks thought and, in my opinion, it was the basic orientation of scholastic thinking.

With Descartes, however, an opposite way of thinking arose. What is given in the first instance is only what consciousness is: that which is conscious. Only then can I get to the question of how I might get out of this prison of consciousness. And at that point, of course, the difficulty arises that Spinoza had already noticed, namely, how can I ever compare being and thinking with one another? This question has interested me for a long time now, but I haven’t been able to answer it as well as my colleague Heidegger, who has concerned himself much more with these purely historical matters. I would like to put this question to him: in the Scholastics does *adequatio* already mean correspondence of being and thinking? In my opinion this is quite impossible in that it already presupposes the modern theory of consciousness.

*Heidegger:* I am glad to reply to the question to the extent that it is possible for me at the moment. Ἁληθές is in fact a determination of entities themselves; an entity is itself “true,” that is, it is uncovered. And Aristotle often mentions that the ancient philosophers philosophized about “truth.” That does not mean that they speculated about the concept of truth. Instead, he means that they philosophized, that they sought to show entities in their unhiddenness. That is why the Scholastics, and above all Thomas, say that *verum* is a determination of the entity itself and that it is the kind of determination that lies beyond any individual determination of entities: it is transcendent. *Transcendentia:* every entity, *qua* entity, is true.

*Interruption by Scheler:* Also *bonum*.

*Heidegger:* Yes, precisely the *transcendentia* [the “transcendentals”]. Here I am mentioning only *verum*. At any rate it is hard to say to what extent Thomas himself had an original understanding of the sentence *omne ens est verum* (“every entity is true”), or whether this represents just a peculiar kind of Aristotelian understanding, into which we can enter only with great difficulty. I do not believe the Scholastics still had an original understanding of this position of Aristotle’s. On the other hand one can certainly say that on the basis of this conception, God for the Scholastics was, properly speaking, the *ens realissimum*, and every other entity is true only as an *ens creatum*. This trueness on the part of created things (includ-
ing human beings) must also be true for humans insofar as they are created as knowing entities.

World: it is tailored [zugesschnitten] to human beings themselves. *Adequatio* is an ontological determination. I am convinced that the scholastics did not adequately clarify the phenomena of the structure of *intelligere* but only grasped “*species*” in a crude way. Their orientation was that knowers, in their being, are tailored to grasp other entities, that is, that the other entity is true according to its idea. But they no longer understood this being-true itself. On the other hand it is possible from this that consciousness could become explicit as such by interpreting the scholastic theory of knowledge in a psychologically realistic sense. We have to leave the question open. And concerning the appeal to Scholasticism with regard to this conception of truth as *adequatio*, there is no real basis insofar as one understands *intellectus* in terms of consciousness instead of in ontological terms. There is no correspondence of consciousness with being, but rather a correspondence of entities, that is, of the knowing with the known entity.

To come back to Descartes, it is important to keep in mind that his doctrine of consciousness goes back ontologically to the same basis as Scholastic ontology. Only by presupposing this ontology does Descartes get to his *cogito/sum* at all. This *sum* is the εἶναι in the Greek sense.

We say that Descartes is the one who first came across the ego, the very existence [*Dasein*] of human beings, but that is precisely what he did not do. He is the one who brought into the tradition the peculiar *modus operandi* whereby one simply does not ask the question about the being of consciousness. And when we look closer, we see that it is Greek ontology that lurks behind the scenes in all of Descartes’s examination of doubt. Of course only a very precise interpretation can demonstrate this; but it implies that the fundamental question is left out of consideration. Just what kind of being is actually meant here by “the being of the subject”? Or by “the being of consciousness”? Could it be that on the basis of this strange intermediate position of late Scholasticism, which Descartes inherited and subsequently understood, we come to see that Scholasticism is not at all the ground to which one can appeal for a specific philosophical thesis. Rather here we have a world of philosophical thought and work that has to be dismantled at both ends and that has to be clarified as regards its origins. This will show that the claims it makes for its philosophical work have never been put in question. On the other hand we must keep in mind that the modern tendency toward an ontology is uncritical so long as it does not understand that Scholasticism is based on the lack of understanding of an ontological question, that is, that the ontology of the true in the Greeks is only a very delimited ontology that completely breaks down when we pose the question of the historical world. We have to remember that, beginning from the basic phenomenon of time as a characteristic of Dasein itself, we have to press forward to a radical ontology of history and of the human world.
These are the positive tendencies that actually guide this research, which has not the slightest interest in serving antiquarian concerns.

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Appendix: Two Varia on the Text of “Being-There and Being-True According to Aristotle”


...The speech of everyday Dasein does not start with the intention of communicating expertise or a knowledge about matters. The direction and structure of everyday speech comes into perspective when we ask what all the talk is about in the everyday being-with-one-another of human beings. This can be seen from the ways of speaking that are expressly carried out in our speaking with and to one another. The first positive research conducted by the Greeks on the phenomenon of everyday speaking is presented in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Plato took a negative stand toward rhetoric, regarding it as a mere technique. And so it became in the later academies that made it into a rigid discipline in their scientific pre-schooling. But rhetoric is in fact the fundamental doctrine of λόγος, the original “logic.” We will again have to learn to understand Aristotle’s Rhetoric as such an original and creative “logic” free from all the traditional “rational” perspectives that now encumber it.

Aristotle’s rhetoric recognizes three kinds of speech: 1) the speech in the people’s assembly; 2) the speech before the court of justice; 3) the festive speech.

1. The political speech is a speaking for or against a particular conclusion, e.g., whether war or peace. The speech seeks to bring those being addressed to a certain conviction on the state of the state, on the basis of which they could then decide in favor of the counsel imparted by the speaker.

2. The judicial speech is a matter of accusation or defense. It is directed to the auditor as judge, who is to be talked into a particular conviction about the case, on the basis of which judgment is passed.

3. The festive speech celebrates by praising (e.g., a hero, an achievement) or blaming (e.g., a villain, a treacherous act). The auditors are called upon to admire (or despise) the subject of the speech. The goal of the speech is to place them in a state of enthusiasm or outrage.

These speeches have in view not so much the matter that they treat, but are directed more toward the listeners, the auditors. What is conveyed to them is not knowledge of the matters. Instead, they are mediated to an opinion of the things so that they may take such and such a position to them. Talking is a talking-into or “talking-over,” Über-reden.
What do these speeches deal with? 1) The assembly speech speaks of what could be conducive (συμφέρον) or detrimental to the commonweal and thus to every individual, something that is not yet there but is to be brought about or guarded against. This speech gives counsel on future matters. 2) The judicial speech is concerned with the right and wrong of something that has already happened (δίκαιον). It concludes in a judgmental position of evaluation in regard to something past. 3) The commemorative speech brings the listener into the presence of something admirable and noble (καλόν), and thus brings the memorable into the present.

These speeches deal respectively with the future, past, and present such that everyday Dasein is somehow constantly affected. These are the alternating circumstances of life and events of the world in which being-with-one-another dwells and finds its sojourn, circumstances and events that at one time can be so and later can be different, such that our views of them change. The basic thrust of the speeches is formation in the listener of opinions regarding everyday life and what transpires in it. The listeners always bring preconceived opinions with them, views that everyone has. At the same time, they are always inclined or attuned in one way or another toward what stands in the speech. The speaker has to take this temporally particular mood into account and reshape it according to his own sense of things, so that it will speak for the development of the conviction in the audience that the speaker wants.

The speaker himself must show by way of his speech that he is trustworthy, knowledgeable, and well-disposed toward his audience. He himself, his existence (ἦθος), must speak for what he is saying. And finally, he must speak about the matter in the right way, not in lengthy scientific demonstrations. Rather, the speech must be curt and speak directly to the heart (ἐν-θύμος): that is the proper rhetorical sense of the enthymemes, the abbreviated syllogisms that Aristotle exemplifies in his Rhetoric. Because the thinking of the many is short-winded, he should speak in striking examples and not attempt to show the matter itself of itself and for itself. Rather, the speech should present what immediately speaks for the matter at hand, so that the talk becomes a talking-into, persuasion.

These then are the three vehicles of persuasion, the three πίστεις: the πάθος or mood of the audience, the ἦθος of the speaker, and the manner of demonstration (δεικνύναι) of the speech (λόγος) itself. A particular view is to be brought out of these prevalent opinions, making them the unspoken major premises of his enthymemes. He thus assumes what everyone on the average thinks about the things. Speaking and speechmaking operate in the domain of average opinions, they speak out of immediate appearances, out of prejudgments about things that have been handed down and passed on. The speech of δόξα and δόκειν—"it seems that, it looks as if, insofar as I see it, this speaks in favor of the matter"—is therefore, in remaining on the level of matters "that can also be otherwise," in the end
not really demonstrative. This is what Aristotle is referring to when he says that not every kind of speaking is a showing. Aristotle’s three forms of speeches are only exponentialized manifestations of the kind of speech in which everyday Dasein expresses itself about public matters, about public and nonetheless urgent affairs, occurrences, and needs. It is by way of these phenomena of everyday speech that the basic structure of speaking by the “living being possessive of speech” can now be read off and laid out: [transition to section II]

2. The threefold unconcealment possible to Dasein (in Section II, “Being-True and Dasein”)

. . . Thus being-true properly implies an uncovering letting-be-seen of λέγειν, that is, of λόγος as a possibility of carrying out an uncovering ἀληθεύειν, to the extent that it remains negatively the prevalent occasion for concealment:

1. Preliminary disclosure of beings by way of the prevalent opinions commonly held about them, since such everyday opinions do contain a partial view and measure of insight into their being.

2. Disclosive entry into domains of being that have hitherto been completely concealed.

3. The struggle against common speech [Gerede], the chatter and idle talk that pretends to be disclosive and knowing. This very struggle for words already expresses, in an elementary way, how original Dasein sees itself and its being in the world without distortion and sophistication. The Greeks in their linguistic expression not only had an original understanding of truth as unconcealment. The greatest among them led the struggle for such an unconcealment, a struggle against sophistry and rhetoric. We are barely capable of imagining the greatness of this spiritual confrontation of the Greeks with themselves and their Dasein. The spiritual history of the West has moreover experienced a spiritual elevation which is still in need of more precise comparison . . .
Kassel in the early 20th century was an industrial city without a university located between the two old university towns of Marburg and Göttingen. To offset this deficiency in higher education, a local Society for Art and Science was formed in 1912 with the express purpose of regularly sponsoring week-long lecture courses and single lectures by visiting university professors in order to satisfy the “the higher intellectual interests” of the cultured public of Kassel in the latest results and most recent advances of science and scholarship, which covered virtually all of the university disciplines. One of the first philosophers to be invited was a native son of Kassel, Georg Simmel, in 1917, followed by Franz Rosenzweig in 1921. It was through his own son, a student of law at the University of Marburg, that Johannes Boehlau, director of the Society and its educational programs, first heard about Heidegger and so of his growing repute in Germany, and beyond. Heidegger’s first response (letter of July 1, 1924) to Boehlau’s invitation to hold a mini-course in Kassel was to propose the thematic title, “Geschichtliches Dasein und historische Erkenntnis (Einführung in Wilhelms Diltheys Forschungen)” [Historical Exis-

The only extant transcript of this semi-popular lecture series (in fact, a “mini-course”) comes to us by way of the archive of Herbert Marcuse, who in 1929 had typed the long-hand text of Walter Bröcker, Heidegger’s student since 1922 and the sole stenographer/transcriber present at this occasion. For Bröcker had come to Kassel in mid-April 1925 at Heidegger’s behest expressly to perform a function that he had been fulfilling for several years in Heidegger’s regular courses. Discovery of the typed transcript (and a carbon) in the 1980s prompted the further discovery of a paper trail in the Kassel archives of the Kurhessische Gesellschaft für Kunst und Wissenschaft [Society for Art and Science of the Electorate of Hesse], under whose auspices the lectures were held. This paper trail included Heidegger’s correspondence from mid-1924 with Johannes Boehlau, then director of the lecture series for the Society, along with the text of a “relatively brief notice for our newspapers” written by Heidegger at Boehlau’s request (on March 24, 1925) in order to give the interested public “an idea of the comprehensive significance of the theme to be treated” under the above announced title. This sole extant text stemming directly from Heidegger’s hand on the content of his mini-course was first published in the Kasseler Post on April 15, 1925.
tence and Historiological Knowledge (Introduction to Wilhelm Dilthey’s Research), a title which is noteworthy in two related directions: 1) It reflects Heidegger’s most pressing research task at the time, namely, that of utilizing an opportunity to write a review of the Dilthey-Yorck correspondence as a vehicle to present his own original thoughts on time and history. The result would be a longish journal article with the title “The Concept of Time” that in its structure would reflect the first clear major step toward his magnum opus, Being and Time. 2) It marks, for the very first time in Heidegger’s early development, the clear and sharp distinction between two normally synonymous German terms, Geschichte and Historie, where the former henceforth will refer to lived history, actually being-historical, historicality, and historizing as a ongoing happening of Da-sein, and the latter to the known and so recorded history that is the basis of historical science, that is, historiology and its historiography. This terminological distinction, which was already operative in earlier essays (chapters 13 and 14) in the form of the distinction between an actualization history (history of actualization) and an objective history, will now play a major role in the terminology of the Kassel lectures, as observed in their final title, in the concluding phrase “historische worldview,” and in

(now reprinted in GA 16, 49–51), accompanying the announcement of this series of ten lectures given in pairs on five evenings from April 16 to 21. This newspaper notice, in which Heidegger explains his title, identifies the central question and previews the contents of his miniature “lecture course [Vorlesung],” is translated below as a preface to the lectures themselves. No documentation is available regarding the size of the audience in attendance and its reception of the lectures. (The editors wish to thank Prof. Dr. Peter Gercke of the Staatliche Museen Kassel for access to the entire “paper trail” pertaining to Heidegger’s Kassel lectures still to be found in the archive of Kassel’s “Society for Art and Science.”) But the recent publication of Heidegger’s letters to Hannah Arendt reveals that she was present at the last two double sessions of the “Casseler Vorträge” (Heidegger so named them on April 12, 1925: p. 19); shortly thereafter, he presented her with a handwritten manuscript written six months before (“The Concept of Time: Section III. Dasein and Temporality”) and intimately related with the contents of the “Kassel Lectures,” with the dedication, “In Remembrance of April 20 and 21, 1925.” See Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger, Briefe und andere Zeugnisse 1925–1975, ed. Ursula Ludz (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1998; 2nd ed., 1999; 3rd ed., 2002), 19–21, 266–67.

the translator’s first note below. Behind this terminological distinction lies the famous one-liner of Count Yorck von Wartenburg, “We ourselves are history/Wir selbst sind Geschichte,” which had already been covertly interjected into the Jaspers review of 1920 (chapter 13) and is repeated with great rhetorical flourish and variation in the lecture on time of July 1924 (chapter 16; see also chapter 17).

In the context of Heidegger’s philosophical development, the mini-course in Kassel is situated between two “texts” that constitute the first two major steps toward the composition of his magnum opus, Being and Time, so that it to a large extent borrows its themes from both the earlier and the later “step”: on the one hand, from the longish journal article on “The Concept of Time” finalized in November 1924 (published in GA 64)¹ and, on the other, from the course of SS 1925 entitled “History of the Concept of Time” (GA 20), which began a week or so after the Kassel lectures took place. The themes of the ten lectures can accordingly be sorted out, however roughly, into a first half stemming from the first, “Dilthey draft” of Being and Time (November 1924: crisis of the sciences, question of history) and a second half stemming from the second, “Husserlian draft” of Being and Time (SS 1925: phenomenology’s breakthrough, wholesale neglect of the question of being [and so of “being historical”] among phenomenologists). The relationship to Being and Time is strongly manifest especially in the lectures on the public character of everydayness and the dramatic rendition of the full existentiality of my own death. But this “philosophy of existence” (so Jaspers first in 1928) is clearly overridden by Heidegger’s greater concern for a historical method based on a fundamentally ontological sense of history, of what it means to be historical. The result is a deepening of the historical categories that Heidegger takes over from Dilthey and Yorck, like temporality, historicality, destiny, community, generation, and here situates in his own burgeoning temporal ontology.

Space does not permit a detailed analysis here of the specific conceptual progress being made in these Kassel lectures toward the temporal ontology of Being and Time² For there is another aspect of these lectures, namely, their peculiar occasion, which must also be given at least brief consideration in any analysis of their contents. Heidegger obviously took very seriously the responsibility that he incurred in accepting the invitation to give this semi-popular mini-course for a cultivated German public under the auspices of the local academy of science, which for him meant the transposition of his most original developments at the time from a specialized university context to the more general context of concerns of sci-

². See Kisiel, Genesis, chap. 7–8, for such an analysis in the context of surrounding texts.
ence and culture in a Germany still recovering from the war and its aftermath. “The Kassel lectures have put me to a great deal of trouble and cost me considerable effort” (to Arendt on April 12, 1925). Already in his opening lecture, Heidegger situates his own attempt to revolutionize philosophy in the context of a widespread “crisis of the sciences”—first introduced in these lectures, this theme will be repeated by Heidegger for several years thereafter, in Being and Time and beyond—and concludes that such foundational crises have served to evoke productive work from scientists and philosophers alike, so that “there is no cause for resignation,” despite all the postwar talk of the “decline of the West.” In fact, it is cause for national pride: “Science is exemplary for the existence of the entire nation.” Heidegger repeatedly rehearses the intellectual history of modern Germany in the same spirit, as Dilthey had done before him, in order to highlight the current problem-situation of philosophy in which he now finds himself in his own work, which is always regarded against the background of the entire history of philosophy. Even the history of the sciences being rehearsed here is not motivated by any antiquarian interests, but always in relation to the “current struggle” on the intellectual front, like Einstein’s theory of relativity and the more political and cultural struggles over worldviews. It should be noted that the First World War was commonly regarded by intellectuals and politicians alike as a war of contending worldviews, so that Heidegger’s reference to the “current struggle” for a worldview that is to be defined concretely in relation to the particular historical situation in which postwar Germany found itself could already be construed as an attempt to define German identity, as Heidegger would attempt to do in the thirties for this “nation of poets and thinkers” (also a Diltheyan theme). At one point in the lectures, Heidegger even ventures to enlighten the parents of some of his students on the precise purposes and goals of philosophy within a university education dominated by a plethora of particular sciences and practical disciplines. The goal is not to make his students into philosophers, but to put each of them on the cutting edge of their respective fields, attuned to the leading questions and issues that are alive for research in their respective historical situations. This is perhaps the final practical upshot of his “current struggle for a historical worldview.”

Wilhelm Dilthey’s Research and the Current Struggle for a Historical Worldview
Notice in the Kasseler Post, April 15, 1925

This lecture course seeks to impart an understanding of the basic philosophical question of our contemporary spiritual existence [Dasein]. This question concerns the sense and the possibility of a historical existence [Existenz] of the human being and its culture. The history of the emergence of the modern spirit along with the development of modern natural science is defined by the
disclosure of the historical [geschichtlichen] world in the historical [historischen] sciences since the 18th century and by the increasing cultivation of the historical consciousness that accompanied it. Since then, human beings regard themselves within the operative context of history. The choice and fixing of life goals now take place in the horizon of such an historical knowledge. The question, What is the human being?, has become the question of the possibility and sense of a historical Dasein and thus the question of the essence of history.

While nature and natural science since well into the 19th century had taken the lead in guiding the meaningful reflection [Besinnung] on worldviews, history has now stepped into this function. Oswald Spengler in his *Decline of the West* has given the question of the meaning of history for worldviews a comprehensive and fascinating expression. Next to the more sensationalized thesis of the decline and fall of the West, his theory of cultures is widely perceived as a message of salvation. Every culture is a self-contained organism with a limited lifespan. The creations, cognitions, values, and norms of a temporally particular culture are meaningful and valid only for its time. All truths are temporally conditioned and relative to the particular cultural situation. When such an awareness of the relativity of cultural creation is operative in a living present, it results in resignation among the weary and weak. All productive work is hampered by continually glancing at what had already been done and lamed by comparisons with past cultural creations. Doubt comes to dominate the field of knowledge and the covert basic character of all life is despair. The overhasty flight to binding dogmas, the tendencies toward renewal of past cultures (e.g., the Middle Ages) or exotic cultural circles (Indian wisdom), the cultivation of occultism, are the clearest symptoms of the spiritual helplessness of our time. These are the negative manifestations of the struggle for a meaning of historical Dasein. If this struggle is to come to clear decisions, there remains only the way of a scientific meditation on the sense [Besinnung] of the essence of history. After the collapse of Hegelian philosophy, it was Dilthey who, for the very first time and at the same time with regard to the historical human sciences, fundamentally raised and from many sides elaborated the question of history. Accordingly, in order to accomplish the task delineated above, the lecture course will begin with the research work of Dilthey.

Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) is recognized in wider circles for his book, *Experience and Poetry*, which contains four essays—on Lessing, Goethe, Novalis, Hölderlin...
and Hölderlin—and has had an enduring influence on contemporary literary criticism. Then there is his *Life of Schleiermacher,* which belongs among the greatest biographical achievements of the 19th century. The correspondence between Dilthey and Count Yorck, in which the picture of a model philosophical friendship comes into view, gives us some initial insights into the wealth of Dilthey’s production and questioning. His major works, however, have been up to now hidden in scientific journals and treatises of the Berlin Academy of the Sciences. Only now, with the publication of his collected works (so far 4 volumes), are they beginning to have an impact. The lecture course shall present Dilthey’s research work in its main directions and trends with the central orientation on the problem of history. In this context, the impact of Dilthey’s investigations on contemporary philosophy of history will be delineated. This will provide the basis for the critical question of the extent to which the question of the essence of history has been radically posed and could be posed in Dilthey’s work itself. The lecture course advances across the characterization of scientific situations to the problem of history itself. And it indeed makes this step to the ground of the most recent contemporary philosophical direction of research, phenomenology, whose beginnings (from 1901) Dilthey himself still followed with the greatest scholarly hopes for his own work. The question of the essence of history is led back to the question of the essence of time. The concept of time at once brings onto center stage the problem which has undergone a new development in modern physics (relativity theory).

The lecture course seeks to become an introduction to contemporary scientific philosophy in the sense that it not only reports on names and trends, but also invites one to attain a relationship to the questions and to the matters being questioned therein.

ten 26, ed. Gabriele Malsch (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005); English translation: *Poetry and Experience, Selected Works* 5, ed. Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985). (Volumes from Dilthey’s *Gesammelte Schriften* and *Selected Works* are henceforth cited as *GS* and *SW* with volume numbers, respectively.)


Wilhelm Dilthey’s Research and the Current Struggle for a Historical Worldview

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I

Our theme may perhaps seem abstract and strange to some, but implicit in it is a basic problem of all of Western philosophy, the problem of the sense of human life. What kind of reality is life? The question of reality initially assumes the immediate reality of the world, nature. Even so, the question of reality always already includes that of the being of human being itself. The discovery of the proper sense of the being and the reality of human life has a confused history. It is only recently that a basis has been established for investigating it in a scientific and philosophical way. In the history of this question, Dilthey’s work assumes a central place. These recent developments at the same time include a revolution in the very way philosophical questions are being raised, a veritable crisis of philosophy as a science. And it is not the only science in crisis. All sciences and groups of sciences are nowadays caught up in a great revolution of a productive kind which has opened new ways of questioning, new possibilities, new horizons. In physics, the emergence of relativity theory; in mathematics, where the foundations have become questionable, where one speaks of a foundational crisis; in biology, where one attempts to extricate oneself from mechanism; in the historical [historischen] sciences, where the question of the understanding of historical [geschichtlichen] reality and the

8. Following a convention that Heidegger had initiated in his journal article of November 1924 on “The Concept of Time,” which began with a review of the Dilthey-Yorck correspondence, he is much more painstaking and scrupulous than usual in these lectures in distinguishing the two German words for history, Geschichte and Historie, as well as their
possibility of interpreting the past is raised; even in theology (Protestant theology),
where an aversion to mere history of religion is setting in, and theologians are seek-
ing ways to give their theme and method a new direction and sense [sich besinnen].
In this crisis, which goes back to the pre-war period, stands philosophy as well. The
crisis thus grows out of the continuity of science itself, and it is this continuity that
guarantees the seriousness and soundness of its upheavals.

First of all, let us make clear what questions are being raised in our titular
theme. What does “historical [historische] worldview” mean? What is a “struggle
for” a historical [historische] worldview? Who is Dilthey, and what does he have
to do with such topics?

Accordingly, let us first comment upon the theme, mode of treatment, and
structuration of the following discussions.

Historical Worldview

What does this expression mean and how did this problem arise? The term
“worldview” first came into vogue in the 18th century. The expression in itself is
ambiguous, and taken verbally does not really yield what it means: having a view of
the world, a view of nature. For it also means knowledge about life and our own be-
ing in the world. Moreover, such a knowledge serves to shape and posit certain
goals that regulate our actions. A worldview thus assumes a certain attitude and
takes a particular position. It is not just a theoretical knowledge but a practical at-
titude toward the world and our own existence, an attitude that is not a momentary
stand but a persistent position. It is developed and assumed directly by human be-
ings themselves. This possibility first arose with the Renaissance in conjunction
with its freedom from religious bonds. In a broader sense, one also speaks of a nat-
ural worldview that each human being as such already brings with him/herself by
way of milieu, talent, education, etc. This is called a pre-scientific rather than a sci-
entific worldview, which is a position that is secured on the basis of theoretical sci-
entific knowledge.

corresponding adjectives, geschichtlich and historisch. The terminological distinction is
based on Count Yorck’s oft-repeated remark that Heidegger also liked to quote and free
vary upon (e.g., in July 1924, chap. 16), “We ourselves are [our] history [Geschichte],” which
accordingly means to-be-historical, our very historical be-ing, the historical existence that
we happen to be and are thus called upon to be and to live out as our destiny. The termino-
logical distinction is rooted in an earlier distinction that Heidegger first made in 1920 be-
tween the actualization-historical (vollzugsgeschichtlich) and the objective-historical
(objektsgeschichtlich), where the latter is now terminologically linked with Historie and his-
torisch, as in historische worldviews and written Historie, especially when written from the
objective vantage point of science. Historie is thus associated with historiology and the his-
toriographical inquiry into the past. [Note by TK: The remaining notes are provided by
Frithjof Rodi, the editor of the German edition of these lectures.]
A historical worldview is one in which a knowledge of history defines our interpretation of the world and of existence, Dasein. Here struggle means a struggle to gain and win such a position by wresting it from our knowledge of the historical character of the world and of Dasein. It strives to make the defining powers of history primary in determining convictions and in the consciousness of Dasein. That is possible only when history [Geschichte] has pervaded human consciousness as its most unique reality. This is by no means self-evident. Primitive peoples, and we ourselves, have long lived without history. The Greeks undoubtedly already had a certain experience of the historical [das Geschichtliche], but some knowledge of change still does not shape a historical [historische] consciousness. For historical consciousness is tied to certain presuppositions. Humanism and the Reformation initiated a particular historical critique and contestation of Catholicism. They strove to return to the pure [and original] forms of Christian life, which took them further back into history. On the other hand, the national consciousness of individual peoples began to stir and awaken, which forced them to become acquainted with their unique origins. But all this still cannot be named “historical consciousness.” There is historical consciousness only when our own reality is viewed within the context of our history such that life knows about the history in which it stands. Our own epoch is experienced as a situation in which the present itself stands, and this not merely over against the past, but as at once standing in a situation in which the future will decide itself or has decided itself. Thus the awakening and watchfulness that comes with historical consciousness is not something self-evident and given in life, it is rather a task to be developed and cultivated.

For a historical [historische] worldview, it is historical [geschichtliches] knowing that becomes the principle of a complete overview of human affairs. History becomes universal history. The question is: what sense does history have and which goals of existence [Existenz] can be drawn from this historical sense of the future? The drawing of life goals from history has been developed since the 18th century in Kant, Herder, Humboldt, and Hegel. Their basic conviction is that in the end the historical development proceeds such that human beings come out of a state of constraint into a state of freedom (Hegel: the humanity of European cultures incorporated in the State). Thus the way is cleared for proper historical [historische] research, whereby the sciences disclose history [Geschichte] theoretically and scientifically on the ground of sources secured by critical work (as in Wolff, Niebuhr, Savigny, Bopp, Baur, Schleiermacher, Ranke, Jacob Grimm).

The period 1780 through 1840 is an epoch that released creative forces which we now can no longer comprehend. Then, after the collapse of Hegelian philosophy, deliberation on the sense [Besinnung] of historical reality subsided. Positive systematic work on history continued while the question of the sense of historical being waned. Instead, the natural sciences once again took over the lead in devel-
oping a worldview. In the 1860s, when philosophy again reexamined itself in its sense and direction \( \text{sich besann} \), this happened as a historical \( \text{historischen} \) return to Kant as the author of the three critiques, and especially the Critique of Pure Reason, which provides a theory of the mathematical natural sciences. Philosophy was understood as epistemology. This took place in the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism. Philosophy no longer tried to master the particular sciences or to surpass their results, but restricted itself to a domain of its own making and became a theory/philosophy of science. Kant in his first critique had simply presented a theory of mathematical natural science.

In the interim, the historical sciences had emerged. The immediate task was therefore to broaden Kant’s critique to make room within it for a theory of the historical sciences. The subsidence of this way of posing the question at the end of the 19th century and the continuing growth of concrete historical \( \text{historische} \) research made the question of the sense of historical \( \text{geschichtlichen} \) be-ing itself all the more urgent. The question of formal foundations was displaced by the question of material foundations (Troeltsch in conjunction with Windelband and Rickert, who received their impetus from Dilthey; Spengler also comes from this position).

Modern philosophy of history is indebted to Dilthey for its impetus and initiatives. But modern theory did not really understand the proper direction of Dilthey’s thought, and in fact made provisions for this direction to remain buried to the present day.

We shall now try to grasp the sense of the historical \( \text{historische} \) worldview more precisely. What does it mean to know the historical \( \text{geschichtliches} \) be-ing of the world? The cultivation of this knowledge is the task of philosophy as well as of the historical \( \text{historischen} \) sciences. The possibility of a historical worldview is based on attaining full clarity and transparency of the human condition \( \text{menschlicher Stand} \). We need to make this conditionality perfectly clear to ourselves.

The struggle for a historical worldview is not played out in arguments over the historical \( \text{historische} \) picture of the world but in the confrontation of the sense of historical be-ing itself. It is in this context that we can speak of Dilthey’s research work. We need to examine how his philosophical questioning laboriously attains the transparency necessary for cultivating a historical \( \text{historische} \) worldview. We are raising the question: which reality is historical \( \text{geschichtlich} \) in the true and proper sense, and what does historical \( \text{geschichtlich} \) mean?

We shall first follow Dilthey on his various ways. It was Dilthey who (together with Count Yorck) from the 1860s possessed a truly radical consciousness of this very problem. In order to become intimately acquainted with Dilthey’s work, we ourselves must raise the very questions that motivated Dilthey. We need to ask whether he solved the problem, and whether the philosophical means he had at his disposal were capable of doing so. We will thus question beyond him, and indeed on the basis of phenomenology (Dilthey characterized Husserl’s Log-
ical Investigations as an epochal work). We shall see that the reality that is properly historical is human Dasein itself, and what structures it necessarily has. The basic determination of Dasein is nothing other than time. On the basis of this determination of time, we shall make it clear that human being is historical [through and through]. Along with the question of time, we shall come across another problem, that of time in relativity theory, and shall attempt to comprehend its philosophical sense. From the historicality of Dasein we shall come back to Dilthey in order to raise a critical question about the whole of his work.

What is to be thereby attained is a relationship with the matters themselves, in which we shall see that these are issues that truly matter to human beings. We seek to awaken the consciousness of the productive work that is actually being done in the modern sciences [at the universities], so that there is no reason for resignation. Such work is being done without fanfare or commotion. [The endeavor of] science is thus exemplary for the existence of our entire nation.

II

Viewed outwardly, Dilthey’s life was uneventful. What is present and actual for us is his inner life and all that is vital in every question that he as a philosopher raised. This inner life is found expressed in his works and writings that were first of all directed toward the substantial treatment of particular problems. We shall first provide an outer outline of his life, then his “intellectual and spiritual world,” then the decisive factors of his spiritual life, and lastly his works.

Born in 1833 as a pastor’s son, Dilthey first studied theology and later philosophy and the historical sciences (1850s and early 1860s). Appointed to Basel in 1867, to Breslau in 1871, and to Berlin in 1882. Member of the Academy in 1887. Died on October 1, 1911 in the Tyrol. [Self-]sketches of his life in the student years in the diaries entitled Ethica (1854–1864) operate mostly in the scholarly sphere. In his early years as an instructor, interaction with the “Suicide Club” (Scherer, Grimm, Erdmannsdörffer, Usener). Correspondence with Yorck in the years 1877–1897 demonstrates a rare philosophical friendship. Dilthey often


wished for a more peaceful existence than he as a Berliner had. He was not someone who could finish his various works with ease. Rather, due to pressure from the Academy of the Sciences, he was forced to publish things that he otherwise would never have put into print.

The intellectual-spiritual world was for Dilthey the only proper existence. We shall first consider his inner growth and impulses, then the decisive powers working on him from both history and his present actuality. Dilthey was at first a theologian and thus acquired defining horizons and a distinctive openness for existence \([\textit{Dasein}]\) that continued to be operative into his later years. Theology for him was related both to philosophy and to history, specifically the history of Christianity and its fundamental \textit{fact}, the life of Jesus. Dilthey planned to write a history of Western Christianity, but this plan and all of his theological studies foundered in the course of his study of the Middle Ages. In the struggle between faith and knowledge, Dilthey took the side of knowledge as well as of this world \([\textit{Diesseitigkeit}]\). He disclaimed all closure and finality, and was ever satisfied simply with the opportunity to probe and explore, to search and research and “to die wandering on the trail.”\(^{12}\) What he took with him on this journey from theology were essential impulses for understanding human life and its history. His passion for the scientific research of human life remained open-ended.

This unending journey departing from theology helps us to understand his reaction to the actual historical powers of his time: to positivism, to the historical school, and to Kant’s philosophy (as seen by Schleiermacher).

French positivism was a critique of metaphysics that strove for a purely scientific form of knowledge, which coincided with what today is called “sociology.” What Dilthey took as positive in positivism was its critique of metaphysics and its stress on the pure secularity of “this side.” But positivism misconstrued the life of the mind/spirit and its history in seeking to define mind/spirit as nature. Accordingly, Dilthey saw that his task was to save the uniqueness of the spiritual world. He assumed positivism’s attitude “never to allow oneself to be fooled by anything,”\(^{13}\) while he denied its drive to conceive of mind/spirit merely as a product of nature. He adopted positivism simply as a principle of knowledge that defines matters \([\textit{Sachen}]\) from out of themselves.

From the historical school, Dilthey learned to think historically and to experience the vitally operative force of the mind’s past, an impression that remained fresh for him all his life (see his “Seventieth Birthday Speech”).\(^{14}\) The world of history and the lived life of historical research within this world were the fundamentals that prompted Dilthey to raise the radical question of history.

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13. “Vorrede” (1911) in \textit{GS} 5, 3.
Dilthey came to Kant’s philosophy basically because he thought that Kant had raised the question of the essence of knowledge. But under Schleiermacher’s influence, Dilthey saw knowledge in the context of the whole of life. The 1860s were decisive not because of neo-Kantianism but because of Dilthey’s tendency to understand the human situation on the basis of a total comprehension of the human being. Thus Dilthey never assumed the extreme attitude of his time that lined up against Hegel. He knew how to appreciate Hegel’s positive significance long before neo-Hegelianism.

Dilthey opened himself to everything that had substance in itself and was closed to any empty and groundless thinking that simply feeds on itself and never gets to the things themselves. This enabled him once again to pose a basic problem and to promote it in a new way. The impact of his production was at first minimal. Only a few clever persons took up Dilthey’s initiatives. Windelband in his “Rectoral Address” of 189415 leveled and alienated Dilthey’s deepest intentions and turned them on their head. Following in Windelband’s footsteps, Rickert tried to demarcate the natural sciences and the historical sciences from each other in a completely empty and formal manner. This kind of reception has its source by and large in the manner in which Dilthey’s works were published. Only two works appeared during his lifetime, and they both remained at volume one: The Life of Schleiermacher16 and Introduction to the Human Sciences.17 Or else he wrote essays entitled “Contributions to . . .,” “Ideas Concerning . . .,” “Attempts at . . .” All provisional, uncompleted, and on the way. As a result, the resonance of his works long lay dormant. And yet positive discoveries like his cannot be repressed in the long run. Today, we have the possibility of taking up the positive aspects of his influence not simply by rote repetition of what he said, but by questioning anew and further.

III

What is the basic question that Dilthey raises? What means did he have on hand to answer it? We shall try to understand the context in which Dilthey raises his question by setting off his own works from those of his contemporaries. We have noted that all of his works were incomplete. Therefore, any characterization of the

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contents of those works must remain incomprehensible as long as we have no real sense of what Dilthey’s basic question is. Accordingly, it is with an eye to bringing this question out into the open that we first present the historical sequence of his works.

Dissertation: “On Schleiermacher’s Ethics.”18 Already here, it is clear that Dilthey’s thematic is not theoretical but is rather concerned with the practical situation of the human being. At the same time, he wrote the essay for a prize competition, “On Schleiermacher’s Hermeneutics,” i.e., on the scientific theory of historical [geschichtlichen] understanding and the interpretation of texts.19 Schleiermacher was the first to elaborate hermeneutics as a universal theory of understanding, as a discipline that as such will attain fundamental significance in the present and the future. Dilthey never published this essay, although he later contributed a section of it to a festschrift for Sigwart, entitled “The Rise of Hermeneutics.”20 Its connection with history is clear, for history is a science that interprets sources already secured for it by the prior work of historical critique done by philology. His habilitation thesis (1864), “Attempt at an Analysis of Moral Consciousness,”21 is again a theme that forced Dilthey to come to terms with the very being of human beings. At this time, he also wrote essays on Novalis, Hölderlin, and Goethe ([published in 1906 as] Life Experience and Poetry).22 These essays, which seem to go far afield from Dilthey’s central theme, nevertheless have their distinctive sense in his production. For these essays seek to understand concrete historical individuals in the spiritual core of their being (“from their center [Mitte],” as the George circle puts it). Dilthey talks about empirical psychology in this context, and in 1870 his [massive] biography of Schleiermacher was published. In 1875, he wrote essays which contain the core ideas of his Introduction to the Human Sciences: “On the Study of the History of the Sciences of Man, Society, and the State.”23 Dilthey’s main published work, Introduction

23. “Über das Studium der Geschichte der Wissenschaften vom Menschen, der Gesellschaft und dem Staat” (1875), now available in GS 5, 31–73. See also “Vorarbeiten zur
to the Human Sciences (1883), bears the subtitle: Attempt at Laying a Foundation for the Sciences of Society and History. Book One provides an overview of the particular human sciences, and poses the problem of a foundation for this entire group of human sciences. Book Two treats metaphysics as the [possible] foundation of these sciences, how it came into dominance and why it went into decline. When human beings are metaphysically ordered and classified within the context of the world understood as nature, they then cannot really be understood as historical beings. The second volume of this book was never written, so the book concludes with the Middle Ages. Instead, further attempts in this direction of an anthropology were made in a series of essays: “Conception and Analysis of the Human Being . . .”24 “The Natural System of the Human Sciences.”25 Anthropology for Dilthey is a historical investigation seeking to understand how the human being was regarded in earlier times. “Contributions to the Solution of the Question of the Origin of Our Belief in the External World and its Justification,”26 written in 1890, asks how the basic relationship of the human being to the world is to be determined. “Ideas on a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology” was written in 1894 (and will be treated in detail later).27 Dilthey then wrote “Contributions to the Determination of Human Individuality.”28 At this time, Dilthey continued his work on the biography of Schleiermacher, on the “History of German Idealism,” and on the “Story of the Young Hegel.”29 “Studies in Laying the Ground for the Human Sciences” shows that Dilthey’s thinking in 1905 was once again in flux and moving in a new direction.30 This can perhaps be traced back to the impact of Husserl’s Logical Investigations, which Dilthey had just read and recognized as an epochal work, and held seminars on it for years with his students. In his foundational work of 1907, “The Essence of

Abhandlung von 1875” and “Fortsetzungen der Abhandlungen von 1875” in GS 18, 17–37, 57–111.
26. “Beiträge zur Lösung der Frage vom Ursprung unseres Glaubens an die Realität der Aussenwelt und seinem Recht” (1890); now available in GS 5, 90–138.
30. “Studien zur Grundlegung der Geisteswissenschaften” (1905); now available in GS 7, 3–75.
Philosophy,” Dilthey deliberated on the sense [sich besinnt] of his own lifelong activity as a philosopher.  

What is the inner coherence of this variegated production, what holds it together at its core? Not a conceptual system but rather a vital questioning in search of the sense of history and so the sense of being human. Questioning is a questing in the field of knowledge whose goal is the discovery and determination of actual reality. In every question something is interrogated [befragt] from a definite point of view, so that what is interrogated is questioned about [abgefragt] something. Thus, the very raising of a question is in need of an original intuition of the object to be interrogated. Now where is the object, “history,” to be found so that the sense of its being, its “being historical,” can be read off from it? This sense of the question is what also constitutes the sense of a scientific crisis. A scientific crisis occurs when old concepts become unsettled at their core and phenomena come to light that prompt a revision of those concepts.

By what routes did Dilthey gain access to history so that he could read off the sense of its being? There are three major routes:

1. The route through the history of the sciences
2. The epistemological route
3. The psychological route

The first two ways are grounded in the third and presuppose it. We shall later see how they indicate it. Psychology here has a very specific meaning, and the first thing we must do is to ask what Dilthey himself meant by it.

Questioning history by way of the history of the sciences comes into play in his essays on Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics and in the various studies on the history of the sciences, etc. These essays are not simply historical investigations of the history of the sciences. Dilthey rather tries to understand how human life in earlier times was apprehended and interpreted. Their ultimate interest is the question of the conception of life. The history of the historical sciences has a different sense than the history of the natural sciences. When the history of the historical sciences is pursued, life as knowledge is being pursued. Life as a knowing life thus pursues itself in its history. The knower is the known. That is the sense inherent in a history of the sciences of the human being and of its structure.

The epistemological way of raising the question of history also has the same

32. “Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften” (1910); now available in GS 7, 79–188.
ground. Here likewise, the question of the conception of life needs to be emphasized. This direction has to this day been misunderstood. The question appears in the form of the traditional demarcation of the human from the natural sciences that J. S. Mill already made, where Mill sought to understand history by way of how concepts are formed in the natural sciences. But Dilthey sought to provide the human sciences with a status all their own. He was not interested in a theory of method and a system; nor was he concerned with integrating a particular science into some faculty or discipline. Such matters would later pique the interest of Rickert. Dilthey’s central problem was to see historical reality in its own actuality. He sought to save the unique individuality not of a science but of a reality. He sought to make the process of human self-knowledge comprehensible. It belongs to the sense of being human not only to have a consciousness of the world but also a knowledge of itself as an inherent dimension of this consciousness. Historical knowledge is a prominent form of self-knowledge. It was this that especially interested Dilthey and not a pure and simple philosophy/theory of the sciences. This misunderstanding of his intentions is so widespread that even his own school has not understood the real intent of his theory of science, in stressing that Dilthey, in contrast to Windelband and Rickert, drew his theory from a direct acquaintance and real familiarity with historical knowing. That is, to be sure, correct, but it is also obvious and not essential. What mattered to Dilthey was to develop a conception of [human] life also by way of epistemology. And to this end, Dilthey was open to all suggestions. It thus came to pass that even Windelband’s and Rickert’s philosophy of history, which he himself had influenced, could then have a retroactive effect on him such that he in the end misconstrued the directions of his own work. Thus his most proper intentions were still left unrealized.

The goal of these first two directions of Dilthey’s research thus proves to be the apprehension and elucidation of the phenomenon of life. This is also what Dilthey tried to do in his psychology, in contrast to traditional psychology, in which the unique being of life gets lost.

IV

Dilthey’s basic question is directed toward the concept of life. All of his inquiries seek to conceptualize life. It is therefore first necessary to make life accessible originally in order then to grasp it conceptually. This task for Dilthey falls under the traditional title of psychology. Psychology is [classically] the science of the soul [psyche] or, in modern terms, the science of lived experience. Inasmuch as the classical and modern conceptions emerge in a definite continuity, we can speak of the vital stream of experience (James, Bergson). Lived experiences are a reality which does not exist in the world but instead is accessible only in the inner scrutiny of reflection, in the consciousness of oneself. “Consciousness” thus
also comes to designate this entire region of experiences (Descartes: *res cogitans*). Psychology as a science is the science of the context of lived experience, the science of consciousness. Dilthey had still another name for this science that designates more clearly what is at issue for him: anthropology. He is not seeking to observe psychological processes alongside physiological ones. His theme is rather the human being as a spiritual and mental being, whose *structures* he wishes to investigate. This is also what he means by empirical psychology. Dilthey thereby differentiates himself from any psychology that defines itself as a kind of natural science. In these intentions, Dilthey is dependent on attempts that go further back in the tradition of psychology, which nevertheless do not detract from regarding Dilthey’s approach as constituting something fundamentally new. In 1874, Brentano’s *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* appeared. It was a book written in the spirit of positivism that underscored the necessity of accepting the psychic states of affairs before making inquiry into the laws of the flow of psychic events. Before we can read off the constitution of such laws, we must first become acquainted with the primary structures. Brentano was originally a Catholic theologian, a student of Trendelenburg who left the church in 1870 and switched to the study of philosophy. Nevertheless, the historical tradition which he came to know through his theological studies remained alive for him (the Middle Ages and Aristotle). Greek psychology was very different from experimental psychology. Back then, psychology was a doctrine of life and of the very being of human life. (Brentano’s psychology, which did not seek to *explain* psychic processes but to *describe* fundamental constitutive states, influenced not only Dilthey but also Husserl.) Dilthey sought to investigate the structures of the psychical, and so it is essential not to understand such structures as mere forms of psychic existence [*Dasein*] according to which they can be ordered and classified. Instead, he understood these structures to be inherent in the very reality of psychic life. This designates the most extreme position toward which Dilthey pressed in his conception of life. Its structures are the primary vital unity of life itself and not merely classificatory schemata for the apprehension of life.

Dilthey undertook the demarcation of his own psychology from the positivist conception of psychology as a natural science in his “Ideas on a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology” (1894). His psychology is *descriptive* and not *explanatory*, *dissective* and not *constructive*. The conception of psychology as a natural science carries the methods of physics over into psychology and seeks to formulate laws in its measurement of regularities. Because it does this without first interrogating the psychical in its being, it has to transpose particular hypotheses and prejudgments which are not, and cannot be, demonstrated. A hypothesis is justified from its results. But since the hypothesis is not grounded by a prior intuition of the matter under investigation, everything built upon it is only of hypothetical certainty. Such a psychology can never be the basic science of the human sciences. This is the sort
of psychology that Wundt was after in his Physiological Psychology,\textsuperscript{33} where the psychical is considered in close conjunction with the physical and both are to be made available by the same method.

Dilthey called his psychology dissective, or “analytic,” rather than constructive, which is the basic comportment of psychology as a natural science. Like physics, it seeks to reduce everything to ultimate elements. As physics constructs nature out of elements, the psychologist now tries to construct the psyche in the same way. The sense impression is here regarded as the ultimate element. One now seeks to put together phenomena such as “will,” “hate,” and the like from complexes of sense impressions. It is not by chance that this kind of psychology regarded sense data as the original elements, for here the scientific methods of apprehension through measurement are most likely to succeed. Psychology as a natural science is in its essence thus a psychology of the senses. (Today even this kind of psychology—in part due to phenomenology—has come to new ways of raising questions and has a totally different face than it had in Dilthey’s day). For this kind of psychology as well, construction was the way to explain psychic contexts.

Against these trends, Dilthey stressed the importance of first simply taking a look at the psychic context. For what is primary for him is this context, the whole of life itself. And this context is always already there, and not first assembled out of elements. This whole must first and foremost be taken into custody, and its parts can then be drawn from the whole. Such a “dissection” or dissolution is not a breaking loose of elements, but rather a loosening up of primary structures. Psychic life is originally always given whole, and indeed according to three basic characters:

1. It develops itself.
2. It is free.
3. It is defined by an acquired context, i.e., it is historical.

To bring this into sharp relief, let us describe the way we usually try to understand “seeing.” We presume that we can understand seeing as a process of accumulating sense impressions. We do not notice that seeing itself is primary, and that it first defines the reception and interpretation of sense data. The same applies to memory and recollection, which we usually try to explain in terms of the association of elements. The reverse is in fact the case: the conjoint apprehension of two states of affairs at different times is in fact already recollection, and association is but a particular incident of recollection.

The basic definition of a psychic context is the self, the self-sameness of the person, the selfness of the ego, which is conditioned by an external world. This world acts upon the self, and the self in turn acts upon the world. There is a mutu-

\textsuperscript{33} Wilhelm Wundt, Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie (Leipzig: Engelmann, 1874).
al correlation of influence between the self and the external world ("On the Origin of our Belief in the Reality of the External World and its Justification"). This whole context connecting self and world is there in every moment. But this being-there [Da-sein] does not necessarily mean that life knows about this basic structure. The contexture is such that it is continuous: there is always something present to consciousness. For the state of consciousness, taken as it were in cross-section, there is in every moment a continuously cognitive, emotive, and volitional comportment. The inner relation among these moments constitutes the proper structure of consciousness. This structure is something that is vitally experienced by life itself. It is living experience, i.e., the self-experience of psychic life itself, i.e., nothing other than the self-experience of the human being, inasmuch as human being is defined by a world. This is not a causal determination; the contextual connection is rather that of motive and motivation. For psychic life is defined as a context of purposes. This determination is first operative in individual life. Inasmuch as life is life with others, the structures of this life with one another still have to be produced. But how is the life of the other originally given? As an epistemological question, it is presented as the problem of how we come to know an alien consciousness. But this way of posing the question is fundamentally mistaken because it overlooks a basic fact, namely, that life is primarily always already life with others, where we know the others as fellow human beings. Yet Dilthey never pursued these questions any further. What is essential for him is that the structural context of life is acquired and, accordingly, is defined by its history.

How was Dilthey’s basic research taken up? The Marburg school of neo-Kantians, whose interests were essentially determined by epistemological questions, did not bother with Dilthey at all. But the Southwest German school of neo-Kantians, which was influenced as much by Fichte as by Kant, took up Dilthey’s suggestions and challenges: Windelband, “Rectoral Address.” Rickert, _The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science._ But Dilthey’s problem was here misunderstood and altered beyond recognition. Dilthey’s ultimate interest focused upon historical being. Rickert, however, never really took an interest in the knowledge of history, but only in how historians represented it. Rickert’s inquiry resulted in showing that the historian represents unique individuality, while the natural scientist represents the universal; the one pursues individualization, the other generalization. This is a sheer formal ordering which is so true that it cannot be disputed, but it is also so empty that nothing can be drawn from it. For Windelband and Rickert, psychology as a generalizing science is therefore a natural science. It thus

cannot serve as the basis of the human sciences, for a science of the universal cannot be the groundwork for a science of the particular. This kind of analogical inference—taken from the relationship of mathematics and physics—completely overlooks the fact that even in this relationship generality is a totally formal and empty determination. The universality of mathematics is totally different from that of physics; in mathematics, universality is a pure formalization, whereas in physics it is to be understood as a generalization. What is essential here, however, is that the positive direction of Dilthey’s thought was eliminated in a single stroke. It does not matter to them that Dilthey wanted to put forth a psychology that simply did not want to be, nor ever could be, a natural science. The Southwest German school simply asserted that “for us” psychology is a natural science. Rickert is only being internally consistent in polemicizing against philosophy of life in superficial attacks that do nothing to foster further research, but that—and this is typical!—are true in principle. He maintains that it is important for philosophy to form a concept of the matter under investigation. This is true, but the philosophy of life likewise wants to form a concept of life and to elaborate its conceptuality. Rickert’s demand for concept-formation is an empty demand. For the real substance of science is its relationship to the matter under study. A change in the relationship to its matter is also the primary impetus for any transformation that a science might undergo.

When we now regard Dilthey’s life-work of research, we must raise a critical question or two. How far did Dilthey progress in his research? Where and where-in did he fall short? We will have to repeat his question of historical being and do so on the basis of a way of research—namely, phenomenology—that gives us the appropriate means to go beyond Dilthey’s own position.

V

The cultivation of a historical worldview is grounded in historical research. (Yorck: “Our common interest is to understand historicality.”)\(^{35}\) It is a matter of elaborating the being of the historical, i.e., historicality and not the historical, being and not beings, reality and not the real. It is therefore not a question of empirical research upon history. Even a universal history still would not deal with historicality. Dilthey made his way to the reality which is properly historical and possesses the sense of being historical; in short, he made his way to human Dasein. Dilthey thus succeeded in bringing this reality to givenness, defining it as living, free, and historical. But he did not raise the question of historicality itself, the question of the sense of being-ing, the question of the be-ing of beings. It is only with the development of phenomenology that we have gained the capacity to raise this

\(^{35}\) Briefwechsel Dilthey-Yorck, 185.
question clearly and overtly. We therefore have to take a look at this way of re-
search that lays the ground for our question.

The term “phenomenology” is at first obtuse and foreign, although its mean-
ing is simple. We shall first clarify the sense of the matter of “phenomenology” and
thus come to an understanding of this name, by way of the following five sections:

1. The basic attitude of phenomenology as a new direction of philosophical
research, and its relationship to traditional, contemporary philosophy
2. The initial breakthrough in Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*
3. The characterization of its decisive discoveries: intentionality and catego-
rial intuition
4. The name “phenomenology”
5. The limits of prior phenomenological research

The basic attitude of phenomenological research is defined by a principle which at
first seems self-evident: *to the matters themselves*. In our question of historicality it
is therefore a matter of bringing historical reality to givenness so that the sense of
its being can be read off from it. To derive concepts from what matters and to phi-
losophize from the matters themselves seem to be a matter of self-evidence. But it
is in fact only apparently self-evident. Research and life have an inherent tendency
to pass over the simple, originary, and genuine, and to get held up in the compli-
cated, derivative, and non-genuine. This pertains not only to today but also to the
entire history of philosophy. Contemporary philosophy is traditional; its novelty
lies in its renewal of previous philosophy, not in any new way of raising questions
about what matters. Traditional philosophy first has opinions about the matters,
and thus operates with concepts that are not interrogated in regard to their origi-
nal suitability at one time in the past. Against this, phenomenology “postulates”
the task of penetrating to the matters themselves.

This is of course not really done by way of a postulate. The first years of phe-
nomenology was also not a program, but an accomplishment. It dealt with ap-
parently totally primitive and elementary matters. But such a return to the
self-evidence hidden from the consciousness of everyday life is always the proper
route to great discoveries. Every great discoverer raises an elementary question.
With its new principle, which was covered over since the classical time and re-
covered from it, phenomenology wanted not so much to position itself outside of
history as to remain untouched by it. But this is not at all possible, for every dis-
covery stands in a historical continuity and is co-determined by history. Operative
in phenomenology itself are historical motives that in part condition its tradi-
tional way of raising questions and its approaches, thereby obscuring the proper
access to the matters themselves. Phenomenology must first gradually ease its way
into the possibility of cutting itself loose from its own tradition in order to make
past philosophy free enough to appropriate it properly. This sort of phenomenological research necessarily yields a variety of directions, as possible directions of questioning. But there is no phenomenological school. There are only different directions of work that are subject to mutual critique. Any proposition is valid only insofar as it can be demonstrated [in the matters]. Personal views of course can never be entirely suspended, but they carry no weight here.

The first breakthrough in such research occurred in 1900–1901 with the publication of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. In fact, *Logical Investigations* constitutes the ground book of phenomenology, yet we cannot really discuss its contents here. That would even contradict the phenomenological principle, for which a mere report of what is said or written does not constitute a demonstration. The only thing that matters is pursuit of the matters themselves. This requires a kind of schooling that is neither sorcery nor trickery, but a scientific method for which a certain aptitude is naturally needed, as with any method. But this aptitude can only be cultivated by occupying oneself with the matters themselves over many years.

We shall attempt, by way of a detour, to present the two decisive discoveries that will permit us to raise Dilthey's question anew phenomenologically: intentionality and categorial intuition. *Intentio* is an aiming at something. In the Middle Ages, this term designated a distinctive characteristic of psychic comportment. All thinking is a thinking of something, all willing is a willing of something, all experience is an experience of something. This self-evident principle is of fundamental import. When we invoke this directedness toward something, the toward-which of this directedness is likewise at once given just as it is intended in the intending act. We thus experience what is intended in the determinations of its being-intended. We thus have the possibility of interrogating the experienced world in respect to its being-there [Da-sein]. We can learn to see beings in their be-ing. We thus obtain a scientific basis for the question of the being of beings. Phenomenological research does not simply consider a single domain of being. It is a matter rather of thoroughly researching all the domains that there are in regard to the structure of their be-ing. Philosophy thus once again has the possibility of preceding and leading the sciences. It no longer needs to say more generally and badly what the particular sciences have already said better and more precisely. As Plato once opened the way for geometry, so now philosophy once again has the possibility of disclosing the respective domains of the sciences and providing the guiding clues for their researches through basic definitions. Phenomenology thus has its proper site for research at the universities. It wants to make students not into philosophers, but into scientifically developed human beings who have acquired an acute consciousness of their very own disciplines. And this is nothing other than the effect that Plato and Aristotle also sought to achieve at the Academy and the Lyceum.

The second discovery, that of categorial intuition, can only be alluded to...
briefly. We have already distinguished being from beings by noting that being, unlike beings, is not accessible through sense intuition. Nevertheless, the sense of being which is meant when I say “is” must somehow be demonstrable. The act which opens the way to this demonstration is categorial intuition.

Phenomenology dictates that philosophy should not use its concepts in vapid and superficial ways, but should rather make its way directly to what is intended in these concepts so that it may show itself from itself: φαινόμενον [phenomenon] – λόγος [discursive speech]. Phenomenology is therefore an addressing and defining of that which shows itself from itself. Its very name [in its Greek roots] therefore already refers to its basic principle: to the matters themselves. In its initial breakthrough, phenomenological research restricted itself essentially to theoretical experiences, to thinking. It then later also added emotional experiences. Yet it can readily be seen that there is nothing here other than a more radical grasp of traditional psychology. Phenomenology to a large extent still worked within the confines of early psychology when the discovery of intentionality was made, a discovery that moved its research onto another level. Husserl himself misunderstood his own work when he wrote the foreword to his ground book,36 where he advanced the thoroughly perverse interpretation of phenomenology as an improvement upon psychology.

VI

For Dilthey, the properly historical being is human Dasein. Dilthey in his research exposed certain structures in life, but he never raised the question of the reality of life itself, namely, what is the sense of being of our very own Dasein? Because he never raised this question, he never has an answer to the question of what it means to be historical, a question that was in fact also neglected by all previous phenomenological research. This research presupposes life itself. When it asks the question, “what is man?” it merely gives the traditional answer: animal rationale. Sensibility, intellection, and reason are the more exact determinations (in Kant). But what holds these realms together? What is the character of being of the whole being [of man]? Phenomenology defines the human being as a context of life experiences that is held together by the unity of the ego as a center of acts [Scheler!]. But no one asked about the character of being of this center.

We will now venture a preliminary definition of the being of human being that will serve as a basis for the proper definition, wherein the sense of the being of human being will turn out to be time. We shall try to exhibit phenomenologically defined characters of being in the human being by regarding human Dasein as it shows itself in its everyday existence [Dasein]. This is a basic task that operates in the realm of what is seemingly most self-evident and nearest to us. But we

36. Introduction to vol. 2 of Logical Investigations.
shall see that this field of what is nearest to us is factically what is least uncovered for us. This reality has been forgotten by traditional ways of questioning. In view of this obliviousness, we shall take our point of departure from some [common] misconceptions so that we may come to a proper conception.

One basic conception defines the human being as an ego. It goes back to Descartes who, in his *Meditations*, sought a secure fundament of certitude and found it in the ego regarded as *res cogitans*. Starting from this Cartesian foundation and proceeding by way of Kant's inquiries, modern epistemology then sought to understand how the subject comes out of itself to the object and so can know it. In pursuing this line of inquiry, modern epistemology believes itself to be eminently critical. What mattered to Descartes in view of his orientation to geometry was to provide philosophy with certain principles from which inferences could be made. What he wanted was an axiom for deduction rather than a presentation of the full being of the human being. But his conception of the human being, in which only the ego is first given, is itself uncritical. It is based on the presupposition that consciousness is something like a box, where the ego is inside and reality is outside the box. Yet natural consciousness knows nothing at all of this. Instead, the original givenness of Dasein is that of being in a world. Life is the kind of reality which is in a world and in fact in such a way that it has a world. Every living being has its envir-roning world not as something present and on hand next to it, but as something which is there [da ist] for it as disclosed, uncovered. This world can be very simple for a primitive animal. But life and its world are never two things side by side, like two chairs. Rather, life “has” its world. Even in biology this form of awareness is gradually coming to the fore. Here, one now ponders [sich besinnen] the basic structure and sense of the animal. But we overlook the essential thing here if we do not see that the animal has a world. Likewise, we also are always in a world such that it is disclosed to and for us. Objects like chairs, for example, are simply extant, on hand [vorhanden]. All of life, by contrast, is there such that a world also is there for it.

It is now a matter of regarding the basic structures in which this being-in-the-world takes place and plays itself out. How is the world given? Originally not as an object of theoretical knowledge, but as an environing world in which I look and move around, do something and take care of it. These objects are primarily not objects of theoretical knowledge, but are matters I have to deal with, which carry within themselves references to what they are used for and how they are employed, their usefulness. Material things in physics's sense are not what is first given. The extrication of nature from the immediately given world is a complicated [thought] process. The immediate world is a world of practical concern. The surrounding world [Umwelt] and its objects are in their space, but this space of the world-around-us is not the space of geometry. The space of our immediate environment is essentially defined by moments of proximity and distance, near and far, in our “getting around” [Umgang] this world-around-us, by possibilities of turning to-
ward or turning away from handy things and things on hand, and the like. It does not have the homogeneous structure of geometric space, but is rather structured by particular and distinctive places. The spacing of furniture, for example, is not given as measurements, but rather in dimensions which are disclosed in “going about” [Umgang] our occupations with them (they can be reached by hand, we can pass between them, etc.). Uncovering the space of the surrounding world is also a task of the painter. It is on the basis of this environmental space that geometric space is, by way of precise procedures, first elaborated.

The Da-sein of life is further determined by the being-there-with-us of other realities which have the same characteristics of being that I myself have: other human beings. We humans have a special kind of being-with-one-another. We all have the same surrounding world, we are in the same space. Space is there for us with one another, and we ourselves are there for one another. By contrast, the chairs in this space are merely present and on hand, they are not there for one another. Though they are indeed all together in this space, it is not there for them.

Being-in-the-world is thus being-with-one-another. Being-in-the-world is defined by this being-with-one-another even when there is factically no other human there. In the natural way of living, I myself am not given to myself in such a way that I [in detachment] observe my own experiences. I am first given to myself in what I have to do, in that with which I am involved, in that in which I daily dwell. The world (room, house, city, etc.) has a certain familiarity about it. It is in this world that I see myself, fading into its background, as it were, as something real. I encounter myself in my surroundings. The environing world [Umwelt] is immediately given in my practical circumspection, as I “look around” [Umsicht]. The possibility of theoretical research arises here only by way of a certain reorientation [Umstellung]. I can reorient myself by loosening my circumspection from my practical concern and letting it become a “mere” [detached] looking around, i.e., θεωρία [theory, “theater”]. This declaration of independence from the surrounding world and move toward the autonomy of sight is the proper source of any science. Science is the cultivation of the mere look, looking straight at a matter.

But now who is this Dasein? First and foremost, we are not ourselves. We live according to what everyone says, what everyone judges to be the case, how everyone sees things, what everyone wants. It is this indefinite “everyone” that rules this Da-sein. First and foremost, this everyone exerts a proper dominance over Dasein. Even science lives under its rule. Tradition dictates how everyone investigates, how everyone does research. This publicness of Dasein which rules our being-with-one-another makes clear that we are mostly not ourselves, but the Others. We are lived by the others. Who is this everyone? It is imperceptible, indefinable, no one. Yet it is not nothing, but rather the most proper reality of our everyday Dasein. This everyone-Dasein has the tendency to lose itself in the concerns of the world and so to fall away from itself. The human being is inauthentic in its everydayness, not
itself. And this being-inauthentic, not-being-itself, is the primary reality of human Dasein. This becomes most evident in a constitutive structure of human being that the Greeks saw and used in their definition of human being. The human being is a ζῷον λόγον ἕχον [a living being possessive of speech]. For the Greeks, who loved to talk a lot, the human being is defined by its speaking. Speech is not taken here as the basic structure of our being. (Here, of course, speech should not be understood as mere sound after the fashion of psychology as a natural science). Speech is always speaking about something and expressing oneself about something to and with others. What is being discussed is through discussing uncovered and made accessible to others. Λόγος [speech] is δηλοῦν [making visible]. But the possibility of mere talk [gossip, hearsay, idle chatter, etc.] shows that human beings have a tendency to fall or lapse. Idle talk is the possibility in which the everyone takes over. Characteristically, speech by and large does not arise from any original knowledge of the matters, for it is in fact impossible to have seen and demonstrated everything by oneself. A broad range of speech comes from hearsay. What characterizes repeated gossip is that, in the process of being circulated, what is said gets solidified in its validity and at the same time becomes removed from the very matter about which it is said. The more idle talk dominates, the more the world gets concealed. Everyday Dasein thus has the tendency to cover over the world as well as itself. This tendency of concealing is nothing but Dasein’s flight from itself into the public, a flight that will become important for understanding the phenomenon of time.

Here we are not dealing with acts or with experiences of consciousness, but with particular ways of being-in-the-world. We define this Dasein at first as concerned coping with the world. This concern always includes a concern with myself. Care is therefore the proper character of the being of Dasein. The phenomenon of care was discovered long ago, its conceptualization and experience are ancient, and yet it has never been taken up and approached in an original way.

At this point, a critical question must be raised: Can we, by way of description, arrive at any kind of concepts that will define human Dasein as a whole, as a complete reality? I can only define human Dasein as a living being that always still has before itself a not-yet being. But when I am no longer alive, I am no longer in a position to experience this wholeness. When life is finished, whole, complete, then it no longer is. We cannot avoid this difficulty. How can human Dasein be given in its wholeness? For only in this way can a concept of life be constituted and settled. The information on another’s life that has drawn to its conclusion and become complete provides poor data. For, first of all, this life is really no longer there and, secondly, we can never substitute another’s life for our own. Dasein is in each instance [jeweilig] its own Dasein, my Dasein given at its particular time. This character of ownness is inseparable from Dasein. This ownness must be retained and held fast, if the ultimate sense of Dasein, its proper existence, is to be found. How
can the human Dasein which is in each instance its own be grasped in its wholeness?

VII

Dasein’s circumspection is guided by the kind of interpretation that prevails in publicity. The world that is defined by this public interpretation is accessible to everyone in an average way. The public character of the ways in which Dasein [always already] has been interpreted defines living in publicity. Individual life has the tendency to sink down into this publicity and lose itself in it. Whenever Dasein speaks of itself, it sees itself as something in the world like other things. Thus, life is first couched in concepts of the world and not in concepts that pertain to it in an original way. We first find ourselves in what we are concerned about, in what we do, in our profession, and so on. The world of concerns provides the first concepts of what Dasein is. Thus, the human being is in the first place defined as an animal, while its special being as human only comes to expression in its rationality—a definition that is completely determined by the world. The definition given in Kant takes the human being to be a unity of the sensory world with intellect and reason. These determinations are thus seen together as unified into a single reality, but the question of the sense of the being of this unity is never raised. It is only a sum in which the parts precede the whole, so that the whole is a mere supplement. On the contrary, the wholeness is such that only through it do the parts first receive their definition. A machine, for example, cannot be conceived as the sum of gears and its other parts which are somehow brought together. Rather, the meaning of the whole defines the species and disposition of the individual parts. The important point here is to see life itself first as a whole. We ask about the structural moment that determines life in its wholeness, and what the sense of this whole is, whether perhaps this wholeness is what sustains our being in every moment of time. We already saw that life is essentially still incomplete; there is always a part of itself still ahead of itself. But intrinsic to wholeness is a sense of being finished. However, when life is finished, in death, then it no longer is. Or else we are used to think that when something is finished, it truly is. But this does not apply to life itself: for when all of life’s possibilities have been exhausted, life no longer is. The dead are departed from the world. Here, the question of immortality or non-immortality plays no role. We already saw that we could not escape this predicament by the surrogate route of the life of others whose death we witness, inasmuch as their death is not my death—and there is no such thing as death itself. For death is always in each instance [jeweilig] my own death, each in its own time. When this is overlooked, the very matter at issue has been surrendered.

Just as each Dasein discovers its world for itself, so also is each life given to itself as its very own. We have already spoken of death as a limit. With this, we have
implicitly conceived of life as a process which at one time or another ceases. Life is here understood as a continuity of life experiences that at some time comes to a conclusion. But in saying that, we have once again surrendered what we earlier gained. Dasein is not a process, nor is death something that incidentally comes afterwards, at the end. Death is something which is ever impending for human beings, about which life is itself aware. But this still does not give us a definition of death. There is much that stands before me in its impending imminence. But with death there is a difference! When an event [Ereignis] is imminent for me it is something that pertains to me and that meets me in the world. Yet death is not something that approaches me somewhere and sometime; rather, it is something that I myself am. I am myself the possibility of my own death. Death is the uttermost end of what is possible in my existential Dasein, the uttermost possibility of my Dasein. Implicit in Dasein is a possibility which is ever impending for it and in which human Dasein itself stands before itself in its uttermost possibility. Here it is not a matter of moods or dispositions, but of simply seeing the movements that Dasein makes in its consciousness of death as its uttermost, ever imminent possibility. I myself am my death in the very act of living. Here it is less important to describe different kinds of death than to understand death as a veritable possibility of life. Our goal is not a metaphysics of death, but to grasp the structures of the being of death within life. For what is difficult here is not to die, but to cope with death in the present. We must retain this idea of death for what follows. If this is what death is, namely, the uttermost possibility that Dasein itself is, then Dasein must have various potential ways of standing imminently before its death. First we want to learn how the everydayness of the individual absorbed in the everyone stands before its death, as well as how death shows itself in this stance-toward-death, i.e., how it is met in everydayness. We saw that everydayness is defined by the fact that here Dasein loses itself in its world. Death is met daily in everydayness. We experience it and are aware, somewhat nonchalantly, of dying, the passing of humans from this world, as something that can perhaps also befall us some day. This nonchalance screens a moment of deflecting death away from ourselves. Thus Dasein evades death and pushes it away as a possibility. This flight from death goes so far that everydayness tries to persuade the dying person that he or she won’t die and thereby tries to talk the person out of his or her own death. One believes thereby to have done a service to the dying person. Dasein not only calms itself in the face of death, but tries to push it away by interpreting it away. Thinking about death is defined as cowardice or withdrawal from life. Life calms itself about death and, by interpreting it as something foreign to life, eliminates it from the horizon of life. In concern, Dasein cares for itself. Inherent in the structure of care is the co-concern of Dasein, for itself and for others. Dasein cares for itself and for others by doing away with this possibility of death. It continually takes care to neglect the possibility of conceiving death more radically. It is in this very flight from death that the being-there
[Da-sein] of death directly shows itself. Death shows itself in the from-which of our fleeing. How is death there in our constant flight from it? What are the characters of its special presence? Its indefiniteness: this possibility of Dasein is indefinite. When death will come is for Dasein completely indeterminate. But this possibility is at once an imminent certainty that surpasses every other conceivable certainty. It is for Dasein certain that it will die its death. This certainty neither removes nor diminishes the indefiniteness. Instead, it actually increases the indefiniteness. Everydayness seeks to deflect this indefinite certainty. It takes account of all that is still left for Dasein. It forces the indefiniteness of death into postponement and suppresses its certainty in an attitude of “not dwelling on it.”

Thus, death shows itself as the uttermost, indefinite, and yet certain possibility of Dasein in which this Dasein stands before itself.

This definition of the structure of death is not arbitrary, but rather must be grasped a priori as the definition that underlies every interpretation of death, including those to which even faith must take a position. This definition must also be co-intended in Christianity. It was through Christian theology that the problem of death first arose in conjunction with the question of the sense of life.

We have defined Dasein in its publicity as inauthenticity, as not-being-itself. This inauthentic standing-before-death is thus evasion. What then is standing-before-death in authenticity, and what implications does such a stance have for the basic understanding [constitution?] of human Dasein?

VIII

If an undertaking like the definition of the being of Dasein is to be successful, it must grasp Dasein in its wholeness. Wholeness is determined by limits. Death is a limit which is there for Dasein itself. Standing imminently before this limit as an indefinite and yet certain possibility is precisely what defines the beings that have the character of human life. Dasein in its everydayness evades this possibility. Such an evasion is characteristic of an inauthentic stance toward death.

Is there an authentic way of standing before this impending death which is not defined by publicity, but rather a way in which Dasein stands before itself as in each instance individual, ownmost, and mine? It is a matter of apprehending the actuality of this possibility and holding on to it. To stand before a possibility means to apprehend it as possibility. To endure the possibility of death means to have it there such that it stands before me just as it is—indefinite in its When, certain in its That. To allow this possibility to persist as a possibility and not make it into an actuality, say by suicide, calls for running toward it in anticipation. Here the world recedes and collapses into nothingness. The possibility of death means that one day I will depart from this world, that one day the world will have nothing more to say, that all that I am attached to, all that I occupy myself with, and all that is of con-
cern to me will have nothing more to say to me, and will no longer be of help to me. The world out of which I can live then is no longer there. I have to come to terms with this possibility purely on my own. This shows that the possibility of choice is already given to Dasein. Dasein can at any moment comport itself such that it chooses between itself and the world. It can make each decision on the basis of what it meets in the world, or it can fall back on itself. Dasein's possibility of choosing is the possibility of recovering itself from its lostness in the world, that is, from its publicity. In choosing itself, Dasein has at once chosen itself and choice itself. But having chosen choice means to be resolved. Running forward in anticipation thus means choosing, having chosen means to be resolved—resolved not to dying but to living. This choosing and this being-resolved is the choice of responsibility that Dasein assumes for itself, such that in my action I make myself responsible for each of my actions. Choosing responsibility for oneself means to choose one's conscience as the possibility that the human being properly and authentically is. Phenomenology's error (Scheler) lies in its misunderstanding of the properly anthropological structure of Kantian ethics. Kant saw that the basic sense of Dasein is possibility, namely, to be itself possibility and to be able to seize it. But to choose conscience at once means to become guilty. As Goethe once put it, “He who acts is always without conscience.” Every action is at once guilt. For the possibilities of action are limited over against the demands of conscience, so that every successful action results in conflicts. Choosing self-responsibility is therefore becoming guilty in an absolute sense. Insofar as I truly am, I become guilty whenever I act at all.

What do these contextual connections mean? This forerunning into the uttermost possibility of my self, which I am not yet, but will be, is to be the future. I myself am my future by way of this anticipatory forerunning. I am not in the future, but I am the future of myself. Becoming guilty is nothing but carrying the past within oneself. Becoming guilty is being my past. The past is retained and is visible in becoming guilty. Human Dasein thereby comes properly into the present, into action. In being resolved, Dasein is its future, in being guilty it is its past, and in acting it comes into the present. Dasein is nothing but being time itself. Time is not something that occurs out there in the world, it is rather what I myself am. Time itself is there in my forerunning, in my being guilty, in my acting. Time defines the wholeness of Dasein. Dasein is in each instance [jeweilig] not only in the moment, but rather is itself in the full stretch of its possibilities and of its past. It is remarkable how the past comes alive and the present vanishes whenever we act in the direction of the future. Those who act properly and authentically live out of the future, and can also live out of the past, while the present takes care of itself. Time constitutes the wholeness of my Dasein and at the same time defines my own being at every moment. Human life does not transpire in time, but rather is time itself. This becomes comprehensible if we can show that, even in its everyday way of being, what defines Dasein is time.
How is time there in everydayness? It is manifestly there when I discern or determine something about it, as when I glance at the clock and say “now.” What about this now? What sort of time is being determined when Dasein’s existence is arranged according to time-tables, days, weeks, and years? In these [regular] means of orienting ourselves, we already see that all of life is determined in a special way by time. These ways of regulating time are determined by concern. Concern fulfills its meaning by managing to make available what is not yet available; it has the sense of bringing what has been placed under its care into the present. There is in care a certain expectation or waiting, that is, a definite relation to the future. I expect something from the future which concerns me; it is not something that I am, but rather something I have to do. To concern oneself in this way with the future is at once to forget. What is of concern loses its character of having become and is now simply there. Its history becomes concealed. It now becomes everyday. The counter-phenomenon to this expecting is thus not remembering but forgetting. Everydayness always lives in the present, according to which the future is reckoned and the past is forgotten. This tendency to keep to the present is the reason for the widespread use of clocks. Why are there clocks? Because everydayness wants to have the regular flow of the world available in the Now. Now-and-then, and then, and then ad infinitum: nothing but more nows to be made available in and for the everyone. To make these nows generally accessible requires a clock.

What is the genesis of the clock? And what are the proper motives for calculating the time? Plato’s *Timaeus*: time is the sky. This definition has grown out of an original experience, but Plato was unable to conceptualize it. Everydayness orients its concern upon the now. The circumspection of concern is defined in its possibilities by daytime. The night for primitive humanity is the time to rest. The day and the course of the day define the day’s work. Morning, midday, and evening are not astronomical data, they are rather points of orientation in our going about our daily rounds, now-points for particular concerns. Inasmuch as humanity defines this now in the heavens, its statements about time address the sky. “Time is the sky.” For the Greeks, further temporal determinations come from the time of the market and the time for the people’s assembly, which again get their orientation from concerns. Inasmuch as this sense of concern developed from being-with-one-another, agreement over specifying the time and the moment became all the more urgent. To this end, the Greeks invented the tree clock (?). Shadows measured by footsteps served as the measure of time. The more that everyday Dasein becomes absorbed in concern-with-one-another, the less time it has and the more refined the clock becomes. No time must be lost even in specifying the time (pocket-watch). But to be truly and properly temporal is not a matter of acting in time and reckoning with time. The comprehensive use of a clock means to turn all time into the present. This is notably apparent in the use of a clock to define the processes of nature in an objective way. Dasein seeks to define the world by means of the clock.
Why does Dasein define the world in clock time? And what kind of time is measured in the natural sciences? What does it mean to use the clock in science, i.e., to use a periodical system of reckoning? It means the ready availability of the possibility of setting the now. But in this way, life loses its sense of the time that it itself properly is. To look at the clock means to say “Now!” This now is not, however, my own now but the now of the clock that we can talk about in common, the public now of being-with-one-another. This time is the time of the everyone that belongs to publicity. Everyone’s time, on account of which we get hustled and rushed by existence [Dasein], manifests the extremity to which the rule of the public is carried in our Dasein. This kind of time is nothing but our being-with-one-another itself. It is therefore the time that we are with one another.

IX

The being of Da-sein in the world is defined by circumspective concern. Here Dasein has the possibility of disregarding its concern and making its circumspection autonomous. This is how philosophy and science as such originate. Philosophy or science is beholding of the world, disclosing it in its being. The proper being of the world thereby becomes the nature that always is [immerseidente]. Science of the world is thus first an extrication of nature. Nature is to be made present such that it becomes accessible in its eternal being [Immersein] and its lawful regularities, and all the moments that come at the expense of observation and thus influence our access to it are corrected and eliminated. This latter tendency first developed in Greek philosophy, which, instead of constructing defined contexts of the laws of nature, sought to determine its guiding basic concepts.

Modern physics forced its way to the discovery of the laws of motion, defining them in a way that was free from all the contingencies of their access, measurement, and definition. Relativity theory took this idea of an absolute knowledge of nature quite seriously. It is not a theory about the relative validity of physical laws. Instead, it asks about those conditions of definition and measurement that permit nature to be apprehended purely in terms of itself and allow its laws of motion to be understood. What is the philosophical significance of this particular scientific theory? This is a legitimate question insofar as every genuine science is but a concrete philosophy, and is genuine only to the extent that it is philosophically founded. To date [1925], the theory of relativity has received little verification from the facts. Of course, it has recently received two confirmations of great import: 1) the curving of light rays by gravity; 2) the aberration in the orbit of Mercury. Mathematically, the theory of relativity depends upon arriving at a radical conception of geometry. Not every spatial property of a figure is geometrical. Above, below, right, and left are irrelevant in Euclidean geometry. Its results are independent of displacement, rotation, and reflection. Contrary to these transformations, its principles are invariant. On the basis of these facts, the mathematician Felix Klein
[Göttingen] developed a geometry as a theory of invariants for a particular group of transformations. This way of raising the question was evoked by the controversy over the axiom of parallel lines, which could not be proved. So the methodical assumption was made that this axiom could not be valid, and this led to the development of two new geometries which were in themselves free from contradiction: 1) elliptical geometry, which is based on the assumption that no parallel line can be drawn through a point at any degree (here the sum of the angles in a triangle > 180°); 2) hyperbolic geometry, which is based on the assumption that several parallel lines can be drawn through a point at any degree (here the sum of the angles in a triangle > 180°). In regard to the question of determining the laws of motion, one proceeds from a system of coordinates, with time as the fourth coordinate, and then raises the question of whether a static system is preferable, or whether the equations of a dynamic system should be maintained. The Newtonian laws were transformed by an accelerated motion in the system of measurement. The tendency to maintain the laws of motion led to modifying space and time (as conditions of measurement) such that the laws of motion are maintained with respect to all motions in the system of measurement. How should the system of coordinates be determined for this? The necessary condition here is that the time that I measure varies with the movement, as do the very standards for measuring it. Space and time vary and they are dependent on matter. Accordingly, the concepts of matter and field of force must be redefined.

What is implied in these definitions regarding time? Here the Kantian concept of time no longer suffices. The new discovery in the theory of relativity is that time is always local time, that it is dependent upon the locale where it is measured. Measuring means to question a standard of measurement so that the quantity of what is measured becomes apparent. The measured quantity is made available through number and brought into the present. Measuring is a way of making matters present. The idea that time is actually local time becomes understandable if one recalls that the self is proper time. Time is not something that happens outside of us in some sort of container of being. Rather, we ourselves are time. The processes of the world are encountered in time. They encounter a way of apprehending in which it is fitting and proper to say “now.”

Thus time, even the time of nature, cannot be grasped in an absolute metaphysical way. This is really what relativity theory discovered. Time is physically a one-dimensional, irreversible manifold of earlier and later moments. Each “now” is unrepeatable and has its own distinct position. The ultimate determination of these nows is their openness, which is without beginning and end. Hermann Minkowski [Göttingen] sought to reform geometry on the basis of these aspects of time. With the auxiliary assumption of time as the fourth coordinate, he developed geometry into a theory of relativity.

It is the kind of world-time that everyone can agree upon. While this meas-
ured time is not proper time, Bergson is wrong in thinking that time is here spatialized. It is instead transposed from the future into the now.

It is not by chance that the first scientific definition of time concerns the time of nature. Aristotle understood fully what he was really measuring in measuring time. The sundial displays a moving shadow that constantly changes place—it is now here, now here, now here . . . Time is thus, says Aristotle, what is counted in motion with respect to the earlier and later. This definition has essentially remained the same into modern times. Even Kant defines time from an apprehension of nature. But it is now a matter of understanding time as the reality of our own selves. The ordinary conception of time expresses the improper being of time. But proper time [eigentliche Zeit] is something that we ourselves are, each one of us. Yet a difficulty arises here: if in each of its individuations [jeweils] Dasein itself is time, how can there nevertheless be such a thing as measured time? This is a question about how the specific character of individual Dasein is to be understood in our being-with-one-another in time.

At any rate, what we have already determined should suffice for our next and last question that concerns the sense of historicality.

Dilthey’s true and proper question goes after the sense of history. It is related to his tendency to understand life from out of itself rather than from a reality alien to it. This implies that life itself in its very constitution must be made transparent. Dilthey has shown and stressed that the basic character of life is to be historical. But he went no further with his findings and neglected to ask what being-historical might be. Nor did he show in what way life itself is historical. We have raised this question on the basis of phenomenology and prepared ourselves for it by providing an analysis of Dasein and its proper actuality, time. We have thus prepared an adequate basis for raising the question of historicality, which we shall discuss in three stages:

1. History and historicality,
2. Historicality and historical science,
3. An example of historical [historische] knowledge as a possibility of being-historical [Geschichtlich-Sein], namely, research in the history of philosophy.

By way of preparation, let us begin by defining our terms, namely, history [Geschichte] and historical science [Historie]. Each word has a completely different origin and yet both get used interchangeably. This possibility is by no means accidental. History [Geschichte] signifies a happening [Geschehen] that we ourselves are, such that we ourselves are there, involved. There is a difference between history and motion (e.g., the motion of the heavenly bodies). It is only in a very broad
sense that we can also speak of a history \([\text{Geschichte}]\) of the world. History is formally a certain kind of movement. It is a kind of happening which, as something past, is still there, and about which we are cognizant in a definite way, carry with us, and sustain. In the specification “past,” the moment of time shows itself.

Historical science (\(\text{ιστορεῖν:} \) ascertaining and reporting what has happened) means the knowledge of a happening. The mode and manner of knowledge which enables something past to be reported is called historical \([\text{historisch}]\). It takes place in the uncovering, critique, and interpretation of sources, as well as in the account of what is found in these sources. But why is the expression of the knowledge of the happening used for the happening itself? Because it happens with ourselves and to ourselves \([\text{mit uns selbst}]\). What has happened is retained and conserved in our knowledge of it.

A scientific definition of history would require us to distinguish it from motion. Here we must be satisfied with several indications. We have already distinguished being-extant or being-on-hand \([\text{Vorhanden-Sein}]\) from being-in-the-world. Motion is the broader concept, referring to the phenomenon of change and of changeover from one thing to another. Motions run their course in the world. History happens to me myself; I am this happening. Anticipatory forerunning is a movement that Dasein performs in its own future. This getting-ahead-of-itself is the basic movement from which history \([\text{Geschichte}]\) arises, for it is by way of this going-before-itself that the past is uncovered. This happening is not merely a change that runs its course and ends. Rather insofar as we go forth ahead of ourselves, we are this happening itself. That we know about ourselves in this very happening belongs structurally to it. For it is in this knowing that the happening is originally uncovered. We give ourselves an understanding of this structure of historicality in the same way as we have come to understand time. We are history, i.e., our own past. Our future lives from out of the past. We bear the past with us. That can be clearly seen in the historical being-with-one-another that we call a generation. It was Dilthey who discovered the importance of the concept of generation for the phenomenon of historicality. Each of us is not only his or her own self, but also their generation. The generation precedes the individual, [and as a precedent] is there ahead of the individual, defining its Dasein. Individuals live out of what their past has been and carry it and themselves through the present, only to be finally overtaken by a new generation.

The past can now be apprehended explicitly. In other words, this particular context of being out of which life lives can now be disclosed as a theme for research. The past is immediately there for us as a present that has passed by. This apprehension of the past is always tensed in certain limits. This possibility is delimited by how we ourselves apprehend and define our own Dasein. Spengler’s notion of the absolute observation of history, for example, is delimited by an interpretation of cultures that basically defines them as symbols, the expression of
a cultural soul. But Spengler’s way of interpreting the phenomena of the past no longer allows for a proper determination of these phenomena. The soul of a culture is understood in purely biological terms. Spengler’s sense of historical observation is an aesthetic form of observation that does not pursue historical movements in their dynamic connections, but is merely a botany disguised as history. Our own present is itself thus only one among other [species of the present].

Such theses on the interpretation of history are, to be sure, controversial. Here we only wish to indicate that whatever is being investigated from the start stands within a particular interpretation. If the past is to be properly disclosed in accord with what it is, we shall have to refrain from bringing in questions that contradict the temporally particular jeweilige historical situation in its full uniqueness. This means that the fundamental meditation on the sense Besinnung of historical research includes cultivating a concept of Dasein that would make the interpretation of its history possible. Elaborating the ground for this possibility is a basic part of historical method. Objective historical research by and large operates under the naive assumption that the concepts that it picks up and puts to use are self-evident. Succumbing to this naiveté, the Marburg school in its history of philosophy sought to understand this history in Kantian concepts. And Catholic philosophy interpreted Aristotle from a Thomistic standpoint. In the rivalry of these two schools, the Marburgers promoted Plato as an idealist while the Catholics played up Aristotle as a realist. The present situation of research is fraught with the danger of obstructing history, of not uncovering it, but instead rendering it inaccessible. It poses the critical task of freeing ourselves from such stereotypical opinions and meditating instead on those conditions that enable us to apprehend our own sense of the past. Philosophical research must be a critique of the present. An original disclosure of the past no longer takes it to be merely a present that preceded our own present. It is possible to open up the past and to show that we can find in it the proper roots of our existence and take them over into our own present as a vital force. Historical consciousness makes the past free for the future. The past then gains impetus and becomes productive. It is only because Dasein is in itself historical geschichtlich and can have its own past that unhistorical unhistorische ages are also possible. These ages do not see the past as such but instead become absorbed in their present. Unhistorical ages are thus only a particular way of being-temporal and being-historical.

We shall exemplify historical research and its possibility by way of the history of philosophy. This example has not been chosen arbitrarily, but rather because phenomenology, a genuine and radical trend in the recent history of philosophy, is marked by a lack of history, even an antipathy toward history. For it believes that it can dismiss all that has been as irrelevant and come to the matters themselves on its own. But here phenomenology remains hung up in traditional ways of raising questions. And yet it belongs to the very sense of phenomenological research to meditate
time and again upon its own sense and to shake off non-genuine traditions in order to activate a genuine sense of the past.

We shall direct our consideration of the history of philosophy toward a basic problem which we have continually had in view but have not yet expressly raised, namely, the question of the be-ing of beings. The question of the being of a particular realm of beings is not yet radical enough, inasmuch as I still do not know what I really want to understand by the term be-ing [Sein]. Plato was the first to raise this central question in *The Sophist*. The decline of philosophical research itself also put this basic question into decline. Today we simply assert that being is the most universal concept and so cannot be defined. But what is decisive for a concept is not definition, but its demonstration in and by way of its subject matter. This critical foundational question is the central question of philosophy. It is at once the question of the way in which the sense of being is to be experienced. By putting the question in this way, the otherwise disorderly aspect of the history of philosophy becomes quite simple. It is remarkable that the Greeks already interpreted being in terms of time: οὐσία [being; property] means presence, the present. If this is what being signifies, then proper being is that which is never not there, what is always there (ἀεί ὄν [perpetual being]). And yet this concept of being has in the tradition been taken up and used to understand historical reality, which is in reality not always there. It is therefore manifest that if the Greek doctrine of being is uncritically taken as absolute, it then becomes impossible for research to understand an actuality like historical Dasein at all. Proof of this is provided by Descartes, who salvaged the Greek doctrine of being and carried it over into the present. He made use of the Thomistic doctrine of being, whose basic concepts are thoroughly Greek. Descartes neglected to ask what the sense of the being of the “I am,” which he had discovered, might be. He simply applied the concept of being understood as being-present-at-hand in the world. This neglect and obscurity has over the years been transplanted into the heart of phenomenology. Husserl also fails to raise the question of the being of consciousness. It is therefore manifest that a certain interpretation of being pervades the entire history of philosophy and defines its entire conceptuality.

Thus the inquiry into the history of philosophy takes us back to the basic question of being itself. This question of being must be raised in a way that preserves its continuity with the first scientific formulation of the question of being by the Greeks, in order to investigate the legitimacy and fundamental limits of this formulation. If we succeed in bringing scientific philosophy back to its real thematic, we may be assured that such research will once again be fruitful for the sciences. Logic will then no longer be a supplementary formulation after the fact of scientific procedures, but rather a basic guide that runs ahead of the sciences and discloses their fundamental concepts. To this end, we need the history of philosophy, so that we may understand the ancients anew. We must press forward so that we may once again be equal to the questioning of the ancient Greeks.
Yorck von Wartenburg had perhaps an even better sense than Dilthey of this need for historical meditation-on-meaning [Besinnung]. On August 21, 1889, he wrote: “It seems to me that the oscillations brought about by the principle of eccentricity, which led to a new era more than four hundred years ago, have now become extremely broad and flat. Knowledge has progressed to the point where it annuls itself and human beings are so removed from themselves that they can no longer see themselves. ‘Modern man,’ i.e., man since the Renaissance, is ready for burial.”37 And then on February 11, 1884: “Since to philosophize is to live, there is in my opinion—Do not be alarmed!—a philosophy of history. But who could write it? . . . That is also why there can be no real philosophizing that is not historical. The distinction between systematic philosophy and historical presentation is in its essence incorrect. . . . I am dismayed by the monastic cell of modern man in these times when life’s waves surge so high and when, if anytime, knowledge should be power. But if science has a native ground, it is to be found in the world of the past, in antiquity.”38

37. Briefwechsel Dilthey-Yorck, 83.
38. Ibid., 251. This and the above quotation from Yorck were put into modern German by Walter Bröcker, who transcribed the Kassel Lectures.
In the semester break of the Pentecost week in late May 1926, Heidegger writes to Karl Jaspers and brings him up to date on his all-out effort to rush a “clean” readable manuscript of the First Division of Being and Time off to the printers, which had been his principal task day and night since the first days of March:

I am once again moving along well in the work, and in the excitement also do not feel at all tired. Today, for the Pentecost celebration of the Academic Association, which in the winter semester read your book, The Idea of the German University, I held a lecture entitled “On the Essence of Truth” [Vom Wesen der Wahrheit]. Hopefully, the worst effects will not hit me after the strain of these last months. But of course, one will have to pay for it somehow.¹

Indeed, the dated record of page proofs and galleys shuttling between Heidegger’s pen in Todtnauberg and Marburg and the printers in Halle shows that he was at this time just finalizing the very last section of the First Division, § 44 entitled “Dasein, Disclosedness, and Truth” (BT, 212–30), for the printer.² It is upon the
projected structure of this pivotal section of Being and Time that the talk of Pentecost Monday is clearly based. It may well have been organized from various notes gathered together from other manuscripts on hand in preparation for the penning, in the remainder of this holiday week in 1926, of the printer’s clean manuscript of this climactic section of Being and Time. This “truth” talk of 1926—or, more precisely, § 44 of Being and Time—in turn assumes a pivotal position between the very first of the “truth” talks in December 1924 (“Being-There and Being-True According to Aristotle”; see chap. 17 above) and the later versions of 1930–1932, likewise entitled “On the Essence of Truth,” to which it can be fruitfully compared. In fact, the religious allusions that introduce this talk are reminiscent of the version of “Von Wesen der Wahrheit” modified for the occasion of its presentation to the Department of Protestant Theology at Marburg on December 5, 1930, in a talk which opens with an explanation of the connection of its announced title, “Philosophsizing and Believing,” with its subtitle, “The Essence of Truth,” and later departs from the strictly philosophical development of this essence with references to biblical passages like “The truth shall make you free.”

Comparing this impromptu talk with the similarly structured § 44 of Being and Time (the overt parallels in their outlines are detailed in the notes below) exposes a fair degree of oratorical freedom, even experimental formulation, on the part of Heidegger in this displaced Pentecostal context (e.g., in prematurely including resolute openness to the call of conscience, a later section of Being and Time), which may in part also be due to the rough and incomplete quality of the transcript itself. The problem of the essence of truth has Heidegger citing and exploring a variety of examples of truth, scientific, perceptual, real and ideal, genuine, practical, personal, religious, and philosophical, and using terms for truth that will only later become central, like bergen (see n. 3 below). But despite this spontaneity and sometimes suggestive looseness of formulation, the text follows § 44 in displaying the distinction in the questions of the locus and the “essence” of truth by its focus on truth as a relation and following the shift in its ontological nexus of relationships in the movement from judgment’s correspondence to Dasein’s world disclosure to being’s unconcealment in language, thus in making the relational shift of Dasein’s disclosing from a simple being-true (as in 1924) to its being “in the truth,” and finally making the notorious claim that “There is truth, it gives truth, only as long as Dasein is,” which asserts the finitude, facticity, temporality, indeed the mortality of truth, and leads to the concluding observation that factic Dasein is originally both in the truth and in untruth.

 lication of Being and Time,” 483 and 564 n. 17. Thus, the discovery of the typescript of this 1926 “truth” talk provides one more document toward determining the detailed chronology of the drafting of Being and Time.
On the Essence of Truth (Pentecost Monday 1926)

Pentecost, the feast of the Spirit, the Power, and the Truth, demands for its celebration that we not act arbitrarily and discuss whatever we like. Not doing whatever we please is in an original sense that urgent issue toward which Dasein of itself necessitates us. Dasein possesses an intrinsic pull that draws us to truth. But truth is an aim that most properly belongs to science. The Academic Association has in fact not only a relation to the university. Inherent in its very being is the continual deliberation-on-the-sense [Besinnung] of the overt endeavor to cultivate a vital relationship with science and toward truth. Such an endeavor needs a guideline, a secure idea of the aim toward which all research and teaching is directed. The deliberation itself, however, in the sense of the actual confrontation of the individual and his relationship to academic study and the university, is not our topic of discussion here. There is also no need to predetermine it here. It must remain open and must be your very own affair, the affair of your community. Even the pre-given horizon against which such a confrontation takes place must remain open. In order to clarify this horizon somewhat, I have made it my task to clarify the essence of truth.

This requires that we get a better sense of the interchange of question and answer in the scientific conversation. The frigid air of cold deliberation and contemplation, the hardness and necessity of the concept are one thing. The sunny gaiety of play and dance, the free approximations and tentative moves of finding and giving oneself are another. Both are our Dasein. Both re-cover and secure [bergen] this feast and both sustain its celebration. Both must continue to be held in trust [verwahrt] and safekeeping by you as a symbol of your academic community.

Our considerations are concerned with the essence of truth. This theme requires a more precise circumscription. Its underlying problem calls for a provisional characterization. The consideration itself requires an orientation of its course and a prefiguration of its sequence of steps. We ask about the essence of truth, that is, what truth itself is. This investigation of the essence of truth is accordingly not

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3. *Das Ver-wahren der Wahrheit*, “holding truth in trust (troth, truth), safeguarding it,” was before 1926 (esp. in 1922; see chap. 14) frequently played upon by Heidegger to emphasize the conservative tendency of the habits of truth. Perhaps for the first time in this 1926 talk, *bergen* (to shelter) begins to take over the same function of secure safekeeping, bringing with it the added notes of “to cover, conceal, en-close” as in a covert “cove,” harbor, or valley sheltered by mountains (*Berge*). Around 1930, Heidegger coins the word *entbergen* (to take out of cover), and these two words along with the old word in this family, *verbergen* (to conceal) and their variants (e.g., *Verborgenheit*, “concealment,” “secrecy,” “retirement”; the one frequently used in *Being and Time*) will henceforth play the major roles in the later Heidegger’s accounts of the covert “essence of truth.” To preserve the truth means to provide a covering shelter for it (the academic community?), to maintain its secrecy, to safeguard its mystery (e.g., of the Holy Spirit).
directed toward particular truths. We are not asking, for example, about a true and authentic life, or the truth of faith, or about the true propositions of the particular sciences. The question is rather concerned with what uniquely defines truths as truths. What is the sense of the truth of a true life? We are therefore investigating what is proper to the truth of a mathematical proposition, what is characteristic of the truth of faith. With such questions we seek no particular truths, but instead inquire into the truth character of these truths. We now require an understanding of the different forms of truth. What is a life-truth as such, a faith-truth as such, a mathematical truth as such? We are not asking about truths but about modifications of truth. When we thus ask about truth as such and its modifications, we then always presuppose the idea of truth as such, which is modified to practical, theoretical, and religious truths. What then makes truth to be what it is? We are searching for truth in general.

It is an extremely general question. Where and how can we find something like truth in general, where can something like it be apprehended, so that we can define it and demonstrate the rightness of the concept thus obtained?

The air gets thin when we discuss such a general question. But such questions have their own atmosphere and therefore also demand their own treatment and investigation. If the concept of truth is not to remain a phantom, an invention of philosophy, but is demonstrable from what truth is, there must be a way to work directly on truth itself and its essence. Which does not necessarily mean that we are taking the right path. What is essential here is that you see the whole of the question of truth in its principal traits.

We are asking about truth as such, as it is in its essence, and not yet about truths. Is the matter in fact ordered in this way? Are we not after all searching for truths, for true statements about the essence of truth itself, for criteria of true knowledge of the very idea of “truth”? Of course!

We are seeking truths, particular propositions, statements that give a revealing account [Aufschluss] about what is sought. But these philosophical truths that we seek do not in this deliberation of sense become a theme of the investigation; they become truth only to the extent that we remain underway in the investigation, which has the peculiarity of being referred to [bezogen auf], along with that about which it questions, the very questioning that is in search of truth. This peculiar “return reference” [Rückbezogenheit] has been called presupposing: In asking about the essence of truth we presuppose particular truths, philosophical truths, and also presuppose that there is something like truth. There are truths, there is truth. How do matters stand with this presupposition? Is it correct, is it in order? What does it mean to say that there is truth, “it gives” truth? What is the sense of this es gibt? Is it given like mountains or houses? How then is it given? In what way is truths, or are truths? Where is truth or truths domiciled, as it were, where is it “at home”? De-liberation-on-the-sense of the essence of truth includes the question of the be-ing
of truth and the question of why it must be pre-supposed that there is truth, it gives
truth, and what the sense of this presupposition is. The problem is thereby con-
centrated on two questions: What is truth? and How is truth?; in what way is it?

The problem of the presupposition of truth and of the sense of this presup-
position has been touched upon by philosophy since antiquity in connection with
the refutation of skepticism. But what gets completely overlooked is that the defi-
nition of truth in itself includes the question of the essence of truth. Skepticism is
thus disclosed on a basis that is inadequate to the issue. This question itself makes
clear why truth is such that it must always already be presupposed. The discussion
of its kind of be-ing therefore necessarily belongs to the question of truth.

Philosophy and science in their beginnings did not ask about truth itself. It
lies in the drift of everyday experience to ask about what is first available to it. An
untypical return to searching and questioning themselves is therefore required. But
this does not mean that they lack an understanding of truth. We thus find in the
prosaic poem of Parmenides, for example, certainly not a theoretical but neverthe-
less a universal deliberation on the sense of truth. It is itself addressed as a goddess,
as a guide on the path of research:

[Heidegger here reads the proem in German translation apparently at least
into Fragment 5 and the goddess’s words on the ways of being and non-being].

The truth accordingly led Parmenides to the way upon which he made the
most fundamental discovery that science has time and again made: Being is and
non-being is not.

Plato discovered that even non-being is, that even the evil, untrue, and bad
is. Although he at first resisted it, he had to become the murderer of his father
and revise the thesis that being is and non-being is not. But what does that imply?
Nothing less than that the goddess led Parmenides into untruth, or more pre-
cisely put, that she concealed from him that even the untruth as non-being is
and that she herself as truth is at the same time the possibility of untruth.

There is accordingly something enigmatic about what we call truth. We will
not try to resolve this enigma but rather to understand it.

Two Parts:

I. The Concept of Truth as Such
II. The Be-ing of Truth and the Necessity of Truth’s Presupposition

I. The Concept of Truth as Such

We shall proceed by way of a detour. We shall not begin directly with the char-
acterization of the proper essence of truth, because such an approach would in its
method exact demands that are too high. Our way out will be with the traditional
concept of truth. We shall ask what from early on, and always with a measure of jus-
tification, is understood by truth. What is defined in the traditional concept of
truth will be led back to more original fundaments in accord with which the sense of the traditional concept of truth becomes understandable [verständlich, “intelligible”]. The traditional concept of truth is a derivative modification of the original concept. The connection of the two must come to the fore.

1. The characterization of the traditional concept of truth
2. Return to its fundaments
3. The definition of the original concept of truth from its fundaments
4. The demonstration of the derivation of the traditional concept of truth from the original concept.

§ 1. The Characterization of the Traditional Concept of Truth

Two characteristics:

a) The place of truth is the assertion of something about something, the λόγος, or what in modern logic is called the judgment. And the judgments are “from their native home” [von Haus aus = by nature] true or false. It is in judgment that truth is domiciled, at home [beheimatet]. This thesis has become a commonplace. Everyone appeals to Aristotle, the father of logic, to support it.

b) Truth is the correspondence of the judgment with the object, correspondence of the knowledge with the being that is known. This was first formulated by Aristotle and transmitted in his formula, παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς πραγμάτων ὀμοιώματα, the “lived experiences” of the soul, the νοήματα (“representations”), are assimilations approximating the things. Medieval philosophy, which in large measure provides the implicit basis for modern philosophy, received this tradition from Boethius and from the Arabs. It has become generally familiar in the Latin formula that defines truth as adaequatio intellectus et rei (Isaac Israeli’s 10th-century “Book of Definitions”). By way of the Arabs it comes to Thomas, who also uses correspondentia (correspondence) and convenentia (coming together) for adaequatio (agreement). The usual account tends to interject a break with Descartes. With the introduction of the principle of consciousness and the subject, a new philosophy purportedly begins with Descartes. Thereafter, the knowable includes only that which is given in consciousness and excludes the objects that are outside of consciousness. Knowing does not get beyond the bounds of consciousness itself. Only that which is in consciousness is knowable, Kant radicalized this starting point and thereby carried out the “Copernican revolution” in philosophy. Since Copernicus we know that the earth goes around the sun. In like fashion, Kant showed that knowing is directed not toward objects, but rather the reverse, that objects are oriented toward knowledge. The correct sense of the Kantian thesis cannot be ex-

explored here. But how does Kant understand the essence of truth? How does he define the essence of truth in the work that realized this “Copernican revolution,” in the Critique of Pure Reason? B82: “The venerable and celebrated question with which it was supposed that one might drive the logicians into a corner . . . is ‘What is truth?’ The nominal definition of truth, namely, that it is the agreement of knowledge with its object, will here be granted and presupposed.” And further: “If truth consists in the agreement of knowledge with its object, then this object must be distinguished from other objects; for knowledge is false if it does not agree with the object to which it is related, even if it should contain something that might well hold for other objects” (B83). And the introduction to the transcendental dialectic adds: “Neither truth nor illusion are in the object insofar as it is intuited, but rather are in the judgment about that object insofar as it is thought” (B350). Thus, Kant also adheres to the traditional concept of truth, so much so that he does not even bring it up for discussion but simply presupposes it.5

Knowledge (Judgment [Ur-teil]) = agreement with the thing.

§ 2. Return to its Fundaments

What does such a “return” mean? It means that we are seeking to lay out and expose that upon which “truth as agreement of knowledge with the things” is based. What is necessarily intended and posited with that “as”? To see these fundaments, it is ever more urgent to characterize that which is here posited as truth. Truth: agreement of something with something (thing: Sache). Something is so . . . as (the subject matter itself), thus the general character of a relation (of something to something, knowledge to the matter). Truth is a relation. But not every relation is an agreement. A sign, for example a road sign, indicates what is shown. This showing of the sign is a relation to the shown, but this showing as a relation is in no way an agreement (the road-pointing sign does not agree with the village that it points to). To say that truth is a relation is therefore basically to say nothing. What kind of a relation is agreement? Not every agreement is the kind that we mean by agreement (adaequatio, convenentia, correspondentia) of knowledge with the things. The number “6” agrees with “16 minus 10.” An agreement in the sense of equation with regard to the question “How much?” has taken place. Equality is agreement, but truth in an agreement of knowledge with objects is not equality!6 “This board is black”: this judgment agrees with the thing, but this agreement does not mean that the judgment is equal to the black board! What kind of an agreement is it then that lies before us in the relation of truth? Not equality or similarity or accordance [Entsprechung, co-respondence] or an appropriate fit, a fitting

match \([\text{Augemessenheit}], \text{adaequatio}\)? But even these terms are somewhat indeterminate. The key fits into the lock, it is a suitable match, it is in harmony \([\text{übereinstimmen}]\) and agreement with it, but the harmonious key is as match to the lock not the truth about the lock, even though we do speak of a wrong (false) key or a right (true) one.

We will not come any further as long as we do not take a look at what the between of this relation of truth consists of. It is the relation between knowledge and object that characterizes the relation of truth. But when we reflect on that, we first arrive at the real difficulty. Knowledge, agreement, is a comportment of the soul, of the mind, of consciousness. It is something in the subject. The thing standing before us is the object outside of consciousness, beyond the inside of the soul. How can there be an agreement between the inside of the soul and the outside of the object?

The cognitive relationship between subject and object has often been interpreted in terms of copying, replication by way of a picture or image \([\text{Abbildung}]\). The true statement or true knowledge is a duplicate of the things outside. This copy theory is just as often refuted, to be sure only negatively and in terms of its consequences. This interpretation always presupposes the incomprehensibility of the truth relation. If I am to judge truly about a matter, come to an agreement with it so that the representations in the consciousness are the actual copy of the thing, then the copying cognition must itself already see what is to be copied, how it is, in order to draw the copy in accord with it. I must already know how the things outside look in order to copy them in the right way. What does it mean to say that “I must already know how the things outside look”? I must have a true knowledge of the being that is outside. A true knowledge of truth is then a copy? How is this copy itself demonstrated and identified as the truth? In this manner it is shown that the interpretation of truth as the duplication of things in representation is impossible. One tries to reject these things by means of a reductio ad absurdum.

However, the positive argument against the copy theory is different. Not by way of the consequences but in regard to the foundations, by laying out the grounds! On this issue it must be asked whether knowing has the character of a copy consciousness at all. “The board is black.” When I upon perceiving the board so judge, do I first have in my consciousness a copy which I relate to something outside? Not even a trace of it can be shown. The board itself is the copied being. The theory is not to be rejected because it leads to impossible consequences. It is instead constructively falsified by what must be laid down in advance, by the definition of the sense of the cognizing true judgment. This is what the copy theory misses.

How does it stand with the relation knowledge-agreement-object on the one side, and the relation knowledge-thing on the other side? Modern logic states that agreement is not the agreement of representing as a psychically real process with a
real physical thing outside. Rather, the agreement persists between the stated content of the statement and the being, thus not with any representations floating around in my soul but with the content of the sentence: the board is blackness. The content of the sentence is the whole of meaning that it intends, the sense of the judgment. The being-black of the board agrees with the thing, the blackboard. It is therefore an agreement between sentence content = judicative sense and physical thing. The sense and the content of meaning of what is meant in the sentence: what precisely is that? It is something ideal, an ideal being. This ideal being, the being-black of the board is the same in all the real judgments that we now together at the same time make about this thing as well as repeat at various other times. The psychic development of the judgment is different in everyone, but the meant content of the statement is the same. This sameness of meant content is called the ideal sense of the judgment. It is supratemporal, eternal. It has been identified, with some justification, with the Platonic idea.

How is agreement between ideal being and real being possible? What sort of being does this agreement itself have? Is it something real or ideal? Or what is it? This question is probably insoluble because it comes from a reversed approach. We are asking about the state of affairs of the “true judgment.” How is it then, when I make the true statement “The board over there is black”? Am I directed toward a judicative content such that I demonstrate its agreement with a thing? In no way! No more than I am related to representations in my consciousness am I related in my statements to an ideal sense whose agreement I establish. In the statement, “This board is black,” I am only related to the board itself. The popular psychology says that when I do not see it, I merely have a representation of the board. What does that mean? It is a pure construction. That I merely have a representation which I do not see when I judge only means that I make the board present to myself, but what I intend is the board itself. Even in presentifying it, thus even in merely representing it, the being itself is intended. “The Freiburg cathedral is made of red sandstone.” I have a mere representation, but I mean the cathedral itself. When I judge from memory that the forest was then so and so, nothing is being judged about the agreement of a representation which has a certain disposition in my soul; rather, I mean the forest itself, the being as it was then! In the natural judicative comportment, I am from the start related and only related to the meant, judged, and known being itself.

When I make the attempt to demonstrate the judgment, it means that I must see the board itself. The demonstration consists in identifying, by seeing the board itself, what is intended in the presentification with what is now intuited. The demonstration and verification of a sentence thus consists of the following: On the basis of seeing the board itself, I bring into coincidence what is meant in the presentification with what is now intuited, I now apprehend it as the same being. But even in this bringing into coincidence, I am not related to representations in
my consciousness. Instead, bringing into coincidence is carried out as an identification of the very same intended being itself. The stating, the comporting relating that we characterize as true, has the distinction of always already relating itself to the being itself. We thereby waive from the start a presupposition that is most often made in the discussion of the truth relation, which is also taken as a relation between subject and object, as if only the representation were first given in the consciousness within and then the consciousness would have to go out to the object, or one would have to explain the form of truth. This approach is a pure construction. I am always already outside with the beings, I am already always in a world. This is the basic state of the affairs: My own being as human Dasein always grounds the phenomenon of truth. This is the fundament that we must now make present to ourselves with more precision.

§ 3. The Definition of the Original Concept of Truth from its Fundaments

Being-in-the-world is a basic character of Dasein, a unified basic definition of my Dasein. Insofar as there is at all a being that we call Dasein or living, it is in a world. This is where we must start in order to understand the traditional doctrine of lumen naturale [natural light]. Understood philosophically, we can say that human Dasein has the sort of being that sustains a light within itself; it is in itself “lighted” [gelichtet]. The chair is in the world differently. It does not have that in which it is as space. The ground that it touches is inaccessible to it, closed, while our way to be is such that we are in each instance, in accord with our essence, already in a world. Even a jellyfish already has, when it is, its world. Something like a world, a being that it itself is not, is revealed to it, uncovered. For the chair, however, a world is beyond any possibility of being discovered or concealed. The Dasein is therefore, inasmuch as it is according to its essence in the world, discovering. It has, in various degrees of distinction-and-articulation [Deutlichkeit], discovered the beings around it. The Dasein is, insofar as it is defined by being-in-the-world and in accord with its proper essence, discovering. Subject—Dasein—Being-in-the-world-discovering: It already sees and has already always sighted other beings that it itself is not. The Dasein is discovering: this is the authentic and proper sense of truth. Truth means nothing but being-discovering! It is not an arbitrary definition selected at random. The sense of truth as being-uncovering is nothing other than the sense of truth as the Greeks understood it ἀ-λήθεια, unconcealment (λήθη, the concealed). ‘Ο λόγος ἀληθεύει, “the λόγος is uncovering, it is true (today everyone says, “the judgment is true”!). This is the original sense of truth, as the Greeks already suspected but did not themselves overtly apprehend. It is the fate of Greek philosophy, and probably every philosophy, that it conceals what it is itself on the way to discover. They saw the essence of truth without comprehending its proper
fundaments. They provided the inducement for taking truth as agreement and thereby for no longer regarding being-true as being-discovering.

§ 4. The Demonstration of the Derivation of the Traditional Concept of Truth from the Original Concept

How does the concept of truth in the sense of agreement come from the concept of being-true in the sense of uncovering? The Dasein is discovering, the world is disclosed to it, it understands its world within certain limits. But with the understanding of its world, Dasein at once understands its own be-ing, its being-in-the-world, its way of relating itself in the world and relating to itself. Already co-discovered and co-disclosed is my own Dasein with regard to its comportments and its possibilities to be. We therefore only arrive at the proper concept of truth when we see that being-discovering, disclosing other beings, co-originally also relates itself to the beings that have the kind of be-ing that Dasein has, other human beings. Dasein thus includes the disclosure of the world, one’s own being, and other human beings. I already understand the other in a certain way even when she is incomprehensible. Only because of this understanding can she be incomprehensible and remain so!

Dasein is, in accord with its essence, in the truth (truth as disclosedness). But Dasein is first of all and most of all everyday in a particular kind of truth. We busy ourselves in an everyday way with things, we get absorbed in all the things we have to do, we lose ourselves in what we do, one’s own Dasein is thereby forgotten. But there is always the possibility for Dasein to return to itself.

The original kind of uncovering is not the statement about something but the primary comportments which we call seeing and hearing in the broadest sense. I hear a car: The psychologists say that I first have sensations of noise and sound which subsequently are apprehended as the noise of a car. But this is a pure construction. What I first hear is not a sensation of sound, I first simply hear the car. Hearing a pure noise requires an advanced experimental setup in the psychological laboratory. The statement only explicates what is already discovered.

The way of Dasein is to discover. Likewise, one’s own Dasein is not discovered through psychoanalysis and psychic sleuthing, but through the way of be-ing in which it itself resides, through action. Dasein is situated in action. Acting involves resolute openness toward something. Such an openness is the basic mode in which I find myself. Resolute openness toward what? Such an openness does not say what I am, in which it recounts something about my psychic constitution. It is rather related to a willingness to have a conscience, the resoluteness to not allow the con-

7. In comparison with the title of this subsection, § 44b in Being and Time is entitled “The Original Phenomenon of Truth and the Derivation of the Traditional Concept of Truth” (BT, 219–26).
science to be distorted, which would make it impossible for conscience to disclose the Dasein itself. This inner voice of conscience is what properly discloses the Dasein to me, to the extent that I am intimately with myself. This unique way of uncovering and disclosing that lies in the conscience and prescribes for me the temporally particular possibility of my be-ing, this mode of resolute openness has the character of keeping silent. The voice of conscience speaks in silence. Every other mode of uncovering expresses itself, becomes λόγος, comes to words and language. The basic constitution of Dasein has the intrinsic possibility of being called by itself through conscience and summoned to its proper be-ing. The resolve of willing to have a conscience, the conscience itself, is therefore the proper be-ing of Dasein. Truth proper is the conscience because Dasein itself is in the truth.

How do we get from disclosedness to the concept of truth as agreement? First of all, we make statements in our everyday preoccupation. What we know and can do has come to us largely from what we have heard and read. We ourselves have never seen much of what we know and can do. It is often enough for something to be said in order for it to be true. It has been said, so it must be! As the definition of a being, how it is, first shows itself in the statement about things, so in philosophy the λόγος, speech, comes to be regarded as the bearer of truth. The peculiarity of the everyday chatter of idle talk is that it intends beings without experiencing them and understanding them in their proper being. Everyone fixes upon what has been said. But what is meant in the speech merely has an empty relationship to us, and not an original one. What has been said itself becomes to some extent free-floating and detached, though it still has a certain relation to what it intends. Moreover, inasmuch as the statement takes what it talks about to enclose [bergen] and secure the truth within itself, but no one questions how this itself precisely is, but rather takes it as something that in fact occurs, one then construes the statement, and indeed talking itself, as an extant thing. The λόγος is composed of words, words are brought forward and form a unity, the verbal whole implicates a certain relation to the intended being itself. One has an extant something characterized by λόγος juxtaposed to a thing. Inasmuch as something is therein intended, we have a relation. This detachment of living speech from identifying demonstration results in having the question of truth set primarily in the free-floating λόγος itself. A world must then be constructed in conjunction with the λόγος and it is denied that the λόγος transcends the bounds of consciousness.

The truth does not have its original place in the statement. Rather, the statement is true and can uncover only because it is a relationship, and ontologically a mode of Dasein itself! The statement has its possibility-of-being in the truth itself, in the constitution of Dasein, in that it discovers. Be-ing true in the sense of uncovering and disclosing is a character of Dasein itself, the basic way of its be-ing. It is from its native home [von Hause aus] disclosive. We also designate the uncovered and disclosed itself as the truth, as the actuality [Wirklichkeit] that is ap-
prehended just as it is, the uncovered as such. Then there is truth as genuineness, e.g., true gold, real gold. True gold is that which has the kind of being that corresponds to its idea, that is, to the pure possibility that is uncovered in the idea.

The idea of truth as disclosedness thus necessarily implies that truth is disclosedness of something and for something (properly for Dasein). Every truth is truth about and truth for! These relations are essential, they are inherent in the structure of truth itself. Essential to truth is its binding force, it is said: binding for all. Truth would be the highest truth, which is universally valid. Whether something is true or uncovered does not depend on how many agree with the proposition which formulates what is uncovered. The idea of the truth as a goal of science indeed includes objectivity.

But this does not mean that scientific truth must be accessible to each and everyone, binding for each purely and simply, acknowledged by everyone. The idea of scientific truth involves the claim to objectivity, that is, commensuration with the matters. When something is scientifically uncovered and the conditions of access are realized and can be repeated, then scientific truth is binding for each and everyone, regardless of what each personally intends for themselves and how they take their position to the matter. Science is objective. It can be objective only because it is relative, related to the conditions of access and the possibilities of the original ontological relationship to what must be uncovered in Dasein.

II. The Be-ing of Truth and the Necessity of Truth’s Presupposition

How is there truth, how is it given, how does “it give” truth?

Everyone says that truth exists in itself, and that it holds absolutely and eternally. Truth in the original sense is a definition of Dasein. There is truth, it gives truth, only when and as long as Dasein is. If we were to consider the possibility of a moment in which all human Dasein were obliterated, then there would no longer be truth. $2 \times 2 = 4$? Surely this proposition is true even when no human being exists? But it would be nonsense if truth means uncoveredness in a Dasein. This however does not mean that the state of affairs that is intended in a true proposition, in this case “$2 \times 2 = 4$,” no longer continues to exist. When Dasein no longer is, the propositions do not need to become false. They can no more be false than they can be true! As long as Dasein is, there is truth. As long as we are, we are in the truth. We cannot say what there would then be and what there still is when Dasein no longer is. For then the sense of be-ing also no longer is. A being understood in its be-ing then no longer is. The world could then quietly continue to exist if there are no longer human beings.

8. In comparison with the title of this section, § 44c in Being and Time is entitled “The Mode of Being of Truth and the Presupposition of Truth” (BT, 226–30).
Is truth not all relative then? Indeed, all truth is relative. But that does not mean to say that what is discovered in the truth would be subjective opinion; rather, precisely as discovered the being is so, just as it is! A being can only be discovered as discoverable and true. Therefore, that truth is and that there is truth is a peculiar kind of certainty, not an absolute one in the sense of a theoretical or a mathematical or a formally logical certainty, but rather a certainty of the fact of \textit{Dasein itself}. That there is truth is just as certain as the fact that I will die. Only because Dasein is essentially in the truth and its world is already uncovered for it, while it itself by and large loses itself and forgets itself, only because Dasein is in this way, can it and must it be in untruth.

Co-original with truth factically there is also error. Error and untruth are not matters that are left out and, regarded as unsuitable surplus, left to the common sense for discussion. Untruth, error, insanity, illness are co-original with what we are calling Dasein. Only so do we sense the power and uncommon dedication that lie in the excellence of our be-ing, such that we may acknowledge this power and become free for the matters themselves.9

9. Our scribe notes that his transcription is especially incomplete in this abrupt close, missing "perhaps one or more sentences." It appears to be a final allusion to the Pentecostal occasion, in view of the return to the themes of "Power" (\textit{Kraft}) and "dedication" (\textit{Weihe}, "consecration") as well as the associative connection with the issues of "untruth, error, insanity, illness." Heidegger the orator never comes to any discussion of the second theme announced for this concluding part, the \textit{necessity of the presupposition} that "It gives truth" (compare \textit{BT}, 227–29), which of course is introduced in some detail, e.g., in its relation to classical skepticism (\textit{BT}, 229), in the opening remarks of this Pentecostal talk before the Academic Association.
20. Letter Exchange with Karl Löwith on *Being and Time*

The philosophically and interpersonally telling correspondence between Heidegger and his first habilitation student, Karl Löwith, from which a letter from the year 1921 has already been presented in translation (chapter 11), comes to an especially critical climax for both professor and student in this interchange of letters from August 1927. Heidegger had rushed *Being and Time* into print in 1926 in an attempt to fulfill the publication requirements for promotion to the main Marburg professorship in philosophy recently vacated by Nicolai Hartmann and, before

Heidegger’s letter of August 20, 1927, first translated by Gary Steiner, has been edited for this collection by Theodore Kisiel. English translation first published in Karl Löwith, *Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism*, ed. Richard Wolin, trans. Gary Steiner (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 239–43, 292–93. Permission to republish from Columbia University Press is gratefully acknowledged. The original German text, edited by Hartmut Tietjen, was first published in Dietrich Papenfuss and Otto Pöggeler (eds.), *Zur philosophischen Aktualität Heideggers 2: Im Gespräch der Zeit* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1990), 33–38. A more accurate transcription of the letter by Klaus Stichweh, curator of the Löwith papers, enabled me to correct several significant errors of commission and omission in the published German text; errors of commission have been noted in brackets within the translated letter below. The underlining in certain paragraphs of Heidegger’s letter stems not from Heidegger but from Löwith, who labored over Heidegger’s philosophically rich correspondence with him for many years, even citing from it in later articles that take issue with Heidegger’s thought.

The three letters of Karl Löwith to Heidegger on August 2, 10, and 17, 1927, have been translated by Theodore Kisiel into English for the first time especially for this collection. Our publication of them here seeks to display the “occasional work” of a letter exchange replete with philosophically telling statements that are at once deeply embedded in their interwoven biographical, chronological and doxographical contexts. Access to transcriptions of the three letters granted by Dr. Klaus Stichweh, curator of the Löwith papers, and permission to translate for publication granted by Adelheid Krautter, the niece of Karl Löwith, are gratefully acknowledged. Annotated remarks on the various associates and philosophical personalities named in the letters have been provided by Theodore Kisiel, with the help of Klaus Stichweh. For the detailed biographical sketches of Löwith and Oskar Becker, see chap. 11, nn. 1 and 2, above.
him, by Paul Natorp. The book *Being and Time* first actually appeared at the end of April 1927, the summer semester had come to a close with the 400th jubilee celebration of the founding of the University of Marburg (July 29–August 1, 1927); at that point in time the Philosophical Faculty still had not heard anything about the disposition of their “open position” from the Prussian Ministry of Culture in Berlin, which had rejected Heidegger’s candidacy twice in 1926 due to “insufficient” publications. Heidegger’s letter thus questions how much longer he would remain at Marburg, and this state of doubt contributes to the urgency of getting his habilitation student’s work before the Marburg faculty.

Löwith for his part was so anxious to finalize the second draft of his work that he was forced to miss the opening weeks of the summer semester. “But the third systematic part of your work [*Being and Time*] and Hegel are so important that I would still like to take part in them after the Pentecost holidays, provided of course that that is alright with you.” In the same letter (May 1, 1927), Löwith thanks Heidegger for sending him a copy of the newly published *Being and Time*—Löwith had helped in proofreading its galleys in early 1926—which Löwith would put to immediate use in his habilitation work to document his running argument against the ontological and transcendental dimension of Heidegger’s work. Referring to the disputation (*Auseinandersetzung*) which his habilitation work would continue, Löwith, who was a first-hand witness of the “inside story” of Heidegger’s own development in the early Freiburg years, here employs a “you too” analogy and reminds Heidegger of his own *Auseinandersetzung* with his teacher then and its ultimately purely intellectual motivation: “In spite of this, I remain the grateful student of my teacher. I must however ask you to put yourself back into your own situation then in Freiburg vis-à-vis Husserl in order to recognize once again a student’s gratitude in my less than worthy attacks.”

In the letters of August 1927, Löwith distinguishes the “hermeneutics of facticity” that he had learned from Heidegger in his early Freiburg years (1919–1923) from the “ontology of Dasein” of the Marburg years, which Löwith found less appealing. Heidegger for his part rejects such a sharp distinction between the two, insisting on a continuity of his development of an “ontology of temporally individualized [je eigene] existence” that had its start in his very choice of “Duns Scotus,” the medieval master of *haecceitas* (thisness) coupled with the “form” of this individuality, for his own habilitation topic. “Formal indications, critique of the customary doctrine of the a priori, formalization and the like, all of this is still there...”

1. Löwith’s letter to Heidegger on May 1, 1927, the opening day of the semester. Heidegger’s teaching program for the semester included the 4-hour course, “The Basic Problems of Phenomenology” (*GA* 24), even then already understood as a continuation of the unfinished systematic part (the Third Division of Part One) of *Being and Time*, and a seminar for advanced students entitled “Aristotle’s Ontology and Hegel’s Logic.”
[in *Being and Time*] for me even though I do not talk about them now.” While utilizing a kind of formalization in his own habilitation on “The Individual in the Role of Fellow Human Being or Neighbor,” e.g., in the grammar of the I-thou relationship (in Ludwig Feuerbach’s sense), Löwith wishes to take this in the direction of a “formally concrete” ontic anthropology rather than the formal ontology of the “existentials” of Dasein’s be-ing. After expressing his gratitude to Heidegger (in a prefatory remark) for his “philosophical education,” especially in the phenomenological praxis that he would employ in developing his own version of philosophical anthropology, Löwith cautions his reader that his point of departure is not “Da-sein” as such but rather the more popular German term *menschliches Dasein* (human existence); and its fundamental sense is to be situated in human being-with-one-another, so that common expressions like “being-with-one-[significant]-other,” “with-world,” “self,” “existence,” “being-free,” even “being-human,” “are not identical with the similar sounding expressions of Heidegger’s *Being and Time*.”

In accepting Löwith’s habilitation work, Heidegger especially praises its structural organization and flow of development, whose phenomenological-historical content can perhaps be quickly illustrated by the outline of its chapters:

I. Feuerbach’s *Basic Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*
II. Structural Analysis of Being-with-one-another
III. The One and the Other in Their Mutual Autonomy
IV. “I Myself” in my “Singular Uniqueness”

*Being and Time* is cited about ten times in the work, and a displacement of it is achieved in part by Löwith’s more “ethical-humanistic” reading of historical figures like Kant, Schelling, Hegel, Feuerbach, Stirner, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Dilthey, Scheler, Ebner, Barth, Gogarten, and Pirandello. This divergent orientation to philosophy’s history is nicely summarized by Löwith himself when he explains to Heidegger why he plans to have his copy of *Being and Time* bound in black: “For death is its theological principle of freedom. ‘Freedom’: this also seems to me to be the

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singly true and specific idea of a philosophical existence. But I see myself moved by this idea somewhat differently, since my philosophical mother’s milk is Nietzsche and my philosophical homeland is the South” (May 1, 1927).

Löwith’s work, coming as it does from the “inside,” from the active witness of the very genesis of Being and Time amplified by the running testimony communicated to him by its author, has the distinction of being the very first of a long line of critiques of Being and Time which perceive its weakness to reside in its sparing development of the equiprimordial existential of being-with-one-another, which in turn contributes to its lack of an ethics. Heidegger himself, while insisting on his fundamentally ontological predilections, seems to regard Löwith’s work as an extension of his own sparse initiatives in the ontic direction of a philosophical anthropology—what he would a year later, in the face of Scheler’s critique of Being and Time, call a metontology or “metaphysical ontic of existence” developed out of his fundamental ontology. He therefore has no problem in appreciating the phenomenological virtues of most of the basic themes of the habilitation that Löwith rehearses and applies in his letters—mutual reciprocity of in-dividual relationships, mutual response-ability, spoken versus written communication (e.g., in philosophical give-and-take), infant communication, personal and collective memory, role-playing (e.g., in teacher-student relationships), role-models, public versus private relationships, their sensual “nature,” sexuality, etc.—while slyly phenomenologizing on them in his own way: “Circles’ are not friendships. That is already evident from the fact that a day always comes when you get sick and tired of them.” Löwith was also a first-hand witness of the beginnings of the degeneration of the philosophical friendship between Heidegger and Jaspers—who early in their relationship had characterized it as a “loving struggle”—and so wishes that Heidegger might one day find his philosophical match, someone of equal stature who could prompt interchanges more mutually productive than those that Jaspers, and Löwith himself, were capable of initiating.

Löwith’s more “subjective” caricatures of his teachers Husserl and Heidegger, excerpted from a notebook entitled “Fiala: The Story of a Temptation” (an experiential statement of Löwith’s own “ontic” philosophy of life) that was written at about the same time as this letter exchange, is to be found in appendix III to this volume. The letter exchange itself already gives us a rare personal glimpse into the teacher-student relationships within the “Heidegger circle” of students (notably through the notes appended to this chapter) in the context of the academic politics of the postwar German university, with Löwith drawing parallels with Heidegger’s own changing attitude toward Husserl, of which he was a first-hand witness, and Heidegger recalling his attitudes toward his teachers as a habilitation student, as he reviews the development of his ideas from the Scotus habilitation to Being and Time, in the process finding Löwith’s critique juvenile and misguided rather than pertinent and productive.
Letter Exchange with Karl Löwith on Being and Time

Marburg, Weissenburgstr. 38/I
August 2, 1927

Dear Mr. Heidegger,

I regret very much that there were no further opportunities to get together with you. There were so many points on my “agenda” that therefore had to be left unsettled, and the—“ontic!”—difference between written and spoken discourse is very great. Like my point on the “ontic”: The main objection that I have against the “principled” ontological analysis, which is brought into play far too quickly (in accord with the claim of dealing with the Dasein as such), is that the decisive ontic-existentiell distinctions—the questions of accent—get lost in an “absolute indifference” (Hegel). But as crucial ontic-existentiell distinctions, they are also crucial for the ontological formalization, an expression that you however will surely no longer grant and allow to be applied! I believe that your most unique insight into the problematic of the ontic-ontological circle (I am thinking especially of Being and Time, 12–13, 166–67, and 199) must lead to clinching this dialectical movement at one end and “founding” it; not however at the ontological a priori (although this is apparently the consequence of philosophizing) but rather at the ontic-anthropological end. Or, to put it more psychologically: It is not scientific philosophy that grounds the original motives and tendencies of factic philosophizing, it is these motives and tendencies that—de facto—“ground” the former and make it understandable. By what route, in what terms something becomes “uniquely” understandable for someone—this can surely no longer be theoretically decided—is nevertheless determined by the concept of “understandability” [Verständlichkeit] as such. The methodological correctness of the possible objection, e.g., against Feuerbach: “I do not think as a thinker, but as a thinking human being,” “Philosophy must begin with non-philosophy,” “The birth certificate comes before the matriculation,” etc., or conscious understanding is to be understood out of its unconscious impulses—this objection is quite clear to me in its “correctness,” and yet does not seem sound and truly sincere, but rather is the sophism specific to philosophy as such.

But what I take to be essential is that the dialectical simultaneity of being-ex-

3. Löwith appends a remark to this remark: “drastic in Husserl’s way of distinguishing ‘essence’ and ‘fact,’ where the ‘essence’ becomes unessential in fact, a danger which is however also present when a hermeneutics of facticity is elaborated into an ontological analytic of Dasein. In relation to your work, I now feel myself to be at a point analogous to the Munich phenomenologists in relation to Husserl’s development toward constitutional phenomenology. But I hope to be able to accept this turn less narrow-mindedly than these Munichers!”
tant [Vorhandensein] and existing comes into play already in the approach; or better, it comes into play in Dasein = “existing” (a determination which, like all ontological determinations of “Dasein,” is only apparently so formal that it would prejudge nothing on the ontic-existentiell level) and Dasein = “life” (thereupon I have also consulted Kant: man = a “rational creature”—“a natural being begotten for freedom,” which according to Kant cannot be theoretically “grasped”!); a simultaneity which first of all fulfills its purpose and prevents an unequivocal systematization, a closure of the open question (of the analytic of Dasein). That the so-called substantial being-in-itself comes into its own and to analytically explicit expression precisely by first being pushed to the extreme in the one direction, so that it can then come to that point in the recoil: this I understand well enough. But I do not believe this to be the way that the “sensory nature” of man comes to positive expression in its naturality, but really only as un-freedom, when all determinations that are implied in that sort of “nature” are prefigured in advance by such an extreme “existentiell” concept as that of “thrownness.” The same applies to the determination of Dasein as “in each instance its own.” Against this, I have attempted, in an inevitably reversed onesidedness, to display the “in-dividuum” as something communicable that can be “shared-with” [Mitteilbares], as a “persona” that from the start has its “roles” in the world-with [others]. This provides support for Feuerbach’s bare statement of an “I” as the I of a Thou (alter), as a person who is defined in its “first person” by the “second person.” In its most universal form: “intentionality” is to be de-idealized even beyond “being-in-the-world,” so that I have attempted to clarify it out of the anthropological “world’ as a reciprocal intentionality of “relationships” (human to human) and accordingly in its specifically real [reelen] objectivity. But such matters cannot be discussed briefly in writing with any meaningfulness, so I will wait until you are here again.

With regard to the practical side of the matter—even here it is the same—“action” is ontically very different from “knowing,” even if it can be conceived in an ontologically “principled” unity as concern [Besorgen]. So I regret that I must trouble you with this letter and ask for an answer. This time I cannot say that I am doing it merely under pressure from my impatient father, who is anxious for “results,” because I for my part would also like to put an end to the awkward state of suspense between knowing and not knowing. Why I simply cannot wait out the three months of vacation, since the question of the habilitation cannot in fact become urgent until then, can frankly only be explained by this “state,” which is so uncomfortable because the uncertainty over the “outcome” of this foregoing matter obviates the impulse that I have to take on further work, the more so as the familiar Marburg world-with others [Mitwelt]—a “circle”—has become a rather dull and stale affair for me. (Most recently, I did a couple of things with Krüger,4 which

4. Gerhard Krüger (1902–1972), philosopher. Doctorate under Nicolai Hartmann at
of course also goes back to our relationship of “mutuality.” Since he is so discrete, I had already some time ago given him a carbon of my work to read. He studied it thoroughly and wrote a small volume remarking on it. Only his theological background is for me a very obscure and for him the sore point.) The possibility of working philosophically entirely on one’s own account and at one’s own expense and to draw the motivation for doing it time and again solely from oneself is in me much more limited than in you. When I consider how intensively and incessantly you have worked for 10 years essentially without communication, I am astonished. I myself could not do it without the vital interruptions of contacts, in contradiction or in “concurrence.”

To put it briefly and directly, I ask you to write to me and let me know whether you are prepared to accept the text as my habilitation work and, if so, whether I have a chance to come before the faculty at the beginning of the semester and passing. Unfortunately, Jaensch cannot really be trusted: has his Dr. Freiling already actually passed his habilitation? And how do things stand with the filling of the second chair? Or is all of that academic arcana? Did you get to meet Becker and Schmidt-Ott? In the procession of professors, I saw to my great delight the


7. Carl Heinrich Becker (1876–1933), orientalist and Prussian politician. Professor at Heidelberg, Hamburg, Bonn, and Berlin. Founder of Islamic Studies in Germany. In the Prussian Ministry of Culture beginning in 1916; Prussian minister of culture in 1921 and
venerable and imposing figure of von Goebel.\(^8\) But if you look at the photos at Elwert & Ebel,\(^9\) you have to ask yourself whether the head is truly the organ of the mind [\textit{Geist}]. As for the rest, we Germans don’t know how to celebrate. The torchlight procession was so boring, and organized as if one were going to a funeral. Only the Italians know how to \textit{festeggiare}. Sunday night we watched the feast at the castle, a rollicking affair. It was especially hilarious in the huge cellar of the Bavarian beer hall, where the Bavarians showed their best side.

My vacation plans are still completely indefinite, due to lack of funds. In this regard, Bröcker’s\(^{10}\) parents are a commendable exception; this time he even flew back from 1925 to 1930, i.e., in the period when Heidegger received his major university appointments. Instituted the first pedagogical academies in Germany and founded the German Academy of Poets. The young Heidegger cites his \textit{Gedanken zur Hochschulreform} [Thoughts on University Reform] (1919) in his course “On the Essence of the University and Academic Study” in SS 1919 (\textit{GA} 56/57, 214). Other publications: \textit{Vom Wesen der deutschen Universität} [On the Essence of the German University] (1925); \textit{Die Pädagogische Akademie im Aufbau unseres nationalen Bildungswesens} [The Pedagogical Academy in the Structure of our National Educational System], 1926; \textit{Das Problem der Bildung in der Kulturkrise der Gegenwart} [The Problem of Education in the Present Cultural Crisis] (1930).

Friedrich Schmidt-Ott (1860–1936). Doctor of theology, philosophy, and medicine; doctor of engineering; Prussian cultural politician in the Ministry of Culture since 1895; minister of culture 1917–1918; in 1920 he founded the \textit{Notgemeinschaft der deutschen Wissenschaft} [Emergency Association of German Science], of which he was president until 1934.

Both ministers were present in their official capacities at the University of Marburg on the occasion of the 400th anniversary celebration of its founding from July 29 to August 1, 1927.


9. A bookstore in Marburg. A photograph of Heidegger with his colleagues of the Philosophical Faculty in the festive “procession of professors” at the university jubilee celebration in Marburg on Saturday, July 30, 1927, is reproduced in Karl Löwith’s \textit{Mein Leben in Deutschland vor und nach 1933. Ein Bericht} (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1986). It is perhaps the photo that Löwith mailed to Heidegger on August 10, 1927.

home. But you have to ask whether this does Bröcker junior any good. My god-child\textsuperscript{11} keeps on growing, and now and then I secretly misuse her for philosophical studies! These days I have been reading a book of Tolstoy’s correspondence which I will have to give you some time: a non plus ultra [ultimate perfection] of radical mutual understanding and mutual critique. One feels once again what it can mean to be a whole human being and to come to oneself through another.

I wish you a scientifically equal partner, not to say “opponent.” It will however not be so easy for you to meet him. In part, this will be because of what Ebbinghaus\textsuperscript{12} wrote about in the letter that you read to me, because of the confident way in which you would meet him.

I need your advice in another running story: How should I go about jolting that damned Plessner,\textsuperscript{13} that lowdown career climber, in order to get him to open up? He has not answered me at all in response to my ultimatum, but he has also not returned my manuscript. I have heard indirectly that my Klages critique was recently given the putdown by the Kölner Zeitung [Cologne Gazette] with a pair of

\textsuperscript{11} Jutta Gadamer, infant daughter of Frida and Hans-Georg Gadamer, who belonged to the “inner circle” of Heidegger students at that time and would follow Löwith and do, along with Gerhard Krüger, his habilitation work under Heidegger, before Heidegger departed for Freiburg after SS 1928. These first three habilitation students of Heidegger came to be known as the “phenomenological privadocents” who held forth at Marburg into the first year of National Socialism, when Löwith, as a Jew, was removed from his position. For a rich account of these Marburg years from Gadamer’s perspective, see now Jean Grondin, Hans-Georg Gadamer: Eine Biographie (Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 1999); English translation: Hans-Georg Gadamer: A Biography, trans. Joel Weinsheimer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003). Löwith’s account of these years is to be found in his Mein Leben in Deutschland vor und nach 1933. Ein Bericht; English translation: My Life in Germany Before and After 1933: A Report, trans. Elizabeth King (London: Athlone, 1994).

\textsuperscript{12} Julius Ebbinghaus (1885–1981), philosopher, first a Hegelian and then a strict Kantian, working in metaphysics and systematic philosophy. Privatdocent at Freiburg in 1921; he and Heidegger conducted a joint colloquium on Kant’s philosophy of religion in SS 1923. Associate professor at Freiburg in 1926, professor at Rostock in 1930, at Marburg since 1940, became the first postwar rector at Marburg in 1945, emeritus since 1954. His scattered works have been brought together in the posthumous Gesammelte Schriften in 4 volumes (Bonn: Bouvier, 1986–1994). But the extant correspondence between Heidegger and Ebbinghaus has yet to be published.

outrageous sentences for which he is presumably also the clear source. Will see if I can get a hold of that issue.

From the Nietzsche Archive I received a very funny acknowledgment at the direction of Frau Förster-Nietzsche. For there they are glad that Klages¹⁴ now gets something in return! And for that I get a copy of the account of Nietzsche’s life by Frau Förster-Nietzsche!! They even want to type a copy of my dissertation¹⁵ for the Archive. Isn’t this all-too-human “down-to-earth-ness” [Sachlichkeit] grand? The best part of it is that they print nothing at all and regard it as a great favor in providing the opportunity to bring the things to the people only in seminars and lecture courses: le mieux est l’ennemi du bien [The better is the enemy of the good], and indeed as much as possible, so that no one can take it home in black and white.

I wish you and yours great days at the cabin.

Kind regards from your
Karl Löwith

¹⁴. Ludwig Klages (1872–1956), philosopher and psychologist working on a “metaphysics of life.” At the University of Munich, he founded a psychodiagnostic seminar “for the study [Kunde] of expression” that included graphology, the psychological interpretation of handwriting. Basic writings: Ausdrucksbewegung und Gestaltungskraft [Kinetics of Expression and Power of Formation] (1913); Handschrift und Charakter (1917); Der Geist als Widersacher der Seele [The Spirit as Adversary of the Soul], 3 vols. (1929–1932). Heidegger criticizes the latter work as “higher journalism” on a par with Spengler’s The Decline of the West in posing a “sick” spirit as the greatest threat to “life,” in WS 1929–30 (GA 29/30, 105–6).


August 10, 1927

Dear Mr. Heidegger,

As a supplement to my letter of August 2, I am sending you the review of the *Almanach* [vol. 4: see n. 14] by a Mr. “Teltaster.” Is it perhaps Plessner? Is he Catholic? (*Kölner Volkszeitung* [Cologne People’s Gazette]). As far as it goes, I would concede to Teltaster all that he says, only it says nothing about the matter in question. Please save this article for me as a curiosity.

Here it is now very nice and quiet. Everyone is gone, even Gadamer and Krüger. Through Spitta I heard that Knittermeyer (Bremen) will review your book in the *Christliche Welt*, naturally from the perspective of the Barth-Gogarten theology. I wonder. Surely You now have spectacularly clear days and nights up there.

I extend my kind regards
Your Karl Löwith


Hinrich Knittermeyer (1891–1958), philosopher. Habilitation at Marburg under Paul Natorp in 1918 with the work, *Der T erminus transzendent al in seiner historischen Ent wicklung bis zu Kant* [The Term ‘Transcendental’ in its Historical Development up to Kant], published in 1920 (2nd ed., 1985). Employed as a private tutor in Bremen in 1920, he became Director of the Staatbibliothek der Hansestadt Bremen, President of the Bremen Scientific Society, and Leader of the “Bremen Scholarly Lecture Series.” He thus remained active in philosophical education from a Christian perspective throughout his life, publishing his various lecture series in a number of semipopular philosophical texts that reflect the changing fashions of the time, including *Die Philosophie und das Christentum, Acht Vorlesungen zur Einleitung in die Philosophie* [Philosophy and Christianity: Eight Lectures Introducing Philosophy] (1927); *Schelling und die romantische Schule* (1929); *Staat und Mensch* (1931); *Immanuel Kant. Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die kritische Philosophie* (1939); *Philosophie der Lebensalter* [Philosophy of the Ages of Life] (1944); Jacob Burckhardt: *Deutung und Berufung des abendländischen Menschen* [Jacob Burckhardt: Interpretation and Vocation of Western Man] (1949); *Die Philosophie der Existenz von der Renaissance bis zur Gegenwart* (1952); *Der Mensch der Erkenntnis. Ent wurf einer kritischen Transzendentalphilosophie* [The Man of Knowledge: Outline of a Critical Transcendental Philosophy] (1962); *Grundgegebenheiten des menschlichen Daseins. 12 Vorlesungen zu einer philosophischen Anthropologie* [Basic Givens of Human Existence: Twelve Lectures toward a Philosophical Anthropology] (1963). In 1958, he co-edited, with Hans Natorp, the late lecture courses of Paul Natorp, *Philosophische Systematik*, which tends toward what Heidegger called a hermeneutics of facticity. In a letter to Husserl on
August 17, 1927
Weissenburgstr. 38/1

Dear Mr. Heidegger,

Do not take offence that I am writing you once more. The immediate reason is the following: After some time I have once again taken retrospect: piles of correspondence sorted out, packed, organized. For somehow I now feel the chronological fact of “30” years in its “historic” existentiellity, indeed quite poignantly, as well as its pertinence to philosophical work and to all my personal relations (not least the “private” with the “opposite sex”), their development and their decline. In this way, a packet of “Heidegger” correspondence came into my hands, which made me recall what Thust once said to me: “Yes, Heidegger seems to me to be a kind of ‘destiny’ for you. You react with a remarkable vehemence in your relationship to him and to his philosophy.” But I am anticipating myself. What suddenly occurred to me from the letters was the name “Todtnauberg.” For as I read the name, had I perhaps addressed my letter of August 2 and the items that followed (a newspaper clipping and a photo) to Todtnau? I shall not pursue this accidental slip of the pen “psychoanalytically.” I only ask you to please pick them up in Todtnau in the event that you have received nothing from me!

But even without this stupidity, I would have written you again anyway. It is no small matter to recapitulate, to “recollect” the story of a personal and essential relation by way of letters and cards. Some of the letters are 4 pages long! To Munich, Freiburg, Mecklenburg, Baden-Baden, Rome, Settignano, Marburg, with comments that are at times directly in line with your present position, but at other times also appear, at first glance, to be incompatible. You yourself will bring them together more easily than an “other” could. You were “30” then! “I am palpably losing the desire and aspiration to publish, and this is better for me than to be talked about and discussed in circles where philosophy is simply a good opportunity to


18. Löwith first came from his home city of Munich to Freiburg in 1919 to continue his studies in philosophy, was forced by the inflation of 1923 to work for a year as a home tutor in nearby Baden-Baden and then in Mecklenburg in north Germany, and spent a work-study year in 1924–1925 in Rome that ended in Settignano (a Florence suburb). Löwith’s attachment to Italy (“the South”) began with his extended stay in a detention camp in Finalmarina on the Italian Riviera recovering from his battle wounds in 1916–1917. See Mein Leben in Deutschland, 4–7.
show off one's talent. And at 30, one is really still too young. We have enough to do not to let authentic living give us the slip, which we can no longer make up later. One then arrives at a System, and that is what I call too far-fetched in philosophy” (April 2, 1921). Three years later, it is said: “The damnable thing about the work that I have to do is that it has to operate in the vicinity of the old philosophy and theology, critically, to be sure, operating in a certain way on irrelevant matters like ‘categories.’ The appearance arises that through critique something of corresponding content should be counterposed to what is being negated. But this work is uniquely limited, nothing for a school, direction, progression, supplementation. It can only be done by me out of the unique constellation of my conditions. The work is always old-fashioned and springs from a form of existence that is perhaps totally untouched by the currents of ‘today’” [March 26, 1924]. You once spoke expressly of the genuine precariousness of “being together” reduced to its extremity in “existence” [August 19, 1921]! But that we also are no longer together as we were earlier, you and I together in our walks in Freiburg: that certainly requires no further explanation to you. I also did not want to hurt you with my fairly frank but always open letters. It is really I who must know how much of the so-called responsibility in these relationships is “mutual” and “reciprocal,” insofar as one can here speak of “responsibility” [Schuld] at all and not only of destiny, in a totally unpathetic sense. Nothing can be undone here. On the contrary, such “histories” proceed inevitably and any attempt to halt or even reverse the movement only accelerates it, despite ourselves. Therefore “resist not evil” is the final word of wisdom.

I look at the direction of development of your philosophical work in the same way. It certainly had to proceed in that way, and I respect this work [Werk, i.e., Being and Time], which came into being with such a totally unreserved sincerity and candor. I also do not think that you will ever have to expect anything from me that is decisive for you. But I regret all of these inevitabilities very much, as well as all of the constraints that come with them, and therefore feel obligated at least to say that to you. Even in view of the limits of our potential mutual understanding, I am able to come to an understanding with you—the “author” himself—so much better and more meaningfully than with any of your “disciples.” From Becker’s work—I once had to share a table with him and his would-be wife at a restaur-


20. Alfred Seidemann (1895–1976), who recorded many of Heidegger’s late Freiburg courses in transcriptions that are now found in the Herbert Marcuse Archive, completed his doctorate with Heidegger in Freiburg in 1935 with a work on “Bergson’s Stellung zu Kant” [Bergson’s Position toward Kant].
rant. I completely lost my appetite.). I observed that Becker’s opposition in fact
goes essentially in another direction, or better, comes from another arena than
mine. I think that mine is more immanent, inasmuch as I make no attempt to re-
produce the lost “innocence” of a “self-oblivious” natural Dasein. For Dasein as be -
ing-with-one-another lies fundamentally on the same plane of conflict as the
existence that is in each instance its own (and it does not become unproblematic
through “nature” (sensuality), but concretely problematic in a specific way).

If the contestation [Auseinandersetzung] of several questions of your work
that are particularly important to me did not come out quite politely and I did
nothing to avoid the all-too-human vulnerability of a “teacher” through his “stu-
dent,” it happened with the secure consciousness that such caution had for Beck-
er, in his habilitation with Husserl, “served the purpose,” but that, in my case, it
would have been ungrounded and inexcusable cowardice and dishonesty. Per-
haps I have gone too far in the opposite direction. For example, I have failed, I
openly admit out of dumb fear, to promote the impression of being on good
terms with you and affording you a little satisfaction with the publication of your
book. My father is more guileless in these things. He is so accustomed to regard
human beings as beings who can be bought and sold that he wanted to send me
a box of good cigars for you!! Now when your position toward the habilitation
work is decided, I will be freer in this. I requested your opinion in the “Todtnau”
letter, since the opportunity to discuss the matter face-to-face ran out here, and
three months of vacation uncertainty is a downright painful state of being.

As for the winter, I would like in any case to work only for myself. I cannot
very well go anywhere else, in case the habilitation question becomes acute, but
I can still isolate myself. When I wanted to return from Mecklenburg back to you
in Marburg, you wrote that I should consider and decide for myself whether it
would do me “more harm than good” to take part in your seminars and courses.
Nevertheless, it turned out to be enormously “useful” for me to do so. But now
it is probably best that I forego the Schelling seminar and continue to practice
doing things in my own ways, so laboriously learned, by myself. I am not lacking
in “material.” If you want, I can tell you when you return what my plans are in this
context—“Anthropology”—why it is lucky for me that I did not begin to learn
from you with the “ontology” but rather with the “hermeneutics of facticity.”

I am—despite all—grateful to you
Karl Löwith

21. In WS 1927–1928, Heidegger conducted a seminar for advanced students on
Schelling’s essay, *On the Essence of Human Freedom* (1809). It was Heidegger’s first serious
venture into Schelling, made at the prompting of Karl Jaspers, which he would pursue in
seminars and courses into the 1940s.
Todtnauberg
August 20, 1927

Dear Mr. Löwith,

I did receive your three letters and thank you for them. I did not answer in the first days of August because I first wanted to finish reading through your work. However, it had been packed into my book box, which was in transit as freight for ten days. In the interim, Husserl asked me to come to Freiburg, where I stayed for some time. I have been back for several days and have read a bit more of your work.

I accept it as your habilitation essay. It is quite essentially different from your first draft, both in its level of questioning and in its transparency of structure and linguistic presentation.

Whether you materially agree with me or not is for me not a criterion for acceptance or non-acceptance; nor is the matter of whether or not you have understood my work in all of its principal tasks. The places where you have carried out your critique too frivolously and underestimate the difficulties of the problems and of their presuppositions have been indicated in marginal notes solely for your interest.

Your veiled attacks and supercilious jabs are part of the mood in which one presents one's first undertakings. After a decade such gestures subside, provided that one is able to channel all of the rising passion into the secure riverbed of an upsurging life's work.

I want to bring the matter before the faculty as soon as possible. The subsequent course of events depends on whether the open position is filled and whether Freiling's habilitation is concluded. In the latter matter a strong opposition has been spreading, so that Jaensch did not pursue the business as expeditiously as he had originally intended. He hopes to push the matter through with the help of Mahnke\textsuperscript{22} as "schoolteacher." Because I understand nothing of the

\textsuperscript{22} Dietrich Mahnke (1884–1939), philosopher and pedagogue of mathematics. Student of Hilbert and Husserl at Göttingen since 1902–1906, Mahnke first taught at the high school level, then returned from the war to finish his habilitation in philosophy under Husserl at Freiburg in 1922 with a work on Leibniz. Privatdocent at Greifswald in 1926. Professor at Marburg in October 1927 succeeding Heidegger, who took over the main Marburg chair previously held by Natorp and Hartmann (This double appointment of two "Husserlian phenomenologists" had been "in the works" since 1925. It prompted many a comparison of the two in Husserl’s correspondence: see appendix II to this volume). Main publications: 

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{Leibniz als Gegner der Gelehrteinsiedlichkeit} [Leibniz as a Foe of Scholarly Onesidedness] (1912);
  \item \textit{Eine neue Monadologie} (1917); \textit{Der Wille zur Ewigkeit. Gedanken eines deutschen Kriegers über den Sinn des Geistebbens} [The Will to Eternity: Thoughts of a German Soldier on the Meaning of the Spiritual Life; dedicated to Husserl, “the master of eidetic intuition”] (1917);
  \item \textit{Das unsichtbare Königsreich des deutschen Idealismus} [The Invis-
business of either psychology or pedagogy, but also because I am concerned for your situation, I have decided to remain neutral, even though doing so is generally not to my liking. And naturally I shall not take part in any horse-trading. To the extent that I have been able to sound things out, I do not believe that there will be any serious opposition. Jaensch will surely become anxious when he notices that you “also” do anthropology. And his interpretation of the matter will be that I have put you up to it against him. It is also possible that, once the habilitation is underway, Hartmann will work against you among his old friends.

But these are things that you should not take seriously. You would do well to begin thinking a bit on the themes [you wish to propose] for your trial lecture before the faculty and for your public inaugural lecture.

I do not know whether an appointment has been made for the open position, since I left immediately on Sunday and have not heard anything from Marburg since then. The prominent gentlemen and their hangers-on arrived rather late for the evening reception. This turned into—sit venia verbo [excuse the expression]—such an ass-licking groveling around the minister [Becker] and Schmidt-Ott that I got disgusted with the whole thing. The next day I was stuck in my academic gown from nine in the morning until four in the afternoon. The physical exertion would have been tolerable, but the psychic exertion was worse. The sort of banality and barbarism being perpetrated here is a disgrace. What ensued in the next two days probably made things even worse.

You will soon realize the risks that you have incurred with your habilitation. You must be able to endure being passed over and to be in a position to wait. Especially today the whole thing is a game of chance. Natorp’s high estimation of


my Duns Scotus, the fact that my teaching in Freiburg was effective, and the fact that I was taken for an easy-going and innocuous young man: all that was luck. Today I would probably never get the call to a university position. He who wants something will always be contested; the result is that one sometimes suffers a setback. But the fact that my days at Marburg are coming to an end is ultimately not the greatest misfortune. For you there is the further question of whether science and scholarship are so central for you that you will stand up for the university, or whether in your work you bring yourself to conclusions of the kind that Nietzsche drew.

It is best that we converse about your work in person. I still have not mastered it [sie, not Sitz!] sufficiently.

Regarding the Plessner business, I have only this advice: demand the return of the manuscript at once without further comment. Ideally I would at the same time announce my withdrawal from the editorial board. In your interest I will put this off until after your habilitation. Otherwise Hartmann, as I know him, would most definitely seek his revenge by jamming a spoke in your wheels at Marburg, even if

24. Paul Natorp (1854–1924), philosopher and pedagogue. Professor at Marburg 1883–1924; succeeded Hermann Cohen, his teacher, as the principal figure of the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism. Main publications: *Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode* [Introduction to Psychology in the Critical Method] (1888); *Sozialpädagogik. Theorie der Willenserziehung auf der Grundlage der Gemeinschaft* [Social Pedagogy: Theory of the Education of the Will on the Basis of Community] (1899); *Platos Ideenlehre* [Plato’s Theory of Ideas] (1903); *Philosophische Propädeutik* (1903); *Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften* [The Logical Foundations of the Exact Sciences] (1910); *Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode* [General Psychology in the Critical Method] (1912). This 1912 book contains a critique of the very possibility of phenomenology to which Privatdocent Heidegger will respond, in a career-defining move, in his course of early 1919 (GA 56/57, 100–12). Heidegger’s obituary of Natorp on the opening day of WS 1924–1925 (GA 19, 1–5) recalls his older colleague’s early support of the German Youth Movement on the university level. Natorp’s two-volume “war book,” *Deutscher Weltberuf: Geschichtsphilosophische Richtlinien* [Germany’s Calling in the World: Guidelines for a Philosophy of History] (1918), was enthusiastically recommended by Husserl to “Airman” Heidegger, then in military service near the front lines. See Husserl’s letter of September 10, 1918, in appendix II of this volume.

25. Heidegger’s habilitation work, *Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus* [The Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus] was first published in 1916 by J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) in Tübingen. Natorp was so impressed with this student work that he had tried in 1917 and again in 1920 to bring Heidegger to Marburg, before succeeding in 1923. The Natorp Archive in the Marburg University Library still contains the four pages of notes that Natorp made for himself out of this 1916 text.

this has to be done through Jaensch. Apparently the Cologne review is primarily a
dig at the “teacher,” which in Cologne is a typical tactic. It is for such things that
people have waste baskets.

I would like to respond briefly to what you have written on the problem of the
ontic founding of philosophy as ontology. First, I have constantly emphasized, al-
mmost to the point of monotony, the equiprimordiality of existence, thrownness,
and falling, and have accordingly elaborated the be-ing [Sein] of Dasein as care. The
“onset” of fundamental ontology is not in the first ten pages but the entire
treatise. Yet I also say that the analytic of Dasein is an existential analytic and is
therefore guided by existence, and indeed precisely because the “preparatory” ana-
lytic of Dasein (not ontological anthropology!) seeks solely to elucidate the under-
standing of be-ing that belongs to Dasein. It is a matter of explicating this
understanding out of Dasein. The question is: where and how shall I arrive at the
horizon for the interpretation of this understanding? Understanding, however, is
characteristic of existence; it is for this reason that the existential dimension is cen-
tral for both the content and the method of the analytic, but in such a way that at
the same time the “totality” of the fundamental structure of Dasein emerges. The “na-
ture” of human beings is however not something for itself and attached to “spirit.”
The question is: is there a possibility of acquiring a ground and a guiding thread for
the conceptual interpretation of Dasein from nature, or from “spirit,” or from nei-
ther of these? Or is it rather acquired originally from the “totality” of the constitu-
tion of be-ing? For here, for “conceptual” purposes, the existential dimension has the
priority for the possibility of ontology as such. For anthropological interpretation, as
ontological, can be conducted only on the basis of a clarified ontological problem-
atic as such. That is why Becker’s way of posing the problem is in my eyes grotesque
and philosophically impossible. To make mathematical “existence” a problem and
to declare simultaneously that the distinction between ontic and ontological is not
essential and central: to say these at once in fact means not to know what one is do-
ing and what one wants.

What I expected actually was not an “application” of my investigations, but
rather an independent fundamental exposition of the problem of mathematical
existence on the basis of what Becker takes to be the fundament of philosophy.
And yet there is no talk of this; instead, my way of posing questions is subverted
to a completely false level.

27. With the appearance of volume VIII of his Jahrbuch, which includes both Hei-
degger’s Being and Time and Becker’s Mathematical Existence, Husserl writes to Heidegger
on May 24, 1927: “Have you also read Becker’s work? Direct application of Heideggerian
ontology.” Edmund Husserl, Briefwechsel 4: Die Freiburger Schüler, ed. Karl Schuhmann
with Elisabeth Schuhmann (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), 143. See appendix II of this vol-
ume for the larger context of this and other Husserl letters. On Oskar Becker, see also n. 19
above and chap. 11, n. 2.
I too am of the conviction that ontology can be founded only ontically, and I believe that nobody before me has explicitly seen this and said so. But ontic founding does not mean arbitrarily pointing to something ontic and going back to it. Rather, the ground for ontology will be found only after one first knows what ontology itself is and then allows it as such to get to the bottom of itself to the point of foundering [sich zugrunderichten, “to destroy itself”]. The problems of facticity persist for me with the same intensity as they did in my Freiburg beginnings, only much more radically now, and still within the perspectives that were guiding me even in Freiburg. It is no accident that I was constantly occupied with Duns Scotus and the Middle Ages, and then back to Aristotle. And one cannot judge the work simply by what was said in the lecture courses or seminar exercises. I first had to go all out after the factic, pushing it to its extremity, in order to come to facticity at all as a problem. Formal indications, critique of the customary doctrine of the a priori, formalization and the like: all of this is still there for me even if I do not speak of them now. To tell the truth, I am really not interested in my development. But if it is to be put into language, it cannot be hastily thrown together from the sequence of lecture courses and what they happen to communicate. Such a short-winded consideration forgets the central perspectives and motivations that are at work both backwards and forwards.

“What someone wants to understand by ‘understandability’ cannot be decided theoretically.”28 Certainly—but the question remains whether the psychoanalysis of philosophizing, the ontic and psychological explanation of factic philosophizing is itself already philosophy, or whether philosophy is and has to be something different for the psychoanalytical question to make “sense” at all.

Such analyses settle nothing whatsoever for productive knowledge and questioning but instead simply hinder and prevent these, at the same time hardening the complexes.

But when both Becker and you polemicize against me by combating a subjectivism, I must confess that both Becker and you are characterologically much more “subjective,” much more and intensively self-absorbed than I am. Taken ontically, the “with-one-another” and the “human” [Menschliche, not Unoptische] are for both of you conditioned in a highly subjective manner. It is mere pretense for you to believe that you think “more objectively.”

28. Heidegger’s distillation of an assertion in Löwith’s letter of August 2: “By what route, in what terms something becomes ‘uniquely’ understandable for someone—this can surely no longer be theoretically decided—is nevertheless determined by the concept of ‘understandability’ [Verständlichkeit, usually “intelligibility”] as such.” The underlining in these paragraphs of Heidegger’s letter, as in some other instances in this German edition of the letter, stem not from Heidegger but from Löwith, who labored over Heidegger’s philosophically rich correspondence with him for many years, even citing from it in later articles that take issue with Heidegger’s thought.
Ontically of course, the two of you seem to bring something more objective forward than “existence.” Nevertheless, you are ontologically incapable—at least based on past performance—of attaining and founding the universal orientation which makes it possible to enter into the kind of crucial communication with prior philosophy that I am seeking.

I have always had little interest in psychoanalysis, because in a fundamentally philosophical sense it appears to me to be insufficiently relevant to the central problems. On the other hand, from the very beginning Becker and you have slanted my “hermeneutics of facticity” in a psychoanalytic direction and have forced my work into perspectives within which it has never moved.

Hence your relationship to me! [Löwith’s exclamatory emphases] could have also changed only from your side, and it appears to have changed from the moment when you noticed that my work! did not proceed in the direction that you expected, in accord with your ontic interpretation.

My personal feelings toward you are today no different than they were before, leaving aside the mutual differences which were brought to light by developments in our work! But for a long time now this has only been one more reason for me to wait and see, without pressure and solicitation, whether you will find your way from the solidified position of your own work and existence more securely to a genuine friendship.

“Circles” are not friendships. That is already evident from the fact that a day always comes when you get sick and tired of them.

With warm regards
from your
Martin Heidegger

The light in my cabin has failed, so that I had to write in semidarkness.
(of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* Article), with  
Heidegger’s Letter to Husserl

Between September and early December 1927, Husserl composed an introduction to phenomenology for publication in the 14th edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. His text went through four versions (Drafts A, B, C, and D), and was finally published in a much edited and condensed form in 1929. At Husserl’s request, Heidegger cooperated in writing the second draft (October 10–22, 1927): Husserl rewrote Part II of Draft B (“Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology”), while Heidegger composed a new Introduction (“The Idea of Phenomenology, and the Step Back to Consciousness”) and Part I (“The Idea of Pure Phenomenology”). In addition, Heidegger offered a trenchant critique of the last eight pages of Husserl’s draft of Part II (letter of October 22, 1927). This exchange marks the decisive parting of the ways between the two phenomenologists.

The issues in dispute were fundamental. Unlike Husserl, Heidegger viewed phenomenology primarily (and merely) as a method for doing fundamental ontology. Moreover, whereas Heidegger and Husserl agreed that the phenomenological reduction was a matter of refocusing attention on the already operative activity of transcendental constitution, Heidegger located that constitution not in the

noetic-noematic experiences of consciousness in which objects are constituted as correlates of subjectivity but in the “understanding of being,” the prior possibility and necessity of taking entities as this or that. For Heidegger this first-order “constitution,” which he called finite “transcendence,” makes possible both the second-order constitutive functions of acts of consciousness and the third-order reflective-thematic performances of “reductions.” The way to thematize constitution was not Zurück-führung, a cognitive re-duction back to consciousness as the absolute entity (das absolut Seiende), but Hin-führung, an existential in-duction forward to what one already is: a radical opening (Lichtung) that is never a mere entity and that makes possible all taking-as and understanding of being.

Likewise Heidegger insisted that something like world-as-such is an essential correlative of transcendental constitution and cannot be bracketed out. He rejected Husserl’s claim that the transcendentally reduced ego could not be the human ego stricte dicta. And he argued that the “transcendental reduction”—as the way of access to transcendental constitution—was in fact a concrete and immanent possibility of factual Dasein. The constitution of the being and significance of all “positive” present-at-hand entities is carried out by yet another entity “posited” in the world (indeed, “thrown” there), the concrete human being as factual. Although through-and-through worldly, Dasein is never “just there” (vorhanden) but has its being as Existenz, whose privilege it is to be the locus of all constitution.

The outline of this complex text is as follows. The titles of the headings in Part II have been added by the translator.

**[Heidegger:]**

Introduction: The Idea of Phenomenology and the Regress to Consciousness

Part I: The Idea of a Pure Psychology

1. The Object of Pure Psychology
2. The Method of Pure Psychology
   a. The Phenomenological Reduction
   b. The Eidetic Analysis
3. The Basic Function of Pure Psychology

**[Husserl, with notes by Heidegger:]**

Part II: Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology

The First Division of Part II: The Historical Intertwining of Phenomenological and Transcendental Phenomenology, and the Need to Distinguish the Two

1. Section One
2. Section Two

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1. Heidegger amends this to read: “The Phenomenological-Psychological Reduction.”
The Second Division of Part II: Pure Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology

1. The Transcendental Problem
2. Psychologism as a False Solution
3. Transcendental Reduction and the Semblance of Doubling
4. Pure Psychology as a Propaedeutic to Transcendental Phenomenology

[Heidegger:]

Heidegger's Letter and Appendices
Heidegger's Letter to Husserl (October 22, 1927)
Appendix I: Difficulties with Issues
Appendix II: re Arrangement of Pages 21 ff.
Appendix III

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"Phenomenology," Draft B (of the Encyclopaedia Britannica Article), with Heidegger’s Letter to Husserl

Introduction: The Idea of Phenomenology and the Regress to Consciousness (drafted by Martin Heidegger)

[256] The universe of entities is the field from which the positive sciences of nature, history, space acquire their respective areas of objects. Directed straight at entities, these sciences in their totality undertake the investigation of everything that is. So apparently there is no field of possible research left over for philosophy, which since antiquity has been considered the fundamental science. But does not Greek philosophy, right from its decisive origins, precisely make “entities” its object of inquiry? Certainly it does—not, however, in order to determine this or that entity, but rather in order to understand entities as entities, that is to say, with regard to their being. Efforts at answering the question “What are entities as such?” remain shaky for a long time because the posing of the question is itself entangled in essential obscurities.

Nonetheless, already in the first steps of the science of the being of entities something striking comes to light. Philosophy seeks to clarify being via a reflection [Besinnung] on one’s thinking about entities (Parmenides). Plato’s disclosure [Enthüllung] of the Ideas takes its bearings from the soul’s soliloquy (logos) with itself. The Aristotelian categories originate with regard to reason’s assertoric knowledge. Descartes explicitly founds First Philosophy on the res cogitans. Kant’s transcendental problematic operates in the field of consciousness. Is this turning of the gaze away from entities and onto consciousness something accidental, or is it demanded, in the final analysis, by the specific character of that which, under the title “being,” has constantly been sought for as the problem-area of philosophy?
The fundamental insight into the necessity of the return to consciousness; the radical and explicit determination of the path of, and the procedural rules for, this return; the principle-based determination and systematic exploration of the field that is to be disclosed in this return—this we designate as phenomenology. It stands in the service of the guiding philosophical problematic, namely, the question about the being of entities in the articulated manifold of its kinds and levels.

But for a long time now has not this task of returning to consciousness been taken over and adequately fulfilled by psychology, with the result that laying a radical foundation for philosophy coincides with producing a pure psychology? Nonetheless, fundamental reflection [Besinnung] on the object and method of a pure psychology can let us see precisely that such a psychology is fundamentally unable to secure the foundations for philosophy as a science. For psychology itself, as a positive science, is the investigation of a determinate region of entities and thus, for its part, requires a foundation.

Therefore, the return to consciousness, which every philosophy seeks with varying [degrees of] certitude and clarity, reaches back beyond the region of the pure psychic into the field of pure subjectivity. Because the being of everything that can be experienced by the subject in various ways—the transcendent in the broadest sense—is constituted in this pure subjectivity, pure subjectivity is called transcendental subjectivity. Pure psychology as a positive science of consciousness points back to the transcendental science of pure subjectivity. This latter is the realization of the idea of phenomenology as scientific philosophy. Conversely, only the transcendental science of consciousness provides full insight into the essence of pure psychology, its basic function, and the conditions of its possibility.

Part I: The Idea of a Pure Psychology (drafted by Martin Heidegger)

All lived experiences in which we relate directly to objects—experiencing, thinking, willing, valuing—allow of a turn of the gaze whereby they themselves become objects. The various modes of lived experience are revealed to be that wherein everything to which we relate shows itself, that is to say, “appears.” For that reason the lived experiences are called phenomena. The turning of the gaze towards them, the experience and definition of the lived experiences as such is the phenomenological attitude. In [258] this mode of expression, the word “phenomenological” is still being employed in a preliminary sense. With the turning of the gaze to the phenomena a universal task opens up, that of exploring systematically the multitudes of lived experiences, their typical forms, levels and interrelations of levels, and of understanding them as a self-contained whole. Directed towards the lived experiences, we make the “soul’s” modes of comportment—the pure psychic—into our object. We call it “the pure psychic” because, in looking at the lived experiences as such, one prescinds from all psychic functions in the sense of the organization of bodiliness, which is to say, one prescinds from the psychophysical.
The aforementioned phenomenological attitude provides the access to the pure psychic and makes possible the thematic investigation of it in the form of a pure psychology. Clarifying the understanding of the idea of a pure psychology requires answering three questions:

1. What counts as the object of pure psychology?
2. What mode of access and what kind of treatment does this object, given its own structure, demand?
3. What is the basic function of pure psychology?

1. The Object of Pure Psychology

How in general is one to characterize the entity that becomes the object through the phenomenological turn of gaze? In all of the psyche’s pure lived experience (in the perceiving of something, in the remembering of something, in the imagining of something, in the passing of judgment about something, in the willing of something, in the enjoying of something, in the hoping for something, and so forth) there is an intrinsic directedness-toward. . . . Lived experiences are intentional. This relating-oneself-to . . . is not merely added on to the psychic subsequently and occasionally as some accidental relation, as if lived experiences could be what they are without the intentional relation. Rather, the intentionality of lived experiences shows itself to be the essential structure of the pure psychic. The whole of a complex of lived experience—that is to say, a psychic life—exists at each moment as a self (an “I”), and as this self it lives factically in community with others. The purely psychic is therefore accessible both in experience of the self [259] as well as in the intersubjective experience of other [fremden] psychic lives.

Each one of the lived experiences that manifest themselves in experience of the self has about it, in the first instance, its own essential form and the possible modes of change that belong to it. The perception of, for example, a cube has this one thing itself in the originary comprehending gaze: the one thing. Nonetheless, as a lived experience, the perception itself is not a simple empty having-present of the thing. Rather, the thing is presented in perception via multiple “modes of appearance.” The interconnection of these modes, which in fact constitutes the perception as a whole, has its own set of typical forms and its own typical regulation of its flow.

In the recollection of that same object, of that same thing, the modes of appearance are identical [to those of the perception] and yet are modified in a way that befits a recollection. What is more, there come to light distinctions and grades of clarity and of relative determinateness and indeterminateness in the comprehension—such as those of time-perspectives, attention, and so on. Thus, for example, the judged [content] of a judgment is known sometimes as evident and other
times as not evident. In turn, the non-evident judgment either can occur as something that merely happens to have struck you or it can be something explicited step by step. Correspondingly the lived experiences of willing and valuing are always unities of hidden founding “modes of appearance.”

However, that which is experienced in such lived experiences does not appear simply as identical and different, individual and general, as an entity or not an entity, a possible and probable entity, as useful, beautiful, or good; rather, it is **confirmed** as true or untrue, genuine or not genuine. But the essential forms of individual lived experiences are embedded in typical forms of possible syntheses and flows within a closed psychical nexus. The essential form of this [nexus], as a totality, is that of the psychic life of an individual self as such. This self exists on the basis of its abiding convictions, decisions, habits, and character-traits. And this whole of the self’s habituality manifests in turn the essential forms of its genesis and of its current possible activity, which for its part remains embedded in the associative matrices whose specific form of happening is one with that activity throughout typical relations of change.

Factually the self always lives in community with others. Social acts (such as appealing to other persons, making an agreement [260] with them, dominating their will, and so on) not only have about them their own proper form as the lived experiences of groups, families, corporate bodies, and societies, but also have a typical form of the way they happen, of the way they effect things (power and powerlessness), of their development and progression. Intrinsically and thoroughly structured as intentional, this totality of life of individuals in possible communities makes up the whole field of the pure psychic. By what means does one achieve secure access to this region, and what kind of disclosure is appropriate to it?

2. The Method of Pure Psychology

The essential components of the method are determined by the basic structure and kind of being of the object. If the pure psychic is essentially intentional and initially accessible in one’s experience of one’s individual self, the phenomenological turn of the gaze onto lived experiences must be carried out in such a way that these lived experiences are shown in their intentionality and become comprehensible in their formal types. Access to entities that are, by their basic structure, intentional is carried out by way of the phenomenological-psychological reduction. Remaining within the reductive attitude, one carries out the eidetic analysis of the pure psychic, that is to say, one lays out of the essential structures of particular kinds of lived experience, their forms of interrelation and occurrence. Inasmuch as the psychic becomes accessible both in experience of the self and in intersubjective experience, the reduction is correspondingly divided into the egological and the intersubjective reductions.
a. The Phenomenological Reduction

The turning of the gaze away from the non-reflective perception of, for example, a thing in nature [Naturdinges] and onto this very act of perceiving has a special characteristic: in it the direction of the comprehending act, which was previously directed at the thing, is pulled back from the non-reflective perception in order to be directed at the act of perceiving as such. This leading-back (reduction) of the direction of the comprehending act from the perception, and the shifting of the comprehending act [261] onto the act of perceiving, changes almost nothing in the perception; indeed, the reduction actually renders the perception accessible as what it is, namely, as perception of the thing. Of course, the physical thing in nature, by reason of its very essence, is itself never a possible object of a psychological reflection [Reflexion]. Nevertheless, it shows up in the reducing gaze that focuses on the act of perceiving, because this perceiving is essentially a perceiving of the thing. The thing belongs to the perceiving as its perceived. The perceiving’s intentional relation is certainly not some free-floating relation directed into the void; rather, as intentio it has an intentum that belongs to it essentially. Whether or not what-is-perceived in the perception is itself in truth present at hand, the perception’s intentional act-of-meaning [Vermennen], in keeping with its own tendency to grasp something, is nonetheless directed to the entity as bodily present. Any perceptual illusion makes this plain. Only because the perceiving has its intentum, can it be modified into a deception about something.

Through the performance of the reduction the full intentional make-up of a lived experience becomes visible for the first time. But because all pure lived experiences and their interrelations are structured intentionally, the reduction guarantees universal access to the pure psychic, that is to say, to the phenomena. For this reason the reduction is called “phenomenological.” However, that which first of all becomes accessible in the performance of the phenomenological reduction is the purely psychical as a factically singular context of life experience of this particular here-and-now [jeweiligen] self. But over and above the descriptive characterization of this momentary and unrepeatable stream of lived experience, is a genuine, scientific—that is, objectively valid—knowledge of the psychic possible?

b. The Eidetic Analysis

If intentionality makes up the basic structure of all pure lived experiences and varies according to individual kinds of such experience, then there arises the possible and necessary task of spelling out what pertains to, for example, a perception in general, a wish in general, in each instance according to the make-up of its full intentional structure. Therefore [262] the attitude of reduction to the pure psychic

2. Heidegger amends this to read: “The Phenomenological-Psychological Reduction.”
3. Heidegger changes “subjectivity” to “other self.”
that initially shows up as an individual factual set of experiences must prescind from all psychic facticity. This facticity serves only exemplarily as a basis for the free variation of possibilities.

Thus, for instance, the phenomenological analysis of the perception of spatial things is in no way a report on perceptions that occur factically or that are to be expected empirically. Rather, a phenomenological analysis means laying out the necessary structural system without which a synthesis of manifold perceptions, as perception of one and the same thing, could not be thought. Accordingly, the exhibiting of the psychic, carried out in the reductive attitude, aims at the invariant — the necessary typical form (eidos) of the lived experience — which comes out in the variations. The attitude of reduction to the psychic, therefore, functions in the manner of an eidetic analysis of phenomena. The scientific exploration of the pure psychic, pure psychology, can be realized only as reductive-eidetic — that is, as phenomenological — psychology. Phenomenological psychology is descriptive, which means that the essential structures of the psychic are read off from the psychic directly. All phenomenological concepts and propositions require direct demonstration upon the phenomena themselves.

Inasmuch as the reduction, as we have characterized it, mediates access only to the psychic life that is in each case [je] one’s own, it is called the egological reduction. Nevertheless, because every self stands in a nexus of empathy with others, and because this nexus is constituted in intersubjective lived experiences, the egological reduction requires a necessary expansion by means of the intersubjective reduction. The phenomenology of empathy that is to be treated within the framework of the intersubjective reduction leads — by clarifying how the phenomena of empathy within my pure psychic nexus can unfold in mutually felt confirmation — to more than the description of this type of syntheses as syntheses of my own psyche. What is confirmed here, in a peculiar form of evidence, is the co-existence [Mitdasein] of a concrete subjectivity, indicated consistently and with ever new determining content — co-present with a bodiliness that is experienced originally and harmoniously in my own sphere of consciousness; and [yet], on the other hand, not present for me originaliter [263] the way my own subjectivity is [present] in its original relation to my corporeality. The carrying out of the phenomenological reduction in my actual and possible acceptance of a “foreign” subjectivity in the evidential form of mutually felt sympathy is the intersubjective reduction, in which, on the under-

4. Heidegger changes the clause after the semicolon to read: “But on the other hand this other [fremde] self is not present originaliter the way one’s own [self] is in its original relation to its bodiliness.”

5. Heidegger changes this to read: “The carrying out of the phenomenological reduction in my actual and possible acceptance of a ‘foreign’ psychic life in the evidential form of mutually felt sympathy is the intersubjective reduction. On the basis of the egological reduction the intersubjective reduction renders accessible the foreign psychic life originally confirmed in it.”
lying basis of the reduction to my pure and concrete subjectivity, the foreign subjectivities that are originally confirmed in it, come to be accepted as pure, along with, in further sequence, their pure psychic connections.6

3. The Basic Function of Pure Psychology

The [phenomenological] reduction opens the way to the pure psychic as such. The eidetic analysis discloses [enthiüllt] the essential interrelations of what has become accessible in the reduction.7 Consequently in the reductive eidetic investigation of the pure psychic there emerge the determinations that belong to the pure psychic as such, that is to say, the basic concepts of psychology, insofar as psychology, as an empirical science of the psychophysical whole of the concrete human being, has its central region in pure psychic life as such.

Pure psychology furnishes the necessary a priori foundation for empirical psychology with regard to the pure psychic. Just as the grounding of an “exact” empirical science of nature requires a systematic disclosure of the essential forms of nature in general, without which it is impossible to think nature at all and, more specifically, to think spatial and temporal form, movement, change, physical substantiality and causality—so too a scientifically “exact” psychology requires a disclosure of the a priori typical forms without which it is impossible to think the I (or the we), consciousness, the objects of consciousness, and hence any psychic life at all, along with all the distinctions and essentially possible forms of syntheses that are inseparable from the idea of an individual and communal psychic whole. Although the psychophysical nexus as such has its own proper a priori that is not yet determined by the basic concepts of pure psychology, nonetheless this psychophysical a priori requires a fundamental orientation to the a priori of the pure psychic.

Part II: Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology

The First Division of Part II: The Historical Intertwining of Phenomenological and Transcendental Phenomenology, and the Need to Distinguish the Two

1. Section One

[264] The idea of pure psychology did not grow out of psychology’s own needs to fulfill the conditions essential to its systematic construction. Rather, the

6. Heidegger adds: “The former is the necessary component—the latter along with the former is the sufficient component—of the phenomenological method of pure psychology.”

7. Heidegger changes this to: “The tendency was towards a ‘transcendental philosophy.”
history of pure psychology takes us back to John Locke’s famous and foundational work, and back to David Hume’s noteworthy elaboration of the tendencies that stem from Locke. Hume’s brilliant *Treatise* already has the form of a rigorous and systematic structural exploration of the sphere of pure lived experience. Thus in a certain sense it [is] the first attempt at a “phenomenology.”

But here in the beginning, the restriction [of the investigation] to the realm of the pure subjective was determined by interests coming from outside psychology. Psychology was at the service of the problematic of “understanding” or “reason” that Descartes had reawakened in a new form—namely, the fact that entities in the true sense are known to be such only via these subjective faculties. In our current way of speaking, it was a matter of “transcendental philosophy.”

Descartes put in doubt the general possibility that any knowledge could legitimately transcend the knowing subject. That, in turn, rendered it impossible to understand the genuine ontological sense [Seinsinn] of any entity qua objective reality, insofar as its existence is intended and demonstrated only by way of subjective experiences. The “transcendent” world, which, from a naïve point of view, is given as existing becomes problematic from a “transcendental” point of view: it cannot serve as a basis for cognition the way it does in the positive sciences. According to Descartes, such a basis requires that we get a pure grasp of that which is presupposed in the transcendental inquiry and which is itself beyond question: the *ego cogito*. Descartes’s *Meditations* already gained the insight that everything real—ultimately this whole world—has being for us only in terms of our experience and cognition, and that even the performances of reason, aimed at objective truth with the character of “evidence,” unfold purely within subjectivity. For all its primitiveness, Descartes’s methodical attempt at universal doubt is the first radical method of reduction to pure subjectivity.

It was Locke, however, who first saw in all of this a broad area of concrete [265] tasks and began to work on it. Because rational cognition in general occurs only in cognitive subjectivity, the only way to get a transcendental clarification of the transcendental validity of cognition is by way of a systematic study of all levels of cognitive experiences, activities, and faculties exactly as these present themselves in pure “inner experience”—a study that was guided, however, by the naïvely developed basic concepts of the experiential world and their logical elaboration.

8. Heidegger suggests dropping this sentence and changing the preceding two sentences to read: “... a transcendental clarification of cognition’s transcendental validity can [proceed] only as a systematic study of all levels of cognitive experiences, activities, and faculties exactly as these present themselves in pure ‘inner experience’ and announce their pure [Heidegger later erases ‘pure’] psychic genesis. Naturally the most accessible clue for this study was provided by the naïvely developed basic concepts of the experiential world and by their logical elaboration.”
What is required, in short, is inner-directed descriptions and the exploration of pure psychological genesis.  

But Locke did not know how to sustain this momentous idea at the high level of the principles that characterize Descartes’s inquiry. With Locke the methodically reduced Cartesian ego—the ego that would remain in being even if the experiential world did not—once again becomes the ordinary ego, the human psyche in the world. Although Locke certainly wanted to solve the transcendental questions of cognition, they get transformed in his work into psychological questions about how human beings living in the world attain and justify knowledge of the world that exists outside the mind. In this way Locke fell into transcendental psychologism, which then got passed down through the centuries (although Hume knew how to avoid it). The contradiction consists in this: Locke pursues the transcendental exploration of cognition as a psychological (in the natural positive sense of that word) exploration of cognition, thereby constantly presupposing the ontological validity [Seingeltung] of the experiential world—whereas that very world, along with all the positive cognition that can relate to it, is what is transcendentially problematic in its ontological sense and validity. Locke confuses two things: 1) questions about natural legitimacy in the realm of positivity (that of all the positive sciences), where the experiential world is the general and unquestioned presupposition, and 2) the question of transcendental legitimacy,10 where what is put into question is the world itself—everything that has the sense of “being-in-itself” over against cognition—and where we ask in the most radical way not whether something is valid but rather what sense and import such validity can have. With that, all questions about cognition within the realm of positivity (that of all the positive sciences) are burdened from the outset with the transcendental question about sense.

Nevertheless, the historical insurmountability of Locke’s psychologism points back to a deeply rooted [266] sense of truth that can be utilized in the transcendental project, a sense of truth that, despite the contradiction in [Locke’s] transcendental claim, is necessarily a part of every carefully carried out part of a pure psychology of knowledge and reason. Moreover, as transcendental phenomenology (whose proper idea we are striving for) makes clear for the first time, the reverse is equally true: every correctly (hence, concretely) realized part of a genuine tran-

9. Heidegger suggests ending this sentence here and changing the remainder of the sentence, and the next sentence, to: “Here the world itself—that is, every entity with the characteristic of ‘in-itself-ness’ with regard to cognition—is put into question. We ask not whether something ‘is valid’ but rather what sense and, in keeping with this sense, what import such a validity can have. The transcendental question of sense weighs upon the positive sciences.”

10. Heidegger suggests that the remainder of the sentence should read: “...allows of being changed over into a pure psychology of knowledge.”
scendental theory of knowledge contains a sense of truth that can be utilized in psychology. On the one hand, every genuine and pure psychology of knowledge (even though it is not itself a transcendental theory) can be “changed over” into a transcendental [theory of knowledge]. And on the other hand, every genuine transcendental theory of knowledge (even though it is not itself a psychology) can be changed over into a pure psychology of knowledge. This holds on both sides, proposition for proposition.

2. Section Two

In the beginning such insights were unavailable. People were not prepared to grasp the profound meaning of Descartes’s radicalism in exhibiting the pure ego cogito, nor to draw out its consequences with strict consistency. One was unable to distinguish the attitudes of positive research from those of transcendental research and, as a result, one could not delimit the proper sense of positive science. And given the ardent efforts to create a scientific psychology that could compete in fruitfulness and rigor with the pace-setting natural sciences, people failed to radically think through the requirements of such a psychology.

In this situation, which entrapped later thinkers too, neither transcendental philosophy nor psychology was able to attain the “sure path of a science”—a rigorous science fashioned originally from the sources of experience peculiar to it—nor could the ambiguous interpenetration [of transcendental philosophy and psychology] be clarified. The psychologism of the empiricists had the advantage to the degree that it ignored the objections of the anti-psychologists and followed the evidence that any science which questions cognition in all its forms can get answers only by systematically studying these forms via direct “inner” intuition. The knowledge thus acquired about the essence of cognition could not go astray if only it questioned [267] the ontological sense of the objective world, that is, if it followed Descartes’s shift of focus and his reduction to the pure ego. The charge that this was psychologism had no real effect because the anti-psychologists, out of fear of succumbing to psychologism, avoided any systematically concrete study of cognition; and, as they reacted ever more vociferously against the increasing power of empiricism in the last century, they finally fell into an empty aporetics and dialectics that managed to get what meager sense it had only by secretly borrowing it from intuition.

Even though much valuable preparatory work towards a pure psychology can be found in Locke’s Essay and in the related epistemological and psychological literature of the ensuing years, nevertheless pure psychology itself still attained no real foundation. For one thing, its essential meaning as what we might call

11. Heidegger’s note: “It is the task of transcendental philosophy to show this, and that point as such must be made directly here.”
“first psychology”—the eidetic science of the *logos* (? of the psychic—remained hidden, and thus the genuine guiding idea for systematic work [on it] was lacking. For another thing, the great efforts of individual psychological investigations, whether concerned with the transcendental or not, could bear no real fruit so long as naturalism, which dominated everything, remained blind to intentionality—the essential characteristic of the psychic sphere—and therefore blind to the infinite breadth of the pure psychological problematic and methodology that belong to intentionality.

Pure psychology, in the fundamental sense sketched out in Part I, arose from outside general psychology; specifically, it blossomed as the final fruit of a methodologically new development of transcendental philosophy, in which it became a rigorously systematic science constructed concretely from below. But of course pure psychology arose not as the goal of transcendental philosophy or as a discipline belonging to it but rather as a result of the fact that the relations between positivity and transcendentality were finally clarified. This clarification made possible for the first time a principled solution to the problem of psychologism; and following from that, the methodological reform of philosophy into rigorous science was concluded and philosophy was freed from the persistent hindrances of inherited confusion.

The prior event that made this development possible was Brentano’s great discovery: his transformation of the scholastic concept [268] of intentionality into an essential characteristic of “mental phenomena” as phenomena of “inner perception.” In general, Brentano’s psychology and philosophy have had an historical impact on the rise of phenomenology but no influence at all on its content. Brentano himself was still caught in the prevailing naturalistic misunderstanding of conscious life, and into that orbit he drew those “mental phenomena.” He was unable to grasp the true sense of a descriptive and genetic disclosure of intentionality. His work lacked a conscious utilization of the method of “phenomenological reduction” and consequently a correct and steady consideration of the *cogitata qua cogitata*. The idea of a phenomenologically pure psychology in the sense just described remained foreign to him. Equally foreign to him was the true meaning of transcendental philosophy, indeed the necessity of a basic eidetic transcendental discipline related to transcendental subjectivity. Essentially determined by the British empiricists, Brentano in his philosophical orientation took up the demand for a grounding of all specifically psychological disciplines (including transcendental philosophy) on a psychology that would be [constructed] purely out of inner experience but that, in keeping with his discovery, would have to be a psychology of intentionalities. As with all empiricists, Brentano’s psychology was, and ever remained, a positive and empirical science of human psychic being.

Brentano never understood the fundamental charge [laid against him] of psychologism, any more than he understood the profound sense of Descartes’s first
Meditations, where both the radical method of access to the transcendental sphere and the transcendental problem itself were already discovered in a first, if primitive, form. Brentano did not appropriate the insight (which emerged already in Descartes) into the antithesis between positive and transcendental science and into the necessity of an absolute transcendental grounding of positive science, without which it cannot be science in the highest sense.

There is another limitation to Brentano's research. It is true that, as with the old, moderate empiricism of a Locke, Brentano did stimulate various a priori disciplines, although without clarifying their deeper sense as inquiries into essence. However, grounded in the positivity that he never [269] overcame, he did not recognize the universal necessity of a priori research in all ontological spheres if rigorous science is to be possible. For precisely that reason he also failed to recognize the fundamental necessity of a systematic science of the essence of pure subjectivity.

The phenomenology that grew out of Brentano was motivated not by psychological interests and not at all by positive-scientific ones, but purely by transcendental concerns. In our critique of Brentano we have indicated the motives which determined the development of his phenomenology. In that regard it is always to be remarked that he continued to be determined by a traditional motive of Lockean-Humean philosophy, namely, that regardless of its orientation, every theory of reason, cognitive or otherwise, had to be derived from inner experience [Anschauung] of the corresponding phenomena.

Thus, the major points are: the disclosure of the genuine sense-content and method of intentionality; disclosure of the deepest motives and the horizon of Descartes's intuitions [Intuitionen], culminating in the method of “transcendental reduction,” first of all as egological and then as intersubjective. By such means one lays out the transcendental field as the arena of such transcendental experience. I may also mention the separation between positivity and transcendentalty, as well as the systematic unfolding of the fundamental content of positivity under the rubric of an universitas of rigorous positive sciences, merged with the complete science of the given world and related to the universitas of the underlying a priori disciplines, themselves merged with the unity of a universal positive ontology. Furthermore there is the comprehension of the concrete totality of transcendental questions posed by the positivity of all these sciences; the knowledge that transcendental philosophy in its primary sense is a science of essence related to the field of transcendental possible experience; further, the fact that on this ground a universal descriptive science and then a genetic science must be established purely from out of possible experience (in the eidetic sense), which is the source of all transcendental questions relative to the particular sciences and then to all forms of social culture as well. At the beginning of this development, [270] stimuli from Leibniz's philosophy, mediated by Lotze and Bolzano, played a role with regard to the pure exhibition of a priori “ontologies.” The first studies made were the inten-
tional analyses connected with the production of a “formal ontology” (pure logic as \textit{mathesis universalis}, along with pure logical grammar).

Of course one very quickly recognized the proper realm of \textit{a priori} psychology and the necessity of positively developing it. Nevertheless that faded for a while in the interests of exploring the intentional structures of the transcendental field, and thus in general all the work remained purely philosophical work carried out within a rigorous transcendental reduction. Only very late did one come to see that in the return (which is possible at any time) from the transcendental attitude to the natural attitude, the whole of transcendental cognition within the transcendental field of intuition changes into pure psychological (eidetic) cognition within the field of psychic positivity, both individual and interpersonal. That very insight led to a pedagogical idea about how to introduce people to phenomenology given all the difficulties related to its unaccustomed transcendental attitude. Essentially every philosophy has to start with the attitude of positivity and only [subsequently], by motivations far removed from natural life, clarify the meaning and necessity of the transcendental attitude and research; therefore, the systematic development of pure psychology as a positive science can serve in the first instance as a pedagogical propaedeutic.

The new method of intentionality as such and the immense system of tasks that go with subjectivity as such offer extraordinary difficulties, which can be overcome at first without touching on the transcendental problem. But this totality of scientific doctrines grounded in positivity then acquires transcendental sense through the specific method of transcendental phenomenological reduction, which elevates the whole [realm of] positivity to the philosophical level. This was the very method we followed when we dealt with phenomenology as pure psychology in Part I, thereby giving phenomenology a pedagogically lower, and not yet fully genuine, sense.

\textbf{The Second Division of Part II: Pure Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology}

1. The Transcendental Problem

[271] The issue of all-inclusiveness belongs to the essential sense of the transcendental problem. Each and every entity, the whole world that we talk about straightforwardly and that is the constant field (pre-given as self-evidently real) of all our theoretical and practical activities—all of that suddenly becomes unintelligible. Every sense it has for us, whether unconditionally universal or applicable case by case to individuals, is, as we then see, a meaning that occurs in the immanence.\footnote{12. Heidegger inserts a red “T” at the beginning of this sentence so as to direct Husserl’s attention to Appendix II (below), first point, concerning the “unintelligibility” of entities.}
of our own perceiving, representing, thinking, evaluating (and so on) lives and that takes shape in subjective genesis; every acceptance of being is carried out within ourselves, all experiential or theoretical evidence grounding that acceptance is active within us and habitually motivates us onward. This applies to the world in each of the determinations [we make about it], including the taken-for-granted determination that what belongs to the world is “in and for itself” just the way it is, regardless of whether or not I or anyone else happen to take cognizance of it. If we vary the factual world into any world that can be thought, we also undeniably vary the world’s relativity to conscious subjectivity. Thus the notion of a world existing in itself is unintelligible, due to that world’s essential relativity to consciousness. An equal [degree of] unintelligibility—and this too belongs to the transcendental question—is offered by any ideal “world,” such as, for example, the world of numbers, which, in its own way, does exist “in itself.”

2. Psychologism as a False Solution

Our elaboration of the idea of a phenomenologically pure psychology has shown the possibility of disclosing, via a systematic phenomenological reduction, the proper essential character of psychic subjects in eidetic universality and in all their possible forms. The same goes for those forms of reason that ground and confirm legitimacy, and consequently for all the forms of worlds that appear in consciousness and show themselves as existing “in themselves.” Although this phenomenological-eidetic psychology is not an empirical psychology of the factual human being, nonetheless it now seems called upon to clarify concretely, and down to the last detail, the ontological sense of world as such. [272] However, if we closely analyze the phenomenological-psychological reduction and the pure psyches and communities of psyches that are its outcome, clearly only the following is entailed in the procedure: that for the purpose of exhibiting psychic subjectivity as a field of pure inner experience and judgment, the psychologist must “put out of play” for all psyches the world they accept as existing. In making phenomenological judgments, the psychologist must refrain from any belief regarding the world. For example, when I as a psychologist describe my own perception as a pure psychic event, I am not permitted to make direct judgments about the perceived thing the way a natural scientist does. Rather, I am permitted to judge only about my “perceived as such” as that which is an inseparable moment of the lived experience of perceiving: namely, as an appearance with this given sense, known as the selfsame, believed in as existing, and the like, amidst whatever changes in its modes of appearance. And so on in every case.14 Thus,15 when I make a general

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13/14. For the next two sentences I follow Husserl’s original typed version (B2, p. 22, lines 16–25).
15. Heidegger’s note here is highlighted in red: “What kind of ‘excluding from con-
and (as is required) a rigorously consistent reduction to my psyche, the world that has been rendered questionable in the transcendental inquiry is certainly no longer presupposed—and the same for all psyches as regards their purity. Here in this context of statements about the purely psychic, the world that has straightforward validity for these minds themselves is not the focus of attention, but rather only the pure being and life of the very psyches in which the world appears and naturally, via the corresponding subjective modes of appearance and belief, acquires meaning and validity.

Nonetheless, it is still a question of “psyches” and connections between them, psyches belonging to bodies that are always presupposed and are only temporarily excluded from theoretical consideration. To put it concretely, [pure psychology] is concerned with the animals and human beings that inhabit a presupposed spatial world; and just as physical somatology explores such animals and human beings with a systematic methodical focus on only one side of them—the animate organism aspect—so pure psychology explores them with an equally systematic focus on only the other side—the pure psychic aspect. Even when doing pure psychology we still stand, as psychologists, on the ground of positivity; we are and remain explorers simply of the world or of a [particular] world, and thus all our research remains transcendently naive. Despite their purity, all pure psychic phenomena have the ontological sense of worldly real facts, even when they are treated eidetically as possible facts of a world which is posited as general possibility but which, for that very reason, is also unintelligible from a transcendental point of view. For the psychologist, who as psychologist remains in positivity, the systematic psychological-phenomenological reduction, with its epoché regarding the existing world, is merely a means for reducing the human and animal psyche to its own pure and proper essence, all of this against the background of the world that, as far as the psychologist is concerned, remains continually in being and constantly valid. Precisely for that reason this phenomenological reduction, seen from the transcendental viewpoint, is characterized as inauthentic and transcendently non-genuine.

3. Transcendental Reduction and the Semblance of Doubling

If the transcendental problem is concerned with the ontological sense of any world at all as getting its meaning and validity only from functions of conscious-
ness, then the transcendental philosopher must practice an effectively unconditioned epoché regarding the world and so must effectively posit and maintain in validity only conscious subjectivity, whence ontological sense and validity are produced. Thus, because the world is present for me only thanks to my life of experiencing, thinking, and so forth, it makes sense at the outset to go back precisely to my own self in its absolute proper essentialness, to reduce back to my pure life and this alone, precisely as it can be experienced in absolute self-experience.

But is this really something different from reduction to my pure psyche? Here is the decisive point which differentiates the genuine transcendental-phenomenological reduction from the psychological reduction (the latter being necessary for the positive scientist but not transcendentally genuine). According to the sense of the transcendental question I as a transcendental phenomenologist place the whole world entirely and absolutely within this question. With equally all-inclusiveness, therefore, I stop every positive question, every positive judgment, and the whole of natural experience qua pre-accepted valid basis for possible judgments. [On the one hand,] my line of questioning requires that I avoid the transcendental circle, which consists in presupposing something as beyond question when in fact it is encompassed by the all-inclusiveness of that very question. On the other hand [it requires] a reduction to the very basis of validity that this question as such presupposes: pure subjectivity as the source of sense and validity. Thus, as a transcendental phenomenologist, what I have now is not my ego as a psyche—for the very meaning of the word “psyche” presupposes an actual or possible world. Rather, I have that transcendentally pure ego within which even this psyche, with its transcendent sense, is endowed, from out of the hidden functions of consciousness, with the sense and validity it has for me.

When, as a psychologist, I take myself as a pure psychological theme, I certainly do discover, along with all the pure psychic, that element as well in which I come to have an “idea” of myself as the psyche of this worldly corporeality of mine; and I prove its validity, define it more closely, and so on. So too my psychological activity, all my scientific work—in short, anything and everything that belongs to me as a pure subject—all of it I can and must acquire in this way. But the very habituality of the psychological attitude, which we call its positivity, entails

18. Heidegger recommends that Husserl add this phrase.
19. Heidegger inserts this phrase.
20. Heidegger’s double note at this point is highlighted in red. [First note:] “Does not a world-as-such belong to the essence of the pure ego? [Second note:] See our conversation in Todtnauberg [April, 1926] about ‘being-in-the-world’ (Being and Time, 1, § 12, § 69) and its essential difference from presence-at-hand ‘within’ such a world.”
21. Heidegger’s note is bordered in red and topped off with a red circle: “1. As something present-at-hand! But human Dasein ‘is’ in such a way that, although it is an entity, it is never simply present-at-hand.”
that at each step one is always effecting anew or keeping in effect (but always laten-
tly) the apperception of the world,\textsuperscript{22} within which everything that [eventually] becomes a specific theme is inserted as a worldly thing. Of course all these [acts]—in general, all apperceptive performances and validations—belong to the psychological realm, but always in such a way that the apperception of the world remains universally accepted as valid; and whenever something new emerges, it always becomes, within [that] apperception, a worldly thing. The disclosing of the mind is an infinite process, but so too is psychic self-apperception in the form of worldliness.

It is the transcendental reduction’s fundamental and proper character that, from the very beginning and with one blow—by means of an all-inclusive theoretical act of will—it checks this transcendental naïveté that still remains as a residue in pure psychology: it encompasses the whole of current and habitual life with this act of will.\textsuperscript{23} This will demands that we practice no transcendent apperception and no transcendent validation, whatever its condition. It demands that we “put [all this] in brackets” and take it only as what it is in itself: a pure subjective act of perceiving, meaning, positing-as-valid, and so on. After I do this to \textsuperscript{[275]} myself, I am not a human ego\textsuperscript{24} even though I lose nothing of the proper and essential content of my pure psyche (and thus, nothing of the pure psychological). What is bracketed is only the positing-as-valid that I had performed in the attitude of “I, this human being” and the attitude of “my psyche in the world”; what is not bracketed is that positing and that having-as-valid \textit{qua} lived experience. This reduced ego is certainly [still] my “I” in the whole concretion of my life, but it is seen directly in transcendently reduced inner experience—and now it really is the concrete ego, the absolute presupposition for all transcendence that is valid for “me.” In fact it is evident that the ego in its [now transcendently] reduced peculiarity is the only one that is positable \textit{setzbar}\textsuperscript{25} with all its intentional correlates, and that it therefore offers me the most fundamental and primordial experiential ground for tran-

\begin{itemize}
\item 22. Heidegger’s note is underlined in red: “2. And this will itself! [Und dieser Wille selbst]”
\item 23. Heidegger provides two notes on this phrase, both of which are highlighted in red:
  \begin{itemize}
  \item 3a. Or maybe [one is] \textit{precisely} that [i.e., a human ego] in its ownmost ‘wonder-
some’ possibility-of-\textit{Existenz}. Compare p. 27 below [the penultimate paragraph of Draft B], where you speak of a ‘kind of transformation of one’s whole form of life.’”
  \item 3b. Why not? Isn’t this action a possibility of the human being, but one which, pre-
cisely because the human being is never present-at-hand, is a \textit{comportment} [a way of ‘having oneself’], i.e., a way of being which comes into its own entirely from out of itself and thus never belongs to the positivity of something present-at-hand.”
\end{itemize}
\item 24. Heidegger’s note is highlighted in red, and he underlines the word “nothing” twice: “[So it is a] \textit{positum}! Something positive! Or else what kind of \textit{posing} is this? In what sense [can one say] that this \textit{posed-something is}—if it is supposed to be not \textit{nothing} [but] rather in a certain way everything?”
\item 25. Heidegger’s note (he underlines the last two words twice): “\textit{An ascent (a climb-}
scendental exploration. The phenomena attained in this transcendental reduction are transcendental phenomena.

Every single pure psychic experience—once we take the next step of submitting it to the transcendental reduction that purifies it of worldly sense—produces a transcendental experience that is identical [to the pure psychic experience] as regards content but that is freed of its “psychic” (that is, worldly, real) sense. In precisely this way the psychic ego is transformed into the transcendental ego, which, in each of its self-disclosing reflections [Reflexionen] (transcendental reflections), always rediscovers itself in its own transcendental peculiarities, just as the psychological ego, in keeping with the change in reductive focus, always rediscovers itself in its own psychological peculiarities. In this way there comes to light this wondrous parallelism of the psychological and the transcendental, which extends to all descriptive and genetic determinations that can be worked out on either side in the respective systematically maintained attitude.

The same holds if I as a psychologist practice the intersubjective reduction [276] and, by prescinding from all psychophysical connections, thoroughly examine the pure psychic nexus of a possible personal community, and then carry out the transcendental purification. This purification prescinds not just from the positively valid physical, as above; rather, it is a fundamental “bracketing” of the whole world, and it accepts as valid only the world as phenomenon. In this case what is left over is not the psychical nexus, as in the former instance; rather, the result is the absolute nexus of absolute egos—the transcendentally intersubjective nexus—in which the world of positivity is “transcendentally constituted” with its categorial sense for entities that in themselves exist intersubjectively. However, one may (as in E. Husserl’s Ideas I) follow transcendental rather than psychological interests and take up, from the very beginning, the transcendental reduction, both egological and intersubjective. In that case, what emerges is not at all pure psychology but immediately transcendental phenomenology as a science (fashioned purely from transcendental experience) both of transcendental intersubjectivity—indeed, thanks to the requisite eidetic method, an a priori possible transcendental intersubjectivity—as well as of possible worlds (or environments) as transcendental correlates.

4. Pure Psychology as a Propaedeutic to Transcendental Phenomenology

Now one understands in depth the power of psychologism. Every pure psychological insight (such as, for example, all the psychological analyses—even if imperfectly sketched—that logicians, ethicists, and so on, make of judgmental cognition, ethical life, and the like) is, as regards its whole content, in fact able to

*ing up) that nonetheless remains ‘immanent,’ that is, a human possibility in which, precisely, human beings come to themselves.*
be utilized transcendentally so long as it receives its pure sense through the genuine transcendental reduction.

Likewise one now understands the pedagogical significance of pure psychology as a means of ascent to transcendental philosophy, which is completely independent of its significance for making possible an “exact” science of psychological facts. For essential and easily understood reasons, humankind as a whole, as well as each individual human being, has, in the first instance, always lived and continues to live lives entirely and exclusively in positivity. Thus, the transcendental reduction is a kind of transformation of one’s whole way of life, one that completely transcends all life experience heretofore and that, due to its absolute foreignness, is hard to understand both in its possibility and [277] actuality. The same holds correspondingly for a transcendental science. Although phenomenological psychology is relatively new and, in its method of transcendental analysis, even novel, nonetheless it is as universally accessible as are all the positive sciences. Once one has systematically disclosed, in [pure psychology], the realm of the pure psychic, one thereby already possesses, implicitly and even materially, the content of the parallel transcendental sphere, and all that is needed is the doctrine that is capable of merely reinterpreting [the pure psychological sphere] rather than supplementing it [by adding something on to it].

To be sure, because the transcendental concern is the supreme and ultimate human concern, it would be better “in itself” if, both historically and factically, the theories of subjectivity, which for profound transcendental reasons are ambiguous, were developed within transcendental philosophy. Then, by a corresponding change in focus, the psychologist can “read” transcendental phenomenology for his own purposes “as” pure psychology. The transcendental reduction is not a blind change of focus; rather, as the methodological principle of all transcendental method, it is itself clarified reflectively and transcendentally. In this way, one may say, the enigma of the “Copernican Revolution” is completely solved.

26. Heidegger’s note: “But on the contrary, isn’t this ‘reinterpretation’ really only a ‘supplemental’ application [or: utilization] of the transcendental problematic that you find incompletely [worked out] in pure psychology, such that when the psychical comes on the scene as a self-transcending [entity], from that moment on, everything positive is rendered transcendentally problematic—everything: both the psychical itself and the entities (world) constituted in it.”

27. That is, what we have entitled “The Second Division of Part Two,” above.
Messkirch
October 22, 1927

Dear fatherly friend,

My thanks to you and Mrs. Husserl for the recent days in Freiburg. I truly had the feeling of being accepted as a son.

Only in actual work do the problems become clear. Therefore, mere holiday conversations, enjoyable as they are, yield nothing. But this time everything was under the pressure of an urgent and important task. And only in the last few days have I begun to see the extent to which your emphasis on pure psychology provides the basis for clarifying—or unfolding for the first time with complete exactness—the question of transcendental subjectivity and its relation to the pure psychic. My disadvantage, to be sure, is that I do not know your concrete investigations of the last few years. Therefore, my objections may appear simply as formalistic.

In the enclosed pages I attempt once more to fix the essential points. This also gives me an occasion to characterize the fundamental orientation of Being and Time within the transcendental problem.

Pages 21–28 are written essentially more concisely than the first draft. The structure is transparent. After repeated examination, I have put the stylistic abbreviations and glosses directly into the text. The marginal notes in red concern questions about issues that I summarize briefly in Appendix I to this letter.

Appendix II deals with questions about the arrangement of those same pages. The only thing that matters for the article is that the problematic of phenomenology be expressed in the form of a concise and very impersonal report. Granted that the clarity of the presentation presupposes an ultimate clarification of the issues, nonetheless your aim, or that of the article, must remain confined to a clear presentation of the essentials.

For all intents and purposes the course of our conversations has shown that you should not delay any further with your longer publications. In the last few days you repeatedly remarked that a pure psychology does not yet really exist. Now—the essential elements are there in the three sections of the manuscript typed by Landgrebe.

29. In WS 1927–1928, Heidegger lectured on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (see GA 25) and held seminars on Schelling’s On the Essence of Human Freedom and “The Concept and Concept-Formation.”
These investigations [relating to pure psychology] must be published first, and that for two reasons: 1) so that one may have the concrete investigations in front of him and not have to go searching in vain for them as some promised program, and 2) so that you yourself may have some breathing space for [preparing] a fundamental exposition of the transcendental problematic.

I would ask you to stick to the second draft for the “Studien [zur Struktur des Bewusstseins]” as a guide. I have now read it through once again, and I stand by the judgment I made in my previous letter.—

Yesterday I received from my wife the letter from Richter (a copy of which is in appendix III). I have written to Mahnke.

Of course, here I do not get down to my own work. That will be a fine mess, what with the lecture course and the two seminars\(^{30}\) and the lectures in Cologne and Bonn,\(^{31}\) and Kuki besides.\(^{32}\)

However, the requisite enthusiasm for the problem is alive; the rest will have to be done by force.

Next week I leave here to see Jaspers, whom I will ask for some tactical advice for myself.

I wish you a successful conclusion of the article, which will keep many problems astir in you as a starting point for further publications.

Again, you and Mrs. Husserl have my cordial thanks for those lovely days. I send you my greetings in true friendship and respect.

Yours,
Martin Heidegger

Appendix I: Difficulties with Issues

We are in agreement on the fact that entities in the sense of what you call “world” cannot be explained in their transcendental constitution by returning to an entity of the same mode of being.

\(^{30}\) During the week of December 5–9, 1927, Heidegger gave a lecture on “Kants Lehre vom Schematismus und die Frage nach dem Sinn des Seins” (“Kant’s Doctrine of Schematism, and the Question of the Meaning of Being”) both in Cologne for the Kant Society (Max Scheler, chair) and in Bonn. A three-day stay in Cologne resulted in an important philosophical exchange with Scheler, reportedly on the relation of the question raised in Being and Time to Scheler’s metaphysics and his idea of phenomenology. This would be their last conversation: Scheler died in May of 1928. (See GA 26, 62–64/50–52 and 182/144 n., where the above lecture on Kant’s schematism is wrongly dated January 26, 1927.)

\(^{31}\) Baron Shuzo Kuki (1888–1941), whom Heidegger met at Husserl’s home on October 12, 1927.

\(^{32}\) That is, “The Second Division of Part II.”
But that does not mean that what makes up the place of the transcendental is not an entity at all; rather, precisely at this juncture there arises the *problem*: What is the mode of being of the entity in which “world” is constituted? That is *Being and Time*’s central problem—namely, a fundamental ontology of Dasein. It has to be shown that the mode of being of human Dasein is totally different from that of all other entities and that, as the mode of being that it is, it harbors right within itself the possibility of transcendental constitution.

Transcendental constitution is a central possibility of the *Existenz* of the factical self. This factical self, the concrete human being, is as such—as an entity—never a “worldly real fact” because the human being is never merely present-at-hand but rather ex-sists. And what is “wondersome” is the fact that the existence-structure of Dasein makes possible the transcendental constitution of everything positive.

Somatology’s and pure psychology’s “one-sided” treatments [of the psycho-physical] are possible only on the basis of the concrete wholeness of the human being, and this wholeness as such is what primarily determines the human being’s mode of being.

The [notion of the] “pure psychic” has arisen without the slightest regard for the ontology of the whole human being, that is to say, without any aim of [developing] a psychology—rather, from the beginning, since the time of Descartes, it has come out of *epistemological* concerns.

That which constitutes is not nothing; hence it is something, and it is ‘in being’ *[seiend]*—although not in the sense of something positive.

The question about the mode of being of what does the constituting is not to be avoided.

Accordingly the problem of being is related—all-inclusively—to what constitutes and to what gets constituted.

Appendix II

Re: *Arrangement of Pages 21 ff.*

The *first* thing in the presentation of the transcendental problem is to clarify what the “unintelligibility” of entities means.

- In what respect are entities unintelligible? i.e., what higher claim of intelligibility is possible and necessary?
- By a return to what is this intelligibility achieved?
- What is the meaning of the absolute ego as distinct from the pure psychic?

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33. See above, *Hua* IX, 271, line 5: “a cloud of unintelligibility spreads over the whole world.”

34. ■
• What is the mode of being of this absolute ego—in what sense is it the 
  same as each and every [je] factual “I”; in what sense is it not the same?
• What is the character of the positing in which the absolute ego is something 
posited? To what extent is there no positivity (positedness) here?
• The all-inclusiveness of the transcendental problem.

Appendix III

“I have the pleasure of being able to inform you that the Minister has de-
cided to assign you the chair as full professor of philosophy at the University [of 
Marburg]. On consideration of your present income your basic salary would be 
set at 6,535 Reich Marks yearly, increasing as is customary every two years to the 
sum of 9,360 Reich Marks.

“While inviting you to express your opinion on this settlement, I likewise 
have the honor of informing you that Privatdozent Dr. Mahnke from Greifswald 
has been called to the professorship that you have held up to now.

“With best regards,

[Richter]”
22. “Heidegger, Martin”: Lexicon Article Attributed to Rudolf Bultmann

On December 29, 1927, the theologian Rudolf Bultmann writes from Marburg to his close colleague Heidegger in “Tödtnauberg – Cabin” with a rather unusual request: “Since Wünsch¹ has to write an article entitled ‘Heidegger’ for the lexicon Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart and fortunately turned to me for advice, I ask you to let me know as soon as possible what specifically you would want to make known and be named from your vita in such an article (which you cannot, and should not avoid). Not just the dates but also something about your relationship to Husserl and the motives of your philosophy that come from Luther, Kierkegaard, and Dilthey as well as from Aristotle, Augustine, and Scholasticism. Regarding the relationship to theology, you might want to say perhaps no more than that the motives of the theological tradition are taken up by you because of your relationship to medieval philosophy? The article is supposed to be 15 lines long.”

Heidegger replies on “Sylvester’s Day,” the last day of the Year of Our Lord 1927, by first observing that he finds the whole idea of the article “somewhat ludicrous,” to have him taken apart and put together again in a list of motives, and begs Bultmann that the article not be reduced to a “mere listing of names and trends, which everyone could then construe for themselves in different ways.” Bultmann

¹. Georg Wünsch (Augsburg 1887–Marburg 1964), Protestant theologian whose field was social and economic ethics, privatdocent at Marburg in 1922, associate professor in 1927. Wünsch will write neither of the “Heidegger” articles for RGG in that year.
accordingly lifts Heidegger’s own verbatim statement about what could be said about “my work” from the letter and publishes it in the lexicon article in a slightly retouched form under his own name. What follows is a translation of the article as it is published in *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, with some indication of Bultmann’s (perhaps also the lexicon editor’s) supplementation and trimming (down to 26 lines) being placed in square brackets. The lexicon article “Heidegger” in fact places “Martin” in second place, following an entry on Heidegger, Johann Heinrich (1633–1698), a Reformed theologian of the Baroque period, written by a Herr Schrenk.

On at least two points, the article proves indeed to be more than a “mere listing” of Heidegger’s past motives and influences, all of which have been amply illustrated by the chapters in this collection. Bringing out “the true motives of German idealism” from Kant to Hegel by way of radicalizing their sense of the “subject” down to the concrete human Dasein proves to be an announced project of deconstruction of the texts of German idealism begun in the course and seminars of WS 1925–1926,2 which includes the earliest drafts of portions of the 1929 Kant book, that would continue unabated through the political years of the early 1930s in seminars and courses to Heidegger’s lecture course on Schelling in SS 1936.

A second project that would likewise extend through the political years in close conjunction with the deconstruction of German idealism is somewhat more tacitly announced in the concluding sentence of the lexicon article, in response to Bultmann’s request, namely, the task of providing an ontological founding for the ontic science of theology, as well as for “worldviews” other than religious ones. For it is only in SS 1928 that Heidegger would overtly announce the incorporation into his own ontological work of the task of a full-fledged metontology, “the turn in which ontology itself explicitly returns to the metaphysical ontic in which it always implicitly stands” (*GA* 26, 201/158) in order to articulate it in the terms of its newly found fundamental ontology. Metontology as a metaphysics of the ontically primal phenomenon of human existence (199/157) in its special “place in the cosmos” (Scheler) would pose not only the ontically global questions of “philosophies to guide life” and “worldviews” in their ethics, politics, practics, technics, and

2. It is then that Heidegger experienced a precipitous creative shock in reading the texts of Kant and Hegel as if for the first time, “as if scales fell from my eyes, and Kant became for me an essential confirmation of the rightness of the path that I was seeking” (*GA* 25, 431). Two letters to Jaspers further testify to this creative shock and serve to date it precisely: “My Kant and Hegel seminars are giving me a great deal of pleasure, and I’m glad that I am only now coming around to these things, when it is at least to some small degree possible to understand something of them” (December 10, 1925). “I am grateful that fate has kept me from spoiling Kant and Hegel with any one of those pairs of glasses available on the market today. I thing I can sense the world spirit in the presence of both” (February 17, 1926). See Kisiel, *Genesis*, 409 for a summary of this turn of events.
beliefs, but also the questions of regional ontology like the distinction of the “world-cultivating” human being from the “world-impoverished” animal and the “worldless” stone (WS 1929–1930). But the most notorious (and least understood) of Heidegger’s ontic-ontological ventures would become the “metontological concept of the political” that he develops in the Nazi 1930s in response to the often fanatical quest and fierce contention over which worldview and form of life would bring the German people to its proper self-identity.3

Heidegger, Martin

Philosopher, born 1889 in Messkirch (Baden), 1923 [correcting R.B.’s 1922] professor at Marburg, since 1928 at Freiburg. His work [R.B. adds: which is carried out within the school of phenomenology] repeats [RB: the problems of] ancient ontology in order to radicalize it [them], and outlines a universal ontology which in addition includes the region of history. The fundament of this problematic is developed by starting from the “subject” properly understood as “human Dasein,” such that, with the radicalizing of this approach, the true motives of German idealism come into their own. Augustine, Luther, and Kierkegaard were influential [H.: philosophically essential] for H. in the development of the [H.: a more radical] understanding-of-Dasein, and Dilthey for the interpretation of history [H.: the “historical world”]; Aristotle and Scholasticism were decisive [H.: philosophically essential] for the rigorous formulation of certain ontological problems [H.’s emphasis deleted]. H.’s research is carried out in a methodology that is guided by the idea of a scientific philosophy as it was grounded by Husserl, not without the influence of the logical investigations and philosophy of science of H. Rickert and E. Lask. H.’s work aims at neither a theology nor a worldview, but it may well include approaches [H.: and intentions] that are fruitful for an ontological founding of [H.: Christian] theology as a science.


Bultmann

Appendices

Supplements by Heidegger’s Contemporaries
Appendix I

Academic Evaluations of Heidegger by his Teachers and Peers

These six documents that evaluate Heidegger in the initial course of his university career first record his beginnings as a student of philosophical logic who gradually made the systematic and the historical in philosophy “equiprimordial,” despite the protestations of Rickert, his habilitation director, who was more taken by Heidegger’s “decided aptitude for abstract thinking.” It was this unusual historical side of Heidegger, this ability to do original systematic philosophy through historical case studies of Duns Scotus, Aristotle, Augustine, even Paul, that made

The first two evaluations (1 and 2) by Professors Schneider and Rickert were first translated by Thomas Bowen from the German Gutachten [authoritative appraisals] transcribed by Thomas Sheehan in “Heidegger’s Lehrjahre” (1988), 115–18, and edited for this volume by Theodore Kisiel. The remaining four evaluations, occurring at various stages of Heidegger’s ascent in his university career, have been translated by Theodore Kisiel directly from original documents deposited in the university archives listed below, each of which is gratefully acknowledged for access to the pertinent manuscripts and for permission to translate them into English.


him attractive to the Philosophical Faculty at Marburg. The documents record the meteoric rise after the First World War of his public image as a philosophically revolutionary teacher whose “fame precedes his literary achievements,” such that Georg Misch was forced to determine whether this obviously talented teacher was also a “born philosopher” solely from unpublished manuscripts (chapters 13 and 14) in circulation at the time (see chapter 12). The lingering dearth of actual publications temporarily arrested Heidegger’s meteoric rise among the insiders in academia, forcing him to rush his magnum opus, *Being and Time*, into print. Its publication in 1927 only ratified the insiders’ extrapolations of Heidegger’s direction toward a fusion of Dilthey’s hermeneutic philosophy of the spirit and Husserl’s phenomenology, the latter itself already understood as inherently hermeneutical by Misch and others, which accounts for its effective applicability to the concrete case studies of intellectual history and, through such studies, to the ultimate ontological questions. Phenomenology for Heidegger is not just a preliminary labor propaedeutic to philosophy proper but a “new kind of method applied on a grand scale” to the full scope of ontology and to the entire history of philosophy. It is curious that none of his early evaluators discern the grand “deconstructive” intent of Heidegger’s historical method of interpretation but are content to admire his ingenuity and ability to understand tradition-worn philosophers in the context of the modernist “history of problems” then current through Wilhelm Windelband’s tomes on the history of philosophy. Misch even sees the young Heidegger’s philosophical bearing to be overbearing rather than liberating, something that “would not find the same full resonance on Göttingen ground as it does in the Freiburg air.” Heidegger had better luck on the Marburg mountainside than on Göttingen ground, before he found his way back to his beloved *Bodenständigkeit* (native ground) in the Black Forest and at Freiburg.

* * *

**Academic Evaluations of Heidegger**

1. Evaluation of Martin Heidegger’s Dissertation (July 1913)

*The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism: Critical and Positive Contributions to Logic*

by Arthur Schneider

The first part of this work, the historical and critical part, shows the great influence that psychologism has exercised in the current logical theory of judgment, deliberate as well as undeliberate, and continues to exercise today in spite of all the opposition it has encountered. Characteristic evidence of this ongoing influence is here found in the theories of Lipps, Meyer, and Wundt. A detailed analysis brings out the extant psychologistic infusion in these theories, and the explanatory value
of this infusion is examined by means of immanent and transcendent criticism. The result is negative. It is demonstrated that the essence of the logical judgment is in no way affected by such overtly psychologistic notions.

The second part of the work, the positive part, contains the outline of the author’s own theory that the judgment of logic is, first of all, meaning [Sinn]. The whole problem that the author treats is a difficult one. It is anything but a run-of-the-mill theme. It presupposes an extremely comprehensive familiarity with the new logic and more than a little acumen and, above all, a certain maturity of philosophical judgment. The author, who has already established himself in scientific periodicals with his logical commentaries, demonstrates these proficiencies to a high degree.

While I am not quite in agreement with every point of the exposition of the positive part, here also it is a matter of philosophically interesting and significant lines of thought. The work as a whole has to be characterized as an outstanding accomplishment.

I accordingly allow the author to submit his application to me for admittance to the oral examination by the faculty.

July 10, 1913
Schneider

2. Evaluation of Heidegger’s Habilitation Work (July 1915)

The Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus
by Heinrich Rickert

The study deals with a famous Scholastic about whom a comparatively large literature exists and who nevertheless seems in part to be virtually unknown. Although the “logic of language” of Duns Scotus, which forms the main subject of the study at hand, is indeed already treated by K. Werner, that attempt fails to place these thoughts in their larger logical contexts and thus to do true justice to their philosophical import. It should, therefore, be considered fortunate that Dr. Heidegger had the idea to make Duns Scotus’s “doctrine of meaning” the subject of a special treatise and that he lays a systematic foundation for our understanding of this doctrine by preceding it by an analysis of this thinker’s “doctrine of categories.” The concept of “meaning” is thus first relegated to its logical place in the universe of the thinkable such that the relation of a “speculative grammar” to the foundational problem of logic is made clear.

However, one has not yet thereby come to a historical treatment of the theme. Such an attempt also involves great difficulties and would perhaps even have exceeded the strengths of the author. One should go back here especially to the influence of Plotinus, which always gained primacy over Aristotelianism, and which
also Prantl, in his large work, has much too little appreciated. The historical introduction that Dr. Heidegger has attempted is mistaken and must be totally omitted. One should ignore altogether every aspect of this study which intends to present the historical development of the conceptions of the nature and task of grammar in the middle ages. Dr. Heidegger’s orientation toward modern formulations of the problem is purely systematic, and his work remains unassailable only insofar as it expressly abstains from historically situating Duns Scotus. The author has studied some writings of the great Scholastic without asking what this author takes over from others and what is proper to him. Yet he attempts to show in what measure Duns Scotus approximates the thoughts of the logicians of our time. This undertaking is through and through meritorious and leads to some truly interesting results. Particularly the expositions joining the unum and the verum—that is to say, two of the four medieval “transcendentals”—show unequivocally that Duns Scotus has seen problems which today are the center of logical interest, and they might surprise many. Dr. Heidegger thereby gains the ground upon which the problem of the relation of word and meaning, or language and logical “sense” [“Sinn”], can be broached and what the treatise De modis significandi sive Grammatica speculativa [On the Modes of Signifying, or Speculative Grammar] has to say to theoretical philosophy can be understood. Also in the particular expositions of this text, which I do not have to go into here, Dr. Heidegger finds relations to modern authors, particularly to the important “meta-grammatical subject-predicate-theory” of Lask, to whose work the author is particularly indebted for his philosophical orientation as well as for his terminology, perhaps more than he himself has become aware.

Because I have never worked, like most of my colleagues, independently in the field of medieval philosophy, I held it desirable to get to know the judgment of our colleague Krebs on the study. In essence it agrees with mine. Krebs finds that the study, although it refrains from any historiographic ordering, also enriches our historical knowledge of the great heights in fact reached by logical thought in the middle ages, which opens a new way of looking at the matters and a new way of appreciating the work of the medieval mind. The texts which have been used as the basis of this study are those of the Paris edition. This edition still leaves much to be desired, yet in the opinion of colleague Krebs the textual corruptions are so insignificant in the texts used in this study that the work as a whole can be completely based upon the Paris edition. Certain revisions that are demanded by the sense in some places that are clearly corrupted should be made recognizable by italics, and the readings of the Paris edition should be indicated in notes, so that the book, when it is published, will conform to scholarly criteria also in this regard.

All in all, the work is not yet a study of the history of medieval logic, but a valuable preliminary study of it. And it will still need several such preliminary studies before a historical presentation as such can be ventured which truly penetrates the
“spirit” of medieval logic. We as yet possess very little of this preliminary work, and the author can here deserve much of the credit. He stands at the beginning of his scholarly development, and yet he is already able to take up the extremely difficult reasonings of earlier centuries and also possesses enough modern philosophical education to see the connections between the past and present. Since he is also mathematically trained and has a decided aptitude for abstract thinking, one may, given the diligence and thoroughness with which he advances, hope for good things in his future scholarly work. Hence, I can only recommend his admittance to habilitation.

Freiburg im Breisgau, July 19, 1915
Rickert

3. Nomination of Heidegger for Associate Professor at Göttingen (November 1922)

[The following is an excerpt from the proposal of nominations for the position of associate professor of philosophy in the Philosophical Faculty at Göttingen transmitted to the Ministry of Science, Art, and National Education (Berlin) on November 2, 1922, under the signature of Georg Misch, then dean of the Philosophical Faculty, who drafted the proposal in part from statements sent to him by both Heidegger (chapter 12) and Husserl (letter of May 31, 1922, in appendix II). Nominated in first place was Moritz Geiger of Munich, a phenomenologist of mathematics and the natural sciences. Heidegger was ranked second, after Geiger.]

An even stronger personality [than Geiger], unusually strong, is a younger representative of philosophy, whom we nominate in second place: Martin Heidegger, born 1889, since 1915 instructor in Freiburg. He has also undergone a radical development. He came to philosophy from the opposite side [from Geiger, who came from the natural sciences], from theology, specifically from Catholic theology. Son of a cooper in the vicinity of Constance, he began his studies at the University of Freiburg in the Swabian homeland as an alumnus of the theological seminary. He liberated himself from the rigid constraints in which scientific endeavor was being kept there. When the modernist oath was made into a requirement, he decided to leave the seminary and give up his theological studies altogether. Thus rendered without means, but furthered by the university through his promotion summa cum laude, which took place in 1913 with a dissertation on “The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism,” he persisted in his studies until he was able to attain his academic profession, at the age of 25. He still did his habilitation with the Catholic representative of philosophy, but then he also did away with this tie by putting the insights of the school of the history of religion into practice in his own life. Prepared through the study of Lotze, he associated himself with Husserl upon the latter’s appoint-
ment to Freiburg—presently he has the position of assistant in Husserl's philosophical seminar—and thus moved in the direction of German idealism, toward which Husserl in the interim had moved.

This course of development in the ambience of the University of Freiburg, where Rickert, Reitzenstein, Eduard Schwartz and Finke had their effect on him, is reflected in the direction of his works. From his theological studies at home in Augustine as well as in Aristotle and Scholasticism, he concentrated on the study of medieval philosophy and thereby went to work at the central place where his own religious and philosophical position could be clarified by the return to history: in the nominalistic skepticism of the waning middle ages and from Occam back further to Duns Scotus. This was accomplished in his habilitation work, “On the Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus” [sic], which appeared in 1916. Here he proceeds by way of a systematic attitude toward history. The book in its method is elaborated according to the schema of a history of the problems of philosophy along the lines carried out by Rickert's teacher, Windelband. To the connection of modern logic with Scholasticism which has been established in the circle of Franz Brentano, to which Husserl also belongs, it contributes the following insight: what is sought in Duns Scotus can be found by reference to a general theory of objects. The book excels in its thoroughgoing familiarity with the sources, vital intimacy with the operative motives of the Scholastic way of posing problems and of the overview of a history of culture, but on the whole still does not manifest the unique power and independence of mind which would mark the initial literary emergence of a born philosopher.

And yet it is the impression that what we have here is an unusually strong philosophical talent which has motivated our proposal. It cannot be based upon already finalized literary achievements. In addition to the habilitation text, Heidegger has published only one essay, “The Concept of Time in the Science of History” (Journal of Philosophy, 1916). But Heidegger exercises such a strong influence as a teacher of philosophy that his fame precedes his literary achievements. It has been reported to us from various channels that his lecture courses and seminars in Freiburg, where a vigorous philosophical life now prevails, play a commanding role and make adherents of the youth despite the high intellectual demands that they impose. His program of lecture courses displays an unusually pronounced modern direction which proceeds philosophically in conjunction with systematic and historical research: a phenomenology of religion developed in connection with Paul’s basic concepts; Plotinus and Augustine as representatives of the influence of Greek logic upon theological concept formation, followed by the logic and ontology of Aristotle himself as well as general introductions to Husserl’s phenomenology, along with seminars dealing with Lotze’s Logic as well as with the psychological writings of Natorp, Bergson, Dilthey.

In this case it was necessary to make a judgment of the works which underlie
his lecture courses, which was possible because he has transmitted copies of some as yet unpublished treatises to several specialist colleagues. These include a treatise written for the *Göttingen Scholarly Notices* [Göttinger gelehrte Anzeigen] on Jaspers’s *Psychology of Worldviews* and “Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle,” both of which will soon appear in print. The impression made by these treatises is not so clear that we could nominate Heidegger after Geiger without some distance separating them. The “Aristotle” treatise again demonstrates his thorough familiarity with the magister adopted by the Catholic Church, as well as the consciously employed procedure of drawing the means to interpret the Greek thinker from the context of problems developed by modern philosophical research. The interpretation is ingenious and profound in its penetration, but also quite profuse and not as simple as one might want for an unbiased securing of the Aristotelian heritage. But his real intention here, as well as in the other treatise, is to secure his own philosophical position. The treatises thus confirm the impression drawn from his program of lecture courses: he begins with the conjunction of history and systematics at that now much frequented point in “life philosophy” where the hermeneutic procedure logically developed by Husserl and Dilthey’s philosophical exploitation of intellectual and cultural history [Geistesgeschichte] meet and supplement each other. He enhances this complementarity with his own thoroughly original consciousness of the meaning of the historicality of human life, which has its origin in his own development. His unique strength appears to be the capacity to recognize, and to formulate with logical precision, the systematic sense of the philosophy of life in its orientation to the human sciences and to worldviews. The currently much-disputed right of historical philosophizing finds in him a champion of the counter-position, which up to now had pitted logic against life. His formulations, however, are burdened with the full conceptual apparatus of the phenomenological school. They thus still have a tortured quality about them, so that his philosophical bearing also assumes an imposing quality which is not always fruitful, appearing to be overbearing rather than liberating. It is to be feared that such a bearing, even though it is free from all catchphrase, would not find the same full resonance on Göttingen ground as it does in the Freiburg air. Likewise, the addition that he would bring to our faculty would not be as productive in its subject matter as that of Geiger. Nevertheless, this Swabian is undoubtedly a significant phenomenon with his own vision, a researcher with a rich specialist’s knowledge in theology, ancient philology, and the medieval history of ideas, an outstanding teacher who draws the young away from abstract reflection and discussion and into concrete research of the issues, someone who adheres to the high level of pure science with unusual intensity.
4. Nomination of Heidegger for Associate Professor at Marburg (December 1922)

From: Philosophical Faculty of the Philipps University

Marburg, 12 December 1922

To: The Minister of Science, Art, and National Education

Berlin

(through our University Curator)

With these nominations for a replacement to fill our regular associate professorship (at once a Personal Professorship)* for philosophy, the Philosophical Faculty ratifies the viewpoint that also was governing for it in previous nominations for the same position, namely, that this chair is in the first instance intended for the history of philosophy. Since the two present professors of the Department of Philosophy are predominantly systematic philosophers, this of itself becomes the guiding consideration in the choice among the candidates involved.

In first place we nominate Martin Heidegger, instructor in Freiburg i. Br. (born 1889, habilitation 1916 [sic]), who already in 1920 was placed on our list of nominations. Having come from Husserl’s circle of students, he treads the paths of phenomenology but has within this area struck his own paths and pursued his completely independent course. Among the phenomenologists he is the first to have attempted to make this new method serve the purposes of historical research, an attempt which has aroused the lively interest of his philosophical peers. His book on Duns Scotus, published in 1916, already manifested certain tendencies in this direction, though its full scope could only be surmised from afar. The novelties of his goals dictated a slow maturation, which also accounts for the fact that Heidegger has published nothing for years. That he has not stood still in this time is borne out by his prolific teaching activity, whose fruitfulness has been felt by students and colleagues far beyond the realm of the academic life of Freiburg. In recent years his intensive work as a researcher has turned more and more toward ancient philosophy, and there is now a larger work on Aristotle extant in manuscript which will soon appear in the Phenomenology Yearbook. The short excerpt

* The list continues by nominating Heinz Heimsoeth (b. 1886) of Marburg in second place and Richard Kroner (b. 1884) of Freiburg in third. The petition was signed by Rudolf Wedekind (Geology and Paleontology), dean of the Philosophical Faculty at the time. On June 18, 1923, Heidegger writes to the dean at Marburg accepting the position of an “associate professorship in philosophy with the rights and status [but not the pay!] of a full professor.” The latter is a reference to the status of a “personal professor” (öffentlicher Ordinarius) or tenured professor with full pay.—T.K.
from several chapters of this work that could be made available to us already bears witness to the high quality of the work. It is already a great service to activate Aristotle research once again, since it is an area which has been neglected in our time and so has fallen behind other historical research. But how this occurs here is absolutely surprising. The perspective of the whole, of which the present work is only a beginning, is of grand design. It shows how virtually all historical understanding of later philosophy is conditioned by an understanding of Aristotle, far beyond the middle ages up to Luther and the thinkers of modernity. In contrast to this breadth of overview, the method of the investigation proceeds from the closest possible proximity to the given on to its interpretation up to a probing of the etymological problems of the interpretive terminology, and indeed with a philosophical sensitivity which from step to step reveals new and hitherto unseen connections. Along with the originality of the results, another fact also seems to us to be especially telling for the value of his procedure, namely, that even for the seasoned specialist sidelights fall upon the whole which all of a sudden illuminate it and demonstrate that the method goes to the very center of the work, and in fact precisely on the decisive points that the research of the nineteenth century had overlooked in the essence of the matter. Although we have only an excerpt, the method nevertheless allows us to acknowledge that we have in Heidegger a research personality of unusual power. In addition [to his historical gifts], he would also be quite an asset for the Marburg position as a representative of the phenomenological movement.

5. Nomination of Heidegger for Professor at Marburg
(August 1925)

From: Philosophical Faculty of the Philipps University
To: The Minister of Science, Art, and National Education
Berlin

Re: Nominations for the Replacement of the Professorship of Philosophy

For the replacement of the tenured professorship of philosophy which has been vacated with the departure of Professor Hartmann to Cologne, the Faculty nominates the following persons:

1. In first place we nominate Martin Heidegger, who has been here since 1923 in the rank of associate professor of philosophy, as a personal professor. In this position Heidegger has proven himself as a researcher and teacher of the first rank. Two years ago, when we nominated him in first place for the associate professor-
ship, we made our judgment on the basis of several chapters of his work on Aristotle submitted to us by way of E. Husserl. For even then, it was impossible for us to evaluate the mature philosopher on the basis of the early works of the beginner, even though they already contained much that was worthwhile. Already in these chapters, it was easy to discern a new kind of method applied on a grand scale, which by the sheer power of the perspective that it opened could be expected to go well beyond its extant content. This expectation has since been confirmed to the fullest. To be sure, this major work has not yet appeared in publication, but it has long been complete in repeatedly reworked form, and will soon appear. And far more convincingly than before, one gets the impression from the whole of the work of a mighty accomplishment. Philological precision and probing acuity of interpretation, historical and systematic overview here unite in a force of argumentation and an illumination of entire epochs, the likes of which has not been seen in the historical research of philosophy for quite some time.

In addition, there is now a systematic work of recent origin—now being printed—on “Time and Being” [sic], which shows us yet another side of Heidegger, as an independent and constructive philosophical thinker. This work is nothing less than a new elaboration of the ultimate ontological questions. It thus presents a synthesis of the phenomenological way of doing research—here for the first time freed from all subjectivism—with an assessment of the great traditional heritage of ancient, medieval, and modern metaphysics. While the phenomenological procedure in its earlier proponents still had the character of an inconspicuous, albeit ground-laying, preliminary labor and therefore has, more often than not, promoted the impression of being one-sided, in Heidegger its central direction toward the basic philosophical problems is clearly manifest. The consciously posed task of breaking through the binds of deadlocked standpoints which tie up contemporary research and of disclosing new horizons of research by exploiting the Occidental tradition gives this slowly ripened work an importance which is virtually matchless and without parallel on the broader contemporary scene.

Both works together show Heidegger to us in a light which allows us to acknowledge him as the person cut out for our chair, the only man for the chair which through Paul Natorp’s decade-long productivity and efficacy has acquired its distinctive form. Just as Natorp has brought historical and systematic research work into close and fruitful union, Heidegger is doing this today in a radically altered overall situation of science and scholarship. In every age, such a comprehensive synthesis is possible only on the basis of proper, autonomous, and very solid work from the ground up. We are convinced that we have that man in Heidegger, who like no one else among the younger researchers possesses the qualities of inner character and of science to cope with such a task. Accordingly, in the desire to keep him at our university by granting him the tenured professorship, we would in this instance hold it for justified not to name any further names after him.
But in order to comply with the convention of proposing three candidates for consideration, we nominate, at a substantial remove from our first nominee, the following two candidates in second place in alphabetical listing:

[Heinz Heimsoeth of Königsberg and Alexander Pfänder of Munich are named and evaluated accordingly. The nominating petition was signed by Oskar Weigel (Mineralogy and Petrography), the dean of the Philosophical Faculty that year. Heidegger would not get the appointment until October 1927, after the above nomination was first rejected by the Berlin ministry due to lack of publications, and Heidegger in response would draft and publish Being and Time.—T.K.]

6. Nomination of Heidegger for Husserl’s Chair at Freiburg (February 1928)

From: The Philosophical Faculty of the University of Freiburg i. Br. Freiburg, February 8, 1928
A 605

To: The Ministry of Culture and Instruction Karlsruhe

Re: The Replacement for the Chair in Philosophy

With reference to the directive of the Ministry of January 11 (A 439), the faculty in a unanimous decision nominates Martin Heidegger in Marburg unico loco [in sole place] for the replacement of Husserl’s chair.

With this nomination the faculty is first and foremost being guided by the thought that the privileged position which Freiburg has assumed in the last decades as a major location for philosophical studies must be maintained and continued. From this standpoint the faculty found, among the philosophers taken into consideration according to seniority and merit, only one philosopher who through his extraordinary efficacy as a teacher and researcher could guarantee such a continuity. He is Martin Heidegger, who himself grew up in Freiburg and is currently tenured professor in Marburg.

Characteristic of Heidegger’s scientific and scholarly style (his personnel file is summarized at the end) is the far-reaching fundamental grounding of his systematic research by historical investigations, in particular in ancient and medieval philosophy. His first major book, The Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus, already made him a name through the surprising discovery of parallels between Scholastic philosophy and the most modern philosophy in regard to the history of their problems. But it was the work that appeared just last year, Being and Time (First Part), that placed him in the forefront of contemporary philosophers. He thus effectively joins in the two movements stemming respectively from W.
BECOMING HEIDEGGER

Dilthey and from phenomenology,* both of which seek to provide a new orientation for all of philosophy by way of a philosophy of spirit. The astounding originality with which Heidegger attempts to develop and at once to enrich the basic ideas of these two movements in their radical consequences has for years, even before the appearance of this work, manifestly had its effects solely through Heidegger’s impressive lecture courses and seminars at Marburg. This researcher is undoubtedly also one of the most significant philosophical teachers of our time.

These are the reasons why the faculty has put forward the candidacy of M. Heidegger unico loco. It would simply like to add that Heidegger as a person is still well remembered here from his efficacious years in Freiburg. It is well known that he is quite attached to his Alemannic homeland and would therefore be inclined to accept the call to return to his home university.

Martin Heidegger was born on September 26, 1889 in Messkirch (Baden). In 1909–1913 at the University of Freiburg he first studied theology and then the natural sciences, mathematics, philosophy, and history. In 1913 he graduated there with a work on The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism and in 1915 habilitated in philosophy with the above named book on The Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus. In 1923 he was called to Marburg as personal professor in philosophy, where he was named tenured professor in 1927.

The Dean:
M[artin] Honecker [Catholic philosophy]

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* That Husserl is not also named here as the prime mover of phenomenology is due to the fact that Husserl himself, acting as a non-voting advisor to the nominating committee, composed this main section (the laudation of Heidegger) of the nominating petition. Husserl’s draft of January 1928, which underwent only a few stylistic changes in this final form, can be found in appendix II.

Heidegger received the official “call” to the chair toward the end of February, and the provincial ministry at Karlsruhe officially appointed Heidegger tenured Professor of Philosophy at the University of Freiburg on April 23, 1928.—T.K.
Appendix II
Husserl and Heidegger

1. Correspondence to and about Each Other, 1914–1934

Husserl was 57 years old and world-famous when he arrived at the University of Freiburg in April of 1916. Martin Heidegger was 25 years old and had just received, barely nine months before, his certification (Habilitation) to lecture in philosophy. After a slow start, the personal and professional relationship between the old master and the young scholar warmed considerably and blossomed during the last year of the war, mostly by letter while Heidegger was away from Freiburg, serving in the military. What might have seemed like an unlikely union between the founder of the most recent trend in German philosophy and the fairly conservative student of Aristotelian Scholasticism and neo-Kantianism in fact evolved into one the great philosophical collaborations of the century, only to unravel a dozen years later and finally end in bitter estrangement and recriminations. The letters that follow offer a view, however imperfect, of the birth, growth, maturation, and decline of that famous philosophical friendship gone awry.

Heidegger’s interest in phenomenology pre-dated his personal acquaintance with Husserl. This fascination from afar simply in Husserl’s books, or in Husserl as a book, is represented in this compilation by the first letter, dated 1914, and by

The source for most of the letters in this compilation is Edmund Husserl, Briefwechsel, ed. Karl Schuhmann with Elisabeth Schuhmann, Husserliana Dokumente II, 10 vols. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994); hereinafter Briefwechsel, plus the volume number and the pages. Especially cited are volumes 4: Die Freiburger Schüler (The Freiburg Students), 5: Die Neukantianer (The Neo-Kantians), 3: Die Göttinger Schule (The Göttingen School), 9: Familienbriefe (Family Letters), and 2: Die Münchener Phänomenologen (The Munich Phenomenologists). These letters and excerpts from letters have been compiled and translated especially for this volume by Thomas Sheehan. The editors wish to thank Kluwer Publishers for permission to publish these translations in this volume. Other sources and translators are indicated in the relevant footnotes. For a brief but precise presentation of the relation of the two philosophers, see Theodore Kisiel, “Husserl and Heidegger” in Lester Embree et al. (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997), 333–39. The introduction is by Thomas Sheehan.

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Heidegger's articles of 1912 (chapters 3 and 4). From early on, the young student remained focused on the issues of intentionality, truth, and categorial intuition in *Logical Investigations* (1900–1901), material which he saw as important, but finally ancillary, to reawakening and reworking the age-old question about the meaning of being. Heidegger's early studies in Catholic theology and his discrete embrace of Lutheranism during the war led Husserl to consider him a "phenomenologist of religion," and it was as such that Husserl appointed Heidegger his teaching assistant in Freiburg after the war (1919–1923). Those four years, the "first Freiburg period," were mutually enriching for both the master and his new disciple. In his courses and pro-seminars Heidegger drew heavily on Husserlian categories (even as he radically recast them) for his own very original interpretations of St. Paul, Augustine, and Aristotle, whereas Husserl opened up a bit more (though never with great enthusiasm or breadth) to hermeneutics and the history of philosophy. However, by the last year (1922–1923) of this first Freiburg phase Heidegger was very vocally taking critical distance from Husserl (see the letters of February 20, May 8, and July 14, 1922).

The five years that Heidegger spent as associate professor in Marburg (1923–1928) gave him the independence and the distance he needed to work out his own philosophical position and its difference from Husserl's "constitutive phenomenology." Heidegger's increasing criticisms of Husserl for his focus on consciousness and his relentless quest for absolute certitude and mathematical scientficity found its clearest expression in Heidegger's 1925 course "History of the Concept of Time" (*GA* 25). Word leaked out to Husserl back in Freiburg, and Heidegger frequently, if not always convincingly, had to assure the master that they both were really about the same project. The publication of *Being and Time* in 1927 revealed the immense divide between Heidegger and Husserl, and their failed effort later that year to collaborate on the article "Phenomenology" for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* only served to convince Husserl that Heidegger was lost to the cause. Nonetheless, partially in an effort to bring Heidegger closer and perhaps back into the fold, Husserl worked hard and successfully to get his protégé appointed as his successor.

From Heidegger's triumphal return to Freiburg in the fall of 1928 until Husserl's death ten years later, things went from bad to worse between the two philosophers. Heidegger avoided contact with the aged Husserl, and his speech in honor of Husserl's seventieth birthday (April 8, 1929; included in this appendix) did nothing to convince the master that the torch had been successfully passed on. Husserl's intense re-reading of *Being and Time* and *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* during that summer only confirmed the obvious. The professional relation was over—Husserl began saying that publicly from 1930 onwards—and soon enough, with increasing evidence of Heidegger's anti-Semitism, the personal relationship finally snapped. Heidegger's very theatrical entrance into the Nazi Party
on May 1, 1933, was, as Husserl bitterly ironized, “the perfect conclusion to this supposed bosom-friendship of two philosophers” (letter of May 4, 1933).

The Young Student and the Old Teacher, July 1914 to September 1918

July 14, 1914: Martin Heidegger to Engelbert Krebs

[Hugo Ott, “Der Habilitand,” 148]¹

In the summer of 1914 Heidegger was deciding on the topic of his qualifying dissertation (Habilitationschrift): either a logical treatise on the problem of the question or a dissertation in medieval philosophy, as Heinrich Finke and Engelbert Krebs (both of Seminar II, the Catholic program in philosophy) were urging him to do. He eventually chose a topic in medieval philosophy, but read through the eyes of Husserl, and in this letter Heidegger remarks on the difficulties he is having with Husserl’s texts. (Nonetheless, Heidegger did not abandon the other topic. In his July 2, 1915 letter to the Philosophy Faculty petitioning for a qualifying examination, Heidegger would mention “The Logical Problem of the Question” as a possible theme of his trial lecture [Probevortrag] for the doctorate.)

Meanwhile, on June 29, 1914, Pope Pius X issued a Motu proprio (a circular letter written “on his own initiative”) on theological matters, entitled “Doctoris angelici.” It mandated that by mid-1917 all Catholic theology schools that conferred church degrees in Italy “and the adjacent islands” (Sicily and Sardegna) would have to use Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae in their dogma courses or lose the right to confer such degrees. Heidegger’s July 14 letter to Krebs addresses those issues ironically.

Honored and esteemed doctor,

Cordial thanks for your card. I have pulled back because I get interrupted too much in the [philosophy] department. Last week I got caught once again in my work. Wednesday [July 23] I will see Rickert to get his opinion. I have to sacrifice my vacation time because Husserl’s phenomenology is causing me a lot of trouble in the final passages, and I do not want to bring down on my head the accusation of misunderstanding him, the way Messer and Cohn recently did.² I hope to be able to send off my essay “On the Question” [“Über die Frage”³] at the end of the

². In Ideas I (§ 79), 158 n. 2, Husserl criticized two articles, by August Messer and Jonas Cohn, that appeared in the first volume of Jahrbücher der Philosophie.
³. Eventually titled Frage und Urteil ["Question and Judgment"]. See chap. 6 above.
month. In my leisure time I pull out your lecture notes, but of course I have to fa-
miliarize myself with your current course lest the two run along on separate tracks
without any connection at all. Do we too belong to the “neighboring islands”? We
still do not have the motu proprio on philosophy. Perhaps as an “academic” you
could apply for better treatment: all who succumb to having independent
thoughts could have their brains taken out and replaced with Italian salad.

Philosophical demand could be met by setting up vending machines in the
train station (free of charge to the poor). I have a dispensation that covers the peri-
od of my studies. But would you be so kind as to put my name on the list too? 4

Before long now you will develop into a homo phaenom opius [“one who sees
phenomena”] and will demonstrate the metaphysics of movement ad oculos [“be-
fore one’s very eyes”]. Maybe before long there will be an occasion to take a walk
and discuss your logic course a bit. With thanks and best regards,

Cordially yours,
M. Heidegger

May 27, 1916: Edmund Husserl to Martin Heidegger
[Briefwechsel 4, 127]

Husserl transferred to the University of Freiburg in April 1916, and the first
record of communication between the two philosophers is a postcard that Husserl sent
Heidegger in the spring of 1916. It refers to Heidegger’s qualifying dissertation, The
Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus, which had been accepted in
the summer of 1915 and was published early in 1916.

Dear colleague,

I would very much like to avail myself of your kind offer to let me see your
qualifying dissertation. Would you be good enough to send it on to me?

Yours truly,
E Husserl
27.V.16

July 21, 1916: Edmund Husserl to Martin Heidegger
[Briefwechsel 4, 127]

Heidegger did give Husserl a published copy of his qualifying dissertation, in-
scribed “For Professor E. Husserl, with most grateful respect.” Husserl apparently pe-
rused it and passed on a few comments. Two months later, however, when Heidegger

4. It is not clear what list Heidegger is referring to. Perhaps Krebs was gathering the
names of scholars who disapproved of the motu proprio.
queried Husserl about the work, Husserl did not seem to be clear on its contents, or to have much to say about it. He wrote to Heidegger:

Esteemed colleague,

Perhaps you would have time to visit me on Sunday morning [July 23] (sometime before visiting hours, 10:00). I really have not had any possibility to go through your work [on Duns Scotus] again, and my ideas have perhaps faded a bit; I doubt I would have anything further to say that might be useful. I have had too many different things to do. Still, I would be pleased if you could come.

With cordial regards,
Yours,
E Husserl

September 28, 1916: Edmund Husserl to Martin Heidegger

[Briefwechsel 4, 127]

A few months later Heidegger presented Husserl with an inscribed copy of his lecture “The Concept of Time in the Science of History,” which he had delivered a year before (July 27, 1915) as the trial lecture for his habilitation and which had just been published.7 Husserl responded:

Esteemed Doctor,

Thank you very much for kindly sending me your qualifying lecture. Your gift has pleased me very much.

With best wishes,
Yours,
E Husserl
28.9.16

December 10, 1916: Edmund Husserl to Martin Heidegger

[Briefwechsel 4, 128]

Husserl helped Heidegger get his qualifying dissertation published in 1916 by intervening with the Academic Association in Freiburg in order to get Heidegger a publication grant. (See Husserl’s letter of October 8, 1917, below.) Husserl also arranged for Privatdocent Heidegger to teach a course in Seminar II (the Catholic program) of the Philosophy Department, “Basic Questions of Logic,” winter semester of 1916. In the following letter, Husserl expresses his willingness to help Heidegger in his studies.

Esteemed Doctor,

I too am sorry to have missed you when you dropped by—I had gone out for a short while on my usual walk along the Loretto.\(^6\) Perhaps, despite the demands of your military service,\(^7\) you might find the opportunity to repeat your visit and perhaps let me know the time beforehand. (After the lecture course is over I want to leave for Hinterzarten, to relax for a while.)\(^8\) If I am able to assist you in your studies, and if you want me to, I will not let you down in this regard.

With collegial regards,
Yours
E Husserl
10.XII.16

**September 24, 1917: Edmund Husserl to Martin Heidegger**

*Briefwechsel 4, 128*

> As the autumn semester of 1917 is about to begin, Husserl, who is still away on vacation, again offers to help Heidegger with his studies.

Bernau 24.9.17

Esteemed colleague,

I shall return to Freiburg from my stay in Bernau on the 30th [of September] or on October 1. I am sorry that I am unable to be of help to you before that. We can agree on the details when I return, but I will gladly help you with your studies as well as I am able. On October 4 I begin my lecture course on logic,\(^9\) in an attempt to bring my work on the problem of time to some kind of conclusion.

With cordial regards to you and your wife,
Yours truly,
E Husserl

**October 8, 1917: Edmund Husserl to Paul Natorp**

*Briefwechsel 5, 131–32*

> On October 7, 1917, Paul Natorp of the University of Marburg wrote Husserl to request his opinion on the possibility of listing Heidegger in first place for a teaching po-

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6. Husserl lived at 40 Lorettostrasse, along the Loretto River.
7. Heidegger’s military service at this time was as Postal Censor in Freiburg.
8. Hinterzarten, which lies some 35 miles east of Freiburg near the lake resort of Titisee, is the small town where Husserl vacationed in his first years at Freiburg.
position in the history of medieval philosophy at the University of Marburg. Natörp said
he found Heidegger’s publications quite respectable and fraught with promise, “and
they impress me very much by the scope and freedom with which he grasps problems.”
But given Heidegger’s relative youth, Natörp inquired “whether there is adequate ev-
dence of his abilities as a teacher and whether one can be sure there is no narrowness
in his religious commitment.” The paragraph breaks in the letter below have been
added by the translator.

Freiburg i/B. Lorettostr. 40
8.X.17

Dear colleague,

I hasten to respond to your welcome inquiry. Because Dr. Heidegger is very
busy with his army duties, I have not had sufficient opportunity up to this point to
get to know him very well and to form a judgment I could trust about his person-
ality and character. In any case I have nothing bad to say of him.

That he is confessionally tied [to Catholicism] is quite certain, since he stands,
as it were, under the protection, of colleague Finke, our “Catholic historian.”10 Ac-
cordingly last year [June 23, 1916] during committee discussions about filling the
professorship in Catholic philosophy here in our philosophy department—a chair
that we too would like to make a [strictly] professional position in the history of
medieval philosophy—[Heidegger] was placed in consideration, at which point
Finke discussed him as an appropriate candidate in a religious-denominational
sense. (And yet, a few months ago Heidegger married a Protestant woman who as
far as I know has not yet converted.)11

In the final analysis we found him to be too young and not yet mature enough
for the position here, or even for a supplementary assistant professorship. His in-
tellectual versatility and considerable talent are amply evident in his first book, the
one on Duns Scotus. On my recommendation the Academic Association here gave
him funding for the printing costs. It is certainly a very promising beginning for a
historian of medieval philosophy.

Dr. Heidegger has not yet had the opportunity to work full-time as a teacher be-
because, as I alluded above, two years ago he was drafted into the postal service. As re-
gards his teaching I have heard some very favorable judgments and also some critical
ones—which in any case is connected with the fact that, in order to make headway
in the systematic area, he does not give historical lecture courses but systematic ones,
and he strives to achieve a secure position on fundamental questions and methods.

10. Heinrich Finke (1855–1938), a Catholic layman, held the chair in history with-
in the Catholic section of the Philosophical Faculty at the University of Freiburg.
11. Martin Heidegger married Elfride Petri, a Lutheran, in a Catholic ceremony in
Freiburg Cathedral on March 21, 1917, and later in a Protestant ceremony in Mannheim,
in the presence of the Petri family.
BECOMING HEIDEGGER

He began as Rickert’s student but is no longer comfortable with Rickert’s philosophy and now seeks to come to grips with phenomenological philosophy from the inside. It seems he is doing this seriously and thoroughly.

That is all I can say at this time.

With most cordial greetings and highest esteem,
Yours,
E Husserl

January 30, 1918: Edmund Husserl to Martin Heidegger

[Briefwechsel 4, 129]

In the first weeks of 1918 Heidegger was called up for service with the 4th Company of the 113th Ersatz Bataillon and, apart from occasional leaves, was away from Freiburg from January 17 through late November. Of the four extant letters that Husserl wrote to him during that period, the first three are addressed to Heidegger at the army camp where he was training at Heuberg in eastern Baden. Although brief, those three letters (January 30, March 28, and May 11, 1918) are cordial and full of promise of future collaboration. The extraordinary fourth letter (September 19, 1918), written while Heidegger was at the Western front, will mark the beginning of the personal bonding between the two.

Apparently Heidegger wrote in late January to say he would visit Freiburg while on leave in early February. However, from February 1 to April 27, 1918, Husserl was to be on vacation in Bernau, near St. Blasien, some 15 miles southeast of Freiburg. Shortly before departing, Husserl wrote to Heidegger.

[Freiburg]
30.1.1918

Dear colleague,

I am sincerely sorry that your postcard arrived too late. On Friday morning [February 1] we leave for Bernau (Rössle) for at least two months, and you can imagine what that has meant, and still means, in terms of packing. I am taking along an enormous quantity of manuscripts and books, and I hope to be able to do a lot of work in the mountains. I am fervently hoping for a period of quiet contemplation to work out conclusively all the initiatives whose maturation has been interrupted time and again here in Freiburg. I regret very much that we can no longer get together and enjoy our συμφιλοσοφέîν [co-philosophizing]. I2 I wish you again everything good and the very best for your military service.

With regards to you and your wife,
Yours,
E Husserl

[P.S.] Cordial regards to Dr. and Mrs. Rees.¹³

March 28, 1918: Edmund Husserl to Martin Heidegger
[Briefwechsel 4, 129–30]

Two months later Husserl answered another letter that Heidegger had written from Heuberg.

Bernau (Baden) (until around April 25)
28.3.1918
Dear colleague,

I was immensely pleased to receive your greetings from the training camp. So now I do not have to worry about how your health is holding up under the strains of military service. The lively mood that speaks through the lines of your cordial letter is the best testimony that you are healthy and happy. The fact that you now have to put philosophy entirely aside for a while is very good. Hopefully, after the glorious victories in the West¹⁴ the war will not drag on too much longer, and afterwards you can return with even greater vigor to the difficult problems you raise, and I will gladly do my part to bring you in medias res and to familiarize you with those res in συμφιλοσοφεῖν. I firmly hope that this period in the army will redound to your benefit. It would be a pleasure for me if from time to time you again shared your news. Up here in this quiet mountain valley a great work is coming to fruition for me: Time and Individuation, a revival of rational metaphysics based on principles.¹⁵

With cordial regards from my wife and me,
Yours,
E Husserl

¹³. Dr. Theophil Rees (born in 1889), a doctor of internal medicine practicing in Constance, and his wife Martha (deceased in 1919). See below, Husserl’s letter of September 10, 1918.

¹⁴. This refers to General Erich Ludendorff’s (ultimately unsuccessful) offensive against the Allied forces in northeastern France near Amiens, which began on March 21, 1918.

¹⁵. This work later came to be known as the “Bernauer Manuscripts on Time.”
May 11, 1918: Edmund Husserl to Martin Heidegger

[Briefwechsel 4, 131]

Heidegger wrote Husserl again in April, and Husserl responded some weeks later, after returning from vacation in Bernau.

Freiburg, 11.V.1918

Dear colleague,

Your splendid letter was a real joy for me. The reason why I did not answer it from Bernau was that I had to make use of each and every hour, immersed as I was in some very productive work. Productivity is a wealth of energy that is hard to come by: how long it takes, and what enormous efforts of preparatory work, to get the corporea moles [the bodily mass] moving and the mental fires burning. No sooner did I get back to Freiburg than I had more to do than I expected. I found that my “Introduction to Philosophy” was not clear enough as regards developing, through the history of ideas, the ideal of strict science beginning from Plato’s methodological conceptions, and so I have to work out a new lecture course.16 (It is also a question of the original motivating force of the critique of reason as regards Gorgias’s second argument17 and then as regards Descartes’s field of pure cogitatio—in contrast to the development among the ancients, which runs along logical-epistemological and ontological lines, which nonetheless bore lasting fruit for modern times in the exact sciences.) In the meantime your cordial and delightful postcard arrived. If I had only known that you were still here when I got back on April 26, I would have invited you over right away!18 During coming Pentecost week I was thinking of going back up to Bernau with the children (if they are on vacation). The muggy spring weeks in these lower altitudes weigh me down and stifle me, and perhaps I might relax a bit after this overlong period of work. I am glad that, just as I hoped, you are managing to get through basic training so well. You are like a house plant that had grown languid in the stale air of a closed room but now thrives when placed outside in the open air and in the light of the open sky. It is good that you are also able to read a little, and you have made a fine choice. For you this is not the time for abstract speculations. Go a bit easier on yourself and keep in

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16. Upon his arrival at Freiburg in the spring of 1916, Husserl had given a summer semester course, “Einleitung in die Philosophie,” on the possibility of philosophy as an exact systematic science. He partially reworked the course, under the same title, for the summer semester, May to July, 1918.

17. “Even if something is, it could not be known.”

good spirits. Let your health and strength increase. Whatever grows freely from within and extends towards the heights will reach its telos of itself.

With cordial regards,
Yours,
E Husserl

September 10, 1918: Edmund Husserl to Martin Heidegger

[Briefwechsel 4, 131–36]

During the summer of 1918, Heidegger received military training as a meteorologist at Charlottenburg near Berlin. On July 21, 1919 he wrote Husserl a letter from Charlottenberg, some of the contents of which may be deduced from the body and the postscripta of Husserl’s letter below. Husserl did not answer the July 21 letter. Heidegger followed up that letter with yet another, this time written from the Western front where he had been transferred towards the end of August, 1918. Husserl answered both letters together on September 10.

Bernau, 10.9.1918

Dear colleague,

Today I am taking a bit of a holiday. This is the sixth week that I have been here, and what with working nine to ten hours a day, with only one full day off so far, the threat of going dense and numb in the head has finally set in. What better way to enter into the energy of a revitalizing and refreshing life than to write to you! O how your youth is a joy to me, how truly heartening it is that you allow me to share in it through your letters. And yours is a true and authentic youth that can still well up and throw itself at the world, full of feeling, with clear vision, and absorb a true image of that world deep into your soul. What is more, your soul is able to express itself honestly and find its own words to utter the ideas it has crafted. In that, you are “learned” as only someone primus in prima [first among the first-class], and yet with all that you still have eyes and heart and words.—Blast it! This may strike you as underserved praise and no doubt will make you blush. But no, that is the way it is and the way I see you, and it will not endanger your soul’s salvation. It is impossible to imagine you being foolish enough to betray that for some silly gains or to fritter it away—the treasure of such a pure and unspoiled youth, your soul’s clear vision, that pure heart, that clear sense of purpose with its solid diathesis [disposition] for pure and noble goals—to lose all that in some urge to become a pompous, self-important “famous philosopher”—no, it is unthinkable. In fact, there is not a chance of that so long as you can still write letters full of such freedom and serenity of spirit.

Forgive me that I am only now answering your letter from Charlottenburg
(dated July 21!), which made me very happy, together with your recent letter from
the front. During the muggy, stormy months of June and July in Freiburg I felt
quite uncomfortable and down, and I was constantly fighting this passivity, which
took the form of physical lethargy. You understand what such mischief means to a
man like me who is so given to intellectual activity, especially in a period of fruit-
ful progress in my research, and how much I was looking for a few good hours to
make use of. By the way, since I had to take some distance from organizing my own
quite difficult and elaborate thoughts, I read with great interest [Rudolf] Otto’s
book on the holy,19 which in fact is an attempt at a phenomenology of one’s con-
sciousness of God: bold and full of promise at the beginning but disappointing
soon thereafter. It is a pity that you do not have time to write a (thoroughgoing)
critique. Nonetheless, the book stands head and shoulders over the historicizing
and theologizing crowd, even though it has plenty enough of both, especially the
latter.

But from the first day here in Bernau I was suddenly “someone else,” my other
and better self—the “winged soul,” to cite the Phaedrus [246d]. What saved my
soul was Spranger’s article “On the Theory of Understanding and On Humanistic
Psychology” (in the festschrift for Volkelt).20 It deals with questions that much of
my Ideas II is concerned with and that I have wrestled with longer and more
painfully than anyone alive. The influence of my phenomenological writings was
evident right at the start; moreover, the article was accompanied by a very sympa-
thetic and heartfelt letter, such that (even though I usually am never inclined to-
wards reading, because I am always caught in struggling with my own thoughts) I
actually did read it, and with increasing interest. This contact with a profound line
of thought with which I am very familiar awakened me, so that I was gripped by the
issue. Now I am spending whole weeks on the problems of Ideas II (I do not have
the relevant manuscripts with me because I wanted to return to and complete the
introduction to phenomenology and the elaborations and manuscripts pertaining
to it21), especially on how psychology relates, in all its levels and limitations, to
“phenomenology.” Finally I also took up Natorp’s General Psychology (1912, late

Verbältnis zum Rationalen (Breslau: Trewendt und Granier, 2nd ed., 1918)—the edition
Husserl that read; English translation: The Idea of the Holy: On the Irrational in the Idea of

Psychologie,” in Paul Barth and Bruno Bauch (eds.), Festschrift Johannes Volkelt zum 70.
Geburtstag dargebracht (Munich: Beck, 1918), 357–403.

21. Husserl is referring to the manuscripts “Phenomenology and Psychology” and
“Phenomenology and Epistemology.” See Edmund Husserl, Aufsätze und Vorträge, 1911–
1921, ed. Thomas Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp, Husserliana XXV (The Hague: Nij-
October), which was published just when I had finished *Ideas I* and was still feverishly writing *Ideas II*, even before *Ideas I* was printed. Until now (other than the first chapter, which I read on a trip in 1913) I had not read through—much less studied—this book that in many ways is directed against phenomenology (in my sense). I have been well acquainted with Natorp’s *Introduction to Psychology* (1888), which first developed the idea of “reconstructive” psychology. I discussed it thoroughly in a seminar around 1905 and got a very strong impression of it, as I do from everything that is genuinely “profound.” I could not do anything with it, I was unable to break through to an understanding; here and there were immense and vague intimations that I could sort of surmise—while the whole book was claiming to offer a clearly defined theory and problematic.

Likewise in his *General Psychology*, influenced as it is by my *Logical Investigations* and the *Logos* article [“Philosophy as Rigorous Science”], it is clear that Natorp was entirely incapable of grasping the clear and readily available meaning of phenomenology as an analysis of the essence of pure consciousness, prior to and independent of previous philosophy and science; and in general he was incapable of allowing for the validity of [phenomenological] seeing and of what is presented in such seeing. [For Natorp] we first have to swallow the whole of Neokantianism and acknowledge it as a supposedly evident, firm truth and on that basis allow the necessity of a (completely vague) reconstructive psychology to “prove” itself. And yet I now see that Natorp brilliantly foresaw the problematic of phenomenological “constitution” of objectivities at all levels, and likewise I now understand so many perspectives on problems that are concealed by different ways of operating. How odd it is: Natorp, a supremely honorable man (truly an anima candida). a great intellect who honestly takes pains to use my writings, which he has seriously studied, nonetheless thinks my phenomenology is an unclarified prelude to his own psychology, clear and firmly grounded on the deepest foundations! For my part, I think his psychology not even as a prelude, but as an extremely vague premonition—embellished with philosophical constructs—of one problem-level in my phenomenology. So this is the situation of philosophy today: prophets to the right, prophets to the left, and in the middle oneself, also a prophet, battling the laughing fits of the worldly wise. And a melancholy laughter it is. This is true when I

22. See *Ideas I*, § 57, note.


24. “A sterling soul.” See Horace, *Sermones* (Satires), Book I, Sermo 5, 1, 41–42, where Plotius, Varrius, and Vergil are called “animae qualis neque candiores / terra tulit” (“souls such as earth has borne none fairer”). M. Plotius Tucca and L. Varrius Rusus were members of Maecenas’s literary circle and, under Augustus’s orders, edited the *Aeneid* after Virgil’s death in 19 BCE Varrius, along with Vergil, introduced Horace to Maecenas.

25. After Goethe’s poem, “Diné zu Coblenz,” in *Goethes Werke* (= Weimarer Ausgabe),
consider others as well: and so I also read (not for a year and a half have I read so much as in these last months) the new and thick book that Volkelt sent on his seventieth birthday, _Certitude and Truth_, which discusses at length, and with many words of praise, my own phenomenology but cannot see that phenomenological statements are something different from utterly commonplace “empirical psychological statements.” He speaks of my intuition of essences as “the tidings of salvation” and talks about the “prophetic tone” of my discourse, etc. He is very talented in the details, of course, but flat and in no way to be compared with Natorp when it comes to genuine philosophical depth. In the final analysis I force myself to read even texts like these so as to get to know my public, something none of us should forget. It is unfortunately true that once we recognize the confusion and absurdity of ways of thinking that we ourselves were once enmeshed in as philosophical children, we take such distance from them and see them as so obviously worthless that we can’t imagine attributing them to a reasonable person, and so we fail to consider that our readers could indeed hold them.

I have to close now, joining the very cordial regards of my wife and of Dr. and Mrs. Rees (who, to our great joy, have been here for three weeks) to our own good wishes and friendship. I need not tell you how heavily the recent events of the war weigh upon our spirits. Yet it will certainly turn out for the good. And if we want to resist—and so we do, and so we will—the good will happen in the right form of re-action, in which we declare our faith in the good the only way we can—actively: by contributing to that good at our particular place and according to our small powers (which, in the overall reckoning, also count). Each must do his part as if the salvation of the world depended on it: I in phenomenology, you as a full-time weatherman and a part-time phenomenologist of religion.

NB. I too have next to me my Hölderlin, whom I love very much and yet know too little, and so you and I will be in touch in reading him.

Best wishes to you.

Yours,

E Husserl

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27. Volkelt, _Gewissheit und Wahrheit_, 434.

28. Husserl is referring to the collapse of the Western front, which began on August 8, 1918.
[P.S.] I just now looked again at your first letter: 1) Berlin 30 years ago—the university with 1,800 students—what an intellectual atmosphere that still was, and how richly suffused with intellectual “lines of force”! The six semesters I spent there were the most beautiful years of my life.

2) Klose, a good and decent man, although in those days he was not very far-reaching in philosophicis [in philosophical matters]; not really my student; very competent in his field.

3) And as my last P.S. (I’m going on like a chattering old hag): I forgot to mention the two beautiful and invigorating volumes of Natorp’s war-book, which I also read this summer: *The Epochs of the Spirit* and *The Soul of the German.* We have it here, and Frau Rees is now reading it.

The First Freiburg Period, January 1919 to Summer 1923

March 5, 1919: Edmund Husserl to Rudolf Otto

*Briefwechsel 7, 205–8*

*Husserl writes to Professor Rudolf Otto, author of The Idea of the Holy, to offer his impressions of his student Heinrich Ochsner (1891–1970), whose name Husserl misspells here as “Oxner.” Ochsner, who had studied with Husserl and who was planning to convert from Catholicism to Protestantism, had the prospect of an assistantship with Otto at Marburg University. In the course of the letter Husserl reveals at least as much about the young Heidegger, who had become his assistant less than two months before, as he does about Ochsner.*

Freiburg i/B Lorettostr. 40
5.III.1919

Dear colleague, 32

I have just heard from Pastor Katz that you want to avail yourself of my offer to give you my impressions of Mr. Oxner [sic]. I hasten to fulfill your wish.

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29. From April 25, 1878 to March 18, 1881.
30. Walter Klose, a theology student from Husserl’s last years at Göttingen.
32. Otto had been a privatdocent at Göttingen from 1899 to 1904, and an assistant professor there from 1904 to 1914, before becoming a professor at Marburg. Husserl taught at Göttingen from 1901 to 1916. See n. 19 above.
33. Pastor Wilhelm Peter Max Katz had been instrumental in the religious conversion plans of Heinrich Ochsner (1891–1970). Ochsner, a friend of Heidegger’s who studied
Like his older friend Dr. Heidegger, Mr. Oxner was originally a philosophy student of Rickert’s. Not without strong inner resistance did the two of them gradually open themselves up to my suggestions and draw closer to me personally. In that same period they both underwent radical changes in their basic religious convictions. Truly both of them are religiously oriented personalities. In Heidegger, the theoretical-philosophical interest predominates, whereas in Oxner it is the religious—and so much so in Oxner that I am inclined to characterize him straight-away as a *homo religiousus*. Yet at the same time he has a specifically theological nature: he cannot and will not do without philosophy. However, that must be an honest, serious, and scientific philosophy which, via categories that remain faithful to the experience, gives adequate expression to the depths of religious life and to the religious objectivity revealed in it. In addition it must be a philosophy that can purify, clarify, and rationally illumine, and thus one that offers a sure defense against skepticism. He expects a great deal from pure phenomenology In that regard, and he has already penetrated deep into its method and into the spirit of its work—that is, if all indications do not deceive. I say “indications”: It is certainly hard to break through the extraordinary shyness of this man, to guide him to free and easy conversation, even to engage him personally. For years now, whenever I ran across him (for example, after seminar meetings), I invited him to come and talk with me at length about the ideas on philosophy of religion that came up in the seminar (and that always have a lively interest for me). But only twice did he actually come, and in only one instance did we get down to a conversation of more than an hour. Hence I do not know him well in the usual sense. Inasmuch as I have often experienced sharp disappointments with students, I would prefer to be very reserved in my judgment. And yet always in those cases my *daimonion* has frequently warned me. But with Oxner it positively admonishes me to trust him entirely. Only with real difficulty can I imagine being deceived in the case of this completely unsusuming man who timidly keeps himself in the background, who blushes when one simply looks at him—this man with the inwardly directed gaze, from whom only purity and goodness emanate and in whom every trace of fanaticism, maliciousness and deception is lacking. Even to consider this possibility seems almost an injustice. Above all I have the impression that he needs love, as if it were his life-element, but not in the sense of an embittered person whose icy armor would have to be melted. That he is not at all, although I have heard (certainly he would never have told me such a thing) that he does have a very hard life. At most, dear colleague, take my words merely as an occasion to approach this person and get to know him. I suspect that he (who, by the way, was also strongly affected by your book on the holy) will give himself more freely and open himself more readily to you the theologian with Husserl, was planning to convert from Catholicism to Protestantism. He had the prospect of an assistantship with Rudolf Otto.
than to me. Yet I must say that he has enjoyed considerable respect here in my small circle of close-knit students.

I am sure that Pastor Katz has told you I would sincerely like to participate in any “relief effort” to help Oxner. But my name must not be mentioned in that connection. I must not endanger my peaceful effectiveness in Freiburg. Nonetheless, my philosophical effect does have something revolutionary about it: Protestants become Catholic, Catholics become Protestant. But I do not think about Catholicizing and Protestantizing; I want nothing more than to educate the youth to a radical intellectual honesty, to a thinking that guards against obscuring and violating, whether by verbal constructions or conceptual illusions, the primordial intuitions that necessarily determine the sense of all rational thinking. In arch-Catholic Freiburg I do not want to stand out as a corrupter of the youth, as a proselytizer, as an enemy of the Catholic Church. That I am not. I have not exercised the least influence on Heidegger’s and Oxner’s migration over to the ground of Protestantism, even though that can only be very pleasing to me as a “non-dogmatic Protestant” and a free Christian (if one may call himself a “free Christian” when what that means to him is an ideal goal of religious longing and when, for his part, he understands it as an infinite task). For the rest, I am delighted to have an effect on any sincere person, whether Catholic, Protestant or Jewish.

Last summer, through Heidegger and Oxner (I no longer know who took precedence in the matter) I was drawn to your book *Das Heilige* [The Idea of the Holy], and it has had a stronger effect on me than almost any other book in years. Allow me to express my impressions as follows: It is a first beginning for a phenomenology of religion, at least regarding everything that stays within the parameters of pure description and analysis of the phenomena themselves. To put it concisely: I cannot agree with the philosophical theorizing that goes further: it is not at all essential for the specific task and subject matter of this book, and it would be better left out. In my opinion, a great deal more progress needs to be made in the study and eidetic analysis of the phenomena before we come up with a theory of religious consciousness as a philosophical theory. Above all, one would need to make a radical distinction between the accidental *factum* and the *eidos*. One would need to study the eidetic necessities and possibilities of religious consciousness and its correlate. One would need a systematic eidetic typification of the levels of religious data, specifically in their eidetically necessary development.

It seems to me that the metaphysician (theologian) in Herr Otto has swept up Otto the phenomenologist and carried him away on his wings. In that regard I think of the image of the angels who cover their eyes [Isaiah 6:2]. However that may be, this book will have a permanent place in the history of genuine philosophy of religion or phenomenology of religion. It is a beginning, and its significance is that it goes back to the “beginnings,” the “origins,” and thus, in the most beautiful sense of the word, is “original.” And our age knows no yearn-
ing higher than a desire that the true origins finally find expression in word and then, in the higher sense, come to their Word, the Logos.

I am sure that you will not take offense at my outspoken opinions. From our Göttingen years you know how highly I esteem you and with what pleasure I seek out intellectual contact with you. Now that you have brought us phenomenologists such worthwhile gifts, we would be utterly delighted if new ones were to follow.

With cordial regards and unfailing high esteem,
E Husserl

May 1, 1919: Martin Heidegger to Elisabeth Blochmann
[Heidegger/Blochmann, Briefwechsel, 16; translated and introduced by Theodore Kisiel]

Weatherman Heidegger returns from the front at war’s end to become Husserl’s teaching assistant, and on more than one occasion he testifies to what a learning experience this direct access to the founder of phenomenology proves to be. On January 14, 1919, he writes to Elisabeth Blochmann that he has little time to spare because of “my intensive work with Husserl and preparation for my lecture course for the interim semester [KNS 1919] beginning on February 4: “The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldviews” (p. 12). At semester’s end, he summarizes his research and teaching regimen for “Fräulein Lisi” in the following list of three pairs:

... My own work is very concentrated, fundamental, and concrete: basic problems of phenomenological methodology, liberation from the leftover dross of acquired standpoints—repeated new forays into the true origins, preliminary works for the phenomenology of religious consciousness—disciplined orientation toward intensive and high-quality academic effectiveness, continually learning in my association with Husserl.

February 11, 1920: Edmund Husserl to Paul Natorp
[Briefwechsel 5, 139–41]

With the transfer of Max Wundt from Marburg to Jena, an assistant professorship is again open at the University of Marburg. Troubled that he has misrepresented Heidegger to Natorp some two-and-a-half years earlier, Husserl here takes the initiative to correct what he had said in that letter of October 8, 1917.

Freiburg i/B Lorettostr. 40
11.II.1920

Esteemed colleague,

Long after the fact I have had second thoughts and am deeply bothered by them. The assistant professorship in philosophy at Marburg is again to be filled,
and the last time it was vacant, Dr. Heidegger was considered for it, as you kindly informed me at the time. I am now disturbed that, back then, I wrote that it was as a “Catholic philosopher” that Heidegger had gotten himself certified to teach here and that this could again be a reason they put him on the list. Allow me to inform you that, although I did not know it at the time, Heidegger back then had already freed himself from dogmatic Catholicism. Soon afterwards he drew all the conclusions and cut himself off—clearly, energetically, and yet tactfully—from the sure and easy career of a “philosopher of the Catholic worldview.” In the last two years he has been my most valuable philosophical co-worker. I have the very best impressions of him as an academic teacher and a philosophical thinker, and I place great hopes in him. His seminar meetings are as well attended as my own, and he is able to captivate beginners as well as advanced students. Moreover, his highly praised lecture courses—polished in form and yet profound—are very heavily attended (about 100 students). He has worked his way into phenomenology with the greatest energy, and he really works at laying the surest foundations for his philosophical thinking. His scholarship is wide-ranging. A sterling person.

But back then I got involved in a dubious recommendation that was not mine to make and that I pray will not be taken amiss. But since you, dear colleague, had asked me about him at that time, and since I was unable then (as I am able today) to provide a quite unambiguous and securely grounded judgment, it has become a matter of conscience to make up for it, especially since I can now say that he is one of the most promising young men whom we have to look out for (as regards his material plight, which he nonetheless bears light-heartedly. Heidegger—to use the Viennese expression—is not a Raunzer, a whiner).

And how are you, my esteemed colleague? Now and then one of your former students at Marburg drops in on my circle and tells us wonderful things about your work and its ever-increasing impact. With the crowds of people now thronging to philosophy, surely you too must have some misgivings about what will become of all these young people who want to choose philosophy as their life’s vocation. They are not only sincere but also endowed with wonderful talent.

I am currently groaning under the duties that come from being dean and that unfortunately divert me from my life’s work. I am counting the weeks until mid-April!

How is it with your family? Elli sends cordial regards to you. She just got back from Munich, where he was studying with Wölfflin—she is full of vim and vigor,

34. From mid-April 1919 to mid-April 1920, Husserl served as dean of the philosophy faculty.
35. Husserl’s daughter Elli spent a year at the University of Munich (WS 1919–1920 to WS 1920–1921) studying with the Swiss-born art historian Heinrich Wölfflin (1864–1945).
excited—and thin. Unfortunately young people can no longer get enough to eat, hardly even a snack to tide them over. That leads to some sad chapters. These last weeks have been so difficult! How will we be able to build a genuine humanity?

As always, with cordial esteem
Your
E Husserl

October 20, 1920: Martin Heidegger to Karl Löwith
[from an unpublished transcript of the letter edited by Klaus Stichweh; translated and introduced by Theodore Kisiel]

Privatdocent Heidegger is reluctantly preparing a course, “Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion,” for WS 1920–1921 at the behest of Husserl, who in September 1918 (letter above) had nominated Heidegger as his “phenomenologist of religion.” In the context of an impending meeting of the students’ Phenomenology Club just before opening day (October 29), Heidegger asks his future habilitation student, Karl Löwith, to warn Oskar Becker, who was vying to become Husserl’s habilitation student but had a tendency to make anti-Semitic remarks, of the need for discretion in his conversations with Husserl, der Alte, “the old man” (then 61 years old).

. . . Husserl has the best of intentions. . . . But if the old man takes offence, then Becker is finished from the start. It is a sad state of affairs for “free science and scholarship,” but I only mean the best for Becker. I myself am already no longer even regarded as a “philosopher,” I am “actually still a theologian.” . . .

February 1, 1922: Edmund Husserl to Paul Natorp
[Briefwechsel 5, 150–51]

While offering Paul Natorp evaluations of possible successors (Cassirer, Hartmann) to Natorp’s chair at Marburg, Husserl take the occasion to give a frank assessment of Heidegger and to suggest that the Privatdocent be offered an associate professorship (Extrordinariat). A year and a half later, the idea would bear fruit when Heidegger received and accepted a call to the University of Marburg.

Esteemed colleague:

. . . Although Heidegger is developing strongly, one is unable to provide public documentation of his considerable talents, because he is still chooses not to publish. It would not surprise me at all if an uncommon measure of energy and power were aborning in him. His receptive abilities are somewhat underdeveloped, and he is anything but tractable. He is an entirely original personality, struggling, searching for himself, laboring to forge his own solidly grounded approach. His way of seeing and working phenomenologically, and his area of interests—none of this has he
taken over from me passively but always on his own terms and with his own originality. As a teacher he has his own quite unique effect, distinct from my own, and a very strong effect at that. He lectures on what he learns from a deep phenomenological investigation of intellectual history. He lectures, for example, on Augustine, Neoplatonism, Aristotle and the ancient Aristotelian commentators. He throws light on fundamental problems by way of concrete exegeses, and he develops ideas on, for example, the categories of hermeneutics, the meaning of history and its proper method, and so on. Despite his dry lecture style, he exerts a strong attraction on beginning and advanced students alike through his original ideas, presented in a language that he himself has forged. His research is focused essentially on phenomenology of religion, and Luther is one of his major themes; but as a former “Catholic” philosopher, he cannot teach Luther in an intelligible way at this university without some problems. It might mean a lot for his development if he could simply go to Marburg. There he would serve as a strong bridge between philosophy and Protestant theology (which he knows very well in all its major forms and esteems very highly for its intrinsic worth). Hiring him at Marburg could be very important for Marburg too! That might become possible if Hartmann turns out to be your successor and then his own associate-professor slot opens up. Of course, Heidegger’s departure from here would be an irreparable loss to me and to phenomenological research at Freiburg. . . .

With cordial greetings to all of you,
Yours,
E Husserl

April 14, 1922: Martin Heidegger to Edmund Husserl
[Briefwechsel 4, 136–37]

Dear Professor,

According to information from the head of the accounting office, Doctor Dahle\(^{36}\) should

1) petition the rector’s office about either matriculating or being accepted as an auditor, whichever he wants.

There is no problem with the permission. (An application to the Minister of Education is no longer required.)

2) He should likewise petition the Regional Office for a residence permit. The Regional Office makes inquiries with the university and then arrives at its own independent decision.

There will be no problems with the whole matter.

\(^{36}\) Paul Dahle was at that time a student of Husserl’s.
With cordial Easter greetings from our family to yours,
Yours,
Mr. Heidegger

May 31, 1922: Edmund Husserl to Georg Misch
[Georg Misch Archive, University of Göttingen; translated and introduced by Theodore Kisiel]

On May 28, 1922, Georg Misch writes to Husserl in Freiburg to inform him that the associate professorship at Göttingen that Husserl had filled during the years in which he composed Logical Investigations and Ideas I and Ideas II was once again “free for pure philosophy” in the “philological-historical division” of the Philosophy Faculty. Misch inquires whether, among other candidates, Heidegger might be a possible replacement to fill the vacancy. “Should you wish to communicate your judgment of him to us, I would be truly grateful to you” (Husserl, Briefwechsel 5, 273).

Husserl’s reply on May 31 does indeed show signs of haste due to an impending lecture tour, but nevertheless it manages to convey a measure of the close philosophical relationship and pedagogical collaboration with his young assistant as well as his high estimation of Heidegger’s philosophical potential, despite the lack of publications. Husserl is careful to emphasize the hermeneutical links of Heidegger to Dilthey’s philosophy of spirit, which is Misch’s basic orientation. Misch will utilize some of Husserl’s remarks in his own final evaluation of Heidegger’s candidacy (See appendix I above; see also chapter 12).

Dear colleague,

I am answering right away in the greatest of haste, since I still have to make the final preparations for my departure tomorrow to my London lectures.

Heidegger is probably the most important student that I have been permitted to develop up to now. I have great hopes in him, especially in the direction of a phenomenology of spirit and a phenomenological theory of the human sciences [Geisteswissenschaften]. But he is in no way a mere novice: the depth of his insight, the scope of his scholarship, his original style with a feel for the finest intellectual nuances inimical to all overbearing catchphrase and bombastic rhetoric, drawing all his insights from material thought through in the most concrete way: all of this makes every conversation with him a learning experience [Lehrstunde]. I would miss him very much. He is naturally strongly determined by Dilthey, but seeks, so to speak, to complete him. He seeks to do what Dilthey by way of his genius wanted to do, but by way of a phenomenological methodology adapted to the problems of a philosophy of spirit, which since Dilthey has taken us so much further. This approach is being elaborated concretely in a series of great works.

Heidegger is an absolutely independent personality, thoroughly original
(without the student’s tendency toward discipleship) even in the way he pursues phenomenology and blazes his own trails in the primeval forest. Originally a Catholic theologian, he has broken away from the church (in his inner life) and struggled his way through to freedom. He has a Protestant wife. His original philosophical native-home is the history of medieval philosophy, and his book on Duns Scotus soars far above and beyond all neoscholastic makeshifts of history. Because of this book, he has already been nominated twice to the list of candidates for the associate professorship at Marburg. Just as Natorp values the book highly, so also do I. There may hardly be anyone in Germany with such a deep understanding of medieval philosophy as Heidegger. But what has driven him for years are the great questions of the principles of history (hermeneutics, etc.), especially of the history of the philosophical and religious formation of ideas. Beginning in autumn, the *Yearbook* will bring out a series of great treatises, Aristotelian studies directed toward the history of logic and ontology; naturally not merely philological, but founded philologically in a comprehensive way. For years he had lectured extensively on ancient philosophy (Plotinus’s *Enneads*, Aristotle’s *De anima* and chapters from the *Metaphysics*, in the current semester Aristotelian interpretations), and he always presents the most refined analyses.

As a teacher, Heidegger is already well known beyond Freiburg. His impact is extraordinary, in view of the heavy demands that he imposes on the students who work with him. His phenomenological pro-seminar, in which nevertheless most of my advanced students tend to participate, has 86 persons registered in this semester. The usual number is generally between 60 and 80. He could even venture to advertise a *four-hour* course on Aristotle—Interpretations—with success.

I think that you would be pleased with him. And for him as well as for you, I believe, it would be a good thing and would result in a fruitful collaboration. I also believe that the Göttingen faculty could not make a better choice.

It is too bad that the newly planned publications are not already in print. For then there would be no question.

Please excuse the haste in which I have written this, and permit me to extend my friendly greetings to you and your dear wife.

With high regards,
Yours
E. Husserl

February 20, 1923: Martin Heidegger to Karl Löwith

[from an unpublished transcript of the letter edited by Klaus Stichweh; translated and introduced by Theodore Kisiel]

_In his final months as Privatdocent in Freiburg, Heidegger is vigorously taking his distance from Husserl. He writes to Karl Löwith to describe the last hour of Hei-
degger’s seminar devoted to Husserl’s Ideas I (WS 1922–1923, “Phenomenological Exercises for Beginners in Connection with Husserl, Ideas I”):

... In the final hour of the seminar, I publicly burned and destroyed the Ideas to such an extent that I dare say the essential foundations for the whole [of my work] are now cleanly laid out. Looking back from this vantage to the Logical Investigations, I am now convinced that Husserl was never a philosopher, not even for one second in his life. He becomes ever more ludicrous. . . .

May 8, 1923: Martin Heidegger to Karl Löwith
[from an unpublished transcript of the letter edited by Klaus Stichweh]

On May 8, 1923, Heidegger again wrote to Löwith, this time to say that his lecture course that semester, “Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity,”

... strikes the main blows against phenomenology. I now stand completely on my own feet. . . . There is no chance of getting an appointment [with Husserl’s help]. And after I have published, my prospects will be finished. The old man will then realize that I am wringing his neck—and then the question of succeeding him is out. But I can’t help myself.

July 14, 1923: Martin Heidegger to Karl Jaspers
[Heidegger and Jaspers, Briefwechsel, 42]

As Heidegger’s job in Freiburg draws to a close, he continues his critique of Husserl, this time in a letter to Jaspers.

... Husserl has come entirely unglued—if, that is, he ever was “glued,” which more and more I have begun to doubt of late. He goes from pillar to post, uttering trivialities that would make you weep. He lives off his mission as the “Founder of Phenomenology,” but nobody knows what that means. . . . No one understands a “mathematics of the ethical” (the latest!). . . .

The Marburg Years, Autumn 1923 to Summer 1928

February 19, 1924: Malvine Husserl to Elfride Heidegger
[Briefwechsel 4, 137]

In early March 1924 (i.e., after Heidegger’s first semester in Marburg), the Husserls were to visit their son Gerhart in Göttingen and their daughter Elli in Berlin, while at about the same time the Heideggers were planning to pass through Freiburg on their way to winter vacation at their cabin in Todtnauberg. The following two letters discuss the visit and allude to matters that were unfolding in the philosophy department at the University of Freiburg.
Professor Joseph Geyser (1869–1948) held the chair in Catholic philosophy (Seminar II) at the University of Freiburg from 1917 to 1924. (In 1917, Heidegger had applied for the same position but had lost the job to Geyser.) In the winter of 1923–1924, Geyser received a call to Munich.

Even before Geyser had accepted the offer, Husserl tried unsuccessfully to have Geyser’s position at Freiburg “de-confessionalized,” i.e., separated from its Catholic religious affiliation. During the faculty meeting of January 22, 1924, in the course of arguing for de-confessionalization, Husserl made a derogatory remark about how much one had given in to “the Catholic Internationale” during the Great War. At that point Heinrich Finke, the noted Catholic professor of history, interjected, “We have to listen to such stuff from an Austrian Jew!” (“So etwas müssen wir hören von einem österreichischen Juden!”) On February 3, 1924, Husserl wrote to Dean Ludwig Deubner of the University of Freiburg to protest Finke’s remark. The letter is found in Briefwechsel 8, 186.

That bitter exchange is part of what Mrs. Husserl refers to below. But contrary to what she supposes in this letter, Geyser eventually did accept the position in Munich, and in the autumn of 1924 he was succeeded in the chair of Seminar II by yet another Catholic, Fr. Martin Honecker.

Mrs. Husserl’s mention of “the children’s things” presumably refers to articles that she had provided for the Heidegger children, Jörg and Hermann, who were then five and four years old, respectively.

Freiburg, 19.II.24

Dear Mrs. Heidegger,

First of all, many thanks—and also from my husband to yours—for your letter. By the looks of things, Geyser is going to remain [at Freiburg]. I will tell you in person—since it cannot be described—about all the quarreling and racket among the faculty. You will be here soon, and then you will get the full story.

But it would have been lovely to replace Geyser with your husband! However, they are children and do not know the Centrum.37 But I will give you all the details when we speak in person. So we expect you on [Sunday] March 1 and here-with formally invite you to stay with us. Only after your visit will we travel to Berlin, by way of Göttingen where we will see the young couple. Regarding the children’s things from the last visit, I hope you have not put yourself to any bother. First of all, they were not a loan but a gift, and secondly I have an entirely sufficient supply ready.

37. Presumably the “they” refers to the faculty members who would vote to keep the religious affiliation of Geyser’s chair. “Centrum” refers to the Deutsche Zentrumspartei, the Catholic political party of the Weimar Republic.
Please let us know about your Freiburg plans as soon as possible. We are counting on this lovely opportunity to see you again.

Yours,
Malvine Husserl

February 23, 1924: Edmund Husserl to Martin Heidegger, and Malvine Husserl to Elfride Heidegger

[ Briefwechsel 4, 138]

Changes in the Heideggers’ travel plans elicit the following two letters from Husserl to Heidegger and from Mrs. Husserl to Mrs. Heidegger.

Saturday, 22.II [1924]38

[Edmund Husserl to Martin Heidegger:]
Dear friend,

I would be very sad indeed if in fact we were only able to say “Hello” to each other on the run. Naturally we will not let the two of you just pass through, but if it cannot be otherwise, then you will be our dear guests on Wednesday [i.e., either February 27 or March 3]. But I have to lecture on Thursday for sure, and I would really like to lecture on Friday as well. I need to give some sort of conclusion and pre-view, and this semester I have not prepared anything. In addition there is a faculty meeting on Tuesday, which robs even more of my time. So let me ask whether you would be free on Thursday morning.

All month long I have been delighted that you are coming and that we also could speak about philosophy [wissenschaftlich]. I would have thought you could stay here for at least a few days.

So: Couldn’t you at least be here on Friday as well? In that case obviously I would not lecture and would devote myself entirely to you. But if that is not possible, then we will have to abide by your schedule. Regards to all.

Yours faithfully
E Husserl

[Malvine Husserl to Elfride Heidegger:]
Dear Mrs. Heidegger,

We look forward to your visit but certainly hope you can stay at least one more day. My husband has already written about his special wish, which is also mine. [Just send us] two words with your exact arrival time!

Cordially,
M. H.

38. Husserl incorrectly writes “22” for “24.”
December 28, 1924: Edmund Husserl to Martin Heidegger
[Briefwechsel 4, 139]

Husserl discusses Heidegger’s Christmas vacation plans. It is the middle of Heidegger’s second year at Marburg.

[Breitnau]
28.XII.24

Dear friend,

I just received Szilasi’s kind letter and am happy that all of you together want to be with us for a brief while here in Breitnau.39 But hadn’t you expressed the wish to meet with me alone sometime in order to talk through a number of personal and professional matters—which cannot really happen amidst the general (and, of course, lovely) family hubbub?

No need to announce your arrival beforehand. You are cordially welcome at any time, and you will always find comfortable lodgings.

Naturally we are entirely delighted to see your wife and our friend Szilasi.

Yours faithfully
E Husserl
Gasthof zum Kreuz, Breitnau

June 26 1925: Edmund Husserl to Erich Rudolf Jaensch
[Briefwechsel 3, 333–34]

In the summer of 1925 both Heidegger and Dietrich Mahnke were candidates for the chair at Marburg University that Nicolai Hartmann was about to vacate. At the Marburg Philosophy Faculty meeting of June 24, 1925, Professor Edgar Wedekind raised a question about how little Heidegger had published since his doctorate a dozen years earlier. That same day Professor Erich Jaensch wrote to Husserl about the matter; Husserl wrote back two days later.

Freiburg Lorettostr. 40 30.VI.25

My esteemed colleague,

I hasten to respond to your welcome inquiry.

As great as is my personal and professional esteem for Dr. Mahnke, and even

39. Wilhelm Szilasi (1889–1966), who took Heidegger’s chair in philosophy after the Second World War, had been studying at Freiburg since the autumn of 1919 and was close to both Husserl and Heidegger. In December 1924, the Husserls were vacationing in Breitnau in the Black Forest, northwest of the Titisee.

40. The correct date is June 26, 1925. See Husserl, Briefwechsel 3, 333 n. 26 and 581.
though I am sure your faculty would find lasting satisfaction in this genuine scholar and splendid human being (who would also make a wonderful speaker), nonetheless I would be dishonest in advising you if I did not say decisively that, in my opinion, colleague Heidegger simply and unconditionally deserves priority in the matter of this regular professorship. This is the case not only in relation to Dr. Mahnke but also as regards all the other candidates under consideration. Among the new generation I have yet to meet another philosopher of such creative and resourceful originality and such entirely disinterested devotion to philosophy. His singular virtuosity as a teacher—the way his lectures seize the whole person and win people over by the seriousness of his philosophical views—must surely be well known among the colleagues at Marburg. In my view Heidegger is without doubt the most significant of those who are now making their career. Absent some irrational fate or unforeseen occurrence, he is predestined to be a philosopher of the grand style, someone who can lead beyond the confusion and decadence of the present age. He has a host of original things to say, but for years now he has maintained his silence in order that he might publish only what is completely mature, conclusive, and compelling. All of this will be proven by the works he will be publishing in the very near future.

In spite of the high esteem I expressed for Mahnke in my letter of recommendation, I was not able to say the same of him, although he is a fine man who will devote himself and all his scientific powers to the university and will doubtless prove his worth by significant achievements. Certainly he would be superb for a special professorship [persönliches Ordinariat], which would be the right place for him alongside you and Heidegger. But if he were to appear with Heidegger on the proposed list of candidates for the regular professorship, then in my opinion the range of difference between the two should be strongly noted.

With high regards and collegial best wishes,
Yours
E Husserl

May 4, 1926: Martin Heidegger to Karl Jaspers
[Heidegger and Jaspers, Briefwechsel, 64; translated by Thomas Sheehan]

Husserl was on vacation in Todtnauberg when the first galleys of Being and Time reached Heidegger at his cabin there. It was Husserl’s first opportunity to read this long-awaited work by his most promising student. Around April 20, Husserl wrote to Fritz Kaufmann (Briefwechsel 3, 347): “We are helping with the correcting of Heidegger’s Being and Time and are now on the fourth galleys. It gives me a great deal of satisfaction.” A month later, Heidegger wrote to Jaspers about this forthcoming work.

41. More literally: “removed from all worldly interests” (allen weltlichen Interessen entrückten).
... I am counting on the few who will truly study it. Only you will understand its true intentions, what I want. On the whole, it is for me a work of transition. From the fact that Husserl finds the whole book strange and can “no longer find a place” for it in the usual phenomenology, I conclude that I am already de facto further removed [from Husserl] than I myself believe and see. . . .

December 1926: Edmund Husserl to Martin Heidegger (draft)

[ Briefwechsel 4, 139–40]

In August of 1925 the philosophy department of Marburg University proposed Heidegger as the successor of Nicolai Hartmann, who had recently transferred to Cologne. On January 27, 1926, the Prussian Ministry of Education rejected the proposal on the grounds that Heidegger had published too little. Even after Heidegger submitted the galley pages of his forthcoming Being and Time, the Ministry again rejected the proposal, declaring the submitted text to be “inadequate.” Husserl writes in response to that judgment.

My dear Heidegger,

I have read your letter with the deepest sympathy, and in these days full of lecture preparations, invitations, faculty meetings, and small inconveniences, my thought continuously turn back to you and your situation. It is now ordained for you to deal with the same difficulties that I struggled with for so many years at Göttingen, at which I in no way proved myself a hero. May you deal with them better, as you very well are able to. Before anything else, what removes any sting from the behavior of this know-it-all ministry is the fact that the faculty as a whole, right down to each of its esteemed members, are all on your side and have recognized in you the right man for the right job. (It was the same way with Brentano, when he was obliged to resign his professorship. 42) And all this happens just as you are blessed with the great fortune of having in press the book with which you grow into what you are and, as you well know, you have given your own being as a philosopher its first realization. Beginning with this book you will blossom into new dimensions. No one has greater faith in you than I, and I am sure nothing will drag you down into ressentiment or divert you from that which is the pure result of your own gifts and inheres in you and you alone.

42. Note from Karl Schuhmann: “In 1880, because of his marriage, Brentano [a priest] had to give up his professorate at the University of Vienna and qualify as a Privatdozent all over again. Subsequently a total of four times between 1884 and 1893 the philosophy department proposed him as a professor, but for political reasons the Ministry refused to appoint the former priest.” Husserl, Briefwechsel 4, 140 n. 50.
April 5, 1927: Edmund Husserl to Martin Heidegger

[Briefwechsel 4, 140]

Upon returning from a visit with his son Gerhart in Kiel (March 1 to April 5), Husserl heard that Heidegger, who was then vacationing in Todtnauberg, had asked whether he and his wife could stay at Husserl’s home in Freiburg on their way back to Marburg.

Dearest friend,

I just got off the train, and I hear of your inquiry. It goes without saying that you and your wife are cordially welcome. But I think it is not possible that you are already planning your return to Marburg. No, you must visit with me a while and be my guest so that we can also talk some philosophy. Naturally you can stay at our house.

Please excuse the fact that you have not heard anything from me. It was as if I were locked up, and I could not write.

Many cordial regards from
Your old friend
E Husserl
Tuesday afternoon

May 8, 1927: Edmund Husserl to Martin Heidegger

[Briefwechsel 4, 141]

Heidegger’s mother, Johanna Heidegger, 69 years old, died in Messkirch on May 3, 1927, and Husserl here communicates his condolences to Heidegger. The last paragraph of the letter refers to Oskar Becker’s Mathematical Existence, which shared (439–809) the 1927 issue of the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, VIII, with Heidegger’s Being and Time.

My dear friend,

I have just received the death notice, and my heart goes out to you. Your good mother is now released from her long suffering. Here one must bow before the inscrutable. For those left behind, the painful loss abides like a wound, and now that she, your own mother, is gone, your whole life is cast in a different light. . . .

We are now fully caught up in the work of the semester, it is already underway. You too will have plenty to do, and you will not have much time to think of yourself and your sadness. In my lecture course I am now discussing the controversies about the natural sciences and the humanities. Then, after continuing with the material from last semester (and necessarily repeating the main points), I will press on into philosophical-phenomenological problems and into a universal philosophy
as humanistic science in a universal and transcendental sense. The seminar (a phenomenological interpretation of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*) does not have many participants. I also have to take students in their middle semesters.

Did you get the page proofs of Becker’s text, which is especially interesting for you towards the end. In friendship I send heartfelt regards to you and to your wife with whom I beg you to share the expression of my sincere condolences.

Your old
E Husserl

**May 24, 1927: Edmund Husserl to Martin Heidegger**

[Briefwechsel 4, 142–43]

> With *Being and Time* just published, Georg Misch invited Heidegger to Göttingen over the coming Pentecost weekend, from Saturday, June 4, through Wednesday, June 7, Heidegger informed Husserl that he would not be able to visit him in Freiburg at that time, and Husserl replied as follows. Regarding the “astonishing communication,” see Husserl’s letter of December 26, 1927, below.

Freiburg 24.V.1927

Dear friend,

I am sorry that I will not be able to see you at Pentecost! Given that, I have decided to go to Samaden with my wife for the holiday week, where our dear friend Frau Jensen will be staying with her convalescing son (she is now with us for one day on her trip back). And then your astonishing communication! Perhaps Richter now regrets not making inquiries with me right at the beginning. In fact at this point the Ministry cannot go back. In any case it seems that my letter—at the end of which I weighed in with my heaviest guns—had its effect. I dare to hope that the government will now increase your salary and will position you not inferior to Mahnke. The way in which Richter met you was extraordinarily astute, and the circumstances were also completely adequate in a personal sense. The whole business was finally a way of making amends to you. You can now count on the fact that the Prussians have respect for you, which can still have an effect. I have lived through this whole ordeal with you with sincere empathy, and I only wish I could already install you here in the legacy that is due you.

About myself, only this much: As regards retiring or becoming emeritus, I have not yet reached the requisite age. I would have if the day of my birth had been

43. On June 3–12 Husserl vacationed in Samaden in the Engadin, where he stayed with Elsbeth Jensen, the wife of his close friend Paul Jensen, and their son Klaus.

44. Ministerial Councillor Dr. Werner Richter, head of the section on higher education in the Prussian Ministry of Education.
eight days earlier and had fallen in the previous fiscal year. I simply do not know whether it is years or semesters that count; if the latter, then next semester would be the one. Because they are now considering a pay-raise for civil servants—which is important for me since as an emeritus I lose my assistants and then would have to pay them myself, I am not going to make a move just now. For next semester, when I may have to lecture full time, I am announcing a course in the history of modern philosophy. But in any case I am anxious to get out of the harness so I may save what can still be saved of my own work. My health is good, but little by little I am getting somewhat depressed by this situation—really I hardly feel any decline in my powers other than the physical, but I am in my 69th year. I have gotten caught up again in my lectures—up to this point I have had to work out material that would be lovely as regards its thought-content if I were 25 years younger. There are now six Japanese in the course, serious people. Kitayama went to study with Jaspers in Heidelberg in hopes of finishing his doctorate quickly, because his father has put a freeze on his allowance. I wrote him a letter of recommendation for Japan. Have you read through Becker's text? A direct application of Heideggerian ontology.

Faithfully yours
E Husserl

Many cordial greeting from our family to yours.

May 26, 1927: Edmund Husserl to Martin Heidegger, and Malvine Husserl to Martin and Elfride Heidegger

[Brifwechsel 4, 143–44]

Heidegger had sent a copy of Being and Time to his former teacher at Freiburg, the Catholic historian Heinrich Finke (1955–1938), and Husserl encourages him to do the same for Jonas Cohn, who had sent Heidegger a copy of his Theory of Dialectics (Leipzig, 1923). The draft by Landgrebe that Husserl mentions (and that his wife obliquely alludes to below) may be his dissertation “Wilhelm Dilheys Theorie der Geisteswissenschaften,” which was eventually published in the ninth volume of Husserl’s Jahrbuch (see the note to Husserl’s letter of May 9, 1928).

[Edmund Husserl to Martin Heidegger:] Freiburg, 26.V.1927

Dear friend,

I forgot to mention something in the last letter.

45. Junyu Kitayama (1902–1962) began his studies at Freiburg in 1924 and later completed his doctorate at Heidelberg on the topic of The Metaphysics of Buddhism. On May 23, 1927 Husserl wrote to Shinkō Mochizuki on behalf of Kitayama.

1) Clearly Finke was quite delighted with your mailing. He was almost beaming when he told me about it in my office.\footnote{Heidegger sent a copy of \textit{Being and Time} to the Catholic historian Heinrich Finke (1855–1938), his former teacher at the University of Freiburg.}

2) Have you sent a copy to J. Cohn? He is waiting for one and takes it granted since he sent you a copy of his book on dialectics.\footnote{Husserl is encouraging Heidegger to send Professor Jonas Cohn (1869–1947) a copy of \textit{Being and Time}. Cohn had sent Heidegger his \textit{Theorie der Dialektik. Formenlehre der Philosophie} (Leipzig: Meiner, 1923).} It is absolutely necessary that you send him one; otherwise he will be mortally offended.

Shouldn’t Landgrebe send you his draft in time for the Pentecost holidays? He says he would hurry it along and prepare himself to give it to you as a strict Meister Overseer.

Again many regards from
Your ever faithful
E H

[Malvine Husserl to Martin and Elfride Heidegger:]

Dear friends,

I am very sorry we will not see you here at Pentecost. Too bad you did not mention what prevents you from coming.\footnote{Georg Misch had invited Heidegger to Göttingen for the Pentecost holidays.} Presumably we will go to Samaden, where Frau Jensen is staying with her sick child. Dear Mr. Heidegger, just do not let Landgrebe escape your sharp teeth. Unfortunately my husband has again given him the slip and works only on his lectures! But do read Curtius’s essay on Proust\footnote{Ernst Robert Curtius (1886–1956), then professor of literary history at Marburg (and from 1929 to 1951 at Bonn), wrote widely on Marcel Proust, including: essays eventually collected in his \textit{Die Französische Kultur} (1931), \textit{Französischer Geist im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert} (1952, part of which appeared in 1919 as \textit{Die Literarischen Wegbereiter des neuen Frankreich}); and his \textit{Marcel Proust} (1952). See Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, \textit{Vom Leben und Sterben der grossen Romanisten. Karl Vössler, Ernst Robert Curtius, Leo Spitzer, Erich Auerbach, Werner Krauss} (Munich: Hanser, 2002).}—entirely phenomenological and very interesting.

Cordially
M. H.
Freiburg, 3.VIII.1927

Dear friend,

... I am curious about what sort of impression Heidegger’s entirely original and profound phenomenological book [Being and Time] has made on you. On the face of it, the works distances itself entirely from my own analytic phenomenology, which builds from below to the heights. But I am sure that, in the course of a phenomenology from below, the problems he treats—which were not foreign to me, although I never pondered them in such a systematically differentiated way—will have their influence in the relevant places—as constitutive problems of higher levels. . . .

Yours faithfully,
E Husserl

October 22, 1927: Martin Heidegger to Edmund Husserl
[Briefwechsel 4, 144–48]

The growing gap between Husserl and his “beloved student” Heidegger becomes clear with the failure of their attempted cooperation in composing the second draft of the Encyclopaedia Britannica article on phenomenology between October 10 and 22, 1927. Heidegger’s letter of October 22 clearly articulates his differences, as he sees them, with Husserl’s phenomenology. The letter appears in this volume at the end of Draft B of the article. (See chapter 21.)

November 19, 1927: Edmund Husserl to Roman Ingarden
[Briefwechsel 3, 234]

In the fall of 1927 Husserl’s Polish colleague, the 34-year-old Roman Ingarden, was in Freiburg doing research. Between September 15 and the end of October, Ingarden met frequently with Husserl and by his own account “spent two mornings” at Husserl’s home discussing Draft C of the Encyclopaedia Britannica article on phenomenology. 51 By early November Ingarden had left Freiburg for Marburg, apparently with instructions from Husserl to report back to him about Heidegger’s lectures and seminars there (see Husserl’s letter to Ingarden on December 26, 1927). Ingarden wrote to Husserl from Marburg to thank him for their meetings, and Husserl responded, giving indications of his now acknowledged differences with Heidegger.

Freiburg i. Br., 19.XI.1927

Dear friend,

I am answering your letter right away—it delighted and moved me very much. I too am grateful for that finally benevolent fate that after so many years brought you to me for some truly lovely weeks. I certainly can take great pleasure in your development, above all for myself and my now solitary philosophizing. Among my students I find hardly anyone who has the understanding that you do of the broad horizons of my work over these many years. I found all my conversations with you stimulating and thoroughly enjoyable. They also were an inner strengthening for me. I was at each turn [in my career] completely sure of the necessity of the paths I have forged and the problems I have laid hold of. And yet it often weighs heavily on my soul that others in the circle of phenomenologists do not see this necessity; instead they all prefer to following their own new way. My whole life has aimed at making possible a *philosophia perennis* and therefore has aimed at the universal unity of structural necessities that necessarily prefigures the system of all genuine problems or problem-dimensions for any real research—all this as work that needs to be carried out. In my old age I believe I have achieved this general geography of problems, and now I have the feeling of standing pretty much alone. You must come back, and I hope you will for Christmas.

Your letter brought interesting news—Heidegger has become a close friend of mine, and I am one of his admirers, as much as I really have to regret that, as regards method and content, his work (and his lecture courses too, for that matter) seem to be essentially different from my works and courses; in any event, up to this point there still exists no bridge between him and me that the students we share in common can cross. As regards any further philosophy [between us], a lot depends on whether and how he works his way through to grasping my general intentions. Unfortunately I did not determine his philosophical upbringing; clearly he was already into his own way of doing things when he began studying my writings. Now he is a power, absolutely honest and not ambitious, devoted purely to the issues. All great contributions—those of truly independent thinkers—pave the way for something new. Let us hope so. . . .

With best wishes,
Your old friend and teacher
E Husserl

December 8, 1927: Edmund Husserl to Martin Heidegger

[Briefwechsel 4, 148–49]

“The die is cast.” On November 22, 1927, Husserl received his long-awaited retirement contract from the Ministry of Education, and two weeks later a committee
was established to choose his replacement in the chair of philosophy, Seminar I, at Freiburg. More than a month has passed since Heidegger’s October 22 letter about the Encyclopaedia Britannica article (“the London article”), and Husserl has not yet responded to it. He now offers as his reason “a lack of inner calm.”

Freiburg 8.XII.27

Dear friend,

_Jacta est alia,_52 the ball is now rolling more quickly than I had thought. Already last Tuesday [December 6] the committee was selected: Honecker (as chair), Immisch (who also was on the committee twelve years ago, when Rickert left53), Jantzen, Heiss, Ritter. I myself am not a member of the committee—an old faculty resolution stipulates that the out-going professor is not a member. Now I have to prepare myself! Nonetheless I think I will be added to the committee not as a voting member but as a consultant. I am still not yet clear on who will be ranked third on the list.54 Once I tell them I prefer to lecture as little as possible next summer semester—only holding study seminars [Übungen] if possible—they will move very quickly. The committee was selected without waiting either for the Ministry to convoke it or for my actual retirement, and it has gotten down to work.

Many thanks for your very lovely letter [i.e., Heidegger’s letter October 22, 1927]. Why did I not answer it, why did I not write at all? Naturally because of a lack of inner calm. The new version of the London Article, now very carefully thought out and arranged, turned out nicely, although quite differently from the way you would like to have it, even though something essential [of your suggestions] was retained. In the end it was—and I left it—altogether too long, but I did

52. “The die is cast.” In _De vita Caesarum_, “Divus Iulius,” 32, Suetonius relates the apparition that in 49 BCE moved Julius and his men to overcome their hesitation and cross the Rubicon, (possibly the modern Pisciatello, near Rimini, the ancient Ariminum), the boundary between Cisalpine Gaul and Italy. A mysterious figure of exquisite beauty snatched a trumpet from one of Julius’s soldiers and sounded it, whereupon: “Eatur, inquit [Iulius], ‘quo deorum ostenta et inimicorum iniquitas vocat. Iacta alea est,’ inquit.” (“‘Let us go,’ said [Julius], ‘where the signs of the gods and the evil of our enemies call [us]. The die is cast, he said.’”

53. In 1924 Martin Honecker had replaced Joseph Geyser for the chair in Catholic philosophy at the University of Freiburg. (Geyser had beaten out Heidegger for that same job in 1915.) In 1915 Otto Immisch (who had been appointed professor of classical philology the year before) had sat on the University of Freiburg committee convened to choose a replacement for Heinrich Rickert. Husserl was offered the chair on January 5, 1916 and was appointed on January 26, effective April 1, 1916. Hans Jantzen had been professor of art history since 1916. Hanns von Heiss was a professor for Romance Languages. Gerhard Ritter was appointed professor of history in 1925.

54. At this point the leading candidates to replace Husserl were Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer. Nicolai Hartmann was rumored as a possible third candidate (see below, Husserl’s letter of January 6, 1931).
not want to do anything more with it, and it just could not be shortened any further. So I sent it off to England and still have no answer. An expanded version, which takes into consideration a topic that went untreated—the double meaning of psychology: as naturalistic and as humanistically oriented (my old antithesis)—should go into the *Jahrbuch* as an introduction to further publications.

Very cordial greetings from our family to yours,
Your faithful friend,
EH

[P.S.] But will we see each other soon? Are you going to travel to Todtnauberg? I need not mention that our guestroom is ready for you at any occasion.

**December 14, 1927: Edmund Husserl to Heidegger, and Malvine Husserl to Elfride Heidegger**

*Briefwechsel* 4, 149–50

Anticipating a visit over the Christmas holidays when Heidegger would be vacationing in nearby Todtnauberg, Husserl asks Heidegger to bring a summary of *Being and Time* with him, presumably for use with the hiring committee in the matter of Heidegger's possible succession to Husserl's chair.

(But how and when was Mrs. Husserl's fruit-cake to be delivered? Since the following letter was sent to both of the Heideggers, it would seem that Heidegger himself was in Marburg on this date and would soon be passing through Freiburg on his way to the cabin. But perhaps not with Mrs. Heidegger. On December 10, 1927 Heidegger wrote to Elisabeth Blochmann, “It's off to the cabin the week after next [i.e., December 18–24]. I would really love to take you along” [Heidegger and Blochmann, Briefwechsel, 23]. However that might be, it seems that Heidegger was planning to stop at the Husserls on his way through Freiburg and that the fruit-cake would be consigned to him at that time for eventual delivery to Mrs. Heidegger.)

[Edmund Husserl to Martin Heidegger:]

Freiburg in Breisgau, 14.XII.1927

Dear friend,

We are extraordinarily delighted that we will see you next week. Could you still draft the abstract [of *Being and Time*] that we discussed?—that would certainly be a great help to me. Meanwhile Becker is helping out very enthusiastically with a *systematic* summary of how the work unfolds and a detailed explanation of its most important basic concepts and the basic doctrines they designate. Only now do I see how much I was lacking in understanding, for I had not yet gotten it right on the chapters dealing with temporality and historicity. I forgot to write you that Szilasi has announced he will visit on the 21st [of December] and per-
haps spend Christmas Eve with us. I have heard nothing of any [committee] meeting. My wife was very happy to receive the letter from your wife.

Yours faithfully,
E H

[Malvine Husserl to Elfride Heidegger:]

Dear Mrs. Heidegger,

In the midst of baking, I just want to thank you cordially for the lovely lines you wrote. Will we see each other this time? There is a Christmas fruit-cake that your husband, who is making a stop here, will bring back with him.

With very best wishes,
Faithfully yours,
M. Husserl

December 26, 1927: Edmund Husserl to Dietrich Mahnke

[Briefwechsel 3, 456–57]

During the Christmas holidays, 1927–1928, Husserl gave Being and Time a close reading, and his letters to Mahnke and Ingarden on the day after Christmas express his growing disappointment with Heidegger. He is convinced that with this book Heidegger has taken distance from phenomenology in both “substance and method.”

Freiburg i. Br., the second day of Christmas, 1927

My dear old friend,

... De facto you are now in a full professor’s position, one that is very much better than I had throughout my entire period at Göttingen, because you join the faculty as the one whom the faculty itself wanted. What is more, as regards salary you are better off than Heidegger, and rightfully so, given your many years of teaching. But for him, being named to his regular professorship [etatsmässiger Ordinarius] was in amends for the wrongs they had done him. So amends have been made all around. I would also like to pin my hopes on your συμφιλοσοφεῖν [co-philosophizing] with Heidegger. You know how highly I esteem him as an upright and thoroughly genuine person and as a thinker of entirely singular originality. But that does not mean I blindly agree with him in matters of substance and method. In that regard, if I have it right, you are much closer to me. And so now in Marburg may you powerfully represent our common way [of thinking] while at the same time experiencing as much as possible the many impulses that come from the other way of thinking. Although Heidegger is younger than you, in many respects he must be further along because he did not go through the drudgery and was able to make philosophy the exclusive pursuit of his life, with the very powerful intensity and uncom-
mon fluency that is part of his nature. In addition he was my assistant for a number of years and was with me in constant communication with me, which certainly had its advantages. . . .

Cordially,
As ever, your loyal teacher,
E Husserl

December 26, 1927: Edmund Husserl to Roman Ingarden
[Briefwechsel 3, 236–37]

With Draft D of the Encyclopaedia Britannica article finally finished, Husserl tells Ingarden that Heidegger entirely misunderstands phenomenological method, and he chides Ingarden for not reporting back to him on Heidegger’s teaching at Marburg.

My dear friend,

. . . The new Encyclopaedia article has given me a lot of trouble, chiefly because once again and in an original way, I thought through my fundamental procedure and respectfully concluded that Heidegger, as I now must believe, has not understood this procedure nor, consequently, the whole sense of the method of phenomenological reduction. . . .

What more have you read of Heidegger’s works?

You wrote nothing about the method of his seminars, about how the participants work, about his lecture courses. Your proposals for yearly phenomenological gatherings (Heidegger already made a similar proposal a year ago) and for a critical journal make a lot of sense. At the moment I do not have any initiative. As we say in Austria, “The bull’s-eye is full.” . . .

Cordially
Your old teacher and friend
E Husserl

December 30, 1927: Malvine Husserl to Martin Heidegger
[Briefwechsel 4, 150–51]

Five days after Christmas, with the entire Heidegger family now lodged at the cabin and with the Szilasi family visiting in Todttauberg, Mrs. Husserl follows up with a letter requesting a visit from Heidegger. Reading between the lines, one gets a premonition of Husserl’s problems with Being and Time.

In any case, Heidegger came down from Todtnauberg to Freiburg to visit Husserl on Sunday, January 8, 1928, returning to his cabin the same day. Whether or not he managed to allay Husserl’s misgivings, Heidegger came away with a positive impression of the meeting. The following Wednesday he wrote to Elisabeth Blochmann: “Last
Sunday I walked down to Freiburg [from Todtnauberg] and had yet another beautiful, rich day with Husserl.”

Dear Mr. Heidegger,

My husband would like you to break your return trip [from Todtnauberg to Marburg] in such a way that you could give him a whole day for philosophical discussion of your book. He has devoted the entire [Christmas] vacation exclusively to studying the work, and he finds it indispensable to be instructed by you about a number of points that he cannot get entirely clear on.

On Wednesday the 4th we are having some guests in the evening, but the other days are free for you to choose.

Your delightful card from the Feldberg just arrived. We cordially reciprocate your New Year’s wishes. Christmas was very lovely for us. Our sadness at being away from our loved ones in Berlin and Kiel was mitigated by the many charming snapshots of the children—you too would be amazed at them. Tomorrow is the first meeting of the committee, for which my husband is arming himself mightily.

Cordial regards to the cabin-dwellers and to the Szilasis as well.

Yours,
Malvine Husserl

[P.S.] Write as soon as possible about when you will come so that my husband can put off everything else.

January 1, 1928: Edmund Husserl to Martin Heidegger

[Briefwechsel 4, 121]

Amidst his misgivings about Heidegger’s work, Husserl keeps his protégé abreast of the hiring committee’s decision to name Heidegger unico loco—as the one and only candidate—to replace Husserl in the chair of philosophy (in Seminar I) at the University of Freiburg.

Saturday, 21.1.1928

Dear friend,

The decision of the committee: unico loco. I need not add: do not breathe a word about this.

With our cordial regards,

E H

55. Heidegger and Blochmann, Briefwechsel, 23.
56. Gerhart Husserl had been appointed professor at Kiel in November 1926.
January 1928 (towards the end): Husserl’s recommendation of a successor to his chair (draft)
[Briefwechsel 8, 194–95]

As he had informed Heidegger earlier (see his letter of December 8, 1927), Husserl by statute could not be a voting member of, only a consultant to, the committee that would nominate his successor. In that capacity, and writing on behalf of the whole faculty, Husserl drafts a letter to be submitted to the Ministry of Education as the report of the hiring committee. Even though he fears Heidegger has already abandoned constitutive phenomenology, Husserl writes an extraordinarily strong recommendation that Heidegger succeed him in the chair of philosophy at the University of Freiburg.

... In its proposal to ... fill the ... chair of philosophy now being vacated, the philosophy department was guided by one thought above all: that the preeminent reputation which Freiburg has enjoyed for decades as a leading place to study philosophy had to be both preserved and advanced. With this in mind the faculty found that of all the philosophers whose seniority and merit had led them to be considered, there was but a single one whose exceptional powers as teacher and researcher offered a sure prospect of that: M. Heidegger, who was trained here in Freiburg and who is currently an associate professor in Marburg. What characterizes his professional work is the broad and deep grounding of his systematic research in historical, and especially ancient and medieval, philosophy. Already his first major work *The Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus* (1916) made him a name by its surprising discovery, within the history of [philosophical] problems, of parallels between the most recent philosophy and Scholastic philosophy. But of course it is his book *Being and Time* (Part I), just published last year, that has vaulted him into the first rank of contemporary philosophers. In that work he brilliantly engages those trends within W. Dilthey and phenomenology that aim at reorienting all philosophy towards a philosophy of spirit. For years before the book was published, the astonishing originality and radical consistency with which Heidegger sought to develop and enrich the basic ideas of these trends already had noticeable effect, but only within Heidegger’s impressive courses and seminars in Marburg. Without a doubt he now ranks among the most significant philosophical teachers of our time. The above indicates the special reasons why the faculty, in their proposal, has put forth M. Heidegger *unico loco*. It is worth adding that, given his well-know rootedness in his Alemanic homeland, M. Heidegger will certainly be inclined to accept such an offer to teach at his home university.

57. [Note by Theodore Kisiel:] A reference to Dietrich Mahnke, who a year earlier had received a much higher salary for his chair than Heidegger had got for his own.
January 30, 1928: Edmund Husserl to Martin Heidegger

Husserl informs Heidegger of progress within the Freiburg hiring committee—and about the discomfort of nicotine withdrawal, now that he has given up cigars.

Freiburg, Monday 30.I.28

Dear friend,

In the last meeting even my draft for the proposal to be made to the Ministry was accepted unanimously. This draft (as the report of the committee) will be submitted only on February 7, which is the next faculty meeting. The Ministry had required proposals only by the beginning of March. The offer will come only during [spring] vacation. Everything came off beautifully and very happily for you, and it will be equally so at the full faculty meeting.

I am going through a less than agreeable time. The doctor has absolutely forbidden me to smoke. For nine days now I have not had a puff. The world feels very strange now, and not least of all my own manuscripts. To be sure, my insomnia has been transformed into lethargy, but all the remaining bad symptoms of nicotine poisoning have apparently disappeared. I am feeling better again, and my appetite and digestion are in order. Now we will have to see when I shall be really able to think again. One cannot just keep going out for walks.

Many regards,
Your disabled,
E H

February 7, 1928: Edmund Husserl to Martin Heidegger

Husserl tells Heidegger how well his candidacy has been progressing within the hiring committee. Next step: the forwarding of his unico loco nomination to the Ministry of Education.

Freiburg, 7.II.1928, late evening

Dear friend,

In today’s faculty meeting the committee report and the proposal to present you to the Ministry unico loco passed unanimously!

Over the weekend I was in Hinterzarten for three days, and I hope I can now take things in hand again. Stopping smoking generally has done me good except that I cannot really work yet.
With cordial regards and best wishes from both of us,
Yours,
E H

March 5, 1928: Edmund Husserl to Martin Heidegger

[Briefwechsel 4, 152–53]

On Saturday, February 25, 1928, Heidegger had received the official “call” to be Husserl’s successor in the chair of philosophy at Freiburg, effective October 1 of that year. On Wednesday, February 29, 1928, Husserl and Heidegger met in Freiburg as each was going his separate way to vacations in the Black Forest: Heidegger to Todtnauberg, Husserl to Breitnau. It was during this meeting that Husserl consigned to Heidegger the manuscript of the lectures on internal time-consciousness, which Heidegger had agreed to edit. By accident, however, Husserl had left inside the folder of the manuscript some four pages from Draft E (Christopher V. Salmon’s controversial “translation” and editing) of the Encyclopaedia Britannica article on phenomenology. Husserl had already corrected these pages but had failed to send them back to Salmon in Oxford. Thus on March 5, 1928, Husserl sent the following letter to Heidegger in Todtnauberg.

[Breitnau]
Monday [March 5, 1928]

Dear friend,

In the folder with the time manuscript (which originally I had wanted to take with me to Breitnau) there are some pages from the English version of my Encyclopaedia Article: Salmon’s typewritten pages, to which I added corrections. Would you please send these pages, as my corrections, directly to Chr. V. Salmon, Oxford, 14 St. Giles, with a simple note saying they are from me. I am also writing to him directly.

I got a sore throat in Breitnau, with a cold, etc., so despite the wonderful weather I had to come home already on Sunday [March 4]. Fortunately it is not a flu, but I still have to stay in bed about two more days and gulp down aspirin.

Many regards. Surely you are enjoying the lovely weather. Are you able to ski [in Todtnauberg]?

All the best to your wife,
Yours,
E H
May 9, 1928: Edmund Husserl to Martin Heidegger

[Briefwechsel 4, 156–57]

Upon returning from his trip to Holland, where he had delivered his lectures on psychological and transcendental phenomenology, Husserl wrote Heidegger two letters on the same day, full of details about the trip. Only the first of the two bears on Heidegger.

The “Foreword” that Husserl mentions below is the manuscript of Heidegger’s foreword to Husserl’s lectures on inner time-consciousness. Husserl gently objects to the title that Heidegger proposed for the work, and suggests two other titles, of which the first was finally chosen. Husserl was not pleased with Heidegger’s editing job. On July 28, 1928 he complained to Ingarden, “[The lectures will soon be published] unchanged, merely cleaned up a bit as regards style, and edited by Heidegger. I didn’t even get to see the revisions” (Briefwechsel 3, 214). See also his letter to Rickert, December 26, 1928. The work was published as “Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins,” Jahrbuch für Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Forschung IX (1928), 367–498.

My dear friend,

Many thanks for your Foreword. Entirely appropriate! I have written to Niemeyer about expediting the printing. The fault is all Kaufmann’s. Are you already finished with the time-manuscript? Do we really want to call it just “Time-Consciousness”? Should it not be “On the Phenomenology of Inner Time-Consciousness” or “On the Phenomenology of Immanent Time-Consciousness”?

Regards to the two of you from my wife and me.

Yours faithfully

E Husserl

July 10, 1928: Malvine Husserl to Martin Heidegger

[Briefwechsel 4, 158]

The galleys of Husserl’s lectures on internal time consciousness contained an ironic error: Heidegger was listed as the author rather than the editor. Mrs. Husserl writes to warn Heidegger of the error.

58. Fritz Kaufmann apparently had been late in submitting his manuscript “Die Philosophie des Grafen Paul Yorck von Wartenburg,” which would be published in the same issue as Husserl’s contribution, 1–235.
Freiburg i. Br. 10. July 28

Dear Mr. Heidegger,

Along with the “Conclusion” of Landgrebe’s text,59 there also arrive the first two pages of my husband’s time-article. You too must certainly have noticed the error in the running title on the left-hand page, where, in place of “Edmund Husserl” your name appears. In any case I wanted to call it to your attention.

Cordial regards. We are delighted we will see you again soon.60 Perhaps my husband will write you before [you leave on vacation]. Kiel was a great surprise, certainly not pleasant.61 Wi . . . 62 has requested my husband’s opinions on your proposals. He will respond tomorrow.

Yours truly,
M. H.

The Second Freiburg Period, December 1928 to March 1934

December 26, 1928: Edmund Husserl to Heinrich Rickert

[Briefwechsel 5, 186]

Husserl tells Rickert of his work on Formal and Transcendental Logic, which would appear a few months later in the Jahrbuch X (1929), and he takes the occasion to express dissatisfaction with Heidegger’s edition of the lectures on internal time-consciousness.

Freiburg i. Br., 26.XII.1928

Esteemed colleague,

. . . Perhaps this work [Formal and Transcendental Logic] will meet with some interest on your part, more that the virtually unreadable notes from my lectures of 1905, which Heidegger has just brought out. . . .

With highest regards
Your
E Husserl

60. Mrs. Husserl is probably referring to a future visit when Heidegger would be passing through Freiburg on his way to Todtnauberg in late July.
61. In May 1928, the philosophy faculty at Kiel submitted two lists of proposed successors to Professor Schulz. One list put Moritz Geiger in first place, the other put Richard Kroner at the top.
62. That is, the Minister Wolfgang Windelband.
June 27, 1929: Edmund Husserl to Georg Misch

[Briefwechsel 6, 274–75]


Dear colleague,

In response I am writing you just a few lines—because if I really got started in earnest I would not know how to stop—with some questions and answers concerning the text you dedicated to me, which moved me very much. . . .

Perhaps, as I would certainly like to, I may respond in writing (whether I can will have to be seen: see above). Your discussion with Heidegger—or, if you prefer, the Dilthey-Heidegger controversy—touches on me as well insofar as it involves the unavoidable discussion between Dilthey and Husserl. You may be unaware of the fact that some conversations I had with Dilthey in Berlin in 1905 (rather than his writings) were one of the stimuli that moved the Husserl of the Logical Investigations toward the Husserl of Ideas, and that the complete and concrete phenomenology of the Ideas—which I presented only incompletely in that book and worked out concretely and completely really only between 1913 and 1925—led to a close association with Dilthey’s work, although my method takes an essentially different form.

August 3, 1929: Edmund Husserl to Georg Misch

[Briefwechsel 6, 276 ff.]

On his own account Husserl devoted July and August, 1929, to a second and very close reading of Being and Time. In the middle of that effort he attended Heidegger’s Inaugural Lecture at the University of Freiburg, “What Is Metaphysics?” (July 24, 1929), a text that only confirmed that an abyss had widened between Husserl and Heidegger. A few days later Husserl took the occasion of a letter to Georg Misch to accuse Heidegger of abandoning constitutive phenomenology.

Freiburg i. Br. 3.August 1929
Lorettostr. 40

My dear colleague,

. . . In this, the letter of response that I promised you [on June 27], you should un-

63. See Briefwechsel 2, 184 (“two months”) and Fritz Heinemann, Existentialism and the Modern Predicament (New York: Harper, 1953), 48 (which refers to Husserl’s two readings of Being and Time).
derstand phenomenology not the way Scheler does but rather the way it emerges in context (as it does in the *Ideas*) “constitutively,” i.e., as bound up with the essential correlation between consciousness and being. Likewise the “relativity of nature” does not refer to an infinite succession of relations between natural objects within the general unity of nature. Rather, it refers (again, constitutively) to the fact that nature-as-such *qua* experienced, both the nature of sense perception and the nature of natural science, (which both we and the scientist take as always simply in being and valid as being) is *relative* to the current constitutive subjectivity (intersubjectivity, a community of researchers in their specific historical time). I myself understood that at this point I had already abandoned any absolute being of nature (and any absolutely valid natural laws). I further understood that in spite of the somewhat rough *Logos* article [“Philosophy as Rigorous Science”], which was intended to be “popular” (!), I nonetheless understood phenomenology as a radical and universal “humanistic science,” in a far more radical way than Dilthey did, due to the phenomenological reduction (which I first explicitly addressed in my lectures of 190764)—whereas Dilthey stuck to the historical humanistic sciences, and consequently to the already given world, and to anthropology. That is what Heidegger also does in his brilliant book [*Being and Time*], which abandons my method of constitutive phenomenology but without satisfying its requirements, as I am convinced. I have much more to say: Only now in my publications am I beginning to clarify what the *Ideas* (a mere fragment) were aiming at, something that was realized and advanced over the next 15 years. I hope to show constitutive phenomenology as the *unum necessarium.*65 . . .

With friendly regards,

Yours,

E Husserl

December 2, 1929: Edmund Husserl to Roman Ingarden

[Briefwechsel 3, 254]

_Husserl, who spent July and August of 1929 reading not only Being and Time but also Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics and *“On the Essence of Ground” (“Vom Wesen des Grundes”) here sums up his negative evaluation of Heidegger’s work._

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65. The phrase is from the Gospel of Luke 10:42, where Jesus declares that, in listening to his words, Mary the sister of Martha had done “the one thing necessary.”
Freiburg, 2.XII.1929

Dear friend,

... At the moment I am terribly tired, but happy that I will soon be able to relax, as I must. And what about my exhaustive “study of Heidegger”? I came to the conclusion that I can not admit his work within the framework of my phenomenology and that unfortunately I must also reject it in its entirety as regards method, and in the essentials as regards content....

Faithfully yours,
E Husserl

March 15, 1930: Edmund Husserl to George Dawes Hicks (draft)

[Briefwechsel 6, 181–82]

In discussing Gilbert Ryle’s review of Heidegger’s Being and Time (Mind 38 [1929], 355–70), Husserl loses no time in telling George Dawes Hicks of Cambridge about Heidegger’s philosophical heresies.

Dear colleague,

... Many thanks for your kind communication about the lectures of Mssrs. G. Ryle and C. V. Salmon in Cambridge and London. I am familiar with Mr. Ryle’s careful review of Heidegger in Mind, in which he also discusses my phenomenology but without understanding its full meaning and scope. Since Heidegger absolutely does not follow my method and does anything but advance the descriptive and intentional phenomenology I sketched out in Ideas, the objections Ryle directs against Heidegger in no way touch me. My forthcoming texts will deal at great length with the relation between transcendental phenomenology and psychology. In Part II of my Formal and Transcendental Logic, in dealing with the problem of “transcendental psychologism,” I provide some brief clarifications of this.

My transcendental phenomenology—not the phenomenologies of those who, with a great flourish, call themselves phenomenologists—is an attempt to renew the original idea of philosophy as the universal science (which encompasses within itself all possible particular sciences) and to shape it by way of a systematic process into the strictest scientific form imaginable—in other words, into the form of an “absolute” justification of each and every step of cognition. This includes a principled regrounding of all natural and humanistic sciences (all problems of

66. On December 2, 1929, Christopher V. Salmon spoke to the Aristotelian Society of London on the topic “The Starting-point of Husserl’s Philosophy,” the text of which was then published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society n.s. 30 (1930), 55–78.
foundations and of paradoxes are phenomenological problems). Eidetic phenomenology as “first philosophy” includes a radical reform of psychology. It implicitly entails a pure intentional and apriori psychology, sharply distinguished in its sense and method from the naturalistic psychology of the last century, but also distinct from the psychology of Brentano’s school. Mr. Ryle is also very much in error if he means that phenomenological idealism is a “solipsism." He has underestimated the import of the phenomenological reduction—and that is my own fault, because the Ideas remained a fragment; only in Part II was the phenomenology of Intersubjectivity to be dealt with. . .

E Husserl

December 22, 1930: Edmund Husserl to Martin Heidegger

[Briefwechsel 4, 159]

Heidegger had promised Husserl that he would write to his friend Julius Stenzel in Kiel in support of Ludwig Landgrebe’s habilitation at that university. Heidegger, however, had failed to do so. Husserl here inquires about the matter. (See also the letters of October 1, 1931, and May 29, 1932, below.)

My dear colleague,

Have you have any answer from Kiel yet? How happy I would be were I able to give the very depressed Dr. Landgrebe (who is currently with his in-laws) some good news. Dr. Reiner has had better luck. He has had such a warm reception in Halle that he will even be able to do his habilitation in the winter semester. 69

With warmest regards for the holidays and best wishes from our family to yours.

Your

E Husserl

22.XII.30

January 1, 1931: Edmund Husserl to Alexander Pfänder

[Briefwechsel 2, 180–86; translated by Burt C. Hopkins; introduced by Thomas Sheehan]

On January 2, 1931, Husserl’s old friend and colleague Alexander Pfänder of Munich wrote to Husserl about Mrs. Pfänder’s grave illness and about Pfänder’s own

68. On p. 362 of his review of Being and Time, Ryle wrote: “There is thus a progressive trend visible in the philosophy of Husserl and his followers towards a rarified Subjective Idealism or even Solipsism.”

69. In November 1930, Hans Reiner transferred to the University of Halle to do his habilitation under Professor Emil Utitz, completing it in May 1931.
disappointment, reaching back to 1928, over the fact that Heidegger rather than Pfänder had succeeded Husserl in Freiburg. Pfänder had written, “For ten years you told everyone who would listen that you would name me as your successor . . . Your behavior strikes me as a great disloyalty that leaves me deeply wounded” (Briefwechsel 2, 179). Profoundly shaken, Husserl responds with his longest and most detailed account of his disappointment with Heidegger (and even with Pfänder himself).

Freiburg in Breisgau, Jan. 6, 1931
40 Loretto Street

Dear colleague:

Your letter shook me so profoundly that I was unable to answer it as immediately as I should have. I am continuously concerned with it in my thoughts. Judge for yourself whether I have not inflicted more pain on myself than on you, and whether I may not ethically regard this guilt towards you and blame towards myself as stemming from the best conscience, something I have had to accept, and still must accept, as my fate.

Clarifying the matter requires that I lay out a part of my life history. I had quickly realized that the project for Parts II and III of my Ideas was inadequate, and in an effort (beginning in the autumn of 1912) to improve them and to shape in a more concrete and differentiated fashion the horizon of the problems they disclosed, I got involved in new and wide-ranging investigations. (These included the phenomenology of the person and personalities of a higher order, culture, the human environment in general; the transcendental phenomenology of “empathy” and the theory of transcendental intersubjectivity, the “transcendental aesthetic” as the phenomenology of the world purely as the world of experience, time and individualization, the phenomenology of association as the theory of the constitutive achievements of passivity, the phenomenology of the logos, the phenomenological problematic of “metaphysics,” etc.) These investigations stretched all through the work-filled Freiburg years, and the manuscripts grew to an almost unmanageable extent. As the manuscripts grew, so too did my ever increasing apprehension about whether, in my old age, I would be able to bring to completion what had been entrusted to me. This impasioned work led to repeated setbacks and repeated states of depression. In the end I was left with an all-pervading fundamental mood of depression, a dangerous collapse of confidence in myself.

It was during this period that Heidegger began to mature—for a number of years he was constantly at my side as my close assistant. He behaved entirely like a student of my work and a future collaborator who, as regards all the essentials of method and problematic, would hold the ground of my constitutive phenomenology. My growing impression of his extraordinary natural talent, of his absolute devotion to philosophy, of the powerful energy of this young man’s thought finally
led me to an excessive assessment of his future importance for scientific phenomenology in my sense of the term. Because I realized that no one among the phenomenologists of the Göttingen and Munich tradition followed me in earnest; and because I had an absolute inner certitude that the phenomenological reduction and the transcendental constitutive structuring of philosophy would mean a “Copernican” revolution for philosophy; and because I felt overwhelmed with the burden of responsibility for guaranteeing that, it is understandable how I came to place the greatest hopes in Heidegger. Yes, that was the great, up-lifting hope: to open up for him (presumably my one true student) the unsuspected breadth of my investigations, and to prepare him for his own discoveries—that was a great, up-lifting hope. Time and again we talked of working together, of his collaboration in completing my investigations. We talked about how he would take charge of my manuscripts when I passed away, publishing the ones that were the fully developed, and generally about how he would carry on my philosophy as a framework for all future work.

When he went to Marburg, I regarded his enormous success as a teacher as if it were my own. His visits during [the academic] vacations were joyful events, highly prized opportunities to speak my mind with him and to inform him of my developments. To be sure, in the course of these visits, just as during the Freiburg years, he was rather vague or silent regarding the development of his own ideas. I, as usual, held firmly to my extravagant idea of his genius; inwardly I was virtually convinced that the future of phenomenological philosophy would be entrusted to him, and that he would not only become my heir but also surpass me.

Certainly when Being and Time appeared in 1927 I was surprised by the new-fangled language and style of thinking. Initially, I trusted his emphatic declaration: It was the continuation of my own research. I got the impression of an exceptional, albeit unclarified, intellectual energy, and I worked hard and honestly to penetrate and appreciate it. Faced with theories so inaccessible to my way of thinking, I did not want to admit to myself that he might surrender both the method of my phenomenological research and its scientific character in general. Somehow or other the fault had to lie with me; it might lie with Heidegger only insofar as he was too quick to jump into problems of a higher level. He himself constantly denied that he would abandon my transcendental phenomenology, and he referred me to his forthcoming Volume Two. Given my low self-confidence at the time, I preferred to doubt myself and my ability to follow and appreciate the movement of someone else’s thinking rather than to doubt him. That explains why I entrusted to him the editing of my 1905 lectures on time (something that I afterwards had occasion enough to regret); and why I submitted to him (!) for his criticisms my rough draft of an article for the Encyclopaedia Britannica, and together with him (!) tried to reorganize it (which of course promptly miscarried). I might mention that I had been warned often enough: Heidegger’s phenomenology is something
totally different from mine; rather than furthering the development of my scientific works, his university lectures as well as his book are, on the contrary, open or veiled attacks on my works, directed at discrediting them on the most essential points. When I used to relate such things to Heidegger in a friendly way, he would just laugh and say: Nonsense!

Thus, when it came down to choosing my successor, obsessed as I was with the idea of assuring the future of the transcendental phenomenology I had founded, I saw him as the only one who was up to the task, and so I had to decide unconditionally in his favor. I appeased my inner misgivings with the thought that his call to Marburg may have taken him away too soon from my instruction and influence. When he would come back to my side—especially when he would learn about the important clarifications I had struggled to achieve in the meantime—he would reach his full maturity and get beyond his raw brilliance. He himself readily agreed: Our common life in Freiburg would be one of profound intellectual exchange and steady philosophical continuity.—

This blindness arose from a profound exigency—from a sense of overwhelming scientific responsibility—and God help me, it was blindness, caused basically by the fact that I felt so completely isolated, like an appointed leader without followers, that is, without collaborators in the radical new spirit of transcendental phenomenology.

As regards you, dear colleague, what has never changed are my feelings of friendship, my high esteem for your professional seriousness, for the exemplary solidness of your work. But one thing has changed: I have lost my earlier belief that you recognized the revolutionary significance of the phenomenological reduction and of the transcendental-constitutive phenomenology that arises from it, my belief that you and your students would share in the immense problematic of its meaning.—As for the rest, you should not overlook the role your age inevitably played in the question of filling the chair (you were 58 in 1928). In that regard, at best you might have made the list in merely an honorary capacity, and the way things stood, that possibly would have been in third place, and even that would have been very unlikely. But for your own sake I could not let this happen. Whoever might sponsor you could not be a member of the committee. In the committee, it is true, I certainly did make mention of you; but you were not considered more closely in further discussions. There was not much discussion among the faculty, since from the beginning the mood was only for Heidegger and Cassirer. Only Cassirer presented any occasion for questions (possibly N. Hartmann, too?), which I had to answer.70

However, I still have to tell you how things subsequently turned out between Heidegger and me. After he took over the chair, our exchanges lasted about two

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70. See the n. 56 above.
months. Then, with complete amicability, it was over. He removed himself from every possibility of professional discussion, even in the simplest form. Clearly such discussion was an unnecessary, unwanted, uneasy matter for him.

I see him once every couple of months, even less frequently than my other colleagues.

The success of the Paris lectures, along with *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, which were wrung from me at the same time (both in the course of four months), has given me back—and this is a great turn-about—the confidence in my powers. In looking back over the situation of my works since 1913 I realized that all the major lines have been sketched out now, more that I ever would have ventured to hope. [This is] enough for the writing of a concluding work whose plan has burdened me for a decade. Immediately after the printing of my last book, in order to come to a clear-headed and definitive position on Heideggerian philosophy, I devoted two months to studying *Being and Time* along with his more recent writings. I arrived at the distressing conclusion that philosophically I have nothing to do with this Heideggerian profundity, with this brilliant but unscientific genius; that Heidegger’s criticism, both open and veiled, is based on a gross misunderstanding; that he may be involved in the formation of a philosophical system of the kind which I have always considered it my life’s work to render impossible forever. Everybody except me saw this long ago. I have not withheld my conclusion from Heidegger.

I pass no judgment on his personality—it has become incomprehensible to me. For almost a decade he was my closest friend; naturally that is all over now: Inability to understand each other precludes friendship. This reversal in professional esteem and personal relations was one of the most difficult ordeals of my life. And that includes its consequences, including your changed relationship to me because of the insult I apparently inflicted on you. Do you now understand why I failed to write as frequently as I would have wanted?

It has saddened me deeply to hear that you and your wife have suffered so much because of illness. I reiterate my own and my wife’s cordial best wishes. My best wishes too for the completion of your work. My relation to you is clear. Nothing will change my feelings of friendship and my high esteem for you.

Your old friend,
E. Husserl

[P.S.] I urge you, please treat this letter with discretion. How I may stand philosophically ["wissenschaftlich"] to Heidegger I have expressed plainly at every opportunity. There is gossip enough now, and my personal disappointment with Heidegger, etc. is nobody else’s business.
A week after the letter to Pfänder, Husserl again unburdens himself about Heidegger, with deep emotion, this time to Dietrich Mahnke, who replaced Heidegger’s at Marburg.

Freiburg i. Br., 8.I.1931
Lorettostr. 40
Dear friend,

. . . And then there is the personal situation of my old age, of which you know nothing, the isolation that my age and my retirement as an emeritus have brought with them, my professional isolation, and the enormous disillusionment I have had to go through with Heidegger, who for ten long years I had looked upon as my closest friend. The way I am, I commit myself to a friendship for life, and separating from a (supposed) friend cuts to the core of my very being. What took place was not a break in the usual sense; rather, right from the beginning, after he moved back here (with the exception of the first few months) he stopped coming to visit me. Then there were month-long absences, which obviously made any kind of philosophical exchange impossible. He knew that I entirely disapproved of his development following the appearance of his book, and by a close and repeated study of Being and Time I came to the conclusion that his “phenomenology” has not the least thing to do with my own, and I view its pseudo-scientific character as an obstacle to the development of philosophy. Even my other students, those of an earlier time, have taken their distance from me. They are blind to the decisive new beginning and radical overturning that was only prepared for in my Logical Investigations, that achieved a breakthrough in my Ideas, and that, in opposition to the philosophy of the systems, opens up a rigorously scientific philosophy (a “metaphysics,” if you will, as the most rigorous science). So it is that, in these times when “existential philosophy” is threatening to become the domineering fashion, I feel quite isolated. . . .

Here [in Freiburg] it is the case that Heidegger has his own people, and it is obvious that he distances himself entirely from me, so that he is not bothered by my students. . . .

If you see any possibilities in it, I would of course also write personally to Jaensch, if he is not upset with me over Heidegger. For the rest, as regards what I have written about Heidegger to you, my friend, I ask you very seriously to keep it absolutely confidential. There is plenty enough gossip around already. Of course I often say openly that I separate my phenomenology entirely from Heidegger’s so-called phenomenology. (Unfortunately, for all too long I lived in an illusion and because I personally overestimated him and, in my occasional low self-esteem, long
believed that I did not entirely understand him and that his new paths improved upon and furthered my own!) But I do not want anything I have said to give occasion for people to go gossiping about this personal alienation. Please, dear friend, write me soon about how you see matters. Write me soon and at length. . . .

Your old and faithful friend
E Husserl

October 1, 1931: Edmund Husserl to Ludwig Landgrebe

[Briefwechsel 4, 269–70]

While discussing Landgrebe's on-going search for a job (see the letters of December 22, 1931, above, and May 28, 1932, below), Husserl cannot avoid mentioning Heidegger and his unfavorable opinion of Landgrebe. Husserl also discusses Werner Brock. For Brock's later experiences with Heidegger, see the letter of May 28, 1932, below.

Dear Doctor,

I am writing you amidst a veritable paroxysm of work. The business of the distribution of fellowships is of great importance since you have not been taken under the wing of Richter, the powerful director of the Ministry [of education]. He will look into how you are proving yourself, and then he will provide you with assistance.

Professor Becker's call to Bonn opens up eventual possibilities for you there. Naturally I have spoken with him about the matter and thrown all my weight behind your case. Of course he first has to check the lay of the land. I mean: it could happen, since there are not too many lecturers there right now. Unfortunately, I heard that Professor Heidegger is not very taken with you. It seems that what you told him about your work, about your topic and its development, did not please him very much. And it seems that Professor Becker, who was originally very taken with you because of your doctoral dissertation, has become a bit skeptical because of Professor Heidegger's remarks. And unfortunately Becker is strongly dependent on Heidegger. While I would not keep this a secret from you, you should of course treat it with absolute discretion—say nothing about it to your wife, since it is useless to tell her all the negative and troublesome stuff. But I had to tell you about this lest you get caught up in illusions. . . .

Supposedly Professor Heidegger (whom I have not seen in three months—he avoids discussing departmental matters with me) has decided to appoint, as Becker's replacement in the assistantship position, his favorite student Brook (or however it is spelled: I only just heard this name), who just completed his qualifying dissertation with Misch in Göttingen. 71 There is the question of whether Misch might
now be inclined to grant you a position at Göttingen. Unfortunately I do not know whether it is already a done deal, whether Brook [i.e., Brock] will really come to Freiburg, whether the administration here in Baden is willing to support the position—I do not know how long it will be until I am better informed and could give you some advice or even write to Misch. In any case this is the way matters stand.

January 2, 1932: Edmund Husserl to Martin Heidegger (copy)
[Briefwechsel 4, 159]

Heidegger had written at the New Year to wish Husserl continual success in his work. Husserl responds.

Freiburg i. Br., 2.I.1932

Dear colleague,

Cordial thanks for your good wishes for the new year. In fact I have behind me a fruitful year of work that illuminated many things for me. So you could wish me nothing better than that it keep on going—which I reciprocate as my best wish for you. Of course all the best to your wife (with thanks for her greetings too) and to your children. And the same from my wife.

With collegial regards,
Your old
E. Husserl

February 3, 1932: Malwine Husserl to Elisabeth Rosenberg
[Briefwechsel 9, 401–2]

Dr. Eduard Baumgarten, a German student of American philosophy, had lectured at the University of Wisconsin in the 1920s before returning to his native Germany to do advanced research under Heidegger. The two have struck up a close friendship. By 1929 Baumgarten was Heidegger’s assistant at Freiburg, and Heidegger and his wife became the godparents of Baumgarten’s son. On October 2, 1929, some three years before Hitler came to power, Heidegger wrote a letter to the Society for the Support of German Science recommending Baumgarten, and he offered his reasons why the Society should give financial aid to this young scholar who was not a Jew:

... I would like to say more clearly in this letter what I could only hint at indirectly in my report: It is nothing less than the urgent consideration that we are faced with a choice, either to provide our German intellectual life once more with real talents and educators rooted in our own soil or to hand over that intellectual life

ifying dissertation (on the philosophical foundations of biology) under Moritz Geiger at Göttingen. Soon thereafter he was named Heidegger’s assistant at Freiburg.
once and for all to the growing influence of the Jews [Verjudung] in the broad and narrow sense. We will find our way back only if we are able, without baiting and without useless arguments, to assist budding talents in their development.

Regarding this important objective, I would be especially grateful if Mr. Baumgarten, whom I have selected to be my assistant, could be helped with a grant. 72 . . .

But late in 1931 the two had a falling out when Heidegger refused to support Baumgarten’s work on American pragmatism. Mrs. Husserl’s mentions the matter in this letter to her daughter Elli. Later, with Husserl’s help (see below, May 31, 1932) Baumgarten left Freiburg to teach American philosophy and culture at the University of Göttingen.

3. February 32
Dear Elli,

. . . Last week the Baumgartens were here for the evening and poured out their heavy hearts to us. In the extremely precarious situation into which Heidegger (most cruelly, one can say) has thrust them, they comport themselves in exemplary fashion. We stand beside them with our help, as do all those who know them well and understand the catastrophe—for example, von Möllendorf, professor of anatomy here in Freiburg, 73 and his wife, Marianne Weber (Eduard’s aunt), 74 Professor Jaspers of Heidelberg, and others. They send both of you their cordial regards. . . .

With love,
Mama

May 28, 1932: Edmund Husserl to Ludwig Landgrebe
[Briefwechsel 4, 288–89]

In April of 1932, with Germany on the verge of anarchy, Hitler lost the presidential election to incumbent Paul von Hindenberg. The following letter to Landgrebe, written a few weeks after the election, contains Husserl’s first allusion to Heidegger’s anti-Semitism and to Heidegger’s support for the Nazis. (For more in that regard, see the letter of May 4, 1933, below, as well as the anecdotes that Eduard Baumgarten re-


73. Professor Wilhelm Hermann von Möllendorff (1877–1944) had been director of the Anatomical Institute in Freiburg since 1927. He would serve as rector of the University of Freiburg for only five days (April 15–20, 1933) before resigning in a quiet protest against the Nazis. His successor in the job would be Heidegger.

74. Marianne Weber was the widow of the sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920) and the aunt of Eduard Baumgarten.
lated to David Luban, as recorded in Berel Lang, Heidegger’s Silence [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996], 104–8.)

Two months later, in the election of July 31, the Nazis would poll 37.2% of the vote (their highest ever in an election) and would garner 230 seats in the Reichstag. At that point the party numbered 800,000 members but was supported by as many 13.7 million Germans at the ballot box. On August 31, President von Hindenberg would offer Hitler the office of vice-chancellor, only to be turned down. Then in the elections of November 6, 1932, the Nazis would suffer a major set-back from their July high: the loss of 2 million votes. The following letter is clear about Heidegger’s anti-Semitism.

Freiburg, 28.V.32

Dear Doctor,

I wrote to Heimsoeth right away yesterday and also suggested that you might be able to give a lecture in Cologne.

I am delighted at the happy outcome of your lecture in Hamburg. A letter to Misch could not hurt, although Göttingen will hardly be a suitable place for a habilitation. It is not out of the question that Brock, whom people are talking about, will not stay here, that he might re-qualify himself as a lecturer back at Göttingen, which would mean yet one more candidate there. (Since Heidegger has gone over to National Socialism and to crude anti-Semitism, Brock is in a bad situation. As it happened, Heidegger rushed to bring him here as his assistant without knowing that Brock is a Jew. Naturally that has resulted in an awkward situation for Brock, who on his part did not have the least inkling of Heidegger’s anti-Semitism. For the rest he continues, as before, to make a good impression.)

In friendship,
Yours,
E. Husserl

May 31, 1932: Edmund Husserl to Elisabeth Rosenberg
[Briefwechsel 9, 406]

Husserl tells his daughter of the efforts he is making on behalf of Eduard Baumgarten, whom Heidegger had rejected in such a callous way.

Dear Elli,

... Today Eduard Baumgarten told me about the lovely and welcome letter he had from you and about your package [of children’s clothes], which made him, his wife, and his children very happy. Well, I am methodically making a great effort on his behalf—letters to Grimme, Simons, Professor Hect, Göttingen, etc., and it is again

75. Walter Simons (1861–1937) had been a professor of law at Leipzig since 1927.
becoming clear that he is a lucky kid: everything comes to him and appears to succeed with him—with a professorship at our beloved Göttingen! (although without a regular salary; it’s something like a professorship with a stipend). What luck that Heidegger sent him away, although in such an awful way. . . .

With a thousand regards,

Father

June 21, 1932: Malvine Husserl to Elisabeth Rosenberg

[Husserl has done everything he can to get Eduard Baumgarten a position at Göttingen, but nothing seems to be happening. Mrs. Husserl tells her daughter of the fear that Heidegger, who continues to quarrel with Baumgarten, may have written a letter to Göttingen blackballing him (“a Uriah letter”).

In fact after Baumgarten had been appointed to Göttingen, Heidegger did just that. On December 16, 1933 he wrote a damming letter to Dr. Vogel, head of the organization of Nazi professors at Göttingen, accusing Baumgarten of academic incompetence, of being “very Americanized” and having “liberal-democratic” intellectual tendencies, of associating with “the Jew Fränkel” who was fired from Göttingen under Nazi racial laws, and of having suspicious “political instincts.” Baumgarten was fired from the job and only on appeal managed to get reinstated.

[Freiburg]
[June 21, 1932]

Dear Elli,

. . . Yesterday Baumgarten visited us with his uncle from Kiel.76 The uncle is traveling to Göttingen on his own business and wanted to talk with Papa about the possibility of a visit with Nohl, since for weeks now nothing has stirred there and one may be rightfully apprehensive whether will be a good outcome to something that began so brilliantly. One fears that Heidegger may have written a Uriah letter,77 especially since he had yet another clash with Baumgarten a short while ago. . . .

Cordially,

Mama

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Hans Hecht (1876–1946) had been professor of English philology at Göttingen since 1922.

76. Otto Baumgarten (1858–1934) taught practical theology at Kiel until 1926, when he became emeritus.

77. 2 Samuel 11 recounts how King David, after impregnating Bathsheba, the wife of Uriah the Hittite, plotted Uriah’s death. Joab, David’s general was besieging the Ammonite
January 25, 1933: Malvine Husserl to the Rosenbergs

*Brifewechsel* 9, 416

Husserl invited Heidegger to his home for a “philosophers’ tea” on January 23, 1933, to a celebration in honor of the 50th anniversary of Husserl’s doctorate (1883). Heidegger accepted the invitation. The party took place just a week before Hitler came to power. Mrs. Husserl writes to her daughter and son-in-law:

Dear children,

... It was a very successful celebration in the best sense: it is impossible to imagine greater cordiality, appreciation, and respect. (What is more, Heidegger and his wife were also there.) ...

With love,
Mama

April 29, 1933: Elfride Heidegger to Malvine Husserl (copy)

*Brifewechsel* 4, 160–61

Less than two months after Adolf Hitler became chancellor, the Enabling Act of March 23, 1933, suspended democratic rule in Germany and concentrated all power in Hitler’s hands. Anti-Semitic laws were enacted almost immediately. The Civil Service Law of April 4, 1933 mandated the retirement of all civil servants, including professors, who were not of Aryan descent, but it exempted those who had fought for the Reich during the Great War. The Husserls’ younger son, Wolfgang, had died at Verdun on March 8, 1916, and his older brother Gerhard was wounded twice, the second time (1916) severely. That notwithstanding, Gerhart Husserl was forcibly retired from his position as professor of law at the University of Kiel.

Meanwhile Professor Wilhelm von Möllendorf, the rector of the University of Freiburg since April 15, resigned five days after his appointment rather than carry out the Nazi program for the “alignment” (Gleichschaltung) of the university with the regime. The next day, April 20, Heidegger accepted election as the new rector of the university, and 12 days later he would officially enter the Nazi Party. On April 28, the Civil Service Law of April 4 was suspended, and Husserl along with other Jewish professors were reinstated at the University of Freiburg. Gerhart Husserl, however, was not reinstated at Kiel.

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city of Rabbah, and Uriah was Joab’s armor-bearer. “David wrote a letter to Joab, which he sent by Uriah. In it he directed: ‘Place Uriah up front, where the fighting is fierce. Then pull back and leave him to be struck down dead.’ So while Joab was besieging the city, he assigned Uriah to a place where he knew the defenders were strong. When the men of the city made a sortie against Joab, some officers of David’s army fell, and among them died Uriah the Hittite.” 2 Samuel 11:14–17.
In the following letter it is not Heidegger himself but his wife Elfride—both of them supported the Nazis—who writes to the Husserls to thank them for their support throughout the 1920s, to review the last six years of their relationship, and to offer sympathy over Gerhart Husserl’s problems. The effect of the letter was to outrage rather than placate the Husserls.

[Freiburg]  
29 April 1933

Dear Mrs. Husserl,

In these dark weeks I feel the great need—and I speak for my husband as well—to write a few words to you and your husband. Both of us want to say that today—as always—we recall with unending gratitude all that you have done for us. Although my husband had to follow other paths in his philosophy, he will never forget how much he learned as your husband’s student and how much he has used from that in his own particular work. And I will never forget all that you yourself shared with us, in kindness and friendship, during the hard years after the war.

It pains me that in these last years I may not have adequately evidenced to you this gratitude, although I never really understood what congeries of misunderstandings led you to see us only as two people who had disappointed you. Through all that, however, there abides our profound gratitude for your sons’ willingness to sacrifice themselves. The intention of this new law is precisely that we should acknowledge—unconditionally and with complete respect—those who by their actions stood up for our German Volk in its hour of greatest need. All the more, then, were we shocked when the name of your son in Kiel recently appeared in the newspapers. We hope it is merely a matter of some low-level bureaucrat going too far in the turmoil of these weeks—just as inequities and other painful events took place during the revolutionary weeks of 1918.

Please, my revered and dear Mrs. Husserl, take these lines as what they are: the expression of our sincere and unchanged gratitude.

Very respectfully yours,

Elfride Heidegger

May 4–5, 1933: Edmund Husserl to Dietrich Mahnke

[Briefwechsel 3, 491–93]

Husserl was vacationing near Locarno when Mrs. Heidegger’s letter of April 29 was forwarded to him. On May 4 Husserl wrote to Mahnke with deep pathos, re-

78. More literally: “what he, as a student of your husband, got from him for his own task” (”was er als Schüler Ihres Gatten auch gerade für seine eigenste Aufgabe gewonnen hat”).
marking with equal bitterness on the Nazis’ recent Jewish laws and on the personal and profession betrayal by Heidegger.

Currently at Orselina, outside Locarno, Hotel al Sasso
4. May, 1933
My dear old friend,

You will understand why I am replying so late to your lovely letter and your telegram of congratulations on the 50th anniversary of my doctorate. Already in the autumn of last year I began sliding into my old state of depression, and the [recent] political developments have had an increasingly oppressive effect on my spirits. Finally now in my old age I have to live through what I would never have thought possible: this creation of an intellectual ghetto into which I am to be thrown along with my children, my truly remarkable, noble-minded children (and all their children). Thanks to a national law, valid henceforth and forever, we are no longer to have the right to call ourselves Germans. Our intellectual achievements will no longer be part of German intellectual history. They will only survive branded with the mark “Jewish”—which by all accounts the new regime is determined to make a scar of disdain—and as a poison that German intellectuals must guard themselves against, a virus that must be eradicated.

[Husserl speaks of the difficulties that have dogged the path of his philosophical mission, in particular students who claimed to “improve” on Husserl’s phenomenology. Even though Husserl disagreed with their philosophical work, he remained friends with them.]

But with others I have had to suffer the worst kinds of personal experience—the final case (and it hit me the hardest) being Heidegger: hardest, because I had come to place a trust (which I can no longer understand) not just in his talent but in his character as well.

(The perfect conclusion to this supposed bosom-friendship of two philosophers was his very public, very theatrical entrance into the Nazi Party on May 1. Prior to that there was his self-initiated break in relations with me—in fact, soon after his appointment at Freiburg—and, over the last few years, his anti-Semitism, which he came to express with increasing vigor—even against the coterie of his most enthusiastic students, as well as around the department.) That was a hard thing to get over. I also had to get over the way Heidegger’s philosophy and other “Existenz” philosophies (largely based on caricatures of the ideas I presented in my writings, courses, and private instruction) turned the radical and fundamental scientific sense of my life’s work into its very opposite, and then, wrapping my work in high praise, discounted it as something entirely surpassed and superfluous, not worth studying any more.79 That was not easy either. But I had overcome all that,

79. Husserl may be referring obliquely to Heidegger’s speech at Husserl’s 70th birth-
and in my years as emeritus professor, even in my splendid isolation I felt really quite good because I was making marvelous progress—until once again the hindrances of age (above all) and the corresponding depression set in, perhaps only the negative results of overwork, which of course I again would have overcome after a while.

But what these last months and weeks have brought has attacked the very roots of my existence.

Your old and faithful
E Husserl

October 11, 1933: Edmund Husserl to Roman Ingarden

On October 1, 1933, Heidegger, who favored the dictatorial Führer-principle for governing the university, had gotten himself appointed Führer-Rektor for a term of one year. With that came to right to appoint five deans, without consulting either the heads of the relevant faculties or the University Senate. Heidegger was now in a position to implement the program articulated both in his Rectoral Address of May 27, 1933, and in the speeches he had made on occasion during the past summer. Husserl reports his own reactions to Ingarden.

Freiburg 11.X.1933

Dear friend,

. . . Heidegger is the National-Socialist rector (in accordance with the Führer-principle) here in Freiburg. At the same time he is the leader, from now on, of the reform of the universities in the new Reich. The old German university exists no longer; henceforth its meaning is as a “political” university. A remarkable time. Will I be able to work, to live, as a non-Aryan, denationalized, etc.? . . .

I and my wife greet you in the spirit of old friendship.

E Husserl

March 28, 1934: Edmund Husserl to Julius Stenzel (draft)

In this draft of a letter Professor Julius Stenzel of Breslau (see the letter of December 22, 1930), Husserl offers some very critical remarks on Stenzel’s recent Dilthey und day (April 8, 1929) in which, when presenting Husserl with a festschrift, Heidegger declared, “And so the works we offer you are merely a witness of the fact that we wanted to follow your lead, not proof that we succeeded in becoming your disciples.” The text is printed in this appendix, below.
die deutsche Philosophie der Gegenwart (1934). In the process he intimates that Heidegger and others confuse the phenomenological reduction with the eidetic reduction and thus mistakenly take Husserl for a Platonist.

Respected and dear doctor,

. . . I also note that you too, following the suggestions of Scheler and Heidegger, see me as a Platonist, or what comes down to the same thing, that you confuse the phenomenological reduction with the eidetic reduction.

No one seems to think it necessary to read and take seriously what I say about the reduction. Scheler should know better. In truth I am further from Platonism and every aprioristic ontologism than any past or present philosopher—incomparably further even than Dilthey. . . .

2. For Edmund Husserl on his Seventieth Birthday

Heidegger delivered a speech at a celebration of Husserl’s 70th birthday, April 8, 1929, which a month later he published, together with an introduction, as “Edmund Husserl zum 70. Geburtstag,” Akademische Mitteilungen. Organ für die gesamten Interessen der Studentenschaft von der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität in Freiburg i. Br. 4, 9th Semester, no. 3 (May 14, 1929), 46–47. That text was republished in GA 16, 56–60. The original text from 1929 is the one translated and introduced by Thomas Sheehan in this chapter. An English translation of Heidegger’s speech without the introduction appeared in Edmund Husserl, Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927–1931), ed. and trans. Thomas Sheehan and Richard E. Palmer (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997), 475–78. The editors wish to thank Kluwer Academic Publishers for permission to publish that translation in the present context, where it is preceded by Heidegger’s introduction from the Akademische Mitteilung. In this translation the German honorific titles Geheimrat, Hofrat, and Regierungsrat (roughly, Privy Councillor, Court Councillor, and Government Councillor) have been dropped, or replaced simply with “Professor.” (Husserl’s full title when he reached emeritus status was Herr Geheimrat Hofrat Prof. Dr. Husserl.)

“The festschrift was an absolute surprise,” Husserl wrote to Moritz Geiger in mid-April 1929. He was referring to the bound collection of essays that Heidegger, in the name of a dozen of Husserl’s colleagues and former students, presented to the Master on his 70th birthday.1 “Naturally,” continued Husserl, “Heidegger, who

1. The collection was published under the title Festschrift, Edmund Husserl zum 70. Geburtstag gewidmet (Halle [Saale]: Niemeyer, 1929), and simultaneously as a supplementary volume to Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung (1929). The contributors were Hermann Ammann, Oskar Becker, Ludwig Ferdinand Clauss, Martin Hei-
grew to be my closest friend during his several years as my assistant and who is now my successor, initially conceived the plan. He suggested that Niemeyer first ask our colleague Pfänder to be the editor, and when Pfänder declined, Heidegger himself took the matter in hand.  

A firsthand account of the presentation ceremony comes to us from Roman Ingarden, who had made the long journey from Cracow to Freiburg at the express wish and invitation of the Husserls:

“I finally arrived at the hotel, where I met many old friends and acquaintances, and we all appeared at the appointed hour in Loretto Street [40 Lorettostrasse, Husserl’s home] to Husserl’s great surprise. Notably present from among my old friends were Edith Stein, Jean Hering, Alexandre Koyré, and others.

The official ceremony began when the rector and dean appeared in their gowns, accompanied by Heidegger. After the rector’s address, Heidegger, the newly appointed successor to Husserl, gave a long and fairly complicated speech [which appears below]. After two nights on the train, I was not sufficiently rested and did not understand very much of it. At the end, Husserl, visibly moved, responded, but simply and briefly. He admitted that it was given to him to accomplish something, but most of it still remains uncompleted. He then concluded with the following remarkable words: “On one point I must demur, and that is the talk about great merits. I have none. Philosophy was the mission of my life. I had to philosophize, otherwise I could not live in this world.”

Husserl was then presented with the finished portrait bust for which he had sat some nine years earlier. The work, by Arnold Rickert, son of Heinrich Rickert, had been paid for by a group of contributors organized by Mrs. Heidegger.


4. Concerning the portrait bust, see Husserl, Briefwechsel 5, 188, lines 11 ff.; and 9, 314 n. 39. Husserl had sat for the bust in August 1920. The work is now on display in the Husserl Archives, in Louvain.
One thing that Husserl did not mention in his letter to Geiger was the speech Heidegger delivered before presenting the festschrift—and there may have been good reasons for the omission. While heaping praise on Husserl for his many achievements over the last three decades, Heidegger also offered what he called “sure points of reference for a true assessment of the value of your philosophical work,” and they were not necessarily the points Husserl would have chosen. For Heidegger those points of reference were not the founding of phenomenology, not the phenomenological method, not Husserl’s painstaking reworking of problems, “not this or that answer to this or that question,” but instead a “breakthrough into a new dimension of philosophizing,” one that in the final analysis seemed to lie beyond Husserl’s reach.

Heidegger made it quite clear in his speech that there was no guarantee that Husserl had succeeded in passing on the baton to a group of faithful and orthodox disciples. Heidegger certainly had himself in mind when he declared that “the works we present to you are simply testimonies that we wanted to follow your guidance, not proof that we succeeded in becoming your disciples.” In fact, the speech became a self-advertisement for Heidegger’s own work in contrast to Husserl’s. Philosophy, he said, is not about consciousness but is “human Dasein itself.” It is not a search for the certitudes of rigorous science and its mathemata but a risky journey to “the outermost limits of the possible” where one encounters that which “cannot be uttered.” Nor is phenomenology a matter of the laborious return to a presuppositionless transcendental ego, but rather the hermeneutical task of “bending philosophy back” upon its long history and entering into dialog with “the powers at work in the whole of human existence.” And perhaps not without irony did Heidegger attribute to Husserl himself the insight that “we must always be ready to reverse or even abandon our positions.”

These points surely were not lost on Husserl. Reflecting back on this period some five years later, he would remark bitterly to Dietrich Mahnke about how “Heidegger’s philosophy and other ‘Existenz’ philosophies . . ., while wrapping my work in high praise, discounted it as something entirely surpassed and superfluous, not worth studying any more.”

Heidegger’s Introduction (from Akademische Mitteilung)

On April 8 of this year, Professor Dr. E. Husserl celebrated his 70th birthday. His Excellency Prof. Dr. Uhlenhuth, the current rector, conveyed the congratulations of the entire university and presented a lively portrait of a professional career that redounds to the joy and pride of everyone at our university. Prof. Dr. Dragen- 

dorff, representing the dean of the Philosophy Faculty, which has counted Prof. Husserl a member since 1916, spoke warmly and cordially in thanking the now professor emeritus for the enthusiastic interest that he constantly brought to the academic tasks of the department. The celebration closed with congratulations by the deans of the other faculties and with the presentation of the festschrift that has been published as a supplementary volume of the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, the journal of which Husserl himself is editor.

Professor Husserl, quite moved, expressed his gratitude in words which avowed that his philosophizing was born of an all-encompassing perplexity and arose out of the need for the spiritual self-preservation of his very existence.

Admirers and friends of the philosopher then presented him with his portrait bust, sculpted some years before by Professor Arnold Rickert.

This was not merely an occasion for remembering the past but a powerful moment of reflection on the greatness of the work into which Husserl has directed philosophical research and teaching at our university, work that he continues to pursue even today.

Any attempt to summarize Husserl’s publications and philosophy is doomed to failure, and not merely because of the difficulty of the task. Such reports are by nature without life or effect and necessarily leave out the *single thing* that is worth knowing both now and in the future: that Husserl is among us as an active living force that enacts his true reality. But this means that philosophy must become the real awakening of freedom for ultimate meditation [*Besinnung*] on the intrinsic necessity before which every human Dasein is brought to stand. This freedom emphatically can not be the *result* of academic education but rather is the *presupposition* for the possibility of acquiring such education at all.

To maintain and strengthen the spirit of the university’s inner freedom—this must be the solemn vow of all who understand the meaning and rightness of this celebration. Perhaps an intimation of the tasks incumbent on teachers and students alike may be glimpsed in the words that accompanied the presentation of the festschrift:

**Heidegger’s Speech**

[Most esteemed teacher, dear fatherly friend:] 7

For your students, celebrating this day is a source of rare and pure joy. The only way we can be adequate to the occasion is by allowing the gratitude we owe you to become the fundamental mood suffusing everything from start to finish.

6. The original German reads: “und in dieser Wirkung seine wahre Wirklichkeit sich erwirken will.”

7. This phrase, “Hochverehrter Lehrer, liebervaterlicher Freund!” does not appear in the original publication but only in its new edition in *GA* 16, 57. Heidegger’s letter to Husserl, October 22, 1927, also begins with “Lieber vaterlicher Freund!”
Following a beautiful tradition, we offer you on today’s celebrative occasion our gift: this slender volume containing a few brief essays. In no way could this ever be an adequate return for all that you, our dear teacher, have lavished upon us, and awakened and nourished in us.

In the coming days many people will attempt to review your philosophical work, and they will use various criteria to evaluate its impact and effect. In doing so, they will remind us of many things that we should not forget. However, such a way of parceling out a man’s intellectual impact and of calculating the influence of his writings fails to grasp the essential element for which we owe you our thanks.

That element will not be discovered by pondering how fruitful your teaching career has been. Surely such fruitfulness will be the prerogative and good fortune of every professor, at least so long as the German university avoids the catastrophe of becoming some mind-numbing trade school.

No, the essence of your leadership consists in something else; namely, the fact that the content and style of your questioning immediately forces each of us into an ultimate confrontation [Auseinandersetzung] and demands that we always be ready to reverse or even abandon our positions.

There is no guarantee, of course, that any of us will find our way to the one thing towards which your work has quietly sought to guide us: that composure [Gelassenheit] wherein one becomes seasoned and ready for the problems.

So too, the works we present to you are simply testimonies that we wanted to follow your guidance, not proof that we succeeded in becoming your disciples.

But there is one thing we will all retain as a lasting possession: each one of us who had the privilege of following in your footsteps was confronted by you, our esteemed teacher, with the option of either becoming the steward of essential matters or of working against them.

On this celebrative occasion, as we view your philosophical existence in such a light, we also acquire sure points of reference for a true assessment of the value of your philosophical work.

Does that value consist in the fact that a new movement in philosophy emerged some decades ago and exercised strong influence on the trends that were dominant at that time? Or that a new method was added to the list of previous ones? Or that long-forgotten problematics were now subjected to intense treatment?

Is it simply that the space then available for philosophical inquiry was just expanded and made more complex? Is it not, rather, that first and foremost your research has created a whole new space for philosophical inquiry, a space that makes new claims, provides alternative evaluations, and has a fresh regard for the hidden powers of the great tradition of Western philosophy?

Yes, that is it exactly. The decisive element of your work has not been this or that answer to this or that question, but this breakthrough into a new dimension of philosophizing.
This breakthrough consists in nothing less than the radicalization of how we do philosophy, bending it back onto the hidden path of its authentic historical happening as this is manifested in the inner communion of the great thinkers.

Philosophy, then, is not a doctrine, not some simplistic scheme for orienting oneself in the world, certainly not an instrument or achievement of human existence. Rather, philosophy is this existence itself insofar as it occurs, in freedom, from out of its own ground.

Whoever, by hard research, has arrived at this self-understanding of philosophy is granted the fundamental experience of all philosophizing, which is this: the more completely and originally research comes into its own, the more surely is it “nothing but” the transformation of the same few simple questions.

But those who want to transform must bear within themselves the power of a fidelity that knows how to preserve. The only way to feel that power grow within oneself is to be caught up in wonder. And the only way to be caught up in wonder is to travel to the outermost limits of the possible.

Yet the only way to become the friend of the possible is to remain open to dialog with the powers at work in the whole of human existence. And in fact that is the philosopher’s way of being: heeding what has already been sung forth and can still be perceived in each essential occurrence of the world.8

Such a way of being lets the philosopher enter the heart of what is truly at stake in the task he has been given to do.

Plato knew of that and spoke of it in his Seventh Letter (341c):

ῥητὸν γὰρ οὐδαμῶς ἐστιν, ὡς ἄλλα μαθήματα ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ πολλῆς συνουσίας γνωμένης περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ καὶ τοῦ οὐζήν ἐξαιρφης, οἷον ἀπὸ πυρὸς πηδήσαντος ἐξαφθὲν φῶς, ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γενόμενον αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἕδη τρέφει.

“In no way can it be uttered like those other things that are able to be learned [in the sciences]. Rather, from out of a full dwelling that coexists with the matter itself, it suddenly occurs in the soul-like a spark leaping from the fire and flaring into light, so as then to grow there, alone with itself.”

8. The original German reads: “das Hineinhoren in den Vorgesang, der in allem wesentlichen Weltgeschehen vernehmbar wird.”
Appendix III
Karl Löwith’s Impressions of Husserl and Heidegger

Fiala, “the hero of this story,” is obviously Löwith himself, who as an exile managed to publish several articles in Germany in the Nazi thirties under the pseudonym of Hugo Fiala. “Fiala” is an acronym of *Fiumarina*, the fishing village on the Italian Riviera where the 19-year-old Löwith spent an especially formative year (1916–1917) of his life in a prisoner-of-war fortress recuperating from his near-fatal battle wounds.¹ There “Fiala” had three ground-laying experiences from which he developed, “in accord with his philosophical nature,” three corresponding insights: that it is harder to live than to die “a hero’s death”; that it is easier to live in the South than in the North; that the radical collapse of all the customary “arrangements” of bourgeois existence can be liberating and fruitful.

An unpublished story by Karl Löwith called "Fiala: The Story of a Temptation" ("Fiala: Die Geschichte einer Versuchung") provides an advanced student’s perspective on Heidegger early in his career. The Karl Löwith Archive at the German Literature Archive in Marbach catalogues this 106-page typescript as an “unpublished autobiographical story.” The facing page dates it as “Fall 1926, Marburg,” but the contents indicate that the composition of this text extends into 1927. Access to the eight-page excerpt (16–22a) translated here, granted by Dr. Klaus Stichweh, and permission to translate it for publication, granted by Adelheid Krautter, are gratefully acknowledged. The pages on Heidegger (Professor Ansorge) are crossed out in the typescript and marked with a note in Löwith’s hand: “See now 1940, my second life story!” This “second life story” is now published as Karl Löwith, *Mein Leben in Deutschland vor und nach 1933. Ein Bericht* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1986); English translation: *My Life in Germany Before and After 1933: A Report*, trans. Elizabeth King (London: Athlone, 1994; Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1994). The reader may therefore want to compare Löwith’s temporal shift in view of Husserl and Heidegger from the perspective of the Nazi 1930s with the account of 1927 presented here.


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The recurring “temptation” of this life story from the early teens to age 30, pseudonymously (“objectively”) written after the fashion of a philosophical Bildungsroman, is suicide, Löwith’s personal starting point for philosophizing: “Every human Dasein is struck by the most thoughtworthy of paradoxes: To-be-here without already in fact wanting to be, on the basis of this be-ing to negate itself in thought and to be able to complete this thought by actual negation. Human life is therefore at the peak of its existence in two interrelated decisive moments: in the negative resolution toward suicide and in the positive resoluteness to be-here.” On the basis of this central dialectical experience, Löwith would repeatedly conduct a corrective polemic against Heidegger’s sense of resoluteness as forerunning one’s own death by shifting the priority to the social dimension in a philosophy of Dasein. “The necessary condition of every actual suicide is the radical isolation of human existence, a theory of philosophical solipsism that has become real.” Its philosophy of nature dialectically highlights on the one hand bare mountains and the raw sea—“Where can one more radically philosophize than on the rim of Vesuvius, at the limits of life, in the consciousness of the freedom of dying and of living?”—and on the other the joys of visceral life beginning with sexuality and sociality, “The individual’s willingness to live is believable only by the readiness to continue its species. Fiala’s Hamlet question, ‘to be or not to be,’ was silenced.”

It is from this existential context of the fanciful development of a personal philosophy of life that a student’s caricatures of his teachers, Husserl (Privy Councillor Endlich) and Heidegger (Professor Ansorge), are drawn. Though some of the lines of this 1927 account will be repeated in the 1940 recounting, the context will have shifted radically by way of the world-historical events that took place in Germany in 1933, and the perspective now becomes that of a native German exiled from his homeland as well as from his beloved second land, Italy, simply because he was Jewish.

An Excerpt from “Fiala: The Story of a Temptation”

Two Discoverers of the Truth

A few months after this postwar interlude in Munich, so rich in experiences, the wayward son left his parental home for the second time in order to be able to study in complete independence in a university city in the middle of Germany, and to establish new bonds of friendship. The university that Fiala chose was nothing special viewed from the outside. It was built of squares of red sandstone that seemed to be put together like a box of bricks anchored to the ground. Its style of construction was as indefinable as the Protestant church across from it. But both

buildings had put some even more essential analogies on display. Just as the house of the God of liberal Protestantism invited its grown children with the biblical line, cast in bronze, “Thy Word is the Truth,” so did the “alma mater,” purportedly profane but verbally still true to the Bible, proclaim to its unfaithful children in golden letters, “The Truth Shall Make You Free.” In addition, the entrance to this stone-brick box of truth was flanked by the patriarchs of “art and science,” the ponderous statues of a Homer and an Aristotle.

The person in charge of the key to the truth was in the first place a Privy Councillor Endlich. A story then in circulation about him serves to define his character: As Privy Councillor Endlich went to visit a colleague in another city, he was met at the door by the wife. Upon reading the card extended to her, the professor’s wife, who had often heard her husband speak of Endlich’s Logic, was startled to the core and retorted, “Ach, but is that possible, are you really Herr Privy Councillor Professor Endlich? I always thought you were a book!” This remark was so profound that it went beyond the comprehension of those involved. Only the students who listened to his lectures knew that the Privy Councillor was in fact nothing more than his own extant book. This man, who lived so much in his ideas that it sometimes seemed as if his ideas were actually something real, promulgated the pure and final “truth” according to the latest method, the one he had discovered. Fiala could not believe his ears when he first came into the large and crowded lecture hall and heard from the mouth of this extraordinary being, who was only about 55 years old although he had long outlived himself, the following prophetic as much as professorial words of introduction: “Gentlemen and Ladies, the true philosophy is still in its beginnings, but I can now promise you that the exact analysis of the pure consciousness of time will in about twenty years have progressed to such an extent that we ourselves shall have solved a difficult problem such as that of immortality.” Several weeks later, as Fiala witnessed a demonstration at the psychiatric clinic and observed a mentally ill patient who was unshakeably convinced that he had solved the problem of the infinite prolongation of life by the invention of a “life machine,” Fiala automatically expected that the demonstration would include the philosopher for whose sake he had come to F[reiburg] to study. The only difference between the professor and the psychotic seemed to him to be that the former ran around freely to confuse healthy minds with his crazy ideas and the latter did not. Nevertheless, Fiala made an effort to enter into the mysteries of the “logical experiences” of his mentor.

In the course of this not only sincere but even successful, albeit unfruitful effort, he became acquainted with a somewhat younger student who like him had fled from his parental home to a student’s freedom and now was granting a hearing, likewise with German perseverance and thoroughness, to the “truth” for which his parents had given him the necessary “freedom.” In accord with the special significance that even slight differences in age get in the years of development
toward maturity, Fiala, about two years older, was at first definitely the provider and guide in this mortal pact of friendship. It became his misfortune that the significance of the difference in age lessened noticeably as the younger of the two friends developed, so that the vital impetus of this relationship lost more and more of its drive and after several years totally slackened due to its lack of inner tension. Seven years later, when Fiala again met his friend, now married and finished with his habilitation, in Florence on a vacation trip, he had become a total stranger. To be sure, his face still had the charm of the adolescent, but it seemed to Fiala that the musical nature of his being had become totally absorbed by the fervor of work in “musical science.” In his heart, Fiala was at once enraged and depressed by the bourgeois lack of expectation with which this young and ever so German married couple traveled through Italy: not for the “pleasure,” as the two tended to put it, but in order to “work” in the libraries—with a clue of how unfruitful an intellectual work that affords no pleasure really is and how much work the actual enjoyment of Italy requires. Fiala’s unexpressed thought was that a “science” had to be in a sorry state when it had the effect of bringing a promising young life with a universal bent in just a few years to the point where movies and sleep become the “recovery” from the corresponding “work” of a scientific business trip. Only with reluctance did Fiala admit to himself that his disappointment was in fact the consequence of an undue expectation.

A greater power by far than this friend’s came into play in Fiala’s development through the intervention of another man, who under the rubric of the most varied titles for his lecture courses presented his factual insight into life with scholastic breadth and acumen. He knew how to attract students by first repelling them and then referring them to himself, which would result in their de facto attachment to him to such a degree that they would become his adherents. Under the guise of renouncing disciples and a “school,” he inbred his Hegelians in his own image like a little Hegel. Outside of his public lecture courses he lived according to the philosophical ground principle “Si tacuisses philosophus mansisses,” i.e., he would remain a philosopher by maintaining his silence, as only a Jesuit knows how to remain silent and listen. Just as he was skillful in keeping silent, he knew how to work. From early until late he sat at his writing desk with pen in hand and—thought—with either red or blue ink according to the context. But in oral conversation he was as helpless as a speaker at an open grave whose notes had been blown away at the decisive moment.

3. “Heinrich Besseler habilitated in musical theory at Freiburg and became professor in Heidelberg” (Löwith, Mein Leben in Deutschland, 59/62; see also 102/107, plus two photos of Besseler). The archival record shows that Heinrich Besseler (1900–1969) was at first a philosophy and mathematics major who took part in both Husserl’s and Heidegger’s seminars in 1919–1922, as well as “entertaining” the student-organized Phenomenological Society with “musical afternoons” to which Heidegger was regularly invited.
The external world of this thinker did not extend beyond his writing desk to his writing chair and from there to the lecture hall. His internal world was likewise held within the limits of his own highest Dasein, which he called “existence.” His writing desk was always completely covered with countless slips and scraps of notes, the bricks of a master builder. From their artful juxtaposition in the course of ten years filled with work, he built a system which in consistency, complexity, incomprehensibility, acumen, and fundamental dilapidation, but not in richness, stands comparison with the last system of German idealism.

As typical and modern as the writing desk may have looked, so untypical and unmodern in appearance was its correlate, the writing thinker. A black-and-red woven wool jacket of the kind generally worn only by peasants, but not by professors, shielded the body of this rigorous thinker from the cold. His legs were always elaborately wrapped in a blanket and feet stuffed into a foot-muff, whose motley composition out of leftover scraps suggested less its aesthetic sense than the superlative frugality of the housewife who was at the same time the “woman of the house.” She had also provided a colorful scarf for the neck of her thinking man, not out of tender loving care but rather out of congenital proficiency, with a sober regard for the requirements of a thinking household. Among the other dispensers of heat were to be found a glowing oven, steaming tea, and the smell of an old-fashioned tobacco pipe. This manifold supply of heat was needed to endure the “frigid air of the philosophical concept” (a favorite expression of the thinker).

How Professor Ansorge’s [“the thinker’s”: 1940 change] face looked up close was at first really impossible to say, and for a very simple reason: the thinker could not actually look at anyone for any length of time, or even into the distance with head held high, the pose that photographers like to have. The natural expression of his face included a working forehead, veiled face, and lowered eyes, which now and then would take stock of the situation with a short and swift glance. If someone temporarily forced him into a direct look by speaking to him, then this extremely unharmonious face, jagging angularly in all its features, would become somewhat reserved, wily, shifting, and downright hypocritical. Its expression was through and through self-conscious, since candor and directness were for it in every respect unnatural. What was natural for it was the expression of cautious mistrust, at times full of peasant cunning [bauernschläuen].

4. The 1926 Pentecost talk, “On the Essence of Truth” (chapter 19) in fact invokes two alternating moods essential to the philosophical quest for “truth,” perhaps in part as a result of Löwith’s “southern” influence, as well as other interchanges with his students at the time: “The frigid air of cold deliberation and contemplation, the hardness and necessity of the concept are one thing. The sunny gaiety of play and dance, the free approximations and tentative moves of finding and giving oneself are another. Both are our Dasein.”

5. With this paragraph begin the lines that are in part taken up and woven into the “second life story” of 1940, in the section entitled “Heidegger’s Personality”; see Löwith, Mein Leben in Deutschland, 43–45/45–47.
This face assumed its most positive expression when the thinker looked to the ground or, glancing at his manuscript, spoke with composure and concentration as he thought to himself. In spite of his extraordinarily short stature, his effect at the podium was quite normal, due to his austere and resilient bearing and the well-disposed proportions of his philosophically insignificant corporeality. His lecture was totally devoid of gesture and bombast. The one rhetorical device at his disposal, which he certainly did not forego, was an artful soberness and thesis-like rigor in the construction of his ideas. His bronze-colored countenance seemed full of expression from the manifest effort of mental concentration and through its plain but interesting asymmetries. The penetrating look of his dark eyes was directed only in passing at his listeners. It was the forehead, which was traversed and arched by a highly prominent vein, that laid claim to total animation. One saw it literally working of its own accord, without regard for the audience, which was roused to listen to the lecture more than solicited to think with it. The tangled black hair and an old-fashioned, stiff white collar gave the whole of this face an impressive frame, while the whole man stood at his podium in conscious isolation, as he turned page after page of his manuscript with a slightly conceited hand gesture that betrayed the proud and modest consciousness of a man who knows his way about his subject matter and has nothing to worry about.

The pinnacle of his philosophical system was the problem of death. By death, of course, this thinker did not mean ordinary actual death, which he labelled a mere “passing away,” but the philosophical possibility of “forerunning” one’s death. This “forerunning” naturally did not mean an actual run, like the “Double time!” of a military unit, but a thoughtful anticipation [Vorausnehmen] of death. By means of this imaginary artifice, this remarkable thinker sought to prevent his own highest Dasein from ever being overtaken. In this system, there was no room for suicide and the anxiety of living, for suicide would destroy this extremely interesting philosophical possibility by means of a brutal, naked reality. In opposition to this, Fiala was convinced that the anxiety of living is a much more fundamental fact than the anxiety of death, tainted as this is by Christianity. Death’s true face seemed to him to be totally distorted in the system of this thinker, since it left out every aspect of peace. Lack of peace was also the basic trait of this inwardly tense and fanatical thinker, whose truths were as constrained as their peaceless proclaimer.

Captivated by the energetic earnestness of this thinker so in tune with the times, Fiala spent four long years of his study in the fruitless effort of establishing a human relationship with this man, whose entire life was spent in avoiding personal obligations. Ansorge’s knowledge reached just as far as the mistrust from which it originated. And the only fruit of this mistrust was critique, of which he was an unsurpassed master. Critique and mistrust of everything and everyone were the basic forces of his essential being, which was soft at its core. The reason why one could be misled by his personality lay in the ambiguous discord pervading his life.
and thought, which only seemed clear and univocal from the outside. By birth a simple sacristan’s son, through his profession Ansorge became the lofty representative of a “scholarly consciousness”; refined in his thought, he remained primitive in his life; stringent in the world of the spirit, he was lax in the world of the senses; reticent toward others, he was thereby curious like few others; radical in ultimate matters and bent on compromise in everything penultimate; critical in his particular field of expertise [Fach], he remained uncritical outside of it; a Jesuit by education, he became a Protestant in rebellion; a Scholastic dogmatist by schooling and an existentiell pragmatist from experience; a theologian by tradition and an atheist as scientific scholar; a renegade of his tradition in the guise of being its conservative historian; existential like Kierkegaard with the will toward philosophical system of a Hegel; as dialectical in his method as he was primitive in the content of his philosophy, making thesis-like claims out of the spirit of negation—asserting himself without believing in himself: such was the ambiguous discord that this man’s influence created among his students, who wanted to learn not just “sharp thinking” from philosophy, but also the true life.
Annotated Glossary

The annotations are meant to provide a genealogical sense of the incubation, development, and at times abandonment of some of the key terms in Heidegger’s unique and idiosyncratic vocabulary.

Abbauen, deconstructing.

This common German term for the process of dismantling or tearing down or taking apart, which etymologically means “de-constructing” or “unbuilding,” the reversal of building (Bauen), appears roughly simultaneously in the works of Husserl and the young Heidegger in their formulations of the method of phenomenology, suggesting that it might have been the fruit of their common discussions at the time. The first instance in Heidegger is to be found in WS 1919–1920 (GA 58, 147) in relation to the reversal of the deformation of life-experience inflicted at once by both objectification and subjectification. Deconstruction is there closely connected with “critical deconstruction” (GA 58, 139, 160–62, 248), which in SS 1919 was called, in quasi-Kantian fashion, “phenomenological critique” (GA 56/57, 125–27). The 1920 critical review of Jaspers (chapter 13) in particular is careful to distinguish this intertwined triad of terms.

Anzeige, formale, formal indication.

A core feature of Heidegger’s “method” of phenomenological hermeneutics which first surfaces in the Jaspers review (1920; chapter 13) in the repeated “formal indication” of “existence” as the be-ing of the “I am.” But it is not until Being and Time itself that “ex-sistence” is formally indicated as the projective stretch toward the ek-static temporal horizons of the holistic situation of existence in which each of us find ourselves. Earlier in 1920, the formal indication of intentionality develops its triple-sensed (formal) “prestruction” of relation, containment of content, and actualization or fulfillment, soon to be complemented by the comprehensive sense of temporalization and the conservative sense of safekeeping (October 1922; chapter 14).

In his letter to Löwith in 1927 (chapter 20), Heidegger roots the genesis of his formally indicative hermeneutics of facticity in his 1915–1916 habilitation on categories and meaning in Duns Scotus, especially in his formalization of factic individuality. KNS 1919 diagrammatically schematizes the power of formality in reflexive categories to gain access to the pretheoretical, preworldly “primal something” of our individual facticity. In WS 1919–1920, this access route is given the name “formal indication” (GA 58, 198, 248; on the formality of the I, see 106–7, 157, 216–17, 251).

Already here, formal indication is keyed to the existentially situated “I am,” to which the indicative or “indexical” personal pronouns, “you are” and “we are,” would
be added. Formal indication therefore becomes the call to each of us to own up to the holistic limit-situation of existence in which we happen to find ourselves and to properly make it our very own, to ap-propriate it.

_Auseinandersetzung_, confrontation, disputation, (articulated) contestation that lays open and sets apart.

The Jaspers review (chapter 13 and the “Aristotle Introduction” [chapter 14]) already telegraph this term, which first becomes central in the 1930s, and which places its “polemic” action on the level of be-ing, perhaps in contrast to the “agonistic” action of the “supermen.”

_Ausgelegtheit_, interpretedness, in and of a domain that has always already been interpreted, typically everydayness.

This term first emerges in October 1922, and in SS 1923 it is made to dominate in the habits and customs of the Anyone, and thus plays an increasingly significant role in the talks of 1924 (ch. 16) and 1925 (chapter 18), where it is gradually tied to the historical situation in which we happen to find ourselves. In § 74 of _Being and Time_ on proper historicality, it becomes clear that we have already been interpreted by the particular historical community of language and tradition into which we happen to have been thrown, and the choice is posed of either allowing that initial interpretedness to perpetuate itself in habitual rote repetition or to make that tradition our own by creatively retrieving and reinterpreting it for our own time and generation, a theme that was already sounded in October 1922 (chapter 14) in its formal “indication of the hermeneutic situation” of human existence.

_Bekümmern_, anxious or troubled concern; also distress, trouble, anxiousness, worry.

This term is used in the 1920 and 1922 essays as well as in the courses held in this period to convey the original motivation to philosophize in the face of the very facticity of life. It is replaced by the distinction that “angst reveals care” as the development approaches _Being and Time_. In 1922 Heidegger observes that the care of existence is double genitive, and thus verbally a middle voice. The German _sich kümmern_ perhaps best brings out the middle-voiced character of anxious concern; it means both the active “to trouble oneself” and the passive “to be troubled.”

_bergen_, to shelter, harbor, cover (as in a cove), thus to conceal (_verbergen_); to recover, save, salvage (from a forgotten tradition, in the later Heidegger’s typical sense).

This word first begins to assert itself in the “truth” essay of 1926 (chapter 19), and in the 1930s it tends to displace the _Seinssverwahrung_, the truthful safekeeping of being, so prominent in the early 1920s. In the series of Heidegger’s words for the happening of truth (_Wahrheit_), _Bergung_ as shelter and safekeeping occupies a broad middle (-voiced) ground between outright concealment (_Verborgenheit_) and unconcealment (_Unverborgenheit, Entbergung_).

_Besinnung_, deliberation-on-the-sense, meditation-on-the-meaning; non-objectifying “reflection.”

_Selbstbesinnung_, akin to an “examination of conscience,” but with an outer-directed “ex-sis-tential” emphasis on examining oneself in the context of one’s historical situation.

_sich besinnen_, to pursue, follow, track, or trace the sense already taking place in one’s situation. Note the middle-voiced character of this intrinsically “reflexive” verb.
The dictionary definition of “reflection” for Besinnung immediately runs afoul of Natork’s objection against Husserl’s reflexive method of phenomenology, namely, that reflection stils the vital stream of experience (GA 56/57, 99–101, 110). Significantly, the young Heidegger in 1915 (in a local newspaper article! [chapter 5]) interjects the word into his lifelong vocabulary by way of Nietzsche rather than Husserl (where Reflexion rules) to initiate a meditation on the situational sense (Sinn) of the World War, thus stressing the pursuit (tracing, following) of concrete sense to be drawn out of the historical context, rather than by “taking thought” in the form of a subject reflecting on an object.

Blickstand, initial stand for viewing (unique to October 1922 [chapter 14]).

Blickrichtung, direction of view.

Sichtweite, range of vision.

This triad emerges in 1922 as an alternative way to articulate the hermeneutic situation in conjunction with interpreting Aristotle’s highly visually oriented philosophy. See also Vorbabe, Vorsicht, Vorgriff.

Bodenständigkeit, autochthony, rootedness (in native ground), being indigenous.

This term was first used in SS 1924 in the context of a passage in Aristotle’s Rhetoric (1.5.1360b20) on a landed aristocracy. In the context of the talk on truth in late 1924 (chapter 17), it alludes to the existential rootedness in a native language as in a “locus of truth” and nexus of “ground” concepts. In SS 1925, it refers to the phenomenological sense of demonstration as a return “back to native ground, roots, origins” (GA 20, 104/76, 119/87, 423/307). See also GA 34, 210; GA 39, 181; GA 40, (30); GA 54, 223. Made politically incorrect by National Socialist propaganda, the term will nevertheless be made central in Heidegger’s 1955 “memorial address” to a hometown crowd, which originally bore the subtitle “Bodenständigkeit im Atomzeitalter” (Autochthony in the Atomic Age).

Dasein, being-t/here, Da-sein, existence.

This is a fairly frequent word in its dictionary meaning of “existence” in the works and letters of the young Heidegger since 1910, and in common phrases like the “existence of God” (Kant) and the “struggle for existence” (Darwin). The term is gradually introduced in its etymological sense of “da sein” as “being there” in its various vectorial ins and outs in the Jaspers review (1920): factic life as at once out-of-itself in “objectifying” accomplishments, which are in turn gathered-into-itself in self-experiencing, in these concurrent movements “being there” (chapter 13). In the course of SS 1923, “Dasein,” which now replaces earlier terms like the historical I, the situated I, and factic life experience, is inaugurated as a technical term, i.e., is “formally indicated,” in two distinct directions: 1) in the temporal particularity (Jeweiligkeit) of its facticity or its “be-ing”, and 2) as “being-in-the-world.” The two vectorial directions are very nicely brought together already in SS 1920 in the recurrent phrase “self-worldly Dasein” (GA 59, 75–82 passim) to identify our potentially most originary experience. The lecture of July 1924 on time (chapter 16) clearly intones “Da-sein” in the multiplicity as well as unity of its temporal characters. “Being-there,” in sum, suggests 1) the uniquely situated existence of the human being “thrown” into the facticity of its world and 2) actively being-open, disclosive, revealing, discovering its historically unique world and itself (chapter 17).
Destructation, de[con]struction; to be distinguished from Zerstörung, pure and simple destruction.

“Critical-phenomenological destruction” is first introduced in WS 1919 as a methodological term to replace what in SS 1919 was called “phenomenological critique” and is used in close association with Abbauen, “deconstructing,” e.g., in the Jaspers review and the “Aristotle Introduction.” The positive goal of the seemingly negative critique or “dismantling” of our traditional presuppositions about be-ing is to incur a return to our pretheoretical primal and originary experience of be-ing, to the primal dynamics and structure of “life in and for itself in the eidos, in its understanding evidence and evident understanding” (so in SS 1919: GA 56/57, 126), which Heidegger calls the “phenomenological criterion” of the critique. Compare Abbauen.

Dijudikation, adjudication.

“Phenomenological adjudication” of our presuppositions regarding original experience is discussed in some detail only in SS 1920 and is applied to the preconceptions of Natorp, Dilthey, and Jaspers in order to “adjudge” (decide, determine) how closely (or remotely) their philosophical starting points approach the originary experience of be-ing, “life in and for itself in the eidos, in its understanding evidence and evident understanding” (GA 56/57, 126; compare Destruction), which constitutes the “phenomenological criterion” for the adjudication, for the “de-cision regarding the genealogical position of the meaningful context [being judged] when viewed from the origin” (GA 59, 74; see also 75, 79, 84, 190). Phenomenological adjudication is thus situated at the juncture between the interlinked “methods” of critical deconstruction down to the originary experience of be-ing and the reconstruction of its “prestruction” by way of a formally indicative hermeneutics.

Durchschnittlichkeit, averageness.

The averageness of the public in publicity as lived by the Anyone first emerges in October 1922 (chapter 14). The everyday circulation of generic and common talk in the form of idle gossip and repetitive chatter (Gerede; first in SS 1923) serves to accentuate the averageness in the form of a widespread and persistent common “interpretedness” according to which the everyday public world is understood. Compare Ausgelegtheit and Man, das.

Ereignis, (properizing, appropriative) event.

To mark the qualitative time of history into its proper periods in 1915 (chapter 7), Heidegger refers to the uniquely defining events of the Christian Incarnation and the Islamic Hegira. In KNS 1919, Er-eignis in the etymological sense, playing on the notes of eigen (own, proper) and eigentlich (proper, authentic), first makes an appearance to characterize the most intense lived experience of the historical I in close conjunction with the meaning-bestowing dynamics of “It’s worlding!” The I is fully there in the “It’s worlding!” such that “I myself ap-propriate [er-eigne] It to myself and It appropriates itself according to its [unique and proper] essence” (GA 57/58, 75). But already in 1920, Ereignis is used to designate the events of objective history rather than of the “history of actualization and self-fulfillment” (Vollzugsgeschichte). In Being and Time, the happening of (my, our) history proper, demanding its proper enactment in “authentic historicality,” performs this function rather than Ereignis, which only begins to reassert its unique function of granting us our proper identity (Eigentlichkeit)
and so our “proper name” (Eigennam e) in SS 1928, in a repetition of KNS 1919, and then takes center stage in the later Heidegger as his favored word for be-ing.

Existenz, existence; etymologically understood by Being and Time as “ex-sistence.” By SS 1920, Heidegger is carefully distinguishing between the closely related terms Dasein and Existenz, where “existence” constitutes the possibility of actualizing “self-worldly Dasein” to the fullness of its potential-to-be its proper self, thus of “really being and existing,” being “authentic.” In his review of Jaspers’s book, which is destined to inaugurate Existenzphilosophie, he points out to Jaspers that existence is in fact the formal indication of the “sense of be-ing of the ‘I am’” capable of being actualized by way of passage through the “limit situations” of life. In October 1922, existence reappears as the authentic be-ing of life accessible by way of the distressed questioning of its facticity in a countermovement to life’s tendency to lapse. In WS 1925–1926, this restricted sense of existence narrowed down to Dasein’s ownmost possibility expands, by way of the formal clue of “being-out-toward,” into a more universalized sense of temporal possibility and thus becomes the formal indication of “ex-sistence” developing into the ek-static structure of temporality in the final draft of Being and Time.

existenziell-existenzial, existentiell-existential.
The terminological specification of existence in SS 1920 naturally brings the adjective or adverb “existentiell” (GA 59, 29, 37, 82, 181, 183, 185–86) into ever-increasing play in Heidegger’s courses, works, and letters, but the adjective “existential” is far rarer. This is in keeping with the fact that the pair is matched to correspond with the distinction ontic-ontological only in the final draft of Being and Time.

Faktizität, facticity.
The abstraction “facticity” as an ontological development of ontic “factic life” was first coined by Fichte and was taken by neo-Kantians like Lask to be the “brute, irrational” side of transcendental structures. Heidegger first salvages the term from its neo-Kantian usage in the courses of WS 1919–1920 (GA 58, 172–73, in a supplemental note postdating the course) and SS 1920 (GA 59, 173–74) to identify the transcendental “primal reality” (Urwirklichkeit; GA 59, 173) of factic life experience already charged with a hermeneutic rationality. The phrase “hermeneutics of facticity” (first used in October 1922) thus hinges on a double genitive, where the hermeneutics first comes from facticity itself. As Gadamer, paraphrasing Dilthey, succinctly put it, “Das Leben selbst legt sich aus”: Life itself lays itself out, articulates itself, interprets itself. “Factic life in its facticity, its rich realm of relations, is what is nearest to us, is our neighborhood: we ourselves are it” (GA 58, 173). Accordingly, the distinction between (existential) facticity and (categorical) factuality (Tatsächlichkeit) is also first made in October 1922. In the 1915 habilitation, Tatsächlichkeit had served in part as a surrogate for facticity, following Dilthey, who conflated the two terms.

Gegenständlichkeit, comprehensive object(ivity).
In keeping with his phenomenological complaint against science’s excessive objectifying (and ipso facto subjectivizing) tendency in inappropriate contexts, Heidegger in 1920–1922 terminologically distinguishes the German synonyms Objekt and Gegenstand, and reserves Gegenständlichkeit for phenomena like fear-of and care-for that are clearly relational and situationally intentional in character and that cannot be understood without regarding both “poles” (already dichotomizing!) of the relation in un-
divided unison; hence a “comprehensive object.” *Gegenständlichkeit* thus moves into close proximity with phenomenological *Sachlichkeit*, its drive to get to the matter *itself* (*the* mark of phenomenological ontology for Heidegger), to get at “what matters,” adhering to what is relevant to the particular “object”/matter under discussion. Any and all forms of objectifying are simply irrelevant to *be-ing itself*.

*Gerede*, common speech (idle talk, gossip, repetitive chatter).

This term was first introduced in SS 1923 to describe in more detail the nature of the *interpretedness* of the everyday world that is being promoted and furthered within the *averageness* and *publicity* of the Anyone, which are the *elements* of the domain of everydayness that were already put in place in October 1922. “Common speech,” as in *koine* Greek and Latin *vulgata*, i.e., the popular Latin in common usage among the Roman people, is perhaps the best translation of *Gerede* in a Heideggerian context, as opposed to the more graphic idiomatic translations suggested above, inasmuch as it alludes to the general, generic, and impersonal concepts that prevail in common speech. Heidegger in SS 1924 remarks that the language of everydayness paves the way for the language of objective science, shaped as it is by the criterion of general or universal validity (*Allgemeingültigkeit*).

*Geschichte*, (lived) *history*; versus *Historie*, (recorded) *history* of historians and historical science.

Heidegger first distinguishes these two prima facie German synonyms, after an early period of indiscriminate usage, in late 1924, in the context of reviewing the Dilthey-Yorck correspondence in a just published journal article (now in *GA 64*), which then carries over into his semipopular lectures on Dilthey in April 1925 (chapter 18). The distinction is based on Count Yorck’s remark, often cited by the early Heidegger (e.g., in chapters 13, 17, 18) that “We ourselves are *history* [*Geschichte*].” This distinction is already mirrored in a distinction that Heidegger first made in 1920 (chapter 13) between the actualization-historical (*vollzugsgeschichtlich*) and the objective-historical (*objektgeschichtlich*), where the latter is now terminologically linked with *Historie* and *historisch*, as in *historische* worldviews and written *Historie*, especially when written from the objective vantage point of science. *Historie* is thus associated with historiology and the historiographical inquiry into the past, whereas *Geschichte*, and *Geschichtlich-sein*, “being-historical,” is fundamentally future-oriented, the way we carry (project, enact, actualize) our unique past into the future, a historical action that involves both understanding interpretation and resolute decision. This way of being-historical is the protoaction of proper historicality or historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*, already in the talks of 1924 and 1925), the very being of being-there.

*Gestellsein (das Wie des)*, (how of) being-placed or -pos[ition]ed, thus being-disposed.

This was Martin Luther’s way of speaking about *affectus*, affect or affective habit, first of all in regard to *how* the human being is placed before God, then (dis-)positioned in the world in the flight from God. Heidegger’s use of the term in early 1924 paves the way for his literal translation in SS 1924, in the context of Aristotle’s discussion of the passions, especially the *emotion* of flight called fear, of Aristotle’s generic category for the *e-motions*, *διάθέσις*, as *Befindlichkeit*, dis-position, disposedness, how one finds oneself being “put upon” by the world.

*gleichursprünglich*, equiprimordial, co-original.
This high-frequency coinage in *Being and Time*, typically used to express the relationship among the existentials, receives occasional usage in Heidegger's early essays. The phrase *gleich ursprünglich*, “equally original,” recurs in the 1915 habilitation (FS, 158, 166, 172, 323) in regard to the question of the “convertible” relationships of the transcendentals of be-ing (*esse*) as well as its “ontological difference” from any entity (*ens*, FS, 323). The phraseology probably derives from Heidegger’s reading of Emil Lask.

**Hingabe**, dedicative submission, devotional surrender.

This term plays a central role in Heidegger’s 1917 gloss of Schleiermacher’s Second Speech on Religion (chapter 9) to express the receptive moment of immediate experience at the level of the unity of intuition and feeling, where we humans “give ourselves over” to the universe and allow ourselves to be moved by it.” Heidegger became acquainted with the term from reading Lask, who used it to describe our immediate experience of forms of life, like values, in which we are already “given over to” them, immersed and absorbed in them as in a non-reflective categorial dimension. *Hingabe* as pre-reflective absorption in the categories thus becomes a non-ocular replacement for *Hinschauen*, directly looking-at, inspecting, intuiting. *Hingabe* thus expresses a less “theoretical” and more “practical” manner of receptivity to our immediate experience, our “openness.” Heidegger began using the term in a significant way as early as 1915 (FS, 140). Another term adapted from religious experience at this time, Eckhart’s *Gelassenheit* (letting-be), will eventually win out in the expression of “receptivity” and “openness” to be-ing and existence.

**Jeweiligkeit**, temporal particularity, each particular while.

*jeweils, jeweilig*, at the time, (temporally) particular.

*je-weils*, “to each its while.”

*je*, each, in each instance (instantiation).

Against the background of his Aristotelian reflections on phronetic insight into the particular ultimate, what is to be done here and now in this temporally unique and concrete situation (καιρός), and the place of the particular, ἕκαστον, in osiology as well as kairology, Heidegger formally introduces Da-sein, “being here and now,” as his technical term precisely because it indicates the “particular while” that each of us is and has to be. The family of terms surrounding particular whileness governs the talk on time in July 1924 (chapter 16) but by and large recedes into the filigree of *Being and Time* where *Jemeinigkeit*—”Dasein is in each instance mine”—replaces *Jeweiligkeit*.

As a result, the tiny but crucial particle *je* (and its variants) is often omitted or translated generically as “every” and “always” instead of distributively as “each” and “at any given time.” One thus loses the crucial distinction that Heidegger is making in *Being and Time*, by way of the exemplary distinction between “All men are mortal” and “Each of us must die,” between the generic (common, objective) universal of the “All” and “Every” and the distributive (temporally unique, hermeneutic, contextual, formally indicative, existential) universal of the “Each” (*Jedes* in the German). The legal principle in case law, “To each his/her own,” is now temporally modified through Da-sein to “To each its allotted while,” which points to the unique, one-time-only, originary time of a particular lifetime that each of us is called upon to own up to and make our own, or, as Heidegger puts it, “actualize” (*vollziehen*: enact, fulfill). The stark polar contrast that structures *Being and Time* is that of the proper originary time of my unique lifetime versus the common public time of average everydayness.
The life option is that of being-myself versus being-like-everyone and the language is that of the hermeneutically distributive universal properized according to the particular context je nach dem versus the common generic leveled universal of the averaged and impersonal Anyone.

*Man, das*, the Anyone, the Everyone.

First introduced in October 1922 to specify the pronominal "subject" of the average-ness of the public, this term is first substantified into a German noun in SS 1923 (*GA* 63, 31). Translating the term as “the they” and “they-self” suppresses the key note of generality and generic universality that governs the everyday discourse of the general public, and so dulls the contrast between the common and the proper that sustains this constellation of terms.

*Öffentlichkeit*, the (general) public, (domain of) publicity.

This term likewise first appears in October 1922 in conjunction with interpretedness, averageness, and the “one.” Adding “general” to “the public” once again contributes to bringing out the contrast between the generic universal of the “all” and the distributive universal of the “each.” Compare *Jeweiligkeit*.

*Rede*, (discursive) speech, discourse.

In the 1924 context of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* and his definition of the human being as the living being possessing (and possessed by) speech, λόγος as speech (and not judgment) emerges as a comprehensive locus of truth as unconcealment, and will thus find its way into *Being and Time* as an equiprimordial mode of being-in, being-there, disclosedness. In view of its repetitious and habitual character, speech will also be closely correlated with the concealment of being (see *Gerede*). The articulative note of discursiveness will later be highlighted as an equiprimordial character of be-ing itself as a “differentiating gathering,” the ordering whole of λόγος.

*Seiendes*, being; beings, entities.

*Sein*, be-ing, being, Being.

Heidegger’s repeated insistence that Being and beings are ontologically different prompts us to interject a new orthographical differentiation into the English by translating the German infinitive, *Sein*, as the hyphenated word “be-ing” to underscore at once the dynamic, muscularly verbal character of being—it is in fact time itself—as well as its relational character, actively spinning out a web of relations by contextualizing or “worlding” us and other beings and dispatching us in various temporal directions. In short, as at once context and direction, be-ing itself is meaning, *Sinn*.

*Sinn*, sense, meaning.

*Bezugs Sinn*, (sense of) relation, relational sense.

*Gehalts Sinn*, (sense of) containment, containing sense.

*Vollzugs Sinn*, (sense of) actualization, fulfillment, enactment, performance.

*Zeitigungssinn*, (sense of) temporalization, temporal development, maturation, fruition.

Already in the overview of logic in 1912 (chapter 4), sense emerges as the very “object” of logic and so of the logic of philosophy (in the form of categories). In WS 1919–1920, a triple-sensed intentionality of relation, containment, and actualization is formally indicated as the prestruction of all human experience, where the three "ele-
ments” are identified as “guiding directions of sense” (Sinnführungen; GA 58, 261). The course of WS 1921–1922 adds the comprehensive temporalizing sense of mature development that comprehends all three elements into a temporal unity, and the “Aristotle Introduction” of October 1922 adds the note of custodial preservation of sense through the habit of tradition. The directional character and triadic context of sense are still evident in the filigree of the famous definition of sense in Being and Time (BT, 151) as “the toward-which [Woraufhin] of [factic life’s] projection, already structured by pre-possession, pre-view, and pre-conception, according-to-which [Woraufhin] something as something becomes comprehensible.” See also Besinnung; Verwahrung.

Situation, situation.

Lage, (circumstantial) state.
The “situation I,” a forerunner to Da-sein, first emerges in SS 1919 shortly after the appearance of Jaspers’s book on limit situations. The clear distinction between accidental state and the inescapable essential situation of factic life itself, as “the stand taken by life itself,” is made in October 1922 (see Blickstand). It is called the “hermeneutic situation” to indicate that it is already charged through and through with relational vectors of sense and is accordingly "prestructured" as a meaningful context called the world, which guides and directs the interpretation of any and all things contained within that world-context.

Sorgen, caring.
fürsorgliches, solicitous.
besorgendes, concerned, concernful.
The term “caring” first emerges in WS 1921–1922 as the “relational sense” of life in the world. Its precursors are the biblical Bekümmerung (1920) and Augustine’s cura (1921). Solicitude and concern emerge adjectivally in October 1922 in the context of Aristotle’s discussion of human praxis. In the same context, “care” (Sorge) is identified as a formal indication of factic life itself, and includes within itself the solicitude or care-for-others and concerns about everyday things.

Umgang, getting around (by, along); coping; dealing; (pre)occupation (never intercourse, but perhaps interaction).
This term was first thematized in WS 1921–1922 to describe the how of the daily rounds in the world around us. In SS 1922, it becomes Heidegger’s translation of Aristotle’s concept of experience in Metaphysics I and is related to sich auskennen, "knowing one’s way around," or the know-how of human experience developed through habit and memory according to Aristotle, by familiarizing oneself with the habit (custom, usage, practice) of a historical habitat according to Heidegger, so that one knows how to get around one’s world, get along with others, get by with things, in short, to cope with life’s relations. All of this know-how constitutes the content of what Heidegger calls Seinsverständnis, the understanding of be-ing.

Umsicht, circumspection, looking around (over).
Durchsichtigkeit, perspicuity, transparency.
Hinsicht, inspection, looking at.
Sicht, sight.

All of these “sights” discussed in October 1922, whether original or derivative, along
with regard (Rücksicht) for others, are in Being and Time (BT, 146–47) situated within the “lighting” or “clearing” (Lichtung) of be-ing provided by Seinsverständnis, the understanding of be-ing.

Verfallen, falling (away), lapsing; decadence.
A term used incidentally in conjunction with Abfallen since SS 1920, it is thematized in detail under the biblical term “ruinance” (Latin ruina, fall) in WS 1921–1922 before it becomes the “fateful tendency” (Verhängnis) of decadent falling in October 1922 and the falling away from our proper existence in Being and Time.

Verwahrung, (truthful) safekeeping, safeguarding, preservation, conservation.
This term appears often in the October 1922 “Aristotle Introduction” essay implicitly as a final intentional sense (compare Sinn and Zeitigung) to convey the persistent temporality of a habit of truth, in preserving what has already been unveiled in the tradition and practical usage of a historical habitat. Its overt sense and its apparent etymology suggest translating Seinsverwahrung as “holding being in trust (troth, truth)” and being persistently “true” to it by way of fidelity and loyalty (Treu), in the act of conserving and ‘saving” it. In the 1926 “truth” talk, this idea begins to shift over into the later Heidegger’s preferred term, bergen, to shelter in a cove(r), to preserve and protect by concealment, to save, salvage, and rescue from total destruction.

vollzugs geschichtlich, actualization-historical; versus objekt geschichtlich, objective-historical.
This distinction between compound adverbials of the historical occurs only in the Jaspers review and in the religion course of WS 1920–1921, and already reflects the later distinction between the history that we are and the history that we record and write about. Compare Geschichte versus Historie.

Vorbabe, pre-possession, fore-having.
Vorsicht, Vorblick, pre-view, fore-sight.
Vorgriﬀ, pre-conception, fore-conceiving.
Vorgriﬀ emerges first, already in KNS 1919, and continues to be the clinching term among the fluid presuppositions that structure the hermeneutic situation of life; it is first joined by Vorbabe in SS 1922, and by Vorblick in October 1922, which is replaced by Vorsicht in WS 1923–1924. The prefix of Vorgriﬀ is to be understood dynamically, implying both the “before” of precedence and the forward advance of anticipation, like the “Fore!” warning in golf, thus both past and future joined in the present. Vorgriﬀ thus can stand alone in structuring the temporality of the situation. When joined with the other two structures, it naturally stands at the juncture between the pre-possession arising from the past and the fore-sight into the future, in the fullness of the unique new present begging to be conceived, interpreted, and thus explicitly understood.

Wahrheit als . . . , truth as . . .
Entdecken, uncovering, discovering.
Erschlossenheit, disclosedness.
Unverborgenheit, un concealment.
Unverhüllen, unveiling (later Enthüllen).
Truth as the unconcealment of be-ing and the unveiling of beings first clearly emerges
in Heidegger’s extended gloss of *Nicomachean Ethics* VI in October 1922 (chapter 14). Even though this purportedly etymological way of translating “truth” can be found in some old Greek-German dictionaries, Georg Misch registered puzzled surprise (through question marks and exclamation points) over it in his copy of the “Aristotle Introduction.” The ensuing “truth” talks (chapters 17 and 19) will use the above constellation of terms in various ways before *Being and Time* itself will rigorously reserve the term “disclosedness” for the self and its world, and “discoveredness” for intraworldly beings. The talk of December 1924 (chapter 17) is distinctive in providing the very first listing of the three modes of concealment (*Verborgenheit, verbergen*), two of them through language. The talk on Pentecost 1926 (chapter 19) begins to explore the term *bergen* (to put under cover, to shelter) as a form of authentic concealment provided by tradition (see *bergen* and *Verwahrung*). Circa 1930 Heidegger coins the German word *Entbergung* as a favored way of speaking of truth as unconcealment in his later years.

*Welt, Selbstwelt*, world of the self, self-world.

*Mitwelt*, social world; world-with(-others).

*Umwelt*, environment; surrounding (environing) world, world around us.

The term *Selbstwelt* is the only new coinage here; the other two are relatively common German words. The entire constellation is first invoked in WS 1919–1920 and will persist into *Being and Time*, except that the self-world drops out after SS 1925 and is replaced simply by “the world” in *Being and Time*. Already in WS 1919–1920, it is noted that the other two worlds “come to a focus” (*Zugespitztheit*; GA 58, 59 ff.) and “peak” intensity in the self-world, which is their “domain of origin.” Actualizing this pretheoretical domain thus constitutes the originary experience which a phenomenological philosophy takes as its starting point and its goal, the experience of “self-worldly Dasein” (so in SS 1920).

*zeitigen*, to temporalize, i.e., to ripen, mature, come to fruition.

*Zeitigung*, temporalizing (development), maturation.

It has been noted that intentionality in 1920–1922 is explicitly formalized in terms of at least four interrelated and thus integrated “guiding directions of sense”: the relational, containing of content (“the toward-which of the relating”), actualizing, and temporalizing sense. Unique to the October 1922 “Aristotle Introduction” is the addition of perhaps a fifth conservative sense, that of taking custody of the truth attained in order to maintain and preserve it in the steady act of “truthful safekeeping” (see *Verwahrung*). But note its close connection to the fourth sense of temporalization (*Zeitigungssinn*), a term closely associated with a vintner’s careful and patient cultivation of plants from young seedlings through to their ripening into the full fruition of the mature grapes, and further. (“We shall have no wine before its time.”)

*Zusammenhang*, context, nexus, (inter)connection, continuity.

Etymologically a “hanging together,” this high-frequency word drawn largely from Dilthey’s hermeneutics proliferates in Heidegger virtually from his first writings, and is an ongoing challenge for the English translator to find the most idiomatic translation to accord with the context.
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