Steven Crowell’s *Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger* (Cambridge, 2013) is something of a manifesto: a wake-up call and much-needed therapy for phenomenology in general and for Heidegger studies in particular, especially in North America. His earlier coedited collection *Transcendental Heidegger* (Stanford, 2007) already laid the groundwork for a revolution in Heidegger research, one that just might save that field from the self-congratulatory irrelevance toward which much of it seems to be stumbling. This latest book continues Crowell’s efforts to draw lines between Husserl and Heidegger, those apparent antipodes, as it probes questions bearing on normativity and the like.

In what follows I focus only on certain Heideggerian aspects of the book, and I do so in the form of a propaedeutic to Crowell’s original rewriting of phenomenology as it might be (but mostly is not) practiced by Heideggerians. This is a necessary propaedeutic, I argue, because as Crowell now moves into important issues of normativity, responsibility, ethics, and agency, this book presupposes crucial elements of his rewriting of phenomenology, elements that many Heideggerians either overlook or deny or in any case have yet to take on board.

I will thematize only two of those issues, but the two that constitute ground zero of Crowell’s robust reinstatement of phenomenological method in Heidegger research: the phenomenological reduction and the transcendental reduction. For now I will continue to use the usual term “reduction,” but later in this text—following Heidegger himself, and in order to name his unique formulation of the matter—I will substitute the term “induction” (*Hinführung*, as in the Greek ἐπαγωγή) for “reduction” (*Zurückführung*, as in the Greek ἐπαναγωγή).
1. SUNT LACRIMAE RERUM

Unfortunately, a good deal of contemporary Heidegger scholarship seems to have left phenomenology behind as it cuts its way through the dark thickets of his later texts. Or else it reduces that phenomenology to the quaint simplicity of “letting a thing show itself as it is in itself”—something that is impossible for two reasons. First of all, as regards the “in itself” piece: at least since Plotinus and Augustine, the in-itself-ness of an entity has been understood as the thing’s noumenal status before an intellectually intuiting νοῦς, something that Kant placed decisively beyond the scope of human cognition. Secondly, *Sein und Zeit* (SZ) demonstrates that within phenomenology the so-called *inseitas* or in-itself-ness of a thing is that thing’s current proemitas—relatedness to a human being—within a specific world of interests and concerns. In SZ Heidegger was clear on this:

The *usefulness* of a thing is the ontological-categorial determination of that thing as it is “in itself.”

In our *concernful use* of a readily available thing we encounter that thing’s specific and self-evident “in-itself-ness.”

In other words, in Heidegger’s phenomenology the so-called in-itself-ness of a thing is not its *οὐσία* or substance or “being”—that is, its stand-alone, unchanging essential structure—but rather its current (*jeweilig*) and very changeable significance to the person or persons experientially engaged with that thing within a specific context of concerns and interests. Heidegger investigates entities not in terms of their status as out-there-now-real (Aristotle’s ἔξω ὀν καὶ χωριστόν and ἔξω [τῆς διανοίας]), but only in terms of their *Anwesenheit/Bedeutsamkeit*, their current meaningfulness to someone within specific contexts of human purpose, desire, need, and so on. The key for entering all phenomenology, Heidegger’s included, is the principle of correlation, and it applies equally to his investigations of propositional knowing-that and practical knowing-how. For Heidegger as much as for Husserl, phenomenology is correlation research.

That notwithstanding, some scholars, most notably Professor Richard Capobianco of Stonehill College, Massachusetts, claim that Heidegger refused the phenomenological reduction and focused not on the correlation between things and the acts and structures that constitute them as meaningful, but rather on the independent “being” of things in what amounts to a quasi-realist ontology. (Capobianco goes so far as to suggest Heidegger sought “not to ‘overcome’ metaphysics as such, but rather to refashion it” as some kind of “‘process’ metaphysics.”) Throughout the history of Western philosophy, being (εἶναι, οὐσία, εἶδος, ἐνέργεια, esse, Sein, and so on) has always been the proper object of
metaphysics. And in fact, Heidegger himself confused matters (and misled three generations of scholars) by adopting the shopworn term “Sein” to name the proper object of his own meta-metaphysical thinking. He admitted his mistake in the early 1950s when Professor Tomio Tezuka of the Imperial University of Tokyo confronted him with “the confusion created by your [Heidegger’s] ambiguous use of the word Sein.” Heidegger responded, “Sie haben Recht”—“You’re right.” But having made that admission, he tried, without much success, to salvage and justify the use of Sein in his own work.

*Heidegger:* My own thinking has a clear sense of the distinction between Sein as the Sein des Seienden and Sein as Sein with regard to its own proper sense, which is openness (the clearing).

*Tezuka:* Then why didn’t you immediately and decisively hand back the word “Sein” exclusively to the language of metaphysics? Why didn’t you immediately give your own name to what you were seeking as the “meaning of Sein” on your path through the essence of time?

*Heidegger:* How can I give a name to what I’m still searching for? Finding that would depend on assigning to it the word that would name it.

*Tezuka:* Then we have to endure the confusion that has arisen. (GA12: 104.16–105.3)

And that unnecessary confusion has thrown off the scholarship for more than eight decades. Fortunately, however, Heidegger relented in his later years:

I no longer like to use the word Sein. (GA15: 20.8–9)

Sein remains only the provisional term. (GA7: 234.13)

and even more emphatically:

Sein is no longer the proper object of thought. (“das Sein, das im Geschick beruht, nicht mehr das eigens zu Denkende ist”: GA14: 50.2–3)

There is no longer room even for the word Sein. (“ist sogar für den Namen Sein kein Raum mehr”: GA15: 365.17–18)

William J. Richardson noted a half-century ago that the word Sein has almost completely disappeared from [the later Heidegger’s] vocabulary. . . . Even in SZ, presumably, Heidegger sensed the inadequacy of the term but could find no other way to designate the process under discussion. 6

But alas, instead of abandoning that misleading term and (like Heidegger himself) designating his topic as “the appropriated clearing” (die ereignete Lichtung, GA71: 211.9), Heideggerians like Capobianco beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the metaphysics that Heidegger
abandoned, as they struggle to salvage the word Sein/being, either by an idiosyncratic spelling (“beyng” in imitation of Heidegger’s Seyn) or by writing it under erasure (being) or by offering lame distinctions (e.g., being-self vs. being-qua-beingness) that only perpetuate the confusion.

Retaining the word “being” under very strong erasure might just possibly work, but only if Heideggerians first managed to get clear on two facts:

1. that Heidegger radically reinterpreted the word Sein in a phenomenological mode as the Anwesen or meaningful presence of a thing to and for human beings; and
2. that the phrase das Sein selbst, “being itself,” is not a phenomenon at all but only a provisional heuristic term that stands in for the sought-for “X” of Heidegger’s work.

The phrase “being itself” means little more than “das Erfragte, i.e., the thing we’re after,” which turns out to be not being (Sein)—and not even being-as-Anwesen—but rather that which makes possible such meaningful presence. And Heidegger is clear: what enables or “gives” all forms of the meaningful presence of this or that is ex-sistence (Dasein) as the appropriated clearing.

Welt “gibt” Sein; das Dasein ist das je vereinzelte “es,” das gibt; das ermöglicht und ist das “es gibt” (GA73, 1: 642.28–29).

World is what “gives” being. Ex-sistence is the ever individual “it” that gives, that makes possible and is the “it gives.”

Getting clear on the first fact—Sein reinterpreted as Anwesen—would require that Heideggerians abandon what Husserl called “philosophical naïveté” and finally embrace the phenomenological reduction. Getting clear on the second fact would entail rewriting reams of Heidegger scholarship.

2. INSTAURATIO PHAENOMENOLOGICA

Crowell insists that Heidegger’s philosophy begins with a phenomenological reduction. Over the entrance to Plato’s Academy was allegedly written: “No one ignorant of geometry may enter.” Crowell suggests in effect that over the entrance to Heidegger’s Academy should be inscribed: “No phenomenological reduction? Don’t even try to get in.” But a significant number of Heideggerians would object that whereas such a reduction might be necessary in Husserl’s phenomenology, it certainly is not necessary in Heidegger’s, and that for three reasons.

First objection: For Heidegger human ex-sistence is being-in-the-world, living inescapably in this very messy everyday world of people and things.
Unlike Husserl, therefore, SZ allegedly repudiates the phenomenological reduction and remains resolutely and directly embedded in that world of the everyday.

**Second objection:** Given the first objection, it follows that there can be no époque of the natural attitude in Heidegger, no bracketing of the workaday worlds of the carpenter, the farmer, the hacker, or, for that matter, the philosopher. In line with this objection, instead of performing such an époque SZ allegedly spends its time ferreting out the implicit ontology at work *within* the natural attitude: concern with tools and solicitude for people, along with the everyday structures of fallenness, care, temporality, and the like.

**Third objection:** After his *Kehre* or “turn” in the 1930s, Heidegger allegedly left phenomenology behind for what he called *Seinsdenken*, the thinking of being. In fact it was Heidegger himself who gave William J. Richardson the subtitle of his famous book: “*Durch Phänomenologie in das Denken des Seins*” (Heidegger’s emphasis), that is, *through* (and *beyond*) phenomenology and into the thinking of being. Some take that phrase as virtually summarizing the later Heidegger’s progress, namely, as a *turn away from* the correlational phenomenology of SZ and a *turn to* the unmediated understanding of being, as such being, in its fundamental independence of ex-sistence, reveals and conceals itself, indeed as it has currently abandoned beings in today’s *téχnη*-besotted world, but will once again, some day after the dark night of *Gestell*, show itself as it really is.

However: wrong on all three counts.

**Regarding the first objection (re “no phenomenological reduction”).** Crowell cites chapter and verse on how Heidegger insisted on a phenomenological reduction, most pointedly on Thursday, May 4, 1927, in his course *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (GA24: 29.12–15). Of course Heidegger did not mean a Husserlian reduction to “the transcendental life of consciousness, . . . in which objects are constituted as correlates of consciousness.” Rather, for Heidegger the phenomenological reduction means leading one’s phenomenological gaze back from the apprehension of a thing, . . . back to the understanding of the *Sein* of the thing, that is, taking the thing in terms of the way it is disclosed [*auf die Weise seiner Unverborgenheit*].

We note that the word *Sein* in this passage refers to the mode of *Unverborgenheit*, that is, the meaningful disclosure of something to someone within a phenomenological correlation and in an already operative field of intelligibility. Heidegger’s phenomenological revolution rewrites the *Sein* of a thing in such a way that it now means the way that thing is disclosively related to someone (*mich-bezogen*, GA58: 105.12–13), the way it happens to be meaningful in the present circumstances. In the natural attitude our intentional awareness focuses on *objects*, whether persons or things, and we overlook two things:
• how those objects appear to and are understood by a person; and
• the prior constituting (ausmachen, festmachen, GA9: 244.26–28) of the
  modes of the thing’s appearance and understanding.

In contrast to the naïveté of the natural attitude, in a phenomenological
reduction we draw our intentional gaze away from the object as “indepen-
dently and objectively out there” (whether it be vorhanden, zuhanden, or
persönlich), and lead our gaze back (re-ducere, zurück-führen) to the way
the object is currently disclosed/understood. Once we have done that, we can
begin analyzing how and why the thing is disclosed in the way it is within a
phenomenological correlation. For example: When I’m out camping, why do
I currently understand this rock as an ersatz mallet for pounding in tent pegs
rather than as a specimen of granite from the Achaean Eon? That may have
to do with the specific world of concern (camping in the woods vs. academic
petrology) in which I now find myself.

Once Husserl had put “phenomenological eyes in my head,” as he said in
1923 (GA63: 5.22–23), Heidegger fought against the naïve objectifying real-
isim of the Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics he had been steeped in, which
held that “the real” is id quod habet esse or id cui existentia non repugnat (i.e.,
that which exists independent of any subjective constitution by human beings).
In that traditional view the realness of a thing is its existentia or Vorhanden-
sein, its mere existing (1) outside of nothing and (2) in the real world. The
phenomenological attitude breaks with that naïveté and draws us back reflect-
tively and thematically to where we always already stand without noticing it:
within fields of intelligibility. There we relate to things not merely as objects
positioned spatio-temporally in the universe, independent of us. Instead, we
relate to things in terms of their significance, their meaningful presence to us
as personally, socially, linguistically, and bodily engaged with them.

From the start of his career Heidegger affirmed, “I live in a first-hand
world of meaning; everything around me makes sense, always and every-
where” (GA56/57: 73.1–8: “In einer Umwelt lebend, bedeutet es mir überall
und immer”). Heidegger’s philosophy, like all phenomenology worthy of
the name, is correlation research in which “the one who is philosophizing
belongs together with the things being treated” (GA9: 42.27–27: “zu den
Sachen . . . der Philosophierende selbst . . . mitgehört”). But part from phi-
losophy, even in our everyday lives, once we wake up to this most obvious
fact, “the real” is not simply what’s-out-there-now; it is the meaningful—
not necessarily the “true,” but always the meaningful. Huis clos: there is no hors-
texte, no exit from meaning. For us who are condemned to λόγος, outside of
meaning there is only death.

Regarding the second objection (“no epoché”). The second objection
notwithstanding, Heidegger in fact does carry out an epoché and puts the
brakes on (ἐπέχει) our natural tendency to overlook the constitution of
meaning. Usually we look through (i.e., neglect) the meaning-giving world we currently inhabit; we focus directly on things without noticing what constitutes them as meaningful. It is against such neglect and overlooking that the phenomenological epoché militates. As Aron Gurwitsch famously declared, after the phenomenological reduction the only philosophical issues one may properly pursue are the hermeneutical questions of sense, meaning, and signification.9

This certainly holds for Heidegger, for whom the so-called being of things is now no longer their εἶναι or οὐσία or esse or Sein, as in the metaphysical tradition, but their phenomenological παρ-εἶναι, παρ-ουσία, or An-wesen, where the prefixes παρά and An- point to what the medieval philosophers called the praesentia intelligibilis of a thing.10 In this regard Heidegger was simply channeling Aristotle, who states at Metaphysics II 1 993b30–31 (and spells out in IX 10) that a thing’s degree of being (εἶναι) is the same as its degree of knowability: ὥσϑ’ ἔκκαστον ὡς ἔχει τοῦ εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας. This text in the Metaphysics was the source of the scholastic axiom ens et verum convertuntur: the realness of a thing is measured by its ability to be intelligibly accessed, as in Thomas Aquinas:

Eadem est dispositio rerum in esse sicut in veritate (Summa theologiae I–II, 3, 7c)

Unumquodque, quantum habet de esse, tantum habet de cognoscibilitate (Summa contra gentes, I, 71, 16)

This is an axiom that Heidegger himself accepts: “Die Wahrheit und das Seiende in seiner Seiendheit sind dasselbe” (GA45: 122.4–5)

This is the fundamental, show-stopping fact that is completely missed by the naïve-realist interpretations of Heidegger that Professor Capobianco proposes. In Heidegger “being” is always written under phenomenological erasure. This means that his provisional topic (as contrasted with his Grundfrage) was not Sein but Sinn, not the independent and unchanging “being” of things but their ever-changing significance in relation to one’s specific interests and concerns. Heidegger repeatedly and unambiguously equated his own understanding of “being” with phenomenological Sinn, that is, with the intelligibility and meaningfulness of things.

- Phenomenology is about “the intelligibility” [Sinn] of things (SZ: 35.25).
- The Seinsfrage is “the inquiry into the intelligibility of things, i.e., the inquiry into being” (“die Frage nach dem Sinn des Seienden, nach dem Sein,” GA19: 205.13–14).
Of course, neither Husserl nor Heidegger doubt that things remain “out there,” independent of our minds, after the reduction. Heidegger is emphatic: “Questions like ‘Does the world exist independent of my thinking?’ are meaningless” (GA58: 105.15–16; cf. GA26: 194.30–31)—because after the reduction, what we had originally perceived as out-there-in-nature is not lost but instead is now seen within a phenomenological correlation as the perceived of a perceiving. (Heidegger in 1927: “The thing [now] belongs to the perceiving as its perceived.”) Yes, after the reduction things are still “out there,” but as such they are not the focus of phenomenology. The subject matter of a phenomenological inquiry is things only in terms of our meaningful engagement with them, and to do phenomenology is to study one’s relation to the objects of intentionality.

Regarding the third objection (“after the turn”). This objection notwithstanding, Heidegger in his later years insisted that his work was phenomenological from beginning to end. In 1962 he said that even his writings about Ereignis (obscure as they might seem to some), were echt phenomenology (GA14: 54.2–3). And in his last published tribute to Edmund Husserl (1969) he said the same about his “history of being”: it, too, is unmitigated phenomenology (GA14: 147.15–16). And by “phenomenology” he did not mean the feckless gesture of “letting things show themselves as they are in themselves.” He meant the phenomenological reduction and all that it entails.

3. ἘΠΙΑΓΩΓΗ: INDUCTIO PHAENOMENOLOGICA

At this point we have to clarify and define what a “phenomenological reduction” means in Heidegger, and here we return to what I mentioned at the beginning of this text. The directional adverb zurück in the term Zurückführung corresponds to the “re-” in “phenomenological reduction,” where “re-duction” means “leading the gaze back.” However, the word “back” can be misleading. Heidegger and Husserl hold very different views of both (1) the phenomenological correlation and (2) that-back-to-which one leads the phenomenological gaze. We may illustrate that difference in figure 11.1.

![Figure 11.1](Burch_McMullin_9781786609588.indb_266)
As we have said, all phenomenology, including Heidegger’s, is correlation-research, and as such it is about meaning, and specifically about the meaningful presence of what one encounters (GA64: 23–25). But both (1) the structure of the correlation and (2) that which constitutes the meaning of things within the correlation turns out to be radically different in Husserl and Heidegger. For Husserl the correlation is between the meaning-constituting sub-ject (both psychological and ultimately transcendental) and the meaningfully constituted object. Hence, Husserl’s phenomenological re-duction shifts the gaze “in reverse,” in the direction of the constituting sub-ject. In Greek that shift would be called an ἐπαναγωγή, a leading backward.

For Heidegger, on the other hand, the existential essence of human being is not sub-jectivity but e-jectivity, projected-ahead-ness into meaning. Existence is structurally a geworfener Entwurf, thrown forward as meaningful possibility into specific meaningful possibilities; and thus the phenomenological correlation lies between whatever we encounter and the meaningful possibilities we are living into. And that existential aheadness is precisely what accounts for the constitution of meaning. (GA14: 131.16–17: “Die transzendentale Konstitution ist eine zentrale Möglichkeit der Existenz des faktischen Selbst”). For Heidegger, getting to the existential correlation is a matter of shifting our phenomenological gaze forward (ἐπί) toward the possibilities that we are living into, which give meaning to what we encounter. Thus, he radically recasts the re-duction as an in-duction—in Greek an ἐπαγωγή (GA62: 131.17–132.7; 191–92; GA22: 250.29; GA9: 244.12–35).

We could call Heidegger’s refocusing of the gaze a phenomenological re-duction, as he himself did (GA24: 29.15, as above) but only if we remember that leading the gaze “back” means leading it back to where we already are without always noticing it, namely, a priori ahead as possibility among possibilities. To bring out that point, in what follows I will use the term Heidegger finally favored: in-duction rather than re-duction.

4. ΚΑΤΑΓΩΓΗ: SUBDUCTIO PHAENOMENOLOGICA

Once Heidegger had laid that foundation—phenomenological in-duction as the entrée to all his work—his thinking could go in one of two directions, either (1) to the subsequent question of how one’s experience of meaningfulness can turn out to be true or false; or (2) to the prior question of how things become meaningful in the first place. He did deal with the question of apophantic correctness (e.g., in SZ § 44 and elsewhere), but he mostly followed the latter path back to the prior question regarding how things become meaningful at all.
Regarding the first option, the question of true/false: Heidegger distinguished three “levels” of what the Greeks called ἀλήθεια and what we may translate as “disclosedness,” running from the most derivative to the most primary:

- ἀλήθεια-3: the truth of statements, in the sense of correct correspondence, adaequatio intellectus et rei
- ἀλήθεια-2: the immediate prior condition of such truth, namely, that the subject matter be already disclosed as meaningful, whether correctly meaningful or not
- ἀλήθεια-1: the “clearing,” the prerequisite for—and that which makes possible—both of the above

Granted that discursive meaningfulness rather than intellectual intuition is the only form of meaningfulness we have, Heidegger was less interested in ἀλήθεια-3—or even ἀλήθεια-2 (i.e., meaningfulness). Instead, he was more focused on ἀλήθεια-1, that which must necessarily be already operative if the other two forms of ἀλήθεια are to hold at all. This issue rode under the rubric of die Lichtung or das Offene, the clearing or the “open.”

Intimately bound up with this “open” is the question of the a priori opening up of the open—das Lichten der Lichtung (GA49: 41.25–28; GA4: 56.27; GA12: 127.14–15; GA66: 84.33–34)—or better, the a priori opened-ness of the clearing, a state of affairs that Heidegger referred to as das Er-eignis, the “ap-propri-atedness” of ex-sistence, i.e., the fact that that ex-sistence is always already brought into its proprium, its ownmost way of being—indeed “thrown” into it. Ereignis is not an “event” in any normal sense of that term; it is not a “happening” that has not yet occurred at \( t^1 \) but then takes place at \( t^2 \) and may stop at \( t^3 \). Indeed, as Heidegger constantly declared, Ereignis is not an event at all, not even the so-called event of appropriation (see GA11: 45.19–20; GA12: 247.10; GA14: 25.33–26.2; GA70: 17.19; GA98: 161.8; GA98: 341.25).

Rather, it is the ever-operative factum, the fundamental existential fact that ex-sistence, by its very nature, has always already been brought-ad-proprium, ap-propri-ated to its proper state as the open clearing that makes discursive meaningfulness possible and necessary. Insofar as this already-opened-ness of the clearing is a priori—that is, ex-sistential-structural—it is not effected by anyone’s personal-existentiel will-act; rather, it can only be taken over in a subsequent ex-sistentiel-personal act of resolve (SZ: 325.37; GA65: 322.6–9). As ex-sistential, Ereignis—one’s having been appropriated to be the clearing—comes with the territory of being Da-sein, having ex-sistence as one’s structure. The focal topic of all Heidegger’s work—what the heuristic term “being itself” provisionally stands in for—is ex-sistence as appropriated to sustaining the clearing: die ereignete Lichtung.
Two questions arise at this point:

1. How does the appropriatedness of ex-sistence (and thus ἀλήθεια-1) make discursive meaningfulness (ἀλήθεια-2) possible and necessary?
2. What kind of “reduction” would be the proper procedure for discovering the appropriatedness of ex-sistence?

First: How does the appropriatedness of ex-sistence make discursive meaningfulness possible and necessary?

In the *philosophia perennis*, being (ἐίναι, esse) shows up for us not in an intellectual intuition but only in a synthesis. Analogously in Heidegger’s phenomenology we experience the meaningfulness of something only in discursive acts of λέγειν, taking-something-as, whether propositionally or practically. That is what Aristotle meant by τι κατὰ τινὸς λέγειν/σημαίνειν: saying/signifying something (τι) about something (κατὰ τινὸς), as when we assert this predicate about that subject. All sense-making is discursive, where dis-currere means “to run back and forth”—in this case between things and their possible meanings. For example, “I take Socrates as a Theban” (which is not correct but nonetheless is still meaningful) or “I take this rock as for hammering in tent pegs” (whether the rock works successfully to that end or not). Such synthetic activities are properly classified as “intentional,” and to be able to perform them, I must “reach across the gap” between a thing and its possible meanings or possible uses. As Heidegger puts it, in all discursive activity I must “traverse an open space.”

But what makes intentional acts of traversing-of-the-open both possible and necessary? In answering that question, Heidegger follows the medieval axiom operari sequitur esse: a thing’s activities follow from its nature; or to reverse the direction: natures determine operations. As Heidegger puts it: “Each thing only performs/carries out what it is” (“Jegliches . . . je nur das leistet, was es ist”: GA4: 65.26–28). He applies that axiom to his existential analysis of human being. By way of a phenomenological description of various operations—for example, hammering nails (SZ) or uttering declarative sentences (GA21: 135–62)—Heidegger first uncovers patterns that always recur in those activities; he then resolves those recurrent patterns into the essential structures they share in common. Those, formally speaking, are (1) structures in the absence of which the operations in question cease to be those very operations; and (2) structures the denial of which instantiates the very structures that are denied (retorsio argumenti). Whether in practical activities or declarative sentences, Heidegger discovers that the recurrent, essential pattern is aheadness-and-return, “Sich-vorweg-sein als Zurückkommen” (GA21: 147.23–26). In practical activities (whether ποίησις or πρᾶξις) we first “look ahead” and envision the desired
outcome (the εἶδος προαιρετόν) and then “return” from there to utilize some means to achieve that end. In making a declarative statement (an ἀπόφασις), we first have a pre-understanding of the possible predicate and then “return” to the subject matter to synthesize it with that predicate.

Heidegger derives this pattern of aheadness-and-return from Aristotle’s notion of κίνησις, in which the actuality of a moving thing is its being-possible-for/unto-something. For Aristotle the being of a moving thing is its prolepsis of its goal, either its functioning-undo-its-completion (ἐν-ἐφέρ-εἰμι) or its being already in its perfection (ἐν-τελ-ἔχεια: GA6, 2: 368.33–369.9). By looking ahead to what the thing is moving toward—whether by nature (acorn to oak tree) or by choice (this wood, cut and assembled for constructing a bookcase)—I discover what an acorn is or what a pile of wood in the carpenter shop is for. In these cases the “future” determines the “present,” a rule that Heidegger took over in his interpretation of human temporality (SZ: 327.20–328.25).

Heidegger gathers these issues into his key term Da-sein, which should never, ever, be translated as being-here or being-there or being t/here. I choose to translate it as “ex-sistence” (hyphenated and misspelled to bring out its etymology). The word is made up of two elements:

1. -sistence: In Latin sistere is a causative verb, just as ἵστημι is in Greek. It does not mean “I stand” (by my own power, as it were) but “I am made to stand”—or with Heidegger, I am “thrown into standing.”
2. ex-: I am thrown into standing (1) “ahead” of myself and (2) “out beyond” the persons and things I encounter. Into what?
   - As “ahead” of myself, I am thrown into myself as possibility.
   - As “out beyond,” I am thrown into the open field of possible meanings that those persons and things can have.

“Ex-sistence” says two things about my structure: Geworfenheit and Entwurf, thrownness and openness, or taken together: thrown-open-ness. Structurally (i.e., in my ineluctable way-of-being as ex-sistence) I am a priori (structurally-existentially) the gap, the space, the clearing that makes (personal-existientiel) acts of discursive-synthetic meaning both possible and necessary.

For a while the early Heidegger called this existential thrown-open-ness “transcendence,” understood as the ex-sistentiel-structural aheadness (always already beyond things and into their possible meanings) that makes possible all ex-sistentiel-intentional acts of taking-as. As he put it in 1927, transcendence is the ratio essendi of intentionality, and intentionality is the ratio cognoscendi of transcendence.18 That is to say: transcendence as my structural aheadness-and-return (and thus ἀλήθεια-1) is what makes possible ex-sistentiel-personal acts of making sense of something (ἀλήθεια-2), acts in which I “reach ahead” to a possible meaning and “return” to synthesize that
meaning (correctly or incorrectly) with the person or the thing I’m encountering. Such is Heidegger’s early notion of transcendence, which, as we shall now see, he fills out in his later writings.

**Second: What kind of “reduction” would be the proper procedure for discovering the appropriatedness of ex-sistence?**

For a moment let us allow Heidegger the words “transcendence” and “transcendental” even though he eventually transformed the terms by filling out their structure and meaning to include appropriatedness. In a personal communication made to Professor Max Müller after World War II, Heidegger distinguished two meanings of “transcendental,” namely, (1) das Transzendentale: “the transcendental”; and (2) das Transzendenzhaft: the transcendence-related.19

1. The adjective “transcendental” (transzendent) pertains to acts of passing beyond things to their possible meanings.
2. The adjective “transcendence-related” (transzendenzhaft) pertains to the kinetic structure of ex-sistence: the fact that it has always already—structurally and a priori—passed beyond both things and their possible meanings. “Transcendence-related” names the always-already operative appropriatedness of ex-sistence to its existential condition of being-the-clearing (Lichtung-sein, GA15: 380.11f.)—and being, a priori, ἀλήθεια-1. That is, transzendenthaft names ex-sistence’s condition as the clearing itself.

As regards the relation of the two: the very structure of our being as transzendenthaft (our ratio essendi: always being beyond things and in relation of their possible meanings) makes possible and necessary the structure of our knowing (ratio cognoscendi) as transzendent.

As we said, Heidegger’s phenomenological in-duction leads our inten- tional focus away from the objects of intentionality and forward to the correlation between those objects and the possibilities that we are living into, possibilities that let those objects show up as having this or that meaning. And when fully unfolded, this in-duction also thematizes the particular meaning-giving context (the “world of meaning” organized around our aheadness in purposes, desires, etc.) wherein and whereby these specific things get their current significance.

But the further question is: What holds open (offenhalt) or sustains (aus- steht) this meaning-giving context?

We have already seen the answer, namely, the fact that ex-sistence’s way-of-being (its “essence”) consists in its being a priori appropriated, that is,
stretched-ahead (erstreckt) or drawn out (angezogen, ausgetragen) as the clearing, as the possibility of intelligibility. To thematically articulate that fact requires the phenomenologist to burrow beneath the horizontal-transcendental so as to reveal what makes it possible. In Greek such a leading of one’s gaze “under” or “beneath” (κατά) one’s transcendental aheadness in order to discover appropriation as what sustains and makes possible such transcendental aheadness would be called a καταγωγή—which in a rather lame and literal translation, we may call a phenomenological sub-duction as the complement of a phenomenological in-duction (see figure 11.2).

The phenomenological sub-duction is a further re-directing of one’s philosophical gaze, but this time not away from things and “vertically” onto their possible meanings but rather away from the whole panoply of discursive meaningfulness (including whatever worlds constitute such meaningfulness) and onto ex-sistence’s a priori appropriatedness as das Lichten der Lichtung, as opening up and holding open the clearing and thus making possible any and all such meaning-giving worlds.

For complete clarity on the matter we must note the distinction between (1) the structures of ex-sistence and (2) the subsequent articulation of those structures via the procedures of phenomenological method—that is, the distinction between

1. both the transcendental and the transcendence-related, taken together, as structures of ex-sistence
   and
2. the phenomenological procedures that thematize those structures:
   2.1 phenomenological in-duction as thematizing the transzendentental structure
2.2 phenomenological sub-duction as thematizing the transzendenzhaft structure.

What the awkward and finally dispensable term καταγωγή ("sub-duction") refers to is Heidegger’s radical recasting of the Husserlian transcendental reduction. As noted above, in his letter to Husserl (October 22, 1927) wrapping up his editing of the Encyclopaedia Britannica article, Heidegger wrote in opposition to any reduction to the transcendental ego: “Transcendental constitution is a central possibility of the Existenz of the factical self.”

Ex-sistence as thrown ahead, and thus brought-into-its-own as the clearing, undoes any need for the transcendental ego and thus of a reduction thereto. Granted, Heidegger’s response to Husserl in 1927 is an early and inchoate reference to appropriatedness as holding open the clearing. Nonetheless, it is the seed from which Heidegger’s later articulation of Ereignis will spring, and it demarcates the definitive separation of Heideggerian from Husserlian phenomenology.

But one final objection: Didn’t Heidegger eventually drop the term “transcendence” along with its partner in crime “transcendental”? Isn’t that the gist of the Kehre, his famous “turn” in the 1930s? Doesn’t the Kehre consist in Heidegger’s move away from his earlier transcendental thinking to his later seinsgeschichtlich-thinking focused on Es gibt Sein/Es schickt Sein, the “giving” or “sending” of the clearing? Surely, one might object, the later Heidegger abandoned the notion of transcendence as what opens up and sustains the clearing, and turned instead to Ereignis as the Es, das gibt, the mysterious meta-existential power (heuristically called “being itself”) that gives/sends the clearing and thus all forms of being.

But again: wrong on all counts.

In the first place, Ereignis is the later Heidegger’s name for Geworfenheit as thrown-open-ness. This is borne out by the way he frequently and focally places thrownness and appropriatedness in apposition to each other:

1. Ex-sistence is “thrown, . . . that is to say, appropriated” (geworfener . . . das heißt er-eignet,” GA65: 239.5).
2. “Ex-sistence is thrown, appropriated” (“Das Dasein ist geworfen, ereignet,” GA65: 304.8).
3. Ex-sistence’s taking over its thrownness (“die Übernahme der Geworfenheit” at SZ: 325.37) is equated with ex-sistence’s taking over its being appropriated (“die Über-nahme der Er-eignung” at GA65: 322.7–8).
4. Existence’s readiness for ap-propri-ation is equated with resolutely assuming and becoming the thrownness it already is (“die . . . Bereitschaft des Daseins für die Er-eignung, das Geworfenwerden,” GA65: 34.8–9).
5. The projectedness of ex-sistence as “thrown” is equated with the same
projectedness as “belonging to ap-propi-ation” (“als geworfen . . . zuge-
6. Or in a simple hendiadys that expresses one and the same phenomenon:
“Geworfenheit und Ereignis” (GA9: 377, note d).

In fact, Heidegger scholarship would do well to drop the term Ereignis
entirely, and to always use Geworfenheit in its place, thereby underscor-
ing that Faktizität is the archi-existential that unifies the early and the later
Heidegger.

In the second place, and in contrast to the widespread but erroneous under-
standing of the term, the Kehre in its proper sense is the oscillating sameness
(Gegenschwung) of Da-sein and Da-sein, that is, the inseparability of (1) ex-sis-
tence’s sustaining of the clearing and (2) the clearing that is sustained (cf. GA65:
29.15 et passim; GA70: 126.18; GA75: 59.15; etc.; also GA26: 270.4–5).

Therefore, the Kehre in its proper sense is:

• not a move that Heidegger carried out in the 1930s, beginning with GA65,
Beiträge zur Philosophie (cf. GA13: 149.29–30);
• not the change in how he thought through his fundamental question, begin-
ning in the 1930s; that was what he called not the Kehre but the Wendung
or Wandel im Denken (GA13: 149.21–22);
• not a change in the standpoint of SZ (GA13: 149.23);
• not a change in his fundamental question: “What accounts for the fact that
there is significance at all?” (cf. GA9: 201.30–32);
• not a change in his answer to that fundamental question: ex-sistence as
appropriated to being the Open (cf. GA9: 202.5–9); and therefore it is
• not a matter of “demoting” ex-sistence in relation to the Open (aka “Being
Itself”).

A further issue follows from the above but would require much more space to
spell out in detail: all of the middle and later Heidegger can be folded back onto
the earlier work up through December 1930, the point where he discovered the
intrinsic hiddenness of the clearing (which is usually and wrongly called “the
self-concealing of being”). Yes, there were plenty of new formulations after
1930—“ap-propi-ation” is one of them; the confused term “Seinsgeschichte”
and the so-called givings of being are others—as well as some new topics
(the nature of art, the analyses of poetry, and so on). But as I have argued
elsewhere, these new formulations and topics can be more clearly and con-
vincingly explained in terms of the early work and its less obscure lexicon.22

Let me conclude by saying two things about Steve Crowell’s rich and
clearly argued Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger.
First, the book not only lays out programmatically the possibility of a renewed dialogue between Husserl and Heidegger but goes further and *enacts* that dialogue. And second: If read closely and with an eye to its presuppositions about method, it could liberate Heidegger scholarship from its obfuscating tropes, its fuzzy “methodology,” and its slavish parroting of an exhausted Sein-ology. It could free up Heidegger scholarship for re-appropriating crucial but neglected elements of its phenomenological heritage and open the way to what Plato called τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτό, the elusive “thing itself” that Heidegger spent a lifetime pursuing.23

END

NOTES

1. See, for example, Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus octaginta tribus*, no. 46, “De ideis,” and Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, 15, 1. Much transformed, this is the case even in Hegel 1830/1969, §577 regarding the citation from Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* XII 1072 b 18–30.


10. Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super sententiis, I, distinctio 3, quaestio 4, articu-


12. Originally found in Husserl, Phänomenologische Psychologie (see previous note), 601.45–602.1; ET, 138.11–12: Heidegger’s letter of October 22, 1927.

13. See Summa Theologiae, II–II, 83, 1, obj. 3: “secunda vero [operatio] est com-


15. GA15: 380.6: “eine effene Weite zu durchgehen.” Cf. GA14: 81.35 and 84.3–4; GA7: 19.12; etc.

16. For example, Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I, 75, 3, corpus, ad finem: “similiter unumquodque habet esse et operationem.” Or in the opposite direction, “qualis modus essendi talis modus operandi”: a thing’s way of being determines its way of acting.

17. Argument by retorsion, i.e., περιτροπὴ τοῦ λόγου, “turning the argument [of


20. See note 12 above.

21. Cf. GA94: 337.7–8: resolve as “ein Zurückwachsen in das Tragende der Geworfenheit.”

22. Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift (London and New York: Row-