

TOM SHEEHAN

*Das Gewesen*  
Remembering the Fordham Years

For Bill:

. . . από της ἀληθινῆς σοφίας, ἦν φιλοσόθως  
τε καὶ ὕμῳ ἐπήσκησεν . . .

English translations of the phenomenon called *Zeitlichkeit* miss the mark and throw *Being and Time* off course at the very center of the issue that defines Heidegger's work. What is the problem here? How to remedy it? In an effort to answer those questions, the essay unfolds as follows:

**Part One**

1. Discursiveness
2. Distention
3. Disappearance and Dispensation
4. Dislocation
5. *Dénouement*

**Part Two**

1. Time, Aspect, Temporality
2. *Metaphysics IX 6, 1048b 18–34*
3. *Metaphysics IX 8, 1052a 23 – b 2*

PART ONE

1. *Discursiveness*

Recall that Heidegger's central topic is not "being" – at least not in any of the usual meanings of that term – but rather what he calls the "clearing" of and for being, *die Lichtung*. This clearing is the *locus* of being, analogous (but only analogous) to Aristotle's description of the thinking soul as the place where the forms of things may appear (τόπος εἰδῶν: *De Anima III, 4, 429a 27–28*). In German the clearing comes out as the *Da* of *Sein*, the place

where the whatness, thatness, and howness of things – their being – can become actually manifest in human experience.<sup>1</sup>

Recall also that the essence of a human being is to be “already” (i.e., essentially/necessarily) that place where things show up as what, that, and how they are. The nature of the human being is to be the locus for the “as” – where “as” is shorthand for “the possibility of things appearing *as* this or that,” i.e., appearing *in* their being.

The “as” connotes discursiveness, not only as a human possibility but above all as a human necessity. We are “condemned” to (or “thrown” into) relating to things mediately and discursively, i.e., by way of an as-structure. Discursiveness entails combining different elements while keeping them distinct. In discursiveness the synthesizing “as” and the differentiating “as-not” are not disjunctive but mutually inclusive. Such synthesis-and-differentiation happens both in praxis (using something *as* a means to an end but *as not* the only means) and in theory (seeing Socrates *as* an Athenian but *as not* the only Athenian and *as not* only an Athenian). Heidegger calls the structure of such synthetic-differential activity by the Greek word λόγος, which for him means not “word” or “reason” or “language” but “discursiveness.”

So, the human being is always already thrown into λόγος. And λόγος as the possibility of discursive meaningfulness is what Heidegger calls “world.” To be condemned to this field of discursiveness means to have to clear the field and hold it open. This is what Heidegger initially called “being-in-the-world.” In order (a) to show that one’s “thrownness” into (or *a priori* relegation to) λόγος means that one can have no footing outside of λόγος – neither in the αἰσθησις typical of animals nor in the νοῦς characteristic of angels; and (b) to capture the logical/ontological (not chronological) priority operative here; that is, (c) to emphasize that one’s nature as being-in-λόγος is something one assumes rather than creates – in the interest of all that, we might say: one *always already has, of necessity*, cleared and held open the field of discursiveness.<sup>2</sup>

Clearing and holding open the field of discursiveness means being already positioned (indeed, condemned) to “take-as.”<sup>3</sup> To have to take X *as* Y, i.e., to need to use or know X *in terms of* something else, means that you must already be structured so that you can be in touch with Y. Your being is a “distention” (*Ausbreitung*).<sup>4</sup> You are “ahead” of your actuality, “stretched” into your possibilities, such that you have both yourself and other things from out of (or: in terms of) your possibilities. *Operatio sequitur esse*: Your activities are discursive because your structure is distensive.<sup>5</sup>

## 2. Distention

Having traced discursiveness back to distention, Heidegger interprets distention in terms of movement. Shaping the discussion is his re-reading of κίνησις in Aristotle. Heidegger treats movement here not in the sense of change of

place, quality or quantity, or even generation and corruption of substance, but as a basic kind of being: ontological becoming. (Cf. *GA* 22, 173.1–8.)

In general, an entity has its being as ontological becoming if it meets the criterion of “necessary anticipation,” i.e., if, over and above its as-yet-unachieved individual possibilities, it has its own wholeness (i.e., the required actualization of its necessary possibilities) still ahead of itself and in need of anticipation. Becoming is an entity’s necessary prolepsis of a not-yet-achieved wholeness that the entity needs in order to be at all.<sup>6</sup>

Such becoming is “teleological.” It means (a) being oneself at any given moment only by anticipatorily enacting one’s τέλος; or (b) being present by being absent in the direction of one’s wholeness; or (c) having one’s τέλος and wholeness proleptically and thus finitely present. Becoming means that this absence *qua* anticipated bestows finite presence. At least this is how Heidegger understands Aristotle’s discussion of movement as ἐνέργεια ἀτελής or τοῦ ἀτελοῦς ἐνέργεια.<sup>7</sup>

Just as to be human is to be condemned to λόγος, so too (and as the basis for that) it means being condemned to becoming. Heidegger expresses this by saying that your essence is “to have to ek-sist,” i.e., to be already and necessarily positioned beyond your present actuality, not just in the direction of this or that possibility, but in the direction of your end.

The ultimate and inevitable end that your becoming anticipates is the possibility to end all possibilities. Human becoming is mortal becoming, and mortality is not some future moment up the road. Rather, you already “enact” it: It is how you “already” (i.e., essentially/necessarily) now are. Of its essence, human becoming is a disappearing act. You *are* by proleptically being-no-longer (SZ 259.1–2, 25–26). To be is to enact dying: ἐπιτηδεύεσθαι ἀποθνήσκειν.

This ontological movement of appearing by disappearing is intrinsically time-forming, but not in the usual sense of “chronology.”<sup>8</sup> Rather, your ontological movement entails

- ▶ being present to yourself and to things-in-their-being;
- ▶ by being the mortal becoming that you “already” are.

Heidegger calls this “temporality.” It constitutes the distensive structure of human becoming, which in turn makes possible – and necessary – the discursive structure of human activity. Temporality clears and holds open the field for discursive meaning; in fact it *is* the clearing.<sup>9</sup>

### 3. Disappearance and Dispensation

As with all movement, so too analogously with distention or temporality, its essence – what makes it *be* the finite becoming it is – is the dimension of its intrinsic (but relative) non-appearance or dis-appearance – metaphorically its “hiding” – which Heidegger calls “the mystery” (*das Geheimnis*).<sup>10</sup>

But this intrinsic non-appearance is not “just nothing”; as in all movement,

the absence is positive and productive. As relatively absent, the non-appearance makes possible finite appearance, while remaining itself ever absent. Given its absence, we might cross out this non-appearance lest it get hypostasized:

- # gives being;
- # dispenses being (cf. *Geschick*, *Schickungen*);
- # makes possible the appearance of things as-this-or-that.

And # does so in various “epochal” forms that constitute the “history,” i.e., the historical dispensations, of being. Distention, as disappearing, dispenses discursive appearance, viz., “being” taken as the many ways in which and as which things can appear in human experience.

By clearing and sustaining the field of discursiveness, distention makes possible “appearance-as.” But distention, in turn, is made possible by its own disappearance. So: distention as disappearance makes possible discursiveness as appearance. And both are intrinsically finite, the one as inevitably disappearing, the other as ineluctably discursive.

To name this distention or temporality – the disappearing-dispensing act that clears the field for appearance-as – Heidegger employs the Greek words ἀλήθεια and φύσις, both of which he interprets as distention’s “presence-by-absence” or “appearance-by-disappearance.” This ἀλήθεια refers primarily to (1) the distention of *Dasein*, the very opening up or happening of the clearing in conjunction with one’s finitude and mortality; which clearing, in turn, (2) makes possible the discursive appearance of entities-in-their-being. This is the difference between ontological and ontic “truth”/disclosure.

The heart of the matter – the topic of Heidegger’s thought – is this dispensation-by-disappearance. This unique movement is of the human essence, neither reducible to nor caused by individual human beings nor able to occur without them. It is what one already is and yet needs to become.

#### 4. Dislocation

As intrinsically disappearing, the dispensing is readily overlooked and forgotten. Thus, one can easily go about the business of using and understanding things-in-their-being – in working, playing, doing philosophy – while forgetting the disappearing act that makes it all possible. Just as, in order to represent non-appearance, we used a cross-out, so likewise, in order to represent the overlooking or forgottenness of it, we may bracket (cf. ἐπέχω, ἐποχή) the non-appearing dispensing that is responsible for the various “epochs” of the dispensations or “history” of being (*Seinsgeschicke*, *Seinsgeschichte*). Thus: [# dispenses] the epochal dispensations of being.

But this bracketing/oblivion, which Heidegger sometimes calls “errance” (*Irre*) or “insistence” (*Insistenz*), is hardly a forgetfulness of being; if anything, it insists on being and on its correlate, the subject. Rather, it is a forgetfulness of the disappearing-dispensing *clearing* of and for being. As such, it is

a radical dis-location (cf. ἄτοπον<sup>11</sup>), the forgetting of the locus of being (one's essence) and the substitution of something else for it.

Today, according to Heidegger, the game is up, the whole world is out of joint – but not because being has been lost. Quite the contrary. Being has triumphed. The history that runs from classical Greece to today – from theology as the first technology to technology as the last theology – has reached its eschatological fulfillment in nihilism. Being (i.e., presence) has become everything. The absence that dispenses presence has become nothing.

### 5. *Dénouement*

And yet, reappropriating that absence is always possible, because one always already *is*  $\text{it}$ . Whether easy or not, it is simply a matter of retracing and recovering the ontological movement that one “already” is.

This would entail an end to the bracketing/overlooking of ~~what~~ dispenses the epochs of discursiveness. With the brackets off, the dispensing does not change its nature and come into appearance but, rather, is recognized *as* intrinsically non-appearing.

<p><b>FROM:</b> [<math>\text{it}</math> dispenses] the possibility of appearance-as</p>	<p><b>TO:</b> <math>\text{it}</math> dispenses the possibility of appearance-as</p>
---	---

The result: one might then shift one's focus from the dispensed to the dispensing, and might appropriate the latter. That is, one might begin to understand one's own essence *not primarily* in terms of its relation to being – taken as the product of dispensation in the various historical-epochal forms (the “history of being:” metaphysics) – but, rather, in terms of one's always-already-operative relation to the heretofore overlooked dispensing itself, now understood *as* disappearing and as the place of one's own being.

## PART TWO

### 1. *Time, Aspect, Temporality*

There is no doubt that it is difficult business translating Heidegger's definition of *Zeitlichkeit* (“temporality”). The very compact phrase that defines this essential structure of Dasein's being reads: “*gewesend-gegenwärtigend Zukunft*” (SZ 326.20–21). I suggest that this means:

- 1a. *gewesend*: one's “always-already-operative” (i.e., essential)
- 1b. *Zukunft*: finite, mortal becoming,
2. *gegenwärtigend*: which dispenses one's presence (or present moment) as the possibility of having oneself and other entities present-in-being.

Or in the reverse, and with emphasis on authenticity:

2. The proper (i.e., befitting-one's-essence) way to have oneself and other entities present-in-being, is to do so in terms of  
1a/b. one's always-already-operative being-unto-one's-τέλος.

Clearly, the major problem is how to translate *gewesend* or its cognates *das Gewesen* and *die Gewesenheit*. The received translations use variations on the present perfect participial form “having been.” The Macquarrie-Robinson version of *SZ* renders *gewesend-gegenwärtigende Zukunft* as “a future which makes present in the process of having been” (*BT* 374.11–12).

This reading is misleading. Heidegger himself frequently warned against using any notion of the “past” (*Vergangenheit* – and that includes the present perfect) to translate *das Gewesen* or *die Gewesenheit* with regard to *Zeitlichkeit*. In the very paragraph where he introduces the word *Gewesen*, he explicitly interprets it in terms of Aristotle’s τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, which has nothing to do with either past time or the present perfect tense.

It is important to remember that English and German grammar privilege a view of the verb in terms of tense, whereas ancient Greek, which rules Heidegger’s perspective in this case, privileges aspect, *Aktionsart*.<sup>12</sup> (For Heidegger’s allusions to aspect, see *GA* 2, 114, n. “a,” and 462.6; also *GA* 15, 296.25–30.) Whether in ancient or modern Greek, verb tenses indicate the temporal relation between a given action and some “datum point”; that is, they answer the question: “At what time did this event occur with respect to my speaking about it, or with respect to some other action?” Greek aspect, on the other hand, answers the question: “How is the nature of this or that action being conceived, specifically as regards its completeness or incompleteness as distinct from its tense?” In modern Greek, for example, when your teacher tells you γράψε (present imperative, with imperfective aspect), she means “O.K., start writing” or even “Write regularly” – that is to say, the action is conceived as incomplete, continuous, or repeated. But when she tells you γράψε (aorist imperative, with perfective aspect), she means “Write this down” – that is, the action is seen as complete in this given moment, without reference to action completed in the past and continuing in the present.<sup>13</sup>

If we translate *das Gewesen* as “what-is-as-having-been,” we are privileging a linear view of time that sees some given process of development as having achieved its fulfillment, which fulfillment continues to have effect today. For example, you received your doctorate some years back, and no matter how long ago that was, you have become and still are a doctor. The action occurred in the past and continues to impact you in the present, precisely *as* what you have accomplished in the past. You are-as-having-been. And indeed it is possible to read the Greek present perfect tense that way. For instance, in the verb μανθάνω, “I learn,” the perfect tense μεμάθηκα means: “I now know, I *still* know, *as* having completed a long process of learning.” (See below regarding *Metaphysics* IX, 6, 1048b 24.) Likewise, the perfect tense οἶδα means “I know and still know, precisely as having completed a long process

of ‘seeing’ that resulted in, and still informs, my present act of knowing.” These examples illustrate an ordinary perfect tense with completed aspect in present time, with the formal sense of “is-as-having-been.”

This legitimate sense of “is-as-having-been” is first mentioned in Greek grammar only in very late antiquity – and then only *virtualiter*. The classical Greeks called past time ὁ χρόνος παρελθών (from παρά + ἔρχομαι, go by, pass by). By Hellenistic times Dionysius Thrax (ca. 170–90 B.C.), in his immensely influential Τέχνη γραμματική, called the past tense in general ὁ χρόνος παρεληλυθώς (from the present perfect of the same verb), and specifically called the “present perfect” tense τὸ παρακείμενον or ὁ χρόνος παρακείμενος, “the [past time] lying close by,” or the “recent [past] tense.”<sup>14</sup>

It is only with the Byzantine grammarian Stephanus (before A.D. 700) that one can document that this “recent past tense” gets called the “present-as-perfect:” ἐνεστῶς συντελικός, i.e., “[the] present [as where something has been] completed,” i.e., the “completed present” or “present perfect.” Here ἐνεστῶς, the second-perfect participle of ἐνίστημι, means something like “being-present as standing-in-this-place,” and συντελικός means “completed” or “brought to perfection,” hence: having-been-completed-and-continuing-as-such. In commenting on Dionysius’ list of Greek tenses, Stephanus writes: Ὁ δὲ παρακείμενος καλεῖται ἐνεστῶς συντελικός: “But the *parakeimenos* [recent past] tense is called *syntelikos* [being-present-as-having-been-completed].” That is: It has the time-value of: “is-[and-perduring]-as-having-been [completed]” or “is-as-having-been.”<sup>15</sup>

But this “is-as-having-been” is not what Heidegger intends by *das Gewesen*, nor is it what he hears in τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι or in the “priority” that resounds in πρότερον τῆ φύσει. At SZ 85.17 Heidegger says that “ein *apriorisches Perfekt*” – a “present perfect tense with apriori aspect” – characterizes the very being of Dasein. And in a marginal note to that text (*GA* 2, 114, note “a”) he glosses the phrase with a concatenation of temporal metaphors: *vorgängig*; *a priori*; πρότερον τῆ φύσει and τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι rendered variously as (a) *das jeweils schon voraus Wesende*, (b) *das Gewesen*, (c) *das Perfekt*, and (d) *das jeweils Frühere*.

Let all these phrases ride (provisionally and no doubt inadequately) under the rubric of the ontological “already” – not that which *has been* and still *is*, but that which at any given moment is always “prior” and essential, beyond our determination, always already operative and determining us.<sup>16</sup> What Heidegger does here is strike a novel middle path between the Scylla of the completed-and-present aspect of the Greek perfect (“is-as-having-been”) and the Charybdis of a “Platonizing” aspect, according to which the ἦν of τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι would have an objective-transcendent signification, denoting some original eternal ὄντως ὄν.<sup>17</sup> For Heidegger, *das jeweils Frühere*, “what is, in each instance, prior,” is not chronologically prior in any sense. Rather, it is the existentially apriori, that which in each case is always already ontologically operative in *Dasein*: *das schon voraus Wesende*, as he says, and “*nicht*

*ein ontisch Vergangenes*” (GA 2, 114, note “a”). *Das Gewesen*, like τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, does not designate any past at all, not even a past that still weighs upon the present and allows of a retrieval of its latent possibilities, the way one can retrieve a still hidden meaning from Kant, or revive a personal relationship, or work through a childhood trauma. There is room for that in Heidegger – he deals with it under the rubric of historicity – but that is distinct, even qualitatively different, from the experience of *Gewesenheit* in authentic temporality.<sup>18</sup>

How to test this hypothesis? A clue to what *das Gewesen* means and how one might translate it can be found in Aristotle, *Metaphysics IX*, 6 and 8.

## 2. *Metaphysics IX*, 6, 1048b 18–34<sup>19</sup>

Within the field of “doing” in the broadest sense, Aristotle distinguishes between (1) those doings that have their fulfillment within themselves (ἐνυπάρχει τὸ τέλος, 1048b 22–23) and thus are πράξεις in the proper sense of the term; and (2) those that do not have such a τέλος and so are not πράξεις in the proper sense. (I provisionally translate πράξις, insofar as it is an ἐνέργεια, as “enactment,” not in the sense of “acting something out,” like a dramatic representation, but rather: “putting into act.” An argument against this usage: The “act” of “enactment” misses the sense of “appearance” that ἔργον has for Heidegger: see below. An argument in favor: It seems Heidegger, in another context, is edging towards something like “enactment” with his “*Ins-Werk-setzen*.”)<sup>20</sup>

The example that Aristotle puts forth – exercising in order to lose weight (1048b 18–22) – might at first seem (both intuitively and from the very look of the Greek word) to have the τέλος as intrinsic to the doing and thus to be an instance of πράξις/enactment. Thinning down (τὸ ἰσχνάινειν) has thinness (ἡ ἰσχνασία) as its purpose and goal. More or less the same body, virtually the same word: Isn’t thinning down an “enactment” of thinness? Not so, says Aristotle. Consider the following paraphrase:

1048b 18–22		
[Principle:]	Any doing that has a point where it must stop [πέρας]	18
	does not have its τέλος [within itself]	
	but is for the sake of a τέλος [outside itself].	19
[Example:]	For example, the [τέλος] of thinning down is thinness [itself]. <sup>21</sup>	
[Application:]	The body, <sup>22</sup> when it is in the process of thinning down,	

	is in movement in such a way that it is not yet that for the sake of which the movement is taking place. <sup>23</sup>	21
[Conclusions:]	This kind [of doing] is not a πράξις or at least not a complete-and-perfect one [τέλεια] because there is no τέλος [inherent in the doing].	22

True, it is the same entity that begins the exercise program as an overweight body and finishes it as a thinner one. However, (1) during the regimen, the thinned-down body that is the desired goal and purpose of the movement is not actually present (μη υπάρχοντα ὧν ἕνεκα ἡ κίνησις); and (2) the movement does not persist when the τέλος is attained; rather, once the thinned-down body is achieved, the movement stops.<sup>24</sup> Therefore, says Aristotle, the movement of the body as it loses weight is not a πράξις. It *aims* at thinness but does not *enact* it.<sup>25</sup>

By inverting this negative example, we can derive two positive criteria for a true πράξις:

1. The τέλος must be present, and inhere (ἐνυπάρχει), in the process (1048b 22–23), such that
2. the movement, as always enacting the τέλος, does not have to cease with the attainment of the τέλος (1048b 26–27).

The principles are fine, but the examples that Aristotle gives, both positive and negative, seem counterintuitive. Consider the following:

1048b 22–27		
[Principle no. 1:]	But that [doing] in which the end inheres is a πράξις/enactment.	22
[Positive examples:]	For example, at one and the same time one is seeing and has seen, one is understanding and has understood, one is intuiting and has intuited.	23
[Negative examples:]	but not that [at one and the same time] one is learning and has learned, <sup>26</sup> one is getting well and has gotten well.	24
[Positive examples:]	At one and the same time one is living well and has lived well one is happy and has been happy.	25

[Principle no. 2:]	Otherwise, it would have been necessary [for the process] to stop at a certain point, as when one is thinning down.	26
[Proof of no. 2:]	But not so in these cases: we are living and have lived.	27

Aristotle's two principles may be plain enough, but do his examples work? Say you now understand how to use the Internet. Does that mean you understood it before? Or does the fact that you are now seeing Siena for the first time mean that you have already seen it at an earlier time? Does the fact that you finally found a job and are now living well, entail that you have already lived well before this?

Clearly not. And clearly that is not Aristotle's meaning in this passage, as he shows in the very next lines, which interpret the above according to the distinction of κίνησις ("movement-towards" or "being-on-the-way-to") and ἐνέργεια ("already being in/with the τέλος").

<b>1048b 28–34</b>		
[Thesis:]	Of these, some must be called κινήσεις, the others ἐνεργείαι.	28
<b>A. Κινήσεις</b>		
[Principle:]	Every κίνησις is ἀτελής: [i.e., does not have its τέλος immanent to the doing:]	29
[Examples:]	thinning down learning something walking to a destination building a house.	
[Judgment:]	These are κινήσεις, i.e., they are certainly ἀτελείς:	30
[Proof:]	For it is not the case that at one and the same time one is walking to a destination and has walked there one is building a house and has built it one is becoming something and has become it one is being moved and has been moved.	31
	And the following cases are mutually exclusive: one is moving something; one has moved it.	32

## B. Ἐνεργεῖαι

[Presumed:]	[Every ἐνέργεια is τέλεια, i.e., has the τέλος immanent to the doing].	
[Examples:]	But the following are the same at one and the same time: one has seen and is seeing one is intuiting and has intuited.	33
[Conclusions:]	I declare the latter to be ἐνέργεια, the former to be κίνησις.	34

Aristotle's topic here is what constitutes a true and proper (i.e., "complete" or "perfect:" 1048b 22) πράξις/enactment and how it differs from both an imperfect πράξις (b 21–22) and any kind of ποιησις. A "perfect" πράξις

1. is a doing whose τέλος inheres in the very doing rather than being a separate product produced by the doing.
2. Thus the doing is an end in itself.
3. Therefore, the doing need not cease when the τέλος is attained – because the τέλος is attained in and at each moment of the doing, however short or long the doing might be.

By contrast, an imperfect πράξις – like doing the process called "thinning-down-to-140-pounds" – must cease (as that specific deed) once you have reached 140 pounds; and likewise your building of a house ceases once you produce the τέλος, the house you contracted to build.

By using the "present perfect" tense in his examples, what Aristotle is affirming about a perfect πράξις – and what he is denying of both imperfect πράξις and all ποιησις – is the doing's condition of being τέλεια, i.e., its condition of enacting (realizing, fulfilling) the τέλος of the deed in the mere doing of the deed.

Therefore, Aristotle's use of the present perfect tense (ἔώρακε, πεφρόνηκε, γενόηκε, etc.) is not indicative that something "is as having been" or "is as in the process of having been." Rather, it indicates that the doing enacts its τέλος, and therefore has that τέλος immanent, such that there is an equivalence – expressed by the word ἅμα, "at one and the same time" – between (1) doing and (2) being in the τέλος of the doing. Using time words (but using them only metaphorically; see below), we may express this as the condition of "always-already" having the fulfillment or wholeness present and operative within the doing.<sup>27</sup>

3. *Metaphysics IX, 8, 1050a 23 – b 2*

Aristotle confirms and deepens his notion of the telic-ness of enactment at *Metaphysics IX, 8, 1050a 23 – b 2*. In the context of discussing how ἐνέργεια

is “prior” to δύναμις not just in λόγος and χρόνος but especially in οὐσία, Aristotle returns to the distinction between ποιήσις and πράξις.<sup>28</sup> Consider the following paraphrase.

<i>Metaphysics IX 8, 1050a 23 – b2</i>	
In some cases	23
the doing [χρήσις: exercise of the faculty] is what is ultimate:	
e.g., the ἔργον of sight is the seeing,	24
and nothing besides this is brought into appearance by sight.	25
In other cases	
something else is brought into being/appearance:	26
e.g., the art of building [οἰκοδομητικὴ τέχνη] brings into appearance	
not just the doing-of-building [οἰκοδόμησις]	
but also a house.	
In both cases there is a τέλος:	27
In the first case	
the doing is its own τέλος.	
In the second case, even though the doing is not its own τέλος,	
the doing-of-building [οἰκοδόμησις] is more of a τέλος	28
than is the ability-to-build [= οἰκοδομητικὴ τέχνη].	
And the doing-of-building [οἰκοδόμησις] – as an ἐνέργεια	
– is in the thing being built [the οἰκοδομούμενον];	
that is, the doing-of-building, at one and the same time,	29
(a) comes into appearance itself and	
(b) and is in-and-with the house.	
The second set are doings where	
not only the doing-of-the-doing [χρήσις]	30
but something else besides	
comes into appearance.	
In them, the ἐνέργεια is in the thing-being-produced:	31
e.g.: the οἰκοδόμησις as an ἐνέργεια	
is in the οἰκοδομούμενον,	32
e.g.: the weaving as an ἐνέργεια	
is in the cloth being woven.	
Likewise with other instances:	
in general, movement is in the thing moved.	33

In the first set of doings	
no other <i>ἔργον</i> is brought-into-being	34
besides the state-of-being-in-being [ <i>ἐνέργεια</i> ].	
In them, the <i>ἐνέργεια</i> inheres in the doing:	35
e.g.: the seeing is in the one doing the seeing,	36
the contemplating is in the one doing the	
contempating, life is in the <i>ψυχή</i> , and	b 1
happiness is in the <i>ψυχή</i> too,	
because happiness is a kind of life.	
Thus it is clear that	2
the being – and so the appearance – of a thing	
consists in the thing's being-in-its- <i>ἔργον/τέλος</i> .	

Both kinds of doing mentioned here are seen as “bringing something about”<sup>29</sup> in the sense of letting it come into appearance (*εἶδος*, 1050b 1). Aristotle reads this letting-come-about in terms of *ἐνέργεια* and *ἐντελέχεια* (1050a 21–23). These terms, along with their roots *ἔργον* and *τέλος*, point not to “act” or “activity” but to the *appearance* of something *as what-and-how-it-is*, and to the bringing about of that. In Heidegger’s telling, for the Greeks a thing *is* to the degree that it *appears*<sup>30</sup> (to which he would add: “even if – and in some cases, especially if – it appears as not appearing”). Thus, whatever appearance a thing has *is* the thing as *ἔργον* or *τέλος*; and the coming-into or being-in such *ἔργον/εἶδος/τέλος* is the thing’s *ἐνέργεια* or *ἐντελέχεια*.

The question is: For Aristotle, what kinds of letting-come-into-appearance are the doings that are called *ποίησις* and *πράξις*?

#### A. Ποίησις

*Ποίησις*/production is characterized by the fact that what it allows to emerge into appearance is not only its own doing (the *χρήσις* or “exercise” of its faculty: 1050a 24, 30) but a product as well (*ἕτερόν τι*, 1050a 30). And since the producing of the product is the essential moment of this doing, it follows that:

1. *ποίησις* has its *τέλος* outside itself: it exists to let a product come into appearance;
2. and since *ποίησις* is the *allowing* of something to come into appearance, the actual *coming-into-appearance* is in the thing being produced: *ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ ἐστίν* (1050a 31).

What could this second point mean? If nothing else, it shows why *ἐνέργεια* cannot mean an “activity” such as nailing boards or laying brick. For surely it is the carpenter and the bricklayer who are building the house, and certainly their productive activities are *in them*. (When they don’t show up for work, the house doesn’t get built.)

However, the ἐνέργεια (the coming-into-appearance) that defines the laborers' activity as a ποίησις (as a *letting-come-into* appearance) comes into its fulfillment not primarily in the laborers but in the coming-into-appearance of the house: ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ ἐστίν. Aristotle makes the point in the *Physics* III, 3. Consider the following paraphrase of that text.

<i>Physics</i> III, 3, 202a 13–18	
Movement is in the moved, because movement,	13
whereas it is brought about by a mover, is the coming-into-τέλος of the moved.	14
But the coming-into-appearance of the mover is not different [except in λόγος] [from the coming-into-appearance of the moved].	15
Rather, movement has to be the coming-into-τέλος of both.	16
A mover is that which (a) is <i>able</i> to move something. (b) comes to its own fulfillment when actually moving something.	17
But (b) consists in allowing the moved to come to its fulfillment.	
Therefore, there is one ἐνέργεια for both alike.	18

Hence, the coming-into-the-appearance of the moved (the house) is the goal and purpose that gives the building-activity *its* meaning, its coming-into-appearance as a *letting-come-into*-appearance. Therefore:

3. ποίησις, as a *letting-come-into*-appearance, necessarily ceases once the product itself has come into appearance.

#### B. Πράξις

Πράξις/enactment, on the other hand, brings into appearance nothing other than itself. It is the exercise of its own “faculty” – e.g., seeing as the exercise of sight. Therefore, the exercise itself is the ἔργον and τέλος, the fulfillment-that-appears: ἔσχατον ἢ χρῆσις, 1050a 24. This coming-into-appearance of itself – and of no product besides – is what defines a πράξις. “As regards doings where there is no other ἔργον besides the ἐνέργεια, the ἐνέργεια [and hence the τέλος] is present in and inheres in the doings themselves.” (1050a 34–35).

As examples Aristotle gives: The τέλος of seeing is in the one who is now seeing; the τέλος of seeing-the-unchanging is in the one who is now seeing-the-unchanging; and the τέλος of life is in *Dasein* (ἡ ζωὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, 1050a 36 – b 1) – to which we might add: And *Dasein* appropriates that life by personally enacting dying: ἐπιτηδεύεσθαι ἀποθνήσκειν (cf. *Phaedo* 64A).

Aristotle's conclusion: "Thus it is clear that the being – and so the appearance – of a thing consists in the thing's being-in-its-τέλος" (ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἐνέργειά ἐστιν, 1050b 2–3).

This τέλος is the essence of the thing, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, that which is πρότερον τῇ φύσει ("has priority in being"). It must always be presupposed as the necessary, as what an entity needs in order to be. We could perhaps use temporal metaphors (while remembering they are metaphors) to describe this essential necessity: it is that which "always already *has been* operative," what "always *was*," what "always already *is*," "prior" to the individuals who instantiate it. It is the ever necessary and essential, the "perfect" only in the sense of the *per-factum* or τέλειον: that which "always-already" is in its τέλος and affects us from there as always already "at work" (*ins-Werk-gesetzt*). These are the meanings Heidegger tries to squeeze out of the various forms of *gewesen* that he uses with regard to *Zeitlichkeit*.

\* \* \*

How to employ the above in interpreting Heidegger's definition of "temporality?" One way would be to approach the issue through the phenomenon of the verb-aspect of ancient Greek.<sup>31</sup> Nonetheless, Heidegger's problematic of the "ontological already," which only begins to peek through the texts analyzed above (and then only at the *existentiell* level), cannot, I think, be finally and entirely encompassed within the linguistic questions relating to aspect, not even within the terms of Alexander P.D. Mourelatos' "ontological" approach to "events."<sup>32</sup>

Aristotle's analyses in *Metaphysics* IX 6 and 8 remain at the level of particular, specific, everyday acts – seeing, understanding, intuiting – and their structure as πράξις. This level is what Heidegger calls the *existentiell* – and, to be sure, it includes one of the most important πράξεις of all: resolution (SZ 300.30). However, in defining the ontological structure of temporality, Heidegger, while drawing on these analyses, drops them down a register to what he calls the existential-ontological, the level of the essence of the human. There Heidegger uses Aristotle's work κατ' ἀναλογίαν, that is, as an important analogy for clarifying and articulating his own quite different notion of what one might call "ontological aspect" (cf. *er-augen: ID 24*).

*Sein und Zeit* operates at two levels. (1) At the existential level of one's essence, *Gewesenheit* is ontological "alreadiness," one's "always-already-operative" mortal finitude; and temporality is the existential-ontological "enactment" of that finitude, not as a personal deed or achievement but as a structural "given": "temporality" means that finitude is "always already

enacted.” (2) At the *existentiell* level, resolution is a doubling of what always-already-is-enacted; it means choosing to have oneself and other entities present-in-being in terms of this “always-already-operative” ontological structure.

In short, *das Gewesen* not only lies beyond ordinary time (and especially the present perfect tense) and not only comes from an experience beyond the issue of complete and incomplete activity and other aspectual features of verbs, but also forces a radical redefinition of “time” and “temporality.”

## REFERENCES AND INDICATIONS

### Sources

*Heidegger*: I cite the *Gesamtausgabe* (GA) by volume number and page, and other editions of Heidegger’s works by the abbreviations that appear in William Richardson’s *Heidegger* (1963), xxxi. When a reference is given as page + period + number (e.g.: GA 15, 310.12–15), it refers to the page and the line.

*Aristotle*: I use *Aristotle’s Metaphysics*, revised Greek text, ed. W.D. Ross, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924, 2 volumes, along with *Aristoteles’ Metaphysik* (Greek-German), 2 vols., reworked (from the Bonitz edition) by Horst Seidl, 2nd ed., Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1982; and *Aristotle’s Physics*, revised Greek text, ed. W.D. Ross, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936.

*Aquinas*: For the *Summa Theologiae* I use the text in the series *Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos*, 3rd ed., Madrid: La Editorial Católica, 1963. For other works I cite the *Opera Omnia*, Parma edition, reprinted, New York: Musurgia, 1948–1949, while occasionally checking other editions, e.g.: *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, ed. R.P. Mandonnet, new edition, Paris: Lethielleux, 1929; and (especially for the Latina recens) *In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentaria*, ed. M.-R. Cathala, Turin: Marietti, 1926.

A version of this paper appeared in *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* (1995).

## NOTES

N.B.: Heidegger’s problems with medieval philosophy are well known. Nonetheless, in the notes I occasionally cite texts from Aquinas that seem related to Heidegger’s points.

- [a] *Not the usual meanings of being*: Cf. GA 15, 310.12–15: Heidegger holds “*daß alle Metaphysik sich zwar in der Differenz [von Sein und Seiendem] bewegt (stets wird das betont, besonders bei Thomas von Aquino), daß aber keine Metaphysik diese Differenz in der Dimension erkennt, wo sie sich als Differenz entfaltet*” – that is, in the “clearing.”

[b] “*Clearing*”: passim; cf. SD 71ff., 78.23–24; GA 5, 40.1–2, 71.35; GA 68, 45.11.

Martin Heidegger, “*Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens* (1968),” in *Japan und Heidegger*, ed. Hartmut Buchner, Sigmaringen: Jan Thorbecke, 1989, p. 230.9.

[c] “*Clearing for being*”: GA 65 #171, 295.3. Cf. GA 49, 60.25–27.

[d] “*τόπος εἰδῶν*”: Aristotle emphasizes that the thinking soul is the forms only “potentially” (οὔτε ἐντελεχεῖά ἀλλὰ δυνάμει, 429 a 29–30); and here we say analogously that the “*Da*” is where the being of entities can become actually manifest.

- [e] “whatness, thatness, howness”: This phrase seeks to emphasize the distinguishability, but to deny any true separability, of being (*das Sein*) from entities (*das Seiende*). Cf. Aristotle, *Physics*, II, 1, 193b 4–5: οὐ χωριστὸν ὄν ἀλλ’ ἢ κατὰ τὸν λόγον; and by analogy, III, 1, 200b 32–33: οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κίνησις παρὰ τὰ πράγματα. Cf. also 201a 8–9: ὥστε κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς ἔστιν εἶδη τοσαῦτα ὅσα τοῦ ὄντος.
2. In the received tradition, the triad that structures *In-Sein* is *Befindlichkeit*, *Verstehen*, and *Rede*. As far as one can trace it back, that tradition first surfaces in Alphonse de Waelhens’ *La Philosophie de Martin Heidegger* (1942). However: (1) While the three phenomena are equiprimordial, it is not clear they are *ex aequo* constitutive “components” of the clearing. *Befindlichkeit* and *Verstehen* are defined and determined by *Rede*, but *Rede* is not the third structural component of the “*Da*” alongside those two, because (2) *Rede* would seem to be the already articulated synthetic-differential whole of being-in-the-world and, as such, the defining essence of *Befindlichkeit* and *Verstehen* without which *Dasein* could not see beings as . . . at all, much less articulate them in words. Construing *Rede* as the third of three constitutive moments of being-in-the-world suppresses the true “third” moment of that whole, namely, *das verfallende Sein bei*. . . . Moreover, in the final analysis it seems that there are not three constitutive moments of the clearing or of care, but only two, insofar as *Befindlichkeit* and *Verstehen* (like *Existentialität* and *Faktizität*) are but two aspects of one moment. Thus, in the case of *Sorge*, “already-aheadness” (*Sich-vorweg-im-schon-sein-in*) is one moment, “falling-in-with” (*das verfallende Sein bei* . . .), is the other (SZ 192).
  3. “To take something as something,” whether in constructing declarative sentences or in hammering nails – is what Heidegger means by *entwerfen etwas auf*. . . . In English this usually comes out as “projecting something upon. . . .” However, the *Woraufhin* of a projection is not “that upon which” I throw something but, formally, “that in terms of which” I take something. The *Woraufhin* could be the category predicated of a subject, or the task defining a tool, or the condition I think makes a certain phenomenon possible. I take Napoleon as a husband or an emperor; I use this stone as a missile or a paperweight; I think of being as created by God or as manifested in the clearing.
  4. GA 29/30, 528.25 has “*Ausbreitsamkeit*,” whereas the Simon Moser Nachschrift, 701.2, has “*Ausbreitung*.” The evocation of Augustine’s “*distentio animi*” (*Confessiones* XI, 26) is intentional. See Heidegger, “Des hl. Augustinus Betrachtung über die Zeit. *Confessiones* lib. XI,” conference at St. Martin’s Abbey, Beuron, October 26, 1930, typescript, e.g., p. 10. In SZ “*Ausbreitung*” is represented by “*Sicherstrecken*.”
  5. In a much adapted sense one might hear an echo of Thomas Aquinas’ observation that the human intellect knows potency through potency: “*aliter se habet intellectus divinus, atque aliter intellectus noster . . . [qui] sicut actum cognoscit per actum, ita etiam potentiam per potentiam cognoscat.*” *Summa Contra Gentiles*, I, 71, [11], (Parma V, 51a).
  6. [a] *Anticipation*: Cf. In III *Physicorum* lectio 2 (Parma XVIII, 295b): “. . . quod iam in actu existens habet ordinem in ulteriorem actum; quia si tolleretur ordo ad ulteriorem actum, ipse actus, quantumcumque imperfectus, esset terminus motus et non motus . . .”; In VIII *Physicorum* lectio 10 (Parma XVIII, 500a): “. . . movetur aliquid, quod cum sit in potentia, tendit in actum”; and S.T. I–II, 30, 2, c: “*Est autem alia ratio virtutis motivae ipsius finis vel boni, secundum quod est realiter praesens, et secundum quod est absens: nam secundum quod est praesens, facit in seipso quiescere; secundum autem quod est absens, facit ad seipsum moveri.*”
- [b] *Wholeness*: Thomas Aquinas argues that all steps preceding the end are for the end: cf. S.T. I–II, 8, 3, c: “. . . cum finis sit secundum se volitus, id autem quod est ad finem, in quantum huiusmodi, non sit volitum nisi propter finem.” Here he follows Aristotle’s argument that this state of affairs holds in natural as in rational movement (Cf. *Physics*, II, 8, 199a 8–20, especially 8–9: . . . ἐν ὅσοις τέλος ἔστι τι, τούτου ἕνεκα πρᾶττεται τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς).
7. [a] *Anticipatorily enacting one’s τέλος*: Commenting on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* IX, 8, 1050a 8 (ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα) Aquinas says: “*Dicit . . . quod omne quod fit vadens*

*ad finem, vadit ad quoddam principium. Nam finis cuius causa fit aliquid, est quoddam principium. Est enim prius in intentione agentis, quia ejus causa fit generatio.*"(Parma, XX, 544a; Cathala edition, no. 1857, p. 539). Cf. S.T. I-II, 1, 1, ad 1: ". . . finis [qui est primus in intentione] . . . habet rationem causae."

[b] *Re: Absent in the direction of wholeness:* Cf. In IV Sententiarum, 17, 1, 5, solutio 3, ad 1. [Parma VII/2, 781a]: "*Est enim quidam motus qui est actus imperfecti, qui est exitus de potentia in actum; et talis oportet quod sit successivus, quia semper expectat aliquid in futurum ad perfectionem suae speciei*"; and in discussing angels at *De Veritate* 8, 14, ad 12 [Parma IX, 139a]: ". . . illa operatio per se cadit sub tempore quae expectat aliquid in futurum, ad hoc quod eius species compleatur; sicut patet in motu, qui non habet speciem completam donec ad terminum perducatur."

[c] *Re: Proleptic presence of the τέλος:* Cf. S.T. I-II, 27, 3 c., where Aquinas argues that likeness is a cause of love "*secundum quod potentia habet similitudinem ad actum ipsum: nam in ipsa potentia quodammodo est actus.*" Indeed "*unicuique existenti in potentia, in quantum huiusmodi [hence: unicuique mobili], inest appetitus sui actus: et in eius consecutione [“{anticipated} realization”!] delectatur, si sit sentiens et cognoscens.*"

[d] *Heidegger on Aristotle on movement:* The texts in Aristotle include *Physics* III, 1, 201a 10–11, 201a 27–29; 201 b 4–5; 2, 201 b 31–32 (ἐνέργεια . . . ἀτελής); *De Anima* III, 7, 431 a 8: ἡ γὰρ κίνησις τοῦ ἀτελοῦς ἐνέργεια (cf. S.T. I-II, 31, 2, ad 1: *actus imperfecti*; also In IV Sententiarum, 17, 1, 5, solutio 3, ad 1: "*Est enim quidam motus qui est actus imperfecti . . . [N.B.: Alius motus est actus perfecti. . . ]*": cf. GA 9, 284)). For Heidegger's comments on Aristotle: GA 9, 283–288; GA 22, 171–181; 201–204; 318–331; etc.

8. *Re movement as intrinsically time-forming:* In discussing the temporality of *delectatio* at S.T. I-II, 31, 2, c. Thomas Aquinas makes it clear that entities that have their being as becoming are intrinsically and materially temporal (*in tempore secundum se*) insofar as
- (a) time is the measure of successive states (*numerus successorum*) and
  - (b) succession is essential to these entities (*de quorum ratione est successio*).
- He contrasts such materially-intrinsically temporal entities with entities that are in time
- (a) *only formally*, insofar as the *numerus* is extrinsic to the *successio* (the intellect divides up and numbers successive states and then compares them to some standard or "*primus motus*" like the sun); and/or
  - (b) *only accidentally*, as when an entity does not have succession as part of its *ratio* but nonetheless is "subject to changeable causes" (*subiacet causis transmutabilibus*).

It is interesting to note that, as examples of intrinsically temporal phenomena Thomas offers: "*motus, quies, locutio* [language!]," whereas the one example he gives of something that is in motion only "*per aliud, et quasi per accidens*" – is "*esse hominem*" since, he says, "to be human does not have succession as of its essence, and thus is not movement but rather is the term of a movement or change, specifically that of its own generation" (*de sui ratione non habet successionem, non enim est motus, sed terminus motus vel mutationis, scilicet generationis ipsius*).

The way Thomas puts this matter in his commentary on the *Sentences* (In II Sententiarum, 2, 1, 2, c. and ad 1 [Parma VI, 404b–405a]) is to note that (a) time is the *mensura variationis*; that (b) the *mensura* may be either intrinsic or extrinsic; and (c) in the one instance it is in the measured: "*quaedam intrinseca, quae est in mensurato sicut accidens in subjecto.*"

9. Cf. SZ 133.5, 351.5–6; GA 9, 325.20–21; GA 65, #143, 263.28–29. But cf. GA 49, 60.23–27.
10. [a] Cf. GA 9, 195.23: "*das vergessene Geheimnis des Daseins.*" GA 65, #168, 293.9: "*Der Entzug aber ist des Da-seins.*"

[b] *Re: hiding:* Perhaps it is better to speak of an "intrinsically concealed" dimension rather than (the anthropomorphized) "self-concealing"/"self-concealed." In any case, the intrinsic concealment is only relative, not absolute and entire, for [a] if it were fully "self"-concealed, there would be no *Schickung*, and no anticipation by *Dasein*, only a black hole whence no light shines, hypostasized into a "negative entity"; and [b] if it were fully present,

there would be no more movement, only a Hegelian *Aufhebung* and *Versöhnung*. Therefore: Relative intrinsic concealment (i.e., un-concealedness) dispenses appearance.

[c] Does the “mystery” entail a “doubling” of concealment, a “concealing of concealment”? Whereas the published version of *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* speaks of the mystery as “die Verbergung des Verborgenen im Ganzen” (GA 9, 194.4–5), Heidegger’s hand-corrected typescript of the original lecture (delivered on Thursday, December 11, 1930, in Freiburg im Breisgau), p. 20, calls it “die Verborgenheit des Verborgenen im Ganzen,” with the (to me) clear indication that the “des” is a subjective genitive (“the state of concealedness of the concealed” or equally: “the concealed in its concealedness”) rather than an objective genitive that doubles the concealment (“the act of concealing the fact that the concealed is concealed”).

11. *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 7, 1178a 3. (Cf. VII, 5, 1149a 15.)
12. The best work in English on aspect is Robert I. Binnick, *Time and the Verb: A Guide to Tense and Aspect* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), especially chapters 1 and 6. On the formal distinction between aspect and *Aktionsarten*, cf. *ibid.*, 139–149 and 202–207. Binnick’s work far surpasses Bernard Comrie’s (still useful) *Aspect: An Introduction to the Study of Verbal Aspect and Related Problems*, Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1976. For aspect specifically in ancient Greek see further K.L. McKay, *Greek Grammar for Students: A Concise Grammar of Classical Attic with Special Reference to Aspect in the Verb* (Canberra, Australia: Australian National University, 1974), pp. 214–224; and Hardy Hansen and Gerald M. Quinn, *Greek, An Intensive Course: Preliminary Edition* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1980), Unit 2.1, 3(b).
13. For modern Greek, besides Binnick I draw on Peter Mackridge, *The Modern Greek Language* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 102–124, and W. Householder, Kostas Kazazis, Andreas Loutsouda, *Reference Grammar of Literary Dhimitiki* (The Hague, Mouton, 1964), chapter 5: 5.15.
14. For Dionysius’ text: *Dionysii Thracis Ars Grammatica*/Τέχνη Διονυσίου γραμματικῶν, ed. Gustav Uhlig, in *Grammatici Graeci*, I, 1, (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1883; reprinted, Georg Olms: Hildesheim, 1965), p. 53. E.T. by Alan Kemp, “The TEKHNE GRAMMATIKE of Dionysius Thrax” in Daniel J. Taylor, ed., *The History of Linguistics in the Classical Period* (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 170–189, here, p. 181. (Kemp’s translation replaces T. Davidson’s 1874 translation, which first appeared in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*.)
15. Stephanus’ commentaries on the text of Dionysius Thrax are preserved only in fragments; for the present text see *Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam*, ed. Alfred Hilgard, in *Grammatici Graeci*, I, iii (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1901; reprinted, Georg Olms: Hildesheim, 1965), n. 20: *Scholia Vaticana* §13, Περὶ ῥήματος, 251.4. Cf. further, *ibid.*, *Scholia Marciana*, 405.14–15: πεπληρωμένος: “[is as] having been fulfilled” (cf. Mark 1:15!). On Stephanus (fl. between A.D. 400 and 700) see Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, III/A, ii, 2401a and b, s.v. “Stephanos,” no. 13; and J.R. Martindale, *The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), II (A.D. 395–527), 1030, s.v. “Stephanus 16.” Note the anomaly of his absence from Robert A. Kaster, *Guardians of Language: The Grammarian and Society in Late Antiquity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 361–363 and 464–465.
16. Cf. “. . . φῶς meint jenes, was einer ursprünglich und eigentlich schon ist: das schon Ge-Wesende . . .”: GA 40, 108.
17. Cf. Friedrich Ueberweg, *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie*, 4th ed. (Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1871 [originally 1862–66]), I, 174f. (For very indirect evidence of Heidegger’s use of Ueberweg, see Martin Heidegger and Elisabeth Blochmann, *Briefwechsel 1918–1969*, ed. Joachim W. Storz [Marbach am Neckar: Deutsches Literaturarchiv, 1989], 36.) See also Friedrich Bassenge, “Das τὸ ἐν εἶναι, τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι etc., etc., und das τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, bei Aristoteles,” *Philologus* 104 (1960), 14–47 and 201–222, esp. VII, 205–222.
18. See, for example, Martin Heidegger, “Unbenutzte Vorarbeiten zur Vorlesung vom Wintersemester 1929/30: ‘Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt – Endlichkeit –

*Einsamkeit*,” *Heidegger Studies*, 7 (1991), 6–12, esp. 11, where *Gewesenheit* in the framework of historicity is described as: “*eigentlich hinter sich gebracht und gehalten im wesenhaften Vor-sich-bringen*.” One must distinguish between the *Wiederholen* of oneself in individual resolution and the *Wiederholung* of possibilities from one’s past. It is to latter that John D. Caputo refers to in his *Radical Hermeneutics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), p. 86, when he writes: “As factual being, thrown into the world, *Dasein* carries its past with it, not in the sense of that which is over but in the sense of what *Dasein* has been (*gewesen*) all along.”

19. This section of the Greek is not present in the Latin version that Thomas Aquinas used, and so receives no comment in his *In Metaphysicam* IX, I. V. The Parma edition of the *Opera Omnia* provides a Latin translation at XX, 538b.
20. *GA* 5, 22 and 70. N.B.: The ποιησις mentioned at *GA* 5, 70 n. “a” does not have its Aristotelian meaning (ποίησις in contrast to πράξις) but rather the pre-Aristotelian and generalized sense of “*Ins-Werk-Bringen, Hervor-bringen*,” etc.
21. The divergence here of Ross (II, 253) from Bonitz is well-known. Ross translates ἡ ἰσχνασία here (dubiously, I think) as “fat-removal” and follows Bywater’s emendation of the Greek to the effect: “. . . for example, thinning down or thinness [where there is no τέλος].” Jaeger, *Aristotelis Metaphysica*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1952, sides with Bywater (and implicitly Ross), but brackets out both ἡ ἰσχνασία and αὐτό and notes: “*oratio est admodum dura et obscura et in libris corrupta*.” In any case, I take ἰσχνασία, “thinness,” as a ἔξις here, not as a κίνησις (“thinning”) as at 1048b 29. Like the *Latina recens* (“*velut emaciandi ipse finis est emaciatio*”), Apostle, and others, I follow Bonitz.
22. Aristotle uses the plural (αὐτά, “the parts of the body”) for the entity both as going through the exercise program and as the goal of it. Hence the plurals at 21: τὰ ἄρχοντα and ὄν.
23. Or perhaps: “. . . is in movement is such a way that [the desired body] that is the goal and purpose of the movement is not [yet] present.”
24. Cf. ἔδει ἄν ποτε παύεσθαι (1048b 26–27) and perhaps ὄν ἔστι πέρας at 18. The *Latina recens* renders the latter (dubiously, I believe) as “*quarum est aliquod extremum*” (Aquinas, *Omnia Opera*: Parma XX, 538b). I think it should be “*quarum est aliqui terminus*.”
25. It may seem Aristotle hedges when he adds ἢ οὐ τελεία at 1048b 21–22, but I do not think so. He means: It is, of course, a πράξις in the broad sense of an “activity” or “doing” (cf. the generic τῶν πράξεων at 1048b 18), but it is not a πράξις properly speaking, viz. “one that is fulfilled in the very doing [τέλεια] – because there is no τέλος [present here].”
26. The present perfect form μεμάθηκα means “I know [insofar as I have learned].” Hence, this sentence has the meaning of: “One is learning and already knows.”
27. Gilbert Ryle misses the point of *Metaphysics* IX, 6, 1048b 23 (ὄρα ἅμα καὶ ἔώρακε) when he writes: “Aristotle points out, quite correctly (*Met.* IX, vi. 7–10) that I can say ‘I have seen it’ as soon as I can say ‘I see it.’” *Dilemmas: The Tonner Lectures, 1953*, Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1954, p. 102. His reference (“vi. 7–10”) indicates he may not have been using his left Loeb; perhaps that is why he does not engage the issue of “Aristotelian aspect.” For Heidegger’s remark on the passage: *GA* 9, 284.
28. Cf. *Metaphysics* V, 11, for various sense of “prior” and “posterior,” the last of which is κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐσίαν, 1019a 2–3.
29. Cf. γίγνεται and γινόμενον at 1050a 25, 26, 30, etc. At *GA* 9, 303 Heidegger remarks on this under the rubric of “*Vollbringen*.”
30. Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 2, 1173a 1–2: ἄ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, ταῦτ’ εἶναι φαμεν Cf. *GA* 40, 108: “*Sein heißt [den Griechen] Erscheinen*.”
31. I have tried to say a word about interpreting SZ §65, 325.14–326.25, in “Heidegger’s New Aspect,” *Research in Phenomenology*, XXV (1995).
32. In the important debate over verb types, Mourelatos has definitively advanced the discussion far beyond the earlier work of Zeno Vendler and Anthony Kenny; indeed, one of the essay’s major threshold achievements is to have simply recognized the problem in terms

of verbal aspect. See Alexander P.D. Mourelatos, "Events, Processes, and States," in *Linguistics and Philosophy* 2 (1978), 415–434, in response to Anthony Kenny, *Action, Emotion, and Will*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963, pp. 172 ff. (cf. 173, n. 2 for Kenny's correlation of his verb types with Aristotelian distinctions; also, the chart below), and Zeno Vendler, *Linguistics in Philosophy*, Ithaca: Cornell U.P., 1967, esp. chapter 4 (with minor changes = his "Verbs and Times," *Philosophical Review*, 66 [1957], 143–160). Using the *non*-aspectual framework of Kenny (combined with Vendler) and imbedding it within just the *formal* framework of Mourelatos, we can schematize the issues of *Metaphysics* IX, 6 and 8 as follows. [K = Kenny, M = Mourelatos, S = my own suggestions].

<b>SITUATION</b>	
[as the broadest, most neutral term]	
{ ἔξις: state	ἐνέργεια
{ προῤῥξις: broad sense [M: occurrence, S: doing]	
{ προῤῥξις: proper sense [K: activity, M: process, S: enactment]	ἐνέργεια
{ κίνησις: [K: performance; M: event; S: movement-towards]	κίνησις
{ [unnamed]: punctual achievement [starts/stops, etc.]	κίνησις
{ ποίησις: developing accomplishment [S: production]	κίνησις

In this aspect-neutral framework, what defines a προῤῥξις in the proper sense (K: activity, S: enactment) is its intrinsic completeness and its homogeneity: the fact that the action is realized as soon as it is begun as well as at any moment in the process.